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During the German occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War, the 
Nazi occupiers attempted to use education as one part of their larger project to create a new, 
Germanic identity in the Netherlands. This effort was supported by the highest echelons of the 
German leadership in the Netherlands and the leadership of the Dutch Education Department.  
Together, the Nazis and their Dutch helpers began a series of changes to Dutch education aimed 
at bringing Dutch youth closer to the German Reich, with the ultimate aim of divorcing the 
Dutch from their previous, independent national identity and winning them over to the Germanic 
ideal.  
This effort involved many different initiatives. In an effort to completely reorganize the 
Dutch educational establishment along more Germanic lines, the occupiers and their Dutch 
helpers attempted to gain control over private, confessional education and to reorganize public 
education through the lengthening of compulsory attendance requirements and the introduction 
of an eighth year of primary education. Moreover, the occupiers attempted to introduce new 
subjects, such as physical education, and increase the emphasis on other subjects, including 
historical instruction and German language instruction. Finally, the German occupiers also 
attempted to both foster the development of German International Schools in the Netherlands as 
well as to create new educational institutions (the NIVO and the Reichsschulen) designed to give 
instruction in an explicitly völkisch, Germanic sense, both of which aimed at educating the 
leaders of the future Greater Germanic Reich. These two institutions would also serve as models 
for the education of ordinary Dutch students in Dutch institutions.  
The efforts of the Nazi occupiers were a failure, as their efforts were resisted by the 
majority of Netherlanders and the changes instituted during the occupation were mostly reversed 
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after the return of democratic rule to the Netherlands in summer 1945. Nonetheless, the Nazis’ 
efforts show the ultimate goals of the occupier as regarded the Netherlands and Europe more 
generally, should they have won the war. That goal included a European empire based on the 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The Second World War was the deadliest conflict in human history. A clash of ideologies 
along with the implementation of total war led to the death of tens of millions of Europeans, to 
say nothing of the deaths in other theaters, over the course of almost six long years. Most of 
those deaths in Europe came as a result of the Nazis’ brutal war of extermination against their 
“racial” and ideological enemies in Eastern Europe. In the lands that had previously made up 
Poland, the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union, the Germans attempted to 
create an empire that would last a thousand years. In doing so, Nazi Germany engaged in a 
genocidal campaign against the local inhabitants, murdering millions directly, while causing the 
deaths of millions more through conquest and occupation. 
In waging their war of genocide across Eastern Europe, the Nazi leadership believed that 
there was a fundamental “racial” difference between the local populations that inhabited their 
conquests in the east and those that inhabited their conquests in Western Europe. The east was 
largely inhabited by Slavs, Jews, and other Untermenschen, while the west was populated by 
various types of the so-called Aryan race, even if, in the Nazis’ racial mindset, the purity of 
Western Europeans’ blood decreased as one moved further south. This fundamental difference in 
the Nazis’ view of their subjugated peoples was translated into differing styles of both warfare 
and occupation across the European continent. By and large, while the conquered peoples of 
Eastern Europe were shown little, if any, mercy, in the West a more traditional style of military 
occupation was the norm. Or was it? 
This work seeks to challenge the prevailing scholarly consensus that the occupation of 
Western Europe was in some way less radical than that of Eastern Europe by using the Nazis’ 
occupation of the Netherlands and their efforts in the education sphere during that period as a 
2 
 
case study of the Nazis’ goals for the future of European society. To be certain, the German 
occupation of the Netherlands during the Second World War was not marked by the same sort of 
all-encompassing violence that pervaded Nazi hegemony in Eastern Europe, at least not at first.1 
Rather, the Nazi occupiers did at the outset take a more lenient attitude toward the Dutch public, 
largely because they viewed the Dutch as their racial kin. As the occupation endured and the war 
turned against the Germans, this changed, and a more repressive style of governance emerged, 
but that is not the focus of this study. Rather, the focus is, mostly, limited to the first several 
years of Nazi occupation. That was the period during which the supposedly milder, less 
oppressive form of occupation reigned. 
To a certain extent, this was certainly the case. During the first several years of German 
occupation, the Netherlands enjoyed relative relief from Nazi tyranny, at least as compared to the 
experience of subjugated peoples of Eastern Europe. With the exception of the Netherlands’ 
Jewish community, most Netherlanders were not slated for extermination, were not forced to 
perform slave labor, and did not have to worry about continued fighting threatening their lives. 
The military conquest of the Netherlands was quick, lasting only five days, and after that 
conquest ended, the Dutch could settle back into routines that were much more reminiscent of 
their pre-war lives than they were different. 
Even though the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands was not marked by the all-
encompassing, genocidal violence that characterized the German occupation of the east, in 
another, less obvious way, the German occupation of the Netherlands was still quite radical in its 
own right. Much as in the living spaces being carved out of the east through genocide, the Nazi 
leadership planned, not before the conquest, but quickly after it was achieved, to incorporate the 
                                                 
1 Jennifer L Foray, “The ‘Clean Wehrmacht’ in the German-Occupied Netherlands, 1940-5,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 45, no. 4 (2010): 768–87. 
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Netherlands into a larger post-war polity dominated by Germany. This polity had several names, 
including the Greater Germanic Reich and just the Reich. But whatever it was called, this future 
super-state would, it was planned, dominate the European continent from the North Sea to the 
Ural Mountains and encompass more than one hundred million Europeans that the Nazis 
believed made up the larger Germanic race, which was, in their twisted worldview, the purest 
branch of the larger Aryan racial family.  In order to incorporate the Netherlands into this 
planned empire, however, the Nazis correctly understood that some sort of cultural shift would 
be necessary. The Dutch had a long history of independence, achieved after they managed to 
throw off the shackles of imperial hegemony in the mid-seventeenth century. Over the 
intervening three hundred years, the Dutch no longer viewed themselves as connected to 
Germany in the ways that the Low Countries had been in the Middle Ages when they were a 
constituent part of the Holy Roman Empire. The Netherlands was an independent state, with its 
own language and culture, with a history that was unique and which helped the Dutch define 
their own, independent cultural identity. 
In order to effect the cultural shift that would be a necessary precursor to inclusion into 
the Greater Germanic Reich, the Nazis implemented a wide array of efforts in the Netherlands 
aimed at creating a new cultural identity. These included, among other examples, propaganda 
initiatives aimed at inculcating a racialist, national socialist worldview, the recruitment for 
resettlement of Dutch civilians in the vast, newly depopulated expanses of Eastern Europe, the 
establishment of racially approved SS units, the elimination of Jewish and other allegedly 
unworthy individuals from Dutch society, and, the key focus of this study, a broad campaign of 
educational changes aimed at permanently fusing this new Germanic identity with the next 
generation of Netherlanders. 
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The historiography of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands is surprisingly small when 
compared to most other aspects of historical study concerning National Socialism. In English 
language scholarship, there are only a handful of scholars who work (or worked) on any aspect 
of the German occupation of the Netherlands. When one ventures into the Dutch and German 
language scholarship, the field broadens significantly, but there is still much work to be done 
before the field is even remotely comparable to the volume of scholarship on other topics related 
to Nazism. 
This project, which argues that the Nazis used education in the Netherlands in an attempt 
to foster a new national and cultural identity among the Dutch based on a racialist, völkisch, and 
Germanic ideal, challenges the existing scholarship in three distinct ways. First, there are those 
works that attempt to focus on German administration of the Netherlands in some way or fashion 
and which usually discuss education policy, the Nazis’ Germanic project, or both. Second are the 
works of a handful of scholars who focus on the Nazi occupiers’ Germanic project. Finally, there 
are a few works that deal directly with education, or some facet thereof, during the Nazi 
occupation of the Netherlands.  Above and beyond those three types of works which are 
discussed in more detail below, there is a larger set of works that deal with the Netherlands and 
the Second World War in some way not directly connected to this study, whether that is through 
close examination of topics not entirely connected to education, such as the police or the 
Holocaust, or works that deal with Nazi Empire on a larger scale, only part of which deals with 
the Netherlands.2 
                                                 
2 A non-exhaustive list would include: Gerard Aalders, Nazi Looting: The Plunder of Dutch Jewry During the 
Second World War, trans. Arnold Pomerans and Erica Pomerans (Oxford; New York: Berg, 2004); Benien van 
Berkel, Tobie Goedewaagen (1895-1980): een onverbeterlijke nationaalsocialist (Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij, 
2013); J. J. van Bolhuis, Onderdrukking en verzet: Nederland in oorlogstijd (Arnhem: Van Loghum Slaterus, 1955); 
Bart van der Boom and Peter Romijn, The Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands: 1940 - 1945 -  New 
Perspectives (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers, 2012); Louis De Jong, The German Fifth Column in the Second World War 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956); Jeroen Dewulf, Spirit of Resistance: Dutch Clandestine Literature 
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Of all of the works that discuss the occupation of the Netherlands in the Second World 
War, by far the most expansive is Loe de Jong’s Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. In its fourteen volumes, most of which are themselves split into two parts because 
of their size, de Jong covers almost every aspect of the Nazi occupation in some detail, including 
education.3 De Jong, who after the war became the director of the Netherlands State Institute for 
War Documentation,4 was commissioned by the Dutch Education Ministry to write the work and 
                                                 
During the Nazi Occupation (Rochester, N.Y.: Camden House, 2010); Jennifer L. Foray, Visions of Empire in the 
Nazi-Occupied Netherlands (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Erik Hansen, “Fascism and 
Nazism in the Netherlands 1929-39,” European History Quarterly 11, no. 3 (1981): 355–85; Katja Happe, Deutsche 
in den Niederlanden, 1918-1945: eine historische Untersuchung zu nationalen Identifikationsangeboten im Prozess 
der Konstruktion individueller Identitäten (Siegen: Universität-GH Siegen, 2004); Chris van der Heijden, Joodse 
NSB’ers: de Vergeten Geschiedenis van Villa Bouchina in Doetinchem (Utrecht: Bk18, 2006); Barbara Henkes and 
Ad Knotter, Themanummer De “Westforschung” en Nederland (Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 2005); G 
Hirschfeld, “Die Universität Leiden unter dem Nationalsozialismus,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 23, no. 4 (1997): 
560–91; Dienke Hondius, Return: Holocaust Survivors and Dutch Anti-Semitism, trans. David Colmer (Westport, 
Conn.: Praeger, 2003); Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy of Nazi Occupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in 
Western Europe, 1945-1965 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); M. F. Lenaerts, National Socialist 
Family Law: The Influence of National Socialism on Marriage and Divorce Law in Germany and the Netherlands 
(Leiden: Brill Nijhoff, 2015); Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire: How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2008); Guus Meershoek, Dienaren van het gezag: de Amsterdamse politie tijdens de bezetting (Amsterdam: 
Van Gennep, 1999); Bob Moore, Refugees from Nazi Germany in the Netherlands, 1933-1940 (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1986); Bob Moore, Victims and Survivors: The Nazi Persecution of the Jews in the Netherlands, 1940-1945 
(New York: Hodder Education Publishers, 1997); Thomas Müller, Imaginierter Westen: das Konzept des 
“deutschen Westraums” im völkischen Diskurs zwischen Politischer Romantik und Nationalsozialismus (Bielefeld: 
Transcript, 2009); Dietrich Orlow, The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe : German Nazis, Dutch and French 
Fascists, 1933-1939 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Jacob Presser, Ashes in the Wind: The Destruction of 
Dutch Jewry, trans. Arnold Pomerans (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1969); Peter Romijn, Burgemeesters 
in oorlogstijd: besturen tijdens de Duitse bezetting (Amsterdam: Balans, 2006); Benjamin Aäron Sijes, De 
Februari-staking, 25-26 Febr. 1941. (’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954); Benjamin Aäron Sijes, De 
arbeidsinzet: de gedwongen arbeid van Nederlanders in Duitsland 1940-1945. (’s-Gravenhage: SDU, 1990); Robin 
te Slaa and Edwin Klijn, De NSB: ontstaan en opkomst van de Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, 1931-1935 
(Amsterdam, Netherlands: Uitgeverij Boom, 2009); Stephen Snelders, “National Socialism, Human Genetics and 
Eugenics in The Netherlands, 1940-1945,” in Scientific Research in World War II: What Scientists Did in the War, 
by Ad Maas and Hans Hooimaijers (London: Routledge, 2009), 109–20; C.J.F Stuldreher, Concentratiekampen: 
systeem en de praktijk in Nederland (Bussum: Fibula-Van Dishoeck, 1970); M.C. van den Toorn, Dietsch en 
volksch: een verkenning van het taalgebruik der nationaal-socialisten in Nederland (Groningen: Tjeenk Willink, 
1975); K.H Tusenius, De kansen van het Nationaal Socialisme in Nederland: groei en neergang der N.S.B. 
(Zutphen: Thieme, 1936); Ad van Liempt, Hitler’s Bounty Hunters: The Betrayal of the Jews, trans. S. J. Leinbach 
(Oxford: Berg, 2005); Adriaan Venema, Schrijvers, uitgevers en hun collaboratie, 5 vols. (Amsterdam: 
Arbeiderspers, 1988); Sytze van der Zee, Voor Führer, volk en vaderland: de SS in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
A.W. Sijthoff, 1979). 
3 Volume XIV is actually a compilation of critiques and discussions of the previous thirteen volumes composed by 
other scholars. Unfortunately, it does not go into educational policy at all. See Louis De Jong, Het Koninkrijk der 
Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog (’s-Gravenhage: Staatsdrukkerij- en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1969), XIV/247-
249, 271-276. 
4 Now the NIOD Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies in Amsterdam. 
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it has become the standard reference work for all things related to the Second World War in the 
Netherlands. His sections on education are generally accurate, but quite sparse. He covers in a 
mostly cursory manner the German Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen under the larger 
heading of “Germanization,” under which he also discusses attempts to give certain Dutch 
individuals, such as spouses of Germans, actual German citizenship.5  In his view, the efforts of 
the German occupiers in these three types of educational institution were essentially similar in 
nature to actual attempts to make certain Dutch individuals legally German. It is worth quoting 
him at length: 
Obviously, the entire policy of the occupying forces can be seen as an attempt to make the Netherlands a 
German country, that is to say, a country that, apart from its language, would appear to be the spitting 
image of National Socialist Germany. In this sense, the entire aim that came from the SS sector can also be 
regarded as an attempt at de facto Germanization: after all, the SS wanted the Netherlands to merge into a 
Greater Germanic whole, which meant that the historically developed distinction between Dutch and 
Germans would fade and eventually disappear.6 
 
On its face, de Jong’s statement is largely correct, but in its details, it slightly misses the 
point. He is certainly correct that the SS faction, which was the leading faction in the 
Netherlands, wanted to merge the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic whole. But the notion 
that this effort consisted of little more than Germanization is not quite correct. The German 
leadership did not view the Greater Germanic Reich as simply Germany with added territories. 
Rather, it was Germany plus other Germanic nations. That is, the Greater Germanic Reich was 
something bigger, something new, it was the combined sum of Germany and the other Germanic 
nations of Europe. Viewing the Nazis’ goals in the Netherlands as little more than Germanization 
thus actually contradicts the very goals high ranking Nazis discussed among themselves. For 
example, on this exact subject, specifically the two Reichsschulen, Seyss-Inquart noted to 
Himmler that the “curriculum would need to take more into account the history of the 
                                                 
5 Verduitsing. De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/248-254. 
6 Ibid., V/245. 
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Netherlands and the nature of the Dutch people, but through the pan-Germanic point of view.”7  
The goal at these institutions, much like at regular Dutch schools, was not to erase the 
“historically developed distinction” between Germany and the Netherlands, but on the contrary 
to emphasize the connections between the two countries, both in terms of their past and future. 
The Germans had no more wish to erase Dutch history and culture than they did to erase the 
history and culture of Austria or Bavaria in favor of Prussian culture. Thus, Germanization is not 
really the correct term, for its implications go too far. Rather, Germanicization, the act of making 
the Dutch Germanic, not German, fits the model more accurately. 
The other two sections of de Jong’s magnum opus that discuss education focus on public 
and confessional education respectively.8  The sections on confessional education are based 
primarily on work done by J. H. C. de Pater in his work Het Schoolverzet, and so will be 
discussed below.9  The section on public education is dealt with in his larger chapter on 
Gleichschaltung, while the section on religious education is split between Gleichschaltung and a 
larger chapter on churches and artists. Between the two, the overwhelming majority focuses on 
confessional education, while his section on public education gets comparatively short shrift. He 
begins with a lengthy biography of Secretary-General of Education Jan van Dam, then speeds 
through the attempted changes to discuss how it was all entirely unsuccessful. For de Jong, van 
Dam, and to a lesser extent Noordijk and Terpstra, are the key players here. The Germans’ 
designs are ignored almost entirely, which means that he places altogether too little emphasis, in 
my view, on the similarities between van Dam’s designs and those of the German occupiers. 
                                                 
7 N. K. C. A. In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945 (’s Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976), 667. 
8 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/336-368, 725-742. 
9 Ibid., V/725n. 
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In either case, the goal of educational “reform” as de Jong sees it is little more than 
nazification. To a certain extent, he is, of course, correct. Nazification was part of the goal of 
educational “reform,” but it was only the first part. De Jong misses entirely the second goal, the 
goal of Germanicization, of turning the Dutch population Germanic in order to bring them closer 
to the Reich. This is, however, not entirely surprising because the limited historiography of the 
Nazis’ Germanic project in Europe is much newer than de Jong’s masterpiece. The larger focus 
among historians of Nazi Germany on the creation of a new Germanic empire in Europe only 
came to the fore after de Jong’s final volume was published in the late 1980s, so he can hardly be 
faulted for not having correctly predicted the way that subsequent scholarship on the subject 
would develop.10   
Along with De Jong’s Het Koninkrijk, there are several other standard works that offer an 
overview of the Nazi occupation of the Netherlands. One of the earliest was Werner 
Warmbrunn’s The Dutch under German Occupation, 1940-1945.11 The first English language 
work on the occupation, Warmbrunn’s study predates De Jong’s by several years. Warmbrunn 
focuses his study on the upper echelons of the occupation and gives little attention to education 
in any form. What attention he does give to education is almost entirely limited to the 
universities, and then only as a consequence of how students and faculty participated in or were 
affected by the larger milestones of the occupation, such as the October 27, 1940, closure of 
Leiden University after the dismissal of Jewish civil servants and the effect on universities of the 
general conflagration surrounding the Loyalty Decree, forced labor, and the April/May Strike of 
                                                 
10 De Jong’s work has also been criticized for an over-reliance on the otherwise simplistic notion of “good” and 
“bad” when it comes to collaboration during the Second World War. Ironically, in de Jong’s view, van Dam was 
simply too weak to be either himself. Rather, he was used by both. See Bob Moore, “‘Goed En Fout’ or ‘Grijs 
Verleden’? Competing Perspectives on the History of the Netherlands under German Occupation 1940–1945,” 
Dutch Crossing 27, no. 2 (December 1, 2003): 155–168. 




1943.12  He does also devote three paragraphs to non-higher education in his section on “the 
nazification of public life” in his fourth chapter.  The discussion is limited, however, to the 
Appointment Decrees, which he notes were failures, and a mere three sentences on the entire rest 
of the Germans’ efforts in the educational sphere: 
The new Secretary-General [van Dam] also made some minor changes in the curriculum. German became 
the first foreign language, while French was relegated to an inferior place. More time was devoted to 
language, history, physical education, and vocational instruction, and a decree was passed, but not 
implemented, making the eighth year of elementary school compulsory.13 
 
As a summary of the major efforts at educational “reform,” those three sentences are certainly 
adequate, but their paucity suggests that Warmbrunn was simply not interested in education, 
likely because he correctly understood the Nazis’ efforts in that realm as decidedly unsuccessful. 
On the other hand, however, Warmbrunn does spend several pages discussing the 
ultimate designs of the German administration in the Netherlands. Interestingly, he does note that 
at least part of the impetus behind the planned annexation was “Hitler’s romantic-historical 
vision of a reconstitution of the Holy Roman Empire … [a] vision of a ‘Holy Germanic Empire 
of the German Nation.’”14  He even references Hitler’s statement comparing the incorporation of 
the Netherlands into a Germanic Empire with the incorporation of Bavaria into Germany, but 
either misses or dismisses the point of Hitler’s comparison that the new creation would be 
something greater than Germany alone, for “in the final analysis, Hitler, if victorious, probably 
would have annexed the Netherlands.”15 
The next major work to cover the German occupation of the Netherlands was Konrad 
Kwiet’s 1968 Reichskommissariat Niederlande: Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 146–53. 
13 Ibid., 47. 
14 Ibid., 24–25. 
15 Ibid., 27. 
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Neuordnung.16  Kwiet’s work, which focuses only on the first year or so of the occupation, was a 
major advance in the field, for it correctly displayed the competition between the various groups 
of the German leadership for ultimate control in the Netherlands.17  His work was also the first to 
take seriously the notion of various German leaders that the Netherlands was to be incorporated 
into a Greater Germanic Reich after the end of the war.18  This eventual possibility was, however, 
according to Kwiet, little more than a fantasy given the competing interests during the 
occupation, with various groups going about achieving this goal in different ways.19 
Seyss-Inquart hoped to lead with a soft hand, given his instructions from Hitler, and so he 
proceeded by implementing unsuccessful policies, such as supporting the Nederlandsche Unie, 
that had little real chance of effectively winning the Dutch over to Nazism, let alone the Greater 
Germanic Reich.20 On the other hand, the SS was more interested, in Kwiet’s view, in creating a 
series of specifically SS oriented groups that aimed to consolidate power within the Netherlands 
squarely in the hands of the SS, and therefore Himmler and his deputy Rauter.21  This meant that 
the various efforts of Seyss-Inquart, especially those that sought to use specifically Dutch 
institutions, such as the Nederlandsche Unie or the NSB, as partners in the work of building up 
the Greater Germanic Reich, were countered by the efforts of the various SS organizations, 
especially the various Waffen-SS units that came out of the Netherlands. That many of the 
recruits for SS divisions had previously been affiliated with the völkisch wing of the NSB only 
exacerbated the tensions between the SS faction of the occupying regime and the native Dutch 
Nazi movement, creating distrust among those who should have otherwise been allies. 
                                                 
16 Konrad Kwiet, Reichskommissariat Niederlande: Versuch und Scheitern nationalsozialistischer Neuordnung 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968). 
17 Ibid., 78–91. It should be noted that Kwiet’s work came out the year prior to De Jong’s first volume. 
18 Ibid., 92–96. 
19 Ibid., 153–54. 
20 Ibid., 96–109. 
21 Ibid., 109–16. 
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In essence, then, while Kwiet acknowledges that the long-term goal of the occupiers was 
to incorporate the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic Reich, the competing power centers 
proved too worried about their own political bases to effectively implement a coherent strategy 
toward that end, which left permanent improvisation as the main characteristic of governance in 
the occupied Netherlands. Although he does not discuss education at all, Kwiet does, very 
briefly, make one other telling comment worth considering. In his discussion of the SS’s goals 
during the early stages of the occupation, he notes, quoting a letter from Ulrich Greifelt to 
Himmler as evidence,22  that the goal of the SS, “more or less was to Germanize” the Dutch.23  If 
nothing else, this suggests that Kwiet views the Germanic project in the Netherlands as little 
more than window dressing for the real goal of Germanization, despite characterizing the 
German goals in the rest of his study as “nazification” and “Germanicization.”24 
N.K.C.A. in ‘t Veld takes up this very same question in his own work, discussed in more 
detail below, and notes that Greifelt’s wording, which included “Germanization” as one of the 
SS’s goals in the Netherlands, was likely an effort on Greifelt’s part to secure for the SS a base 
of power in the Netherlands, which at that point, was still militarily resisting the German 
invasion.25 After the Reichskommissariat had been founded, however, the SS’s focus was 
squarely on Germanicization, a position that was formally authorized by Hitler with order 54/42 
when, in August 1942, Himmler was given authority over all “Germanic-völkisch groups in 
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands.”26  But as in ‘t Veld notes, this order was 
typical of Hitler’s practice of granting a “formal allocation of power … once those powers have 
                                                 
22 Kwiet misdated the letter to June 10, 1940, but it is actually dated June 11, 1940, and can be found in In ‘t Veld, 
De SS en Nederland, 493–96. 
23 Kwiet, Reichskommissariat Niederlande, 111–12. 
24 See e.g. Ibid., 93. Nazifizierung and Germanisierung. 
25 In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 494n. 
26 Order 54/42, quoted in ibid., 167–68. 
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in reality long since been usurped.”27  In other words, Greifelt’s claim of “Germanization” as a 
goal in the Netherlands can be understood not as a set policy of the SS but as an attempt to grab 
power using the already existing authority of Himmler as the Reichskommissar für die Festigung 
deutschen Volkstums. Such an understanding also fits perfectly within Kwiet’s larger argument 
that the multiple competing power centers within Nazi Germany—what Gerhard Hirschfeld 
would later term the “fundamental polycracy” of the Nazi regime28—caused a large amount of 
confusion as to the actual policies that should be implemented in the Netherlands. 
More than a decade would pass before the next general study of the German occupation 
in the Netherlands appeared in the form of Gerhard Hirschfeld’s 1984 Fremdherrschaft und 
Kollaboration: Die Niederlande unter deutscher Besatzung 1940-1945, which was translated 
into English in 1988 as Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German 
Occupation 1940-1945.  Much like Kwiet, Hirschfeld pays little attention to the regime’s 
educational policy.29  He does, however, have rather extensively drawn out thoughts on the 
question of the Nazis’ Greater Germanic project in the Netherlands, which he views as little 
more than propaganda for a more traditional, nationalist imperialism in which a victorious 
Germany would dominate the smaller Germanic nations after the war.30 
According to Hirschfeld, the only concrete plan the Nazis had for the future of the 
Netherlands was that it was to be nominally independent, in order to preserve the Dutch 
relationship with their colonies in the Far East, yet otherwise completely subservient to the 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 168. 
28 Gerhard Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under German Occupation, 1940-1945, 
trans. Louise Willmot (New York: Berg, 1988), 44. 
29 In fact, Hirschfeld’s closest mention of educational policy comes in the form of specifically mentioning Jan van 
Dam, but only as a member of the College of Secretaries-General. Both times the mention comes in the footnotes, 
and both times the author incorrectly labels van Dam a member of the NSB. Ibid., 133n, 152n; By 1997, he had 
noted and corrected this error. See Hirschfeld, “Die Universität Leiden unter dem Nationalsozialismus,” 570. 
30 Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule and Dutch Collaboration, 27–35. 
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Reich. Economically, of course, the Germanic nations of North and Northwest Europe were to be 
tightly integrated with Germany, but politically, Hirschfeld argues that 
the “blood-related peoples” of the West … would have the “honour” of being integrated into a “Greater 
Germanic Reich” under the military, economic and political leadership of Germany. However, political 
integration presupposes at least a minimum of partnership; Hitler was neither prepared for, nor capable of, 
such a relationship. After the victorious campaign against France, he asserted that “success” could only be 
“maintained by the powers that had achieved them, thus by military force.” This was more than just a 
rejection of all political methods of achieving German claims to mastery. At the same time, it exposed 
Hitler’s “Germanic policy” for what is really was: well-calculated propaganda to conceal the fact that Hitler 
had no prospective programme for the reorganisation of Europe.31 
 
At the same time, however, Hirschfeld grants that the SS did have a concrete idea of its 
plans and also notes that the SS was dominant in the latter two phases of the occupation, 
beginning in April 1943. Moreover, these phases “differed from the earlier stages in the radical 
consistency with which it [the SS conception of the occupation] was planned.”32  Hirschfeld then 
proceeds to recount how, in fact, the SS conception of the future of the Germanic Reich reached 
back at least to late 1941, and that SS supremacy was enshrined by order 54/42 in August 1942.33  
Hirschfeld’s basic argument, then, is essentially similar to Kwiet’s in that German domination in 
the Netherlands was hampered by political infighting between Seyss-Inquart, the SS faction, the 
German Nazi Party as represented by Commissioner-General Fritz Schmidt, and the two wings 
of the NSB. He differs from Kwiet in that he gives much less credence to the notion of a Greater 
Germanic Reich as a foundational principle guiding the occupation regime, but even then, 
backtracks on this view by allowing it a central place in the occupation’s ideological goals from 
late 1941. 
The most important recent, general study to come out regarding the Netherlands under 
German occupation is Johannes Koll’s 2015 Arthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 31–32. 
32 Ibid., 45. 
33 Ibid., 46–47. 
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Besatzungspolitik in den Niederlanden (1940-1945).34  Part biography and part examination of 
Nazi policy in the Netherlands, Koll’s work is the most substantial general inquiry into the 
German occupation since De Jong’s Het Koninkrijk was completed almost twenty years prior. 
Unlike Hirschfeld and Kwiet, Koll does spend some time on the educational policy of the 
occupiers, but his discussion of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands is not given very 
much coverage. 
On the question of education, Koll does not offer any advances beyond what previous 
authors had already argued, except that he is clear that the impetus for the many changes came 
directly from the top, that is from the Reichskommissar himself or his German subordinates.35  
While Koll notes that many of the “reforms” instituted by the Germans were also changes that 
van Dam had desired, Koll makes it clear that van Dam’s desires only mattered when they were 
in concert with those of Seyss-Inquart and his German deputies, whether it was the reduction in 
clerical salaries, the appointment decrees, or the maintenance of “peace and order” in the 
schools. He does not go into enough detail to note those cases where van Dam’s views won out, 
however. 
A perfect example of this came with the reduction in clerical salaries in February 1941. 
Seyss-Inquart, reacting to recent anti-German preaching on the part of the Catholic Church, had 
wanted to dismiss all clerical teachers outright, but van Dam managed to persuade him otherwise 
noting the strain that would likely cause, which was somewhat ironic given van Dam’s own 
previously stated position that clerical teachers should be dismissed. Either way, Seyss-Inquart 
                                                 
34 Johannes Koll, Arthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche Besatzungspolitik in den Niederlanden (1940-1945) (Wien: 
Böhlau Verlag, 2015). 
35 Ibid., 509–14. 
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settled on a reduction in clerical salaries by a draconian forty per cent.36  Similarly, Koll does not 
discuss in detail the introduction of German language instruction in primary education, but it too 
serves as an example of van Dam being able to push through his own specific designs, as van 
Dam was able to counter Schwarz’s desire to introduce German language instruction in the third 
year of primary school, instead introducing the new subject in the seventh year.37  But these are 
minor points in the grand scheme of things, as Koll is correct that in the overwhelming majority 
of cases, van Dam’s successes were the result of the similarity of his own views with those of his 
German superiors. Indeed, this is one of the reasons van Dam was picked for the top post in the 
Education Department in the first place.38 
Regarding the Nazis’ Germanic project, Koll notes that it was the preferred policy of the 
SS faction within the Nazi leadership, both in Berlin and in the Netherlands, although he also 
points out, like Kwiet and Hirschfeld, that Hitler’s own thoughts were characteristically vague. 
He further notes that Seyss-Inquart could, generally, be counted on to further this policy within 
the Netherlands, and, in fact, this assurance was one of the reasons that Himmler supported his 
appointment to the position of Reichskommissar, a view Koll sees as further evidenced by the 
relatively cooperative relationship between the two men.39  At the same time, like Kwiet and 
Hirschfeld, Koll notes that Seyss-Inquart was in a relatively weak position politically in the 
Netherlands, despite his legal supremacy.  As a result, Seyss-Inquart spent his time trying to play 
the various power groups off each other, supporting whichever group seemed most likely to 
strengthen his own position at any given time.40  So, while he was generally supportive of the SS 
                                                 
36 NIOD 020/417; Peter Jan Knegtmans, P.G.G.M Schulten, and Jaap Vogel, Collaborateurs van niveau: opkomst en 
val van de hoogleraren Schrieke, Snijder en Van Dam (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers AUP, 1996), 258. 
37 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/344. 
38 Knegtmans, Schulten, and Vogel, Collaborateurs van niveau, 250–51; Henk van Setten, Opvoeding in volkse 
geest: fascisme in het onderwijs, 1940-1945 (Bergen, NL: Octavo, 1985), 17. 
39 Koll, Arthur Seyß-Inquart und die deutsche Besatzungspolitik, 114, 176. 
40 Ibid., 276–77. 
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faction’s goal of creating a Greater Germanic Reich after the war, Seyss-Inquart’s political 
double-dealing, especially early in the occupation before the ascendancy of the SS faction, was 
foundational to the larger dysfunction of the occupation regime more generally in the 
Netherlands. 
Of the major works that focus on the nature of the occupation more generally, all agree 
that the ultimate fate of the Netherlands under Nazi leadership was to be some sort of 
incorporation of the country into the Reich, although the exact outlines of that relationship are 
not always agreed upon. De Jong and Warmbrunn both favored a simpler annexation model, 
while Kwiet, Hirschfeld, and Koll argue for a more complex understanding that focuses on the 
variegated power structure among the Nazi leadership, with the Germanic empire a preferred 
goal specifically of the SS faction.  The latter three scholars also recognize that the SS faction 
was especially strong in the Netherlands, if not before the August 1942 order 54/42 granting 
Himmler authority over Germanic peoples in Europe, then certainly after it. Given the strength of 
the SS in the occupied countries, several scholars have focused explicitly on that particular facet 
of the occupation regime. 
By far the most important, both within the general historiography and for this inquiry is 
N.K.C.A. in ‘t Veld’s 1976 De SS en Nederland: Documenten uit SS-archieven 1935-1945. In ‘t 
Veld was the first scholar to take seriously the role of the SS in the Netherlands and its 
implications for the future of the country had the Germans won the war. The work itself covers 
nearly the entirety of the SS’s activities in the occupied country, everything from the pre-war 
split within the NSB between the Mussert and völkisch factions, to the buildup of the various 
Dutch SS units and recruitment for military service in the Waffen-SS. Also important for this 
17 
 
study, in ‘t Veld’s work also contains complete copies of 656 documents the author has pulled 
from the archives that offer the reader context for in ‘t Veld’s analysis. 
For in ‘t Veld, even within the SS, the view of a Greater Germanic Reich was not always 
clearly articulated. At different points, Rauter, and by extension probably Himmler, viewed the 
Dutch as essentially German, and so, to a certain extent, the very ideal of the Germanic project in 
the Netherlands was somewhat of a fantasy. There was no doubt that the future Germanic empire 
the SS wanted to create would look a lot like the present German Empire; its leading language 
would be German and Germans, if by nothing more than their making up more than three 
quarters of the population, would control the Germanic empire. Moreover, after the war ended, 
none of the leaders of the Nazi regime in the Netherlands stuck to the Germanic ideal. Seyss-
Inquart and Rauter both spoke only of Germany at their trials and before their executions. Hitler 
and Himmler likely would have also said the same. In that sense, all of the notions of the Greater 
Germanic Reich were little more than, at best, a mirage of expected victory, and, at worst, 
nonsense.41 
But nonsense still matters, especially when that nonsense is the basis of actual policy, as 
it was in the Netherlands. As in ‘t Veld notes directly: 
The fact that in the history of mankind the driving ideologies consist mainly of unsustainable nonsense has 
never taken anything away from the fanaticism with which the supporters have tried to shape reality into 
their delusions. The different interpretations of collectively professed nonsense have their own interest and 
their own historical power. To say that these views are only idle slogans that cover the true strategic, 
economic, territorial or personal aspects of a struggle for power is all too simple.42 
 
Himmler and his SS subordinates very much believed in the idea of the Greater Germanic Reich, 
even if those ideas were not always clear in their own minds and even if the exact nature of the 
future Germanic empire changed over the course of the Second World War. Those ideas were, 
                                                 
41 In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 160–62. 
42 Ibid., 162. 
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after all, always framed from the position of an eventual German victory, in which there would 
be plenty of time to iron out the differences between the various competing power centers within 
Germany and within the Netherlands. Furthermore, even if the differences between annexation 
into the German Reich and the creation of a Greater Germanic Reich were little more than 
variations on a theme, the proponents of each variation very much saw and placed importance on 
their variation. It would be, as in ‘t Veld notes, like glossing over the differences between 
Zwingli, Luther, and the Roman Catholic Church as minor disputes over insignificant doctrinal 
questions. The differences are important, however, for they “had major influence on the political 
thinking and actions of the German occupiers of the Netherlands.”43 
In essence then, in ‘t Veld argues that historians must take seriously the Germanic project 
in the Netherlands precisely because the German occupiers themselves took it seriously. The fact 
that the Germanic project existed more in the minds of the leaders of the occupation and their SS 
superiors in Berlin and that it was not always entirely different in its conception than a pure 
annexation of the Netherlands into the Reich is of little importance, especially because those 
beliefs informed policy in very real ways. 
In ‘t Veld’s work is also important for another development that is germane to this study. 
Of all of the authors who have written on the German occupation of the Netherlands, in ‘t Veld is 
the one who comes closest to what I argue is the correct understanding of their goals vis-à-vis 
nazification and Germanicization. He cogently argues that the purpose of the German occupation 
was the “nazification and Germanicization of the Netherlands,” and he correctly notes that those 
two actions are not one in the same.44  Germanicization, not Germanization, was a second, 
further aspect of the ideological goals of the German occupiers, especially the SS faction of the 
                                                 
43 Ibid., 162–63. 
44 Ibid., 154. ”Nazificatie en germanisatie.” 
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German regime, and they differ in what the end product of the process looks like. Germanization 
is the attempt to turn non-Germans into Germans, which certainly was a regime policy in some 
areas, especially in the east. Germanicization, on the other hand, was limited to the Germanic 
peoples of North and Northwest Europe, and had the goal, not of turning those people German, 
but of reminding them of their ancestral connections to their past and their shared future with 
other Germanics, even if the idea was confused in the earliest days of the occupation.45   
More recently, Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel has published several stimulating 
works on Dutch “pioneers” in Eastern Europe, one of the main policies that resulted from the 
Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands.46  The recruitment of Dutch farmers was meant to 
help repopulate those areas of Eastern Europe that were being depopulated through the Nazis’ 
program of genocide.  Focusing as it does on the Nederlandsche Oost-Compagnie and the 
colonization of Eastern Europe, Künzel’s work does not overlap with this inquiry directly and is 
more in conversation with other works on the colonization of Eastern Europe.47  It is, however, 
important as a representative of the latest scholarly work on the Nazis’ Germanic project and its 
direct effects on the Netherlands. The use of Dutch farmers to colonize the east was one facet of 
creating the Greater Germanic Empire and is evidence of the Nazi occupiers’ efforts to realize 
that end, even if that effort, too, ended in failure. Even if the Germanic project had been little 
more than a political ideal of the SS that was either entirely imaginary and used for 
propagandistic purposes (Hirschfeld) or limited in its effects because of the eternal power 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 499–500, 521–25. 
46 Geraldin von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, Hitler’s Brudervolk: The Dutch and the Colonization of Occupied Eastern 
Europe, 1939-1945 (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015); Geraldin von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, “Germanic Brothers,” 
in Racial Science in Hitler’s New Europe, 1938-1945, by Rory Yeomans and Anton Weiss-Wendt (Lincoln: 
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Building in Nazi-Occupied Europe,” Journal of Genocide Research 19, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 240–257, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14623528.2017.1313521. 
47 Especially the work of Shelley Baranowski, Donald Bloxham, Wendy Lower, and Jürgen Zimmerer. 
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struggle among the Nazi leadership in the Netherlands (Kwiet and Koll), the Germanic project 
had concrete effects on German policy, in this case through sending thousands of Netherlanders 
east to help build the European New Order, some of whom would never actually make it home. 
All of the previously discussed works touch on this inquiry in some way, mostly through 
their discussions, or disavowals, of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands. There have 
been, on the other hand, several works that have focused more or less on educational policy in 
the occupied Netherlands that are more directly related to this inquiry. The most important is J. 
H. C. de Pater’s 1969 work Het Schoolverzet, which focuses on the Protestant School Resistance 
during the occupation.48  De Pater’s work is, by far, the most in-depth study of the Nazi 
occupiers’ education policy in the occupied Netherlands to date, but its true focus is on 
confessional education, not public education, and then, it looks most closely at the efforts of the 
various resistance groups, especially the organized protestant commissions that aimed at 
defending their constitutional rights against encroachments by the German occupiers and their 
Dutch helpers. He also includes an especially useful study of the various school inspectorates.49 
De Pater’s focus contrasts with this study in two ways. First, this inquiry is more 
interested in public education, although, like de Pater, it does occasionally stray into the other 
form of education (in this case, confessional education, in de Pater’s case, public education) 
when appropriate, especially when it concerns the Appointment Decrees. Second, this inquiry is 
more interested in the Germans’ designs for public education than in the resistance waged 
against those policies. In both ways, the current study is the mirror opposite of de Pater’s work, 
as this inquiry is more interested in the Germans’ designs, especially as they relate to the future 
of Europe after German victory, and their efforts to secure that future through public, rather than 
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49 Ibid., 258–372. 
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private, education. That being said, it must also be noted that, in many ways, the findings of both 
inquiries are similar. In both public and private education, the Nazis’ efforts were complete 
failures, primarily as a result of resistance waged at the local level. On the other hand, de Pater 
also notes that Seyss-Inquart and Schwarz were supporters of the Greater Germanic ideal and 
mostly accepts that these beliefs were sincere and influenced policy, but he himself does not see 
much difference between the Germanic project in the Netherlands and more pedestrian 
nazification or Germanization.50  In that way, this inquiry offers a fresher perspective on the 
Germans’ designs, by taking seriously, in the vein of in ‘t Veld, the Nazis’ Germanic ideal and 
its consequences for the educational sphere.   
In addition to de Pater, four other works cover the educational sphere in the Netherlands 
during the Nazi occupation. Two deal exclusively with German educational institutions, that is 
the NIVO and the two Reichsschulen. The other two deal more with the Education Department 
and the person of Jan van Dam respectively. On the NIVO and the Reichsschulen, the more 
important work is David Barnouw’s Van NIVO tot Reichsschule: nationaal-socialistische 
onderwijsinstellingen in Nederland.51  Barnouw’s work is a close examination of the history of 
three specific schools, the NIVO Koningsheide and the two German-created Reichsschulen, 
which were meant to be the Germanic equivalent of the National-Political Educational Institutes 
created by the Nazis in Germany in the 1930s. The second work is a popular piece written by the 
journalist Paul van der Steen entitled Keurkinderen: Hitlers elitescholen in Nederland.52  Van der 
Steen relied heavily on Barnouw as well as unpublished notes by de Pater on the two 
Reichsschulen that de Pater assembled when he conducted his research for Het Schoolverzet. As 
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a result, van der Steen does not offer much new material in terms of the larger questions I am 
interested in for this inquiry, although his research did lead him to some pertinent details 
regarding the daily life at the schools that are not included in Barnouw. In both cases, the authors 
recognize that these educational institutions were aimed at creating the future elite of the Greater 
Germanic Reich.53  Because this is one area in which substantial research had already been 
conducted, I rely heavily on both works for that section of chapter four that touches upon these 
three institutions. 
The final two works deal directly with the Department of Education, but in slightly 
different ways. The first is Hans Knippenberg and Willem van der Ham’s Een bron van 
aanhoudende zorg: 75 jaar Ministerie van Onderwijs (Kunsten) en Wetenschappen, 1918-1993, 
which is an institutional history of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Arts, and Sciences.54  
Designed as a history of the ministry since the constitutional reforms of 1918, the work covers a 
much broader period than this inquiry. Moreover, it treats the German occupation as a sort of 
interregnum in the otherwise steady development of the Dutch state and educational apparatus 
over the previous three quarters of a century. Despite that, the work is most useful for its insights 
into the work inside of the department during the occupation, including issues of personnel, 
budget, and housing.55  Knippenberg and van der Ham’s work is, for example, the only work that 
gives significant focus to the work in the department after its move to Apeldoorn in early 1943, 
at which point officials there, including the leadership of the department, focused more on 
holding down the fort than on actual oversight and governance of the educational apparatus in 
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the country.56  Because the perspective of the authors is that of the overall changes in the 
ministry, they pay little attention to the overarching goals of the occupiers in their efforts to 
institute educational “reform.” The authors certainly do note that certain elements were inspired 
by the Germanic ideal, especially historical instruction which they briefly cover, but overall, 
these initiatives are subsumed under the larger, and more traditional, concept of pure 
nazification.57 
The final work on education is actually a collection of works by the Dutch scholar Peter 
Jan Knegtmans, who specializes in the history of the University of Amsterdam, among other 
topics, and so has written several chapters for larger publications on one of that institution’s most 
important scholars during the occupation, Jan van Dam.58  Knegtmans’s works are most useful 
for his research into the academic and ideological thought of van Dam. Van Dam was, in 
Knegtmans’s view, first and foremost a scholar of language. His views on race were much less 
pronounced and he even regretted the growing influence of race within his field. Regardless, 
however, he welcomed the increased emphasis on Old Germanic languages, culture, and history 
that accompanied the Nazis’ “seizure of power” in Germany in 1933. This, combined with the 
otherwise apolitical van Dam’s amazement at the success of the Nazis’ governing style, 
especially compared with the failures of the Weimar government that van Dam witnessed in his 
youth as a lecturer at Bonn in the early 1920s, made him a sympathizer with the Nazi movement 
in Germany.  At the same time, he was steadfastly opposed to the Dutch national socialist party, 
the NSB, which he considered to be a club for brutes and ruffians. This odd combination of 
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political sympathies made van Dam an especially useful choice for the German occupiers to fill 
the role of Secretary-General, even though one of van Dam’s colleagues at the University of 
Amsterdam, Geerto Snijder, had been the Germans’ first choice.59 
As a result, when he became Secretary-General during the occupation, but before he grew 
disillusioned with the Nazi regime in the latter half of the war, van Dam pursued policies that, on 
the one hand, were clearly aimed at Germanicization, that is increasing the importance of the 
Germanic element and the place of the Dutch within that world in school instruction, but, at the 
same time, sometimes actually worked against the overtly racial elements of the Nazis’ 
occupation policies.60  In other words, for van Dam, the Germanic project was a cultural project, 
not a racial project, even if, for the SS leadership in both Germany and the Netherlands, race was 
the key element. Further, Knegtmans recognizes that van Dam was a politically weak character, 
but does not go so far as, for example de Jong, to argue that he was little more than a German 
lackey.61 Van Dam had clearly outlined policy initiatives, and in some cases, he was able to 
inhibit the efforts of the Germans, especially when it came to the imposition of forced labor 
among students and van Dam’s protection of culturally significant Jewish Netherlanders. In this 
way, van Dam was a good, but not exactly perfect, collaborator for the German occupiers. In 
those areas that he and his German superiors agreed, which was more often than not, van Dam 
proved to be an able administrator, despite his occasional relapses into “humanistic” tendencies.62 
In contrast to the works just discussed, this inquiry in most focused on the Germans’ 
goals in the field of education during the occupation, especially in Dutch schools, which Schwarz 
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called the indirect path to the Greater Germanic ideal, and to a slightly lesser extent, the German 
schools, otherwise known as the direct path to the Germanic Reich. Like in ‘t Veld, this study 
takes seriously the SS leadership’s view of the Germanic element in the Netherlands. Although 
this goal was somewhat confused during the initial months of the occupation, as many scholars 
have noted, that does not take away from its development by the end of the 1940 into concrete 
policy, supported by Seyss-Inquart, at least to the extent that it did not interfere with his own 
personal base of power. This is especially true for the education realm because all of the 
important individuals in the upper echelons of the education sector were supporters of the 
Germanic project and hoped to further the Germanic ideal among Dutch youth. But before we 
can turn to that directly, a brief overview of the role of education in the modern Dutch state is 
necessary. Developments that occurred in the education field in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century are indispensable for understanding the competing interests among Dutch 
collaborators as well as one of the primary reasons that the Germans’ educational initiatives were 
very likely doomed to failure from the outset. 
Background - Pillarization and The School Struggle 
In contrast to its neighbors to the east, the history of the Netherlands over the course of 
the nineteenth century is one of relative disunity.  At the same time that the German speaking 
states of Central Europe were slowly becoming more unified both economically and politically 
under Prussian leadership, the Netherlands, especially its northern half, found itself floundering.  
This process began when French Revolutionary armies invaded and set up a French puppet state 
in the 1790s in the Northern Netherlands, while the Southern Netherlands—present day 
Belgium—was incorporated directly into the French Empire.  The Batavian Republic, as the 
French puppet state in the Northern Netherlands was initially known, brought an end to the 
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federal nature of the Seven United Provinces, replacing it with a centrally administered state 
along the French revolutionary model.63  Along with this change came the separation of church 
and state and, as a result, state control over education, which had been, up to that point, under the 
purview of the churches.  After the final defeat of Napoleonic armies, at the Vienna Congress the 
victorious allies decided to incorporate the northern and southern portions of the Low Countries 
into a single United Kingdom of the Netherlands, with the son of the last Dutch Stadholder 
taking the throne as King Willem I.   
Willem’s government would continue along the path of centralization but found few 
supporters in either the north or the south of the newly united nation.  Further, Willem’s 
government was overtly pro-Calvinist and worked to legalize much of the already persistent anti-
Catholic discrimination in his new realm.64  Unity proved short-lived, as the majority-Catholic 
southern half of the country pushed for independence from the majority-Protestant northern half, 
a goal which was achieved after the great European upheavals of 1830, when in 1831 Leopold I 
was proclaimed King of the Belgians by the Belgian National Congress, although the final 
settlement would wait until the 1839 Treaty of London.65  Having lost its more industrialized 
southern half, the newly truncated Kingdom of the Netherlands found itself permanently in a 
position it had not been in for several hundred years—politically marginalized and militarily 
weak.66  While the Netherlands, in any of its various political forms, had never been a large 
military power in its own right on the European continent, it had commanded much respect 
among the European great powers because of its immense economic strength.  At its height, the 
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county of Holland was one of the richest, most developed locales in the world, bankers and 
merchants in Amsterdam controlled a significant amount of world trade, and the ships of the 
United East Indian Company ruled the seas.  But that was no more.  Its status as an imperial 
power with colonies in the Far East and the Caribbean did continue to afford the Netherlands a 
certain respect among the European Great Powers into the twentieth century, but there was no 
mistaking the fact that the Golden Age of the Dutch Republic had long since passed.   
This worrying military and geopolitical decline was mirrored by intense changes at home.  
The second half of the nineteenth century saw a flowering of cultural innovation in the 
Netherlands.67  Political reforms instituted after 1848 gave the Netherlands a modern, liberal 
constitution, while the supremacy of Dutch liberalism was cemented during the parliamentary 
upheaval surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Count van Zuylen van Nijevelt in 1868.  
Socially, it was in the last decades of the nineteenth century that a particularly unique feature of 
Low Country society first emerged—pillarization.68   Pillarization was the process by which the 
people of the Netherlands slowly, but surely, coalesced into at first three, and then four, major 
interest groups.  The process began with the two major religious blocs—the Calvinist church on 
the one hand and Catholic church on the other.69  The two religious blocs created large support 
networks designed to help their co-religionists in need.  These networks included schools, 
hospitals, health insurance cooperatives, trade unions, professional organizations, public 
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associations, and, of course, political parties to support it all.70  A third pillar grew up around the 
more secular, liberal segment of the Dutch population, and as the country more fully 
industrialized toward the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the 
growing workers’ movement coalesced into a nascent fourth, socialist pillar, although it was shut 
out of the political process until 1939.71  With universal male suffrage in 1917 and female 
suffrage three years later, this process of social stratification became firmly entrenched in the 
political arena as well.  In theory, the pillars were the supports that held up the roof of Dutch 
society.  In reality, the pillarization of the nation helped to create a series of stable governments 
controlled, by and large, through coalitions between the three established pillars. This resulted in 
a spirit of compromise among Dutch leaders in spite of often diametrically opposed interests 
claiming the status of immutable “truth” for their own positions.72  Unlikely as it is that a 
political scientist would design such a system, it was surprisingly effective at preventing 
instability and keeping the population content, at least to the extent that extremist, anti-
democratic, and revolutionary ideologies such as fascism or communism never managed to gain 
much support among the populace as a whole.    
This does not mean, however, that the Netherlands did not have social problems to work 
through on the domestic front.  Chief among these was the issue of control over education, which 
had been simmering in the background ever since the French invasion a century prior.  At the 
time, the revolutionary spirit of the age called for a decrease in the influence of religion in public 
life, and especially in the schools.73 The Education Act of 1806 set up the basis for two types of 
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schools in the Netherlands.74  The first were public, secular schools, mostly funded and 
supervised by the localities in which they were found.  Although they were ostensibly neutral in 
matters of confession, there was no denying the overtly Protestant nature of many of the schools, 
especially in the Protestant-majority northern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands.75  
The second were the so-called “special schools,” which were private, confessional schools 
organized by the Catholic and Protestant churches.76  But because the creation of these schools 
had to be approved by local authorities, the creation of specifically Catholic schools was 
considerably more difficult in the Protestant-majority north of the country.77  Moreover, despite 
the guarantees in the 1815 constitution for state financial support of both Protestant and Catholic 
private confessional schools, the vast majority of the funds, which both blocs thought were 
insufficient, went to Protestant institutions, further exacerbating the north/south divide in the 
nation and contributing to the Belgian revolution in 1830.  With the death of Willem I, and the 
ascension to the throne of his more tolerant son Willem II in 1840, minor concessions were made 
to Catholic communities.78  For their part, the public schools were mostly seen, according to the 
educational theories that ruled the day, as poor relief, and to the extent that they instructed in 
religion, it tended to be of the Protestant variety, which generally pleased the Protestant elites of 
the period.79  This began to change, however, with the ascendancy of the liberal state in 1848 
which saw public schools take on an increasingly secular nature.80    
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In 1848, as other parts of Europe were embroiled in revolution, Willem II calmly initiated 
the constitutional reforms that would keep revolution at bay.81  This new constitution, which was 
passed by both chambers of the States-General, was in many ways the founding document of the 
modern, liberal, democratic Dutch state. It was also a watershed moment in the development of 
both public and private, confessional education in the Netherlands.82  Among many reforms, it 
again guaranteed partial public financial support of confessional education and removed many of 
the obstacles facing Catholics in the establishment of their own private schools.  Most of these 
constitutional reforms were implemented through the new Education Law of 1857, which also 
increased teacher pay and qualification requirements while calling for a supervisory regime to 
hold everyone accountable.83  The further expansion of state funding for confessional schools, 
however, was not passed, being killed on amendment.84  Twenty years later, however, the 
liberal/Catholic political alliance that had made many of the 1857 reforms possible broke down.85  
In its place was a liberal bloc, overtly secular in nature, on the one hand, and a conservative 
coalition with its base of support in the confessions on the other.86  Despite this political 
realignment, however, the liberal state continued its encroachment upon the classroom with a 
new education law in 1878 that greatly increased the power of the central government over that 
of the local towns and provinces.87  It did this by legislating further pay increases for teachers, 
even higher training requirements, and capital improvements to school buildings and grounds 
that were so expensive that many towns could no longer afford the costs, necessitating the 
financial intervention of liberal ministers in The Hague.  This allowed the central government to 
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increase its supervision of the schools and more firmly to enforce the secular nature of the 
schools that had been in place, in theory but not at all universally in practice, since the French 
invasion eighty years prior.  The law further drew back some of the churches’ gains as regarded 
the establishment of new private confessional schools, which now became nearly impossible to 
newly found.  About a decade later, the political tide turned and the confessional coalition came 
into power and, in 1889, passed yet another education law that relaxed most of the restrictions on 
the confessional schools.  Their establishment was no longer curtailed as it had been in 1878.  
Further, and for the schools themselves most importantly, the 1889 law allowed for increased 
state funding of confessional schools, up to about one third of their costs.  This was, in every 
respect, a political defeat for the liberal parties, and one that led to an exodus of students from 
the public schools for confessional schools, further exacerbating the pillarization that was then 
beginning to stratify Dutch society.88 
The final blow came in 1900 with the introduction of compulsory, universal primary 
education.  Long simmering in the background, the question of the state’s role in education came 
crashing to the fore.  The sides in what would come to be known as the School Struggle were 
split between a liberal/socialist camp that favored secular, public education completely free of 
religious indoctrination, and the two confessional pillars, which angled for full state financial 
support of their private confessional schools. 89 The impasse would finally be resolved, after 
decades of back and forth debate over the subject, during the Great War.  While the rest of 
Europe was engaged in total war, the Netherlands remained neutral, preferring a more cautious 
approach of wait-and-see.  A government of national unity was formed with the support of, but 
not including, the socialist party.  With the great conflict raging to the south, the internal strife 
                                                 




surrounding education took a back seat.  At the same time, full democratization was gaining 
steam, with the increasingly important Social-Democratic Workers’ Party demanding universal 
suffrage.  In December 1917, the government promulgated constitutional reforms.  In a political 
compromise of enormous proportions, the liberal/socialist camp, which was against public 
funding of confessional schools, traded their support for the former in exchange for the support 
of the confessional parties for universal manhood suffrage, followed three years later by 
universal adult suffrage.90  And so, the century long struggle surrounding education that had 
begun with French invasion was ended through political compromise, with everyone winning.  
Except for the liberals, who, thanks to universal suffrage, saw their share of the electorate decline 
precipitously in favor of the socialist and confessional parties.  This political compromise was 
put into law with the Primary School Law of 1920, which officially equalized both the status of 
and the state funding for public, secular schools and their private, religious counterparts, 
although the private confessional schools retained significant influence over their curriculum, 
with only minimum standards enforced by the central government.91 
Although the Primary School Law of 1920 ended the “School Struggle,” that was not the 
end of attempts to reform education. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, a not insignificant 
sector of the extreme right wing of Dutch politics was the inheritor of the liberal position of the 
nineteenth century. These individuals viewed the stratified nature of Dutch education as 
anathema to national unity and wanted, through various schemes, to do away with private, 
confessional education and put all schools under the purview of the state. For many of these 
individuals, Jan van Dam among them, the German invasion in May 1940 would offer a new 
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opportunity to reverse the gains made by the confessional blocs over the course of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Luckily for these extremists, their new German overlords were of 
the very same mindset. 
Reichskommissariat Niederlande 
In the early morning of May 10, 1940, German troops invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and France. Case Yellow, as the plans were known, was meant to knock the 
French Republic out of the war and set up the necessary conditions for the Wehrmacht to invade 
the United Kingdom. Against all odds, the Dutch resisted German advances as best they could. 
Out-manned, out-gunned, and lacking in the necessary training in modern warfare, the Dutch 
military was quickly overwhelmed by the Nazi war machine. Only three days after the invasion, 
on the advice of her ministers and military commanders, Queen Wilhelmina, her family, and 
government ministers fled to the safety of the United Kingdom, leaving the country in control of 
the Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces, General Henri Winkelman. That evening, German 
troops made it past the Grebbelinie—one of the flooded “water lines” the Dutch had erected to 
defend the country from foreign invasion—near Utrecht and moved into “Fortress Holland,” the 
heart of the country. At the same time, German troops advanced in the southwest of the country 
towards the major port city of Rotterdam. With German troops on the south bank of the Meuse 
River just south of Rotterdam and unable to overcome stiff resistance from the Dutch defenders 
on the north side of the river, Hitler ordered that resistance be crushed. 
The following day, Luftwaffe bombers obliterated the medieval city center of Rotterdam. 
Eighty thousand Rotterdammers lost their homes, twenty-five hundred shops, twelve hundred 
factories, five hundred cafes, seventy schools, twenty-one churches, four hospitals, and two 
concert halls were either destroyed outright or went up in flames as a result of the bombing. 
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Initial estimates of lives lost ranged as high as thirty thousand individuals, although by the time 
the dust settled, somewhat less than one thousand actually died.92  Only hours after the news of 
the fate of Rotterdam reached the high command, the Germans issued an ultimatum regarding 
Utrecht, promising that should the Dutch military not surrender the fortifications surrounding the 
city, it too would suffer the “fate of Warsaw.” Faced with the threatened destruction of Utrecht 
and fearing the Germans would not stop there but continue on to the other major cities of the 
country, Winkelman ordered the complete surrender of the Dutch Armed Forces later that day.93  
Full Dutch resistance to the invasion had lasted only five days, although sporadic fighting 
continued in the southwestern province of Zeeland for a few days longer. 
In the first few days of the occupation, a German military administration was put into 
place headed by General Alexander von Falkenhausen. Falkenhausen’s authority lasted about 
two weeks, however, as the Nazis decided to install a civilian administration, headed by the 
Austrian Nazi Arthur Seyss-Inquart, who was appointed on May 18 by Hitler to the position of 
Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, a position he would actually 
assume on May 29.94 It appears that the decision to install a civilian administration was made at 
the last minute, as pre-war plans for the occupation of Western Europe envisioned both a much 
longer struggle for control and the continued presence of the Dutch royal family and 
government. On the twentieth of May, Hitler discussed with Jodl a complete victory that would 
end in a peace treaty that would “return the territory that had been stolen from the German 
people 400 years prior.”95  It was this anticipated peace, along with the absence of the Dutch 
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government that allowed Hitler to use the threat of a political power vacuum in the Netherlands 
as an alibi vis-à-vis the Wehrmacht leadership in order to implement a civilian administration.96   
His alibi to the Wehrmacht was of little importance, however, as he had already drafted the order 
implementing the Reichskommissariat and naming Seyss-Inquart to the position of 
Reichskommissar two days prior.97  And it should be noted, that the very name of the occupation 
regime again betrays the Germans plans, as Gerhard Hirschfeld has noted. The German term 
conveys a dual meaning of implicit connection to the Reich itself while also exposing the overtly 
temporary nature of the current form of governance - kommissarisch being a German term for 
temporary.98  Like its counterparts in Northern and Eastern Europe, the Reichskommissariat 
Niederlande was to be eventually incorporated into a Greater Germanic Reich. 
Arthur Seyss-Inquart was born in 1892 in the Moravian town Stannern, located inside a 
German Sprachinsel in what is the present-day Czech Republic, to Emil Seyss-Inquart, a school 
administrator, and Augusta Hirenbach.99  Unusually, his sisters were brought up in the 
Evangelical church, per the tradition of his mother’s family, while Arthur and his brothers 
followed his father’s family and were baptized Catholic. In 1908, after his father’s retirement, 
the family moved to the small town of Baden, near the imperial capital of Vienna. It was here 
that Arthur began running in more nationalistic, völkisch, and antisemitic circles.100  After 
graduating from high school in 1910, the younger Seyss-Inquart began attending the University 
of Vienna to study law. Shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, the increasingly 
nationalist-minded Seyss-Inquart volunteered for Army service. His wartime service did not 
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hinder his personal or professional development, however, as he married in 1916 and eventually 
graduated with a doctorate in jurisprudence in 1917. In 1918, he was decommissioned from the 
Austrian army after a successful wartime service in which he was wounded several times. 
His political activities in the 1920s are difficult to ascertain for lack of source material, 
but it is clear that he had begun drifting ever further to the extreme right wing of Austrian 
politics. By 1931, he had joined the Steierischer Heimatschutz—a right-wing, anti-democratic, 
antisemitic paramilitary organization that would be officially absorbed into the Austrian branch 
of the NSDAP in 1933.101 He would continue his political work throughout the 1930s, agitating 
principally for the incorporation of Austria into the German Reich. In these efforts, he was 
counted among the more moderate circle of the extreme right wing in that he preferred for the 
incorporation to be handled legally, without resort to street terror or revolutionary activities.102  
After joining the Austrian Staatsrat in 1937, he was appointed, through the insistence of Hitler, 
to the position of interior minister in February 1938.103 On March 11, 1938, again under pressure 
from Nazi Germany, Austrian president Miklas appointed Seyss-Inquart to the position of 
Chancellor. The very next day German tanks crossed the border into Austria. On March 13, 
Seyss-Inquart signed the legislative acts that effectively abolished the Austrian state and legally 
incorporated it into the German Reich. It was at this time that Seyss-Inquart, who had long since 
felt himself tied politically and emotionally to the Nazi party, officially joined the NSDAP and 
the SS, reaching the high rank of SS-Obergruppenführer by the eve of the German occupation of 
the Netherlands.  After the Anschluss, Seyss-Inquart remained as the de-jure head of the newly 
renamed Ostmark as Reichsstatthalter, although he was forced to share power with a newly 
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appointed Reichskommissar für die Ostmark.104  After the German invasion of Poland, he was 
briefly transferred to work there under Hans Frank, in a largely ceremonial role that he despised 
so much that he requested, via Himmler, to be sent to the front where he could truly be useful.105  
Despite his request, however, Hitler decided on May 17, 1940 (formally announced the 
following day), to transfer Seyss-Inquart to The Hague to take up the newly created position of 
Reichskommissar in the Netherlands.106 In his farewell address in Krakow, Seyss-Inquart 
famously remarked that “in the east, we have a national socialist mission, over there in the west, 
we have a function. Therein lies something of a difference.”107  This difference, as the course of 
the occupation would show, manifested itself in the racial make-up of the local population. In the 
east, the Nazis were dealing with Slavic “sub-humans,”108 while the west was populated by their 
Germanic brethren.109 
The regime that Seyss-Inquart was to head was simply placed on top of the already 
existing Dutch governmental apparatus, forming a sort of “supervisory administration,” not 
entirely dissimilar to the occupation regime in Denmark.110  When the Queen and her ministers 
fled to England, the government left instructions to the permanent Secretaries-General—the 
highest ranking non-ministerial bureaucrats—of the various ministries to continue in their work 
as usual. At the summits of these ministries, the Germans installed their own functionaries to 
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oversee the work of the Dutch bureaucrats via a political and administrative organ known as the 
Reichskommissariat.111  The German administration was split into five sections. A 
Präsidialabteilung was to look after questions of personnel, budgets for the departments of the 
Reichskommissariat itself (as opposed to the individual Dutch ministries), and all other issues 
that required the direct attention of Seyss-Inquart.112 In addition to the Präsidialabteilung, there 
were four overarching departments known as Generalkommissariate that were installed on top of 
the existing Dutch ministries.113 In addition to these five top-level departments, Seyss-Inquart 
appointed special Beauftragten for each province, one each for the major cities of Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam, and for certain institutions, such as the Netherlands Bank.114 Following the 
Nazis’ vaunted leadership principle, these representatives acted as petty despots in their own 
administrative domains, reporting directly to the Reichskommissar himself. Finally, on top of the 
official occupation apparatus, various other organs of the Reich tried to establish branches to act 
as bases of political support in the Netherlands, including the German Foreign Office, the Office 
of the Four Year Plan, the Economic and Armaments offices, the SS, and the Nazi Party itself. 
Complicating matters significantly, many figures had dual roles that completely clouded the 
chain of command, allowing for the creation of petty kingdoms inside of the occupation regime 
itself. Far from being a smoothly operating machine, however, this political settlement left the 
various actors too much room to maneuver, and it would, in time, expose many of the principal 
figures responsible for cultural development and education policy as weak political operatives. 
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Upon his appointment by Hitler, Seyss-Inquart was allowed to hand pick two of the 
deputies that would head the Generalkommissariate, while the other two were appointed by the 
Nazi leadership in Berlin. For his choices, Seyss-Inquart chose Hans Fischböck as the 
Generalkommissar für Finanz und Wirtschaft115 and Dr. Friedrich Wimmer for the position of 
Generalkommissar für Verwaltung und Justiz.116  Wimmer also had the distinction of being 
Seyss-Inquart’s principal deputy whenever Seyss-Inquart was away from The Hague.  Both men 
were old friends of Seyss-Inquart’s from their time in Austrian politics and could be trusted to 
maintain political loyalty to him.117  Although he was head of the Generalkommissariat  for 
Finance and Economy, Fischböck was seldom present in the Netherlands from 1942 onward, 
preferring to commute occasionally from Berlin.118  Moreover, his position was closely watched 
by his superiors in Berlin, as the economic health of the Netherlands was given high priority, 
first because of their status as “ethnic kin” and later because of the need for resource extraction 
in the name of the war effort. Further, because of his position overseeing finances and economic 
matters, he had little direct influence in the cultural sphere.119  Wimmer, on the other hand, was 
nearly constantly present in the Netherlands from his appointment in May 1940. This is 
moderately surprising because he had initially been unsure whether he desired to take up work in 
the Netherlands, as he felt at home in his previous post in the Bavarian city of Regensburg, 
where he was involved in local administration. Despite his reservations, Wimmer answered 
Seyss-Inquart’s call to action and, for his trouble, found himself in a position of relative 
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autonomy vis-à-vis occupation policy. Unlike his colleagues, Wimmer had only “weak” 
ministers in Berlin overseeing his work—he explicitly named Wilhelm Frick (Interior Ministry) 
and Bernhard Rust (Education Ministry) as such after the war—which left only his good friend 
Seyss-Inquart supervising his work, a veritable free hand given their close relationship.120 
At the same time, as a check on the power of Seyss-Inquart and to further his own 
designs on the Netherlands, Himmler installed SS-Brigadeführer Hanns Albin Rauter, yet 
another Austrian Nazi, as both Höherer SS- und Polizeiführer for the Netherlands and 
Generalkommissar für das Sicherheitswesen.121  In this position Rauter was simultaneously 
subordinate to Seyss-Inquart as Generalkommissar and subordinate only to Himmler as the 
highest ranking SS officer in the Netherlands.122 As a result, Rauter’s external power base proved 
be a near constant source of conflict with Seyss-Inquart throughout the occupation and source of 
political support sufficient to make his office, and therefore also his control of police and SS 
forces in the Netherlands, practically autonomous from the Reichskommissariat itself.123  Further, 
because of his position as the highest SS officer in the country, Rauter was in direct control of all 
SS efforts in that realm in the Netherlands.   
At the same time, Martin Bormann, the future head of Reich Chancellery who was still at 
the time chief of staff to Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, was able to install Dr. Fritz Schmidt, the 
only German Nazi at the upper echelons of the new administration, as the Generalkommissar zur 
besonderen Verwendung.124  Schmidt was, among other things, to represent the interests of the 
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Nazi Party directly, a task he was more able to accomplish once he was appointed by Hess to the 
head of the NSDAP Arbeitsbereich Niederlande, the successor organization of the Nazi Party’s 
Foreign Organization in the Netherlands, in October 1940.125  His office was also primarily 
responsible for the forced coordination of Dutch society. In this role, Schmidt tended to support 
the interests of the otherwise weak Dutch Nazi Party, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging. 
This support of Dutch Nazis, whose goals for a Greater Netherlandic Empire were often at direct 
odds with their German overlords, would prove a constant source of conflict within the 
Reichskommissariat.126  Additionally, Schmidt was responsible for public enlightenment and 
non-economic associations, but, importantly, excepted from this mandate were questions of 
education policy, which was to remain under the auspices of the education ministry.127  Schmidt’s 
influence in the Netherlands would thus be minimal. With his actions constrained by the 
leadership in Berlin, and his political position in the Netherlands deteriorating, he was killed in 
1943 when he was thrown—or possibly jumped—from a train. While the exact circumstances 
remain unclear, rumors circulated at the time that he had actually been assassinated by the SS.128 
Given that the chain of command in the occupation regime resembled a wild web of 
interconnected and contradictory commitments with built-in conflicts rather than an orderly tree 
diagram with clearly defined roles—the characteristic fundamental polycracy of the Nazi 
system129—it is unsurprising that Seyss-Inquart was not really able to rule single-handedly as he 
had hoped or his position theoretically allowed him.  Technically, he was indeed the highest-
ranking authority, having received his commission directly from and reporting directly to Hitler 
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himself.130  But this did not change his true position as a mid-level bureaucrat in the Nazi regime, 
leaving him constantly susceptible to the machinations of those higher up the Nazi totem pole 
and their various representatives in the Netherlands. His comparatively recent party membership 
and staunch Catholicism did not help his cause either; the latter aspect of his personality actually 
engendered mistrust in some circles.131  Seyss-Inquart’s only recourse was to appeal directly to 
Hitler himself, an option that could not be used constantly and which, even when successful, 
betrayed his own weakness, for that option relied on Hitler siding with Seyss-Inquart over the 
likes of a Himmler, Göring, or Bormann. Even so, because of Rauter’s close relationship to 
Himmler and Himmler’s closeness to Hitler, it is likely that Rauter actually had more direct 
access to the Führer.  Nor was this uncommon in Nazi occupied Europe, as Werner Best, the 
ambassador plenipotentiary in Denmark, noted after the war that the SS leaders were always the 
most powerful in their respective territories.132  For his part, Hitler never seemed to take much 
interest in the actual administration of the Netherlands and was otherwise reluctant to intervene 
between squabbling subordinates in such cases. This left Seyss-Inquart’s best option for 
maintaining influence in playing (or pretending to play) the role of an honest broker between 
competing factions. This was a role that would appear to be amenable to the otherwise moderate 
Seyss-Inquart, but it turned out to be a role he was singularly unprepared to play.133  By and 
large, however, Seyss-Inquart can be counted as belonging to the SS segment of the regime; he 
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himself was a member of the SS, and he definitely saw the future of the Netherlands, both out of 
personal persuasion and through the orders he received from Hitler, as a constituent part of the 
Greater Germanic Reich.134  But, in order to protect his own base of power in the occupied 
country, he still tried to balance equally the political forces around him, whether Rauter, 
Schmidt, or the various wings of NSB.135  The mutual antipathy between Seyss-Inquart and 
Rauter and between Seyss-Inquart and Schmidt, did not help his cause in the slightest.136 
For the most part, the organizational structure of the Dutch government remained intact, 
with the Germans only perching themselves at the summit, save for one major change in the 
cultural sphere. On November 25, 1940, the pre-war Dutch Ministry of Education, Arts, and 
Sciences, which had been situated under the auspices of the Commissariat-General for 
Administration and Justice was split into two departments under the Reichskommissariat: the 
Department of Education, Sciences, and Cultural Administration and the Department of People’s 
Enlightenment and Arts, the latter designed to be a near-carbon copy of Goebbels’s Propaganda 
Ministry in Berlin. This new department, which was meant to be a Dutch governmental 
equivalent to the Hauptabteilung Volksaufklärung und Propaganda137 of Dr. Fritz Schmidt’s 
Generalkommissariat zur besonderen Verwendung, was responsible for the press, radio, and 
film, non-academic literature, art and art installations, theater, architecture, and the fight against 
degenerate art.138  Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, an ardent, völkisch NSBer, was picked to lead the 
new Dutch propaganda department. Goedewaagen was a good choice for Seyss-Inquart’s 
purposes, as Goedewaagen was supported by Geerto Snijder, one of the leading Groot-Germaans 
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thinkers in the Dutch national socialist scene, although Snijder was not yet a member of the 
NSB.139  Further, Goedewaagen himself, while close to Mussert (he had previously served as 
Mussert’s deputy and spokesman and it was Mussert who first suggested Goedewaagen to Seyss-
Inquart), was also more amendable to Greater Germanic thinking than the Dutch Nazi Leider.140 
He was a member of the NSB but was not seen as a “typical” representative of that group, which 
had a not entirely unjustified reputation as a collection of brutes, for Goedewaagen was well read 
and well spoken, a philosopher and aesthete.141   
Under the purview of the other newly created department, the Department of Education, 
Science, and Cultural Administration, were all schools, public and private, adult education, 
teacher training, scholarly books and libraries, scientific publications and conferences, physical 
education, youth development and care, museums, memorials, and nature conservancy.142 Chosen 
to head this newly formed department was the Dutch Germanist professor Jan van Dam, who 
was appointed as Secretary-General of the Department by Seyss-Inquart shortly after its 
formation. Van Dam did not report directly to Wimmer, however, as his department was situated 
under the Main Department of Education and Churches, headed by Dr. Heinrich Schwarz, one of 
several sub-departments organized under Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat. 
Born in 1903 in Berlin, Schwarz was, like Hitler and many other Nazis, an aspiring artist, 
but unlike Hitler actually encountered some success, putting forth multiple artistic exhibitions of 
his own work both before and after, but not during, the Nazi period. Despite his artistic 
sensibilities, he ended up pursuing a legal education, receiving his doctorate in jurisprudence in 
1931. After a short career in various legal roles, he joined the German Education Ministry in 
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1934, then the SS in 1937, and finally the NSDAP proper in 1940. In 1939, he was drafted into 
the Wehrmacht, where he served briefly during the invasion of Poland. In 1940, he was recalled 
from the front and sent to the Netherlands to serve under Wimmer. Wimmer later claimed that 
Schwarz was only a middling bureaucrat, but he was chosen directly by Nazi leaders in Berlin 
for his position, at the explicit request of Seyss-Inquart for an education specialist to take up the 
role.143  Although quite late to join the movement, Schwarz became a committed SS-man and was 
instrumental in the development and implementation of occupation policy in the education 
realm.144  In this role, he was also a supporter of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands, 
noting repeatedly in his reports back to Berlin that his efforts in the education field were aimed at 
implanting the Germanic ideal into Dutch youth.145 His reach extended to almost all areas of 
education policy in the Netherlands and he distinguished himself by his fierce opposition to the 
educational goals of the Dutch Nazis and the role of the confessions.146  For example, it was 
Schwarz who was most influential on the German side in the effort to extend state control over 
confessional education, helping to provoke the Protestant School Resistance Movement in the 
process.147  Together with his direct subordinate Jan van Dam, Heinrich Schwarz had more 
impact on Dutch education policy than any other individual functionary during the entire course 
of the occupation. 
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Periodization of the Occupation 
Historians traditionally break the German occupation of the Netherlands into four distinct 
phases. The first came directly after the installation of the Reichskommissariat and included a 
German focus on what Seyss-Inquart liked to refer to as “self-Nazification,” in which the 
occupiers tried to win the hearts and minds of the Dutch people for Nazism.148  In his initial 
appeal to the Dutch people, dated May 25, 1940, Seyss-Inquart noted that he would do what he 
could to make sure that “Dutch people, who are close to the Germans by blood, do not fall into 
less favorable living conditions than are necessary” in order to win the war, and he hoped that 
both peoples would be able to “treat each other with respect.”  It was an attempt by the new 
Reichskommissar to offer an outstretched hand by repeatedly noting the close relations between 
the German and Dutch peoples.149  Seyss-Inquart did not say it at the time, although he would in 
his post-war trial, but this order to treat the Dutch well and use force only if absolutely necessary 
came directly from Hitler.150 By and large, the repression apparatus was quite limited in nature 
during the early stages of the occupation, with the Nazis’ brutal methods being reserved mostly 
for Jewish people and those actively engaging in resistance. But anti-Jewish measures especially 
galvanized the Dutch populace until, in February 1941, the public engaged in a series of strike 
actions aimed at protesting the Germans’ street raids in the Jewish quarter of Amsterdam. 
The second phase began after the February Strike of 1941 and saw a more forceful effort 
at coordination that relied on the disbanding and reestablishment of institutions along Nazified 
lines.151  Although the tenor of the first two phases was different—the latter being more violent 
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and less accommodating of increasing resistance on the part of the Dutch populace—the ultimate 
goals of both phases were similar. This was period when the process of Gleichschaltung, the 
adoption of institutions of the Reich in the Netherlands or the creation of Dutch counterparts 
along with the coordination of public life along Nazi lines, was most intense. It was also during 
the first two phases of the occupation that the majority of the work aimed at creating a new 
Dutch, Germanic identity took place in the educational sphere. On the other hand, from the 
Dutch perspective the first two phases of the occupation were somewhat different. By and large, 
the initial phase, up until the February Strike, was marked by what Johannes Koll calls a “wait-
and-see attitude” on the part of the populace, while the second phase, which began with the 
Germans showing their true colors through anti-Jewish repression, saw a slow but steady uptick 
in resistance activity in all of its forms among Dutch Gentiles.152   
The third phase of the occupation began in April 1943.153  Because of resistance activity, 
which the German leadership blamed—not entirely incorrectly—on former Dutch military, the 
Germans attempted to recall all soldiers, who had been released after the initial capitulation of 
the Netherlands as a sign of German leniency, in order to send them to Germany as prisoners of 
war.  The resulting strikes, known as the April/May Strike of 1943, marked the beginning of a 
much more repressive German regime and a corresponding uptick in resistance activity on the 
part of the occupied. It was, in effect, a negative feedback loop in which greater repression 
engendered greater resistance which caused even greater repression.  This increasing repression 
marked the tenor of the occupation for the rest of the war.154 
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The fourth and final phase began in September 1944 when the first Allied troops entered 
the southern provinces and liberated those portions of the population that lived south of the great 
rivers.155 Fundamentally, for those portions of the country still under German rule, the nature of 
the occupation did not change, except that repression became even harsher as the “Germans now 
assumed they were occupying enemy territory.”156 Shortly after the liberation of Maastricht in the 
far southeast of the country, Dutch railway workers struck in an effort to support of the Allied 
Market Garden operations to secure rivers bridges over the Rhine at Arnhem.157 When the 
operation failed, the German reprisals against the Dutch populace included the imposition of a 
forced famine, known as the Hunger Winter, that led to the starvation of tens of thousands, 
including about twenty thousands who starved to death.158 This final phase of the occupation 
would last until the last German troops were pushed out of the country by Allied troops on May 
5, 1945. 
When it comes to the educational sphere, these broader chronological categories still 
hold, but are not quite as useful. The February Strike of 1941 did not significantly alter the 
occupiers’ efforts in the education realm. The officials at the Education Department did not take 
part, while Dutch university students, along with many of their professors, had preceded the 
February Strike with their own strikes protesting anti-Jewish measures already in November 
1940, which led to the closure of Leiden University, the oldest and most respected institute of 
higher education in the country.159 Nor did the April/May Strike of 1943 significantly affect 
education. By that point, higher education had, for all intents and purposes, already come to a 
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standstill, while primary and secondary education continued on as it mostly had.160 Finally, the 
last major turning point, the beginning of the nine-month liberation of the nation by Allied troops 
did not, in and of itself, affect the education realm any more than it did the rest of Dutch society. 
The Education Department was still, for all intents and purposes, in disarray, and higher 
education was still at a standstill. In primary and secondary education, the failure of the German 
occupiers and their Dutch helpers to adequately enforce their decrees meant that most schools 
continued on as they always had, only encountering disruptions when the authorities came to 
investigate. By the later years in the occupation, these investigations become less and less 
frequent, as the officials in the Education Department become more and more detached from 
their work, which allowed most schools to continue on as they always had, ignoring the 
“reforms” that had been mandated from on high. Only at the very end of the occupation, as 
warfare engulfed the towns and villages of the country in the wake of the German retreat, was 
education significantly disrupted, as were all facets of life during those often-turbulent weeks. 
Because the traditional periodization of the occupation does not fit the educational sector, 
this work will take a slightly different approach. Chapters Two and Three focus on the period 
before the occupation began. Chapter Two looks at German views of the Netherlands, reaching 
back into the nineteenth century and moving forward through the Nazi “seizure of power” in 
January 1933. Specifically, it discusses the ways in which various influential Germans viewed 
the Netherlands as a sort of lost territory of the German Reich as well as the growing field of 
Dutch Studies in German universities that was significantly, but not entirely, infiltrated by a 
völkisch understanding of the Dutch nation.  Chapter Three looks at the Dutch side of this 
equation. It focuses first on the history of Dutch fascists and national socialist movements, with 
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particular emphasis on the largest and most successful group, the Nationaal-Socialistische 
Beweging in Nederland (NSB). Many of these groups had surprisingly differing views on what 
the contours of the future relationship between the Netherlands and Nazi Germany would be. All 
believed that a close relationship would ensue as a result of German victory, and most supported 
a Greater Netherlandic ideology which saw a Nazi ruled Dutch state that encompassed not just 
the modern Netherlands, but also Flemish portions of Belgium and all of the former colonies of 
the Dutch Empire.161  In this view, the relationship between this new Dutch Nazi state and Nazi 
Germany would be one of equals, with Germany, by nature of its power and size, representing a 
primus inter pares. Alternatively, there was a small, but increasingly influential group that 
adhered much more closely to a völkisch view in which the Netherlands would be a junior 
partner, or even constituent part, of a larger Germanic Empire.162 Finally, the chapter covers the 
educational policy of both the NSB and the history, career, and educational policy of Jan van 
Dam, who was appointed by the Germans to lead the Dutch Education Department in late 
November 1940. In this latter section, I argue that the educational philosophy of the NSB was 
more in tune with the currents of Dutch history, especially the School Struggle, while van Dam’s 
conceptions of reforms, which were favored by the German occupiers, were out of touch with the 
overwhelming majority of Netherlanders, and were, as a result, doomed to failure almost from 
the moment of their initial implementation. 
Chapters Four, Five, Six, and Seven form the heart of the inquiry. Chapter Four focuses 
on Schwarz’s “direct route” toward the Greater Germanic Reich. In his reports back to the Office 
of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery, Schwarz emphasized that there were in essence two 
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routes toward winning the Dutch over to the Germanic ideal.163 The “direct route” went through 
German educational institutions in the Netherlands. The effort here was to increase the amount 
and quality of specifically German education in the country. This would, according to Schwarz, 
stand as an example for Netherlanders, and their schools, to follow. These efforts spanned the 
entire occupation, beginning shortly after Schwarz came to the Netherlands and ending only in 
late 1944, as the war effort took all precedence from domestic initiatives.164 
Chapter Five looks at educational “reform” efforts in Dutch Schools, what Schwarz 
called the “indirect route” at winning over Dutch youth. Here the goal was to win Dutch students 
and parents over to the methods of national socialist Germany.165 This included the introduction 
of new subjects, such as physical education and German language instruction, as well as a 
reorganization of Dutch schooling to decrease the influence of the churches while increasing the 
influence of the state. By and large, these efforts were a failure, for although the occupiers were 
successful in introducing new regulations, they encountered significant success on the ground, as 
Dutch teachers and school administrators often simply ignored the new laws.166 
Chapter Six continues the look at the indirect path, but focuses intently on attempted 
changes in historical instruction, which was viewed by the Germans and many of their 
collaborators as especially important for the creation of a new Dutch identity along Germanic 
lines.167  Although the Germans and their Dutch helpers were not entirely successful in 
introducing a new historical curriculum into the schools, through a close reading of several 
textbooks created for use in Dutch education, it is easy to see that the occupiers’ overriding goal 
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in historical instruction was to inculcate a Germanic identity among Dutch youth to prepare them 
for the eventual incorporation of the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich after the final 
Nazi victory in Europe. Much like those changes discussed in Chapter Five, the introduction of a 
new historical curriculum was hampered both by resistance at the local level and structural 
challenges, not the least of which was the pace of writing and publishing these works, the first of 
which only appeared in January 1943.168 
Chapter Seven sharpens the focus on the local level directly, looking at the ways that 
Dutch youth in the schools, as well as their teachers, reacted to German hegemony and how 
Netherlanders viewed their Nazi and German oriented colleagues, whether teachers or students. 
Throughout the occupation, the government was concerned with maintaining “peace and order” 
in the schools, which it largely defined as the suppression of anti-Nazi teachers and punishment 
of anti-Nazi students.169  Because the focus is on students themselves, and because the source 
material does not tell us what, exactly, students thought about, for example, the introduction of 
German language instruction or the censorship of school textbooks, the focus here necessarily 
remains on students’ (and to a lesser extent teachers’) outward displays of patriotic activity and 
harassment of their German-friendly and NSB colleagues. These actions, which were pervasive 
throughout the country, show a strong antipathy among young Netherlanders for the German 
occupation regime. Moreover, even when it is impossible to determine the exact motives for 
harassment of NSB or German-oriented students, the mere fact that students often chose to focus 
on regime-friendly individuals shows a much wider understanding among students that any 
connection to Germany was perceived as negative. In such a climate, it would have been 
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exceedingly unlikely, and I argue nearly impossible, that students and teachers would have been, 
on the one hand, favorable or even indifferent to the various “reforms” their Nazi occupiers 
wanted to introduce, but, on the other, aggressively antagonistic towards the local representatives 
of those same occupiers. For this reason, despite a lack of direct evidence that explicitly states 
that Dutch youth were against the Nazis’ designs in the educational sector, their overall opinion 
of these efforts was very likely quite negative, even if that negative view was based only on its 
association with the German occupation. 
Chapter Eight serves as a conclusion by focusing on the ignominious end of educational 
“reform” in the Netherlands. As the war turned against Germany in 1943 through defeat on the 
battlefield, the German authorities in the Netherlands, under pressure from their superiors in 
Berlin, turned to ever greater repression of the populace and extraction of resources to support 
the war effort. This turn of events set into motion a negative feedback loop in which greater 
repression led to greater resistance activities on the part of ordinary Netherlanders, which then 
led to even greater repression. The downward spiral led the leading collaborator in the education 
realm, Jan van Dam, to question the value of the Nazis’ Germanic project and eventually resulted 
in the collapse of almost all efforts at educational “reform” for the rest of the war. 
The efforts of the Germans and their Dutch collaborators in the Netherlands were a 
thoroughgoing failure. When the war ended and democratic rule was reestablished, almost all of 
the changes instituted by the occupation regime were reversed.  But this inquiry is not as much 
about what succeeded during the occupation as it is about what the German occupiers hoped to 
accomplish. The goal was the establishment of a fundamentally new Greater Germanic Reich, 
and the Nazi administrators of the Netherlands during the Second World War correctly 
recognized that in order to make this Greater Germanic Reich succeed, they would need to win 
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the next generation for their Germanic project. This was the overarching goal in all of the actions 
the Germans took, regardless of whether their Dutch collaborators agreed with these efforts or 
not. It was a goal that meant bringing the Netherlands back into the Germanic fold from which it 
had strayed some three hundred years prior.
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Chapter 2 - The Netherlands in Modern German Thought 
 
When the end of the world comes, make your way to Holland. There everything happens fifty years late! - 
Unknown, often attributed to Heinrich Heine 
 
Some old-fashioned lords introduced the countryside, some fat mayors introduced the cities, the Princes of 
Orange introduced themselves and the people did not introduce themselves ... The people made cheese and butter, 
got coffee and sugar, and sprouted with the Baltic corn, took three thousand and a few hundred percent from pepper, 
plundered the east, pillaged the west, filled their bags with ducats and worried just as little about the administration 
as about the defense of the state. - L. Weinbarg, Buch über Holland, 18331 
 
The Nazis were not the originators of the idea of a German-dominated state that 
encompassed the territory of the Low Countries.  In fact, that idea predated the Nazi “seizure of 
power” by more than a century. The idea of a German super-state made up of the individuals that 
inhabit the current day Low Countries goes back at least to the Napoleonic period and the 
nineteenth century German nationalist thinkers who looked back to the French domination of the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.2   Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
German intellectuals such as Fichte, Arndt, List, Jahn, Riehl, Treitschke, and Langbehn all made 
important contributions to the concept of a German state that incorporated the Netherlands as a 
constituent part. The Nazis, with their Germanic project in the Netherlands, were very much the 
late inheritors of this legacy, as their efforts in the Netherlands represent the ideological 
fulfillment of this older German view of the Netherlands as little more than a breakaway 
province whose natural place is within a larger German(ic) state. 
The views of German intellectuals toward the Netherlands cannot be divorced from the 
rise of the German nation over the course of the nineteenth century. As German-speaking Central 
Europe fought for liberation from French domination, integrated first economically and then 
politically, and eventually became the leading industrial and military power on the continent, 
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German historians and thinkers viewed the Netherlands through the lens of these developments. 
Especially critical for many of these thinkers was the Rhine river and the need for free use of that 
river for commerce. Control of the Rhine, whether by France or by the Netherlands, was often 
seen as a hindrance to German unity and the attainment of a future German state’s rightful place 
in the world.  At the same time, the narrative of an increase in German strength was correlated 
with an opposite narrative of Dutch decline. In the Early Modern period, the Dutch Republic had 
been a commercial and military power that obtained its independence and created a separate 
national identity, at that same time Germany was little more than a collection of small, mostly 
weak states. By the nineteenth century, however, the places of both nations had reversed such 
that any discussion of German views on the Netherlands must keep this larger political, 
economic, and military landscape in view.3 
By the early twentieth century, German intellectual thought concerning the Netherlands 
had entered into the academy with the slow growth in Dutch Studies, or Niederlandistik, and the 
larger, interdisciplinary field of Westforschung, or “western research.” Neither of these new 
academic disciplines were overtly völkisch in their outlooks, but both had relatively large 
contingents of völkisch thinkers who took up their cause. Regardless of the political ideologies of 
the scholars involved, each helped contribute to a larger understanding within Germany of the 
Germans and Dutch as ethnically, culturally, geographically, historically, and linguistically 
related. 
This chapter thus serves as an intellectual history of the precursors in German thought to 
the Nazis’ eventual invasion of the Netherlands. In it, I argue that the Nazis were the inheritors 
of a long intellectual history which viewed the Netherlands as essentially German, or at least 
                                                 
3 Schöffer, Het nationaal-socialistische beeld, 120–21. 
57 
 
Germanic. These thinkers, especially those infused with a völkisch understanding of the world, 
saw the Dutch as more similar to the Germans than dissimilar, and often argued that the true, 
rightful place of the Netherlands, whether for geographic, political, economic, or cultural 
reasons, was bound to its German neighbor in a single state. Although I do not mean to argue, in 
any way, that the intellectual and political leaders of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
led, automatically, to the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands, I do argue that the Nazi 
ideologues internalized many of the same arguments these earlier thinkers made regarding the 
place of the Dutch state within the larger European order. In this way, the Nazis’ Germanic 
project in the Netherlands was a sort of culmination of a much longer strain of German history. 
The conception of the Netherlands as a constituent part of the German nation dates back 
to the very beginning of German nationalism. Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 1808 Addresses to the 
German Nation represent the “central political-philosophical foundation of the German national 
idea.”4  In his Fourth Address to the German Nation, Fichte argued: 
The first and immediately obvious difference between the fortunes of the Germans and the other branches 
[i.e., the French] which grew from the same root is this: the former remained in the original dwelling places 
of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter emigrated to other places; the former retained and developed the 
original language of the ancestral stock, whereas the latter adopted a foreign language [i.e., Latin] and 
gradually reshaped it in a way of their own.5 
 
The most important of these qualities was the retention of the ancestral language,6 “the 
importance of which lies solely in the fact that this language continues to be spoken, for men are 
formed by the language far more than language is formed by men.”7  Later, in his Thirteenth 
Address, he notes that borders, that is 
the first, original, and truly natural boundaries of States are beyond doubt their internal boundaries. Those 
who speak the same language are joined to each other by a multitude of invisible bonds by nature herself, 
long before any human art begins; they understand each other and have the power of continuing to make 
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themselves understood more and more clearly, they belong together and are by nature one and inseparable 
whole. … From this internal boundary, which is drawn by the spiritual nature of man himself, the marking 
of the external boundary by dwelling-place results as a consequence; and in the natural view of things is it 
not because men dwell between certain mountains and rivers that they are a people, but, on the contrary, 
men dwell together—and, if their luck has so arranged it, are protected by rivers and mountains—because 
they were a people already by a law of nature which is much higher.8 
 
It is, of course, unlikely that Fichte was addressing the Dutch along with the German 
nation. He certainly never explicitly states that the Netherlands and the Dutch people are part of 
the German nation he envisions, nor does he give a concrete idea of where, exactly, the “internal 
borders” are manifested in the natural world.9  But when one considers it, the Dutch do fit all of 
the qualities Fichte mentions.  Like the Germans, the Dutch remained in their ancestral lands. 
Like German, the Dutch language was not heavily influenced by Latin. Dutch, like other West 
Germanic languages, exists in what was once a dialect continuum that stretched from the North 
Sea south and east into present-day Austria, only breaking down in the modern period through 
the standardization of Dutch and German into separate languages, although they retain a very 
limited mutual intelligibility even to this day. In Fichte’s time, this mutual intelligibility would 
have been much greater, that is, a Dutchman and a German, especially a German from what 
would become Northern Germany above the Uerdingen Line, very likely would have been able 
to “understand each other.” 10   
Although Fichte’s arguments about “truly natural boundaries” likely did not include the 
Low Countries, his student, Ernst Moritz Arndt was of a completely different mindset. Arndt 
argued that the true and correct borders of a future German national state should encompass all 
of the territories that were inhabited by Germanic language speakers, that is, in the south the 
border should stand “at the Alps of Italy and at the Ardennes of France … in the west, the North 
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Sea encompasses [the border].”11  According to Arndt, it was the wars of the French Revolution 
that “snatched away the magnificent lands around the Rhine, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the 
Scheldt, [the] original and ancient land of the German tongue, of German freedom and the 
national tribe.”12  All too easily Germans had let these territories be lost to the future national 
state, as they were unaware of the territories’ value, meaning, and the importance.13  For Arndt, 
the value and meaning of these lands was self-evident, as 
the long history of the Fatherland proves, that the Rhenish lands, Swabia, and Westphalia are the heart and 
core of the German people, that from there all of the best and most genuine that is German has begun … 
Here the original Germany, formerly the center and the strength of the empire, is still the center of German 
life and German custom, here is an inexhaustible treasure of German custom, language, and history.14 
 
The ultimate goal in Arndt’s writing is clear: “the two shores of the Rhine, and the surrounding 
lands and people must be as German as they once were; the stolen land and people must be 
reconquered to the Fatherland.”15   
If the Rhine and our torn-off lands are regained by the help of God, and added to the German Reich, so it is 
desirable that the mighty German princes, Austria, and Prussia, especially Alsace, the Netherlands, and so 
much else of Habsburg and Burgundian heritage [are too].16 
 
He would continue on this path for some time. In his 1815 work Ueber Preussens 
Rheinische Mark und über Bundesfestungen Arndt notes that “the Rhine delta is shielded by 
Holland and Belgium, which are nothing more than outposts of Germany, being a bastion of the 
same, and which must always stand or fall with Germany.” By 1831, Arndt was dedicating entire 
works specifically to the place of the Netherlands and surrounding territories in the future 
German national state. In his Die Frage der Niederlande und die Rheinlande he argues, just as 
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before, that the Low Countries were once and should be again a part of a future Germany and 
that he was not alone in this thought either; rather, the political classes, the scientists, linguists, 
and historians were all said to be united in the idea that the people of the Low Countries were 
“almost more German than Germans.”17  To his credit, by this point in his life he was willing to 
allow that the people of the Low Countries were somewhat different from the Germans 
themselves, although he was not yet willing to admit that it really mattered: 
We said: Of course, the Burgundian lands [i.e., the Low Countries] have become somewhat strange to us in 
more than one way, they have not felt themselves a part of Germany since long before the French period … 
but they should and must become more German-like.18 
 
Fichte and Arndt were two of the first German intellectuals to define Germany not only 
by physical borders but through the people that inhabited it—the Volk. Men like Fichte and 
Arndt “conceived of the volk in heroic terms … [it] symbolized the desired unity beyond [the] 
contemporary reality” of dynastic states.19  In a very similar vein to these two thinkers was 
Friedrich Jahn. Jahn is best known as an early proponent of gymnastics and student fraternities. 
In both of these areas, Jahn would profoundly influence later generations of völkisch thinkers, 
who adopted almost wholesale many of Jahn’s beliefs about the importance of “Germanic unity” 
as exhibited through the youth and healthy bodies.20  Like Arndt, however, Jahn also notes in his 
1810 Deutsches Volksthum, that of the many German peoples, the four that were most different 
from the rest were the Swiss, Dutch, Prussians, and Austrians, suggesting that he, too, saw the 
Dutch as merely another variant of the German people.21  Recounting the importance of the 
“shameful Peace of Westphalia,” he further notes that “it was unlucky because the Dutch 
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Republic and the Swiss Confederacy completely removed themselves from us. The Rhine then 
ceased to be the old German Schutzstrom because at its source and mouth there lived in these 
lands of nature henceforth only German half-brothers.”22   
The view of the Netherlands as a[n errant] constituent part of Germany was not limited to 
romantic writers like Fichte, Arndt, and Jahn. Rather, it was more widespread among the German 
intelligentsia.  In his 1841 Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, Friedrich List, who 
was certainly a German nationalist, but not usually counted among the romantic predecessors of 
later völkisch intellectuals, argues that “by spirit and custom, by the descent and language of 
their inhabitants, as through political connection and geographical location, Holland, Flanders, 
and Brabant were parts of the German Reich.”23  Although he freely admits that the Dutch had 
made themselves an independent nationality by the time of his writing, he was not very happy 
about it, even if only from a utilitarian, economic, and power-political point of view: 
If Charles V had thrown off the crown of Spain as one casts a stone that threatens to draw us into the abyss, 
what a different destiny would have arisen for the Dutch and the Germans! As Regent of the United 
Netherlands, as German Emperor, and as pilot of the Reformation, Charles possessed all of the material and 
spiritual resources to found the most powerful industrial and commercial empire, the largest naval and land 
power ever to exist—a naval power stretching from Dunkirk to Riga would have united all the sails under a 
single flag! … If Holland, united with Belgium, with the drainage basin of the Rhine, and with Northern 
Germany, had built a national territory, it would have been difficult for England and France to succeed in 
weakening its naval power, its foreign commerce, and its internal industry in the manner that it happened. 
… Holland, therefore, fell because a piece of the coast, inhabited by a small number of German fishermen, 
sailors, merchants, and ranchers, wished to form a national power for itself, and regarded the hinterlands, 
with which it constituted a whole, as a foreign land.24 
 
List does not limit himself to what could have been, either. He fully argues for a national unity 
between the Dutch and German peoples of his day: 
However, from our national point of view, we say and assert that Holland is, according to its geographical 
position as well as its commercial and industrial relations and the descent and language of its inhabitants a 
German province that was separated from Germany in times of national discord, [and] without its 
reincorporation into the German confederation, Germany is comparable to a house whose door belongs to a 
stranger. Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany or Normandy belong to France, and as long as 
Holland wishes to form her own independent empire, Germany can only have as much power and 
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independence as France would have been able to achieve if those provinces had remained in English hands. 
… Holland, as it has descended from its heights as a commercial power, because it—the mere part of a 
nation—wanted to allege itself as a whole, because it sought its advantages in the suppression and 
weakness of the productive forces of Germany, instead of basing its greatness on the prosperity of the 
hinterlands, upon which every riverine state stands or falls—because it sought to become great through 
separation from Germany instead of union with the same—Holland can only bloom again through the 
German Union and with the closest connection to the same.25 
 
List’s work on political economy was written only one year after the Rhine Crisis of 
1840, which saw French prime minister Adolphe Thiers threaten to invade the Rhineland in 
order to secure France’s “natural borders” after a French diplomatic setback over France’s 
support of Egypt’s Muhammad Ali Pasha, who had attempted to carve out a personal empire 
within the Ottoman realms. The crisis awoke among German nationalists a renewal of anti-
French resentment that had pervaded the earliest decades of the century.26  Patriotic songs, such 
as Die Wacht am Rhein and the Rheinlied, were written by German poets to contest France’s 
threats of hegemony over the Rhineland. But perhaps the most famous of all such songs was Das 
Lied der Deutschen, written in 1841 by August Heinrich Hoffmann von Fallersleben. In the 
song, Hoffmann von Fallersleben includes in the territory over which Germany would prevail 
lands in the West “from the Meuse,” which necessarily included large sections of the Dutch-
speaking Low Countries. A few years later, the German poet Johan Wilhelm Wolff published a 
short poem in De Broederhand noting the close ethnic ties between the Germans and the Dutch-
speaking Flemish: 
Because German and Flemish are closely related 
As close as right and left hand 
And German is German, whether high or low 
That rings from the Scheldt to the Danube and back.27 
 
The Rhine Crisis also spurred Wolfgang Menzel, a conservative historian of the age, to 
publish Die westliche Grenzfrage, which was originally incorrectly attributed to the elder Helmut 
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von Moltke.28  In his 1841 essay, Menzel supports the notion that the language border is the only 
true, natural border, rather than the geographical borders that France had attempted to gain for 
centuries. He notes that the language border between French and German stretches from Calais 
mostly eastward to about Maastricht until turning back southwest to encompass large parts of 
what is today Eastern Belgium and the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine.29   
Everything now west of the designated borderline speaks either Welsh or French; everything that lies to the 
east of it speaks German, and this language boundary has preserved itself, with hardly any noticeable 
changes, as far as the memory of history reaches, for over a thousand years. ... If one starts from the 
national point of view and makes the language the natural border of the nations, then the whole Rhine with 
its whole left and right bank belongs to us, because in the whole river area of the Rhine German has been 
spoken for fourteen centuries.30 
 
In the same issue of the Deutsche Vierteljahrs Schrift that Menzel’s essay appeared, a later essay 
by an author who gives his or her name only as E.D. argues that Holland had ripped itself away 
from Germany with its education and visions of gold and hegemony across the seas, and it had 
wisely raised its “provincial dialect [into] a written language.”31  The following decades would 
see the language border that was so important to men like Fichte, Arndt, and Menzel put onto 
maps by cartographers like Johann Kutscheid, Heinrich Kiepert, and Richard Böckh. These men, 
using statistics, determined where, exactly, the line between the French west and south and the 
German north and east lay.32  The Netherlands were, of course, considered to be part of the 
“lower German language area.”33 
The idea of the Low Countries as a German territory would only pick up momentum 
among German nationalists as the nineteenth century progressed and the völkisch movement 
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came into its own.34  It was, in fact, Arndt’s student Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl who could be called 
the intellectual father of the völkisch movement in Germany, for it was Riehl’s ideas, more than 
any other individual of his age, that would be subsumed into the corpus of völkisch thought. 
Riehl was especially concerned with landscapes and the ordering of society, for it was in nature 
and a close connection with the land that society found its fullest expression. Naturally enough, 
this meant, for Riehl, that the ideal society was that of the Middle Ages, connected as it was to 
agriculture and working the soil. The social division of society into peasants and aristocracy was 
as natural as the division of the land between the forests and the fields. The question of the newer 
estates, the middle-class burgers and especially the workers, was more problematic for Riehl. 
The merchants and tradesmen of the middle classes were problematic for disrupting the idyll of 
the volk’s connection to the land. But even they were afforded a place of honor within the volk if 
they could trace their heritage back to one of the small German hometowns. Similarly, workers 
who lived and worked in harmony with their employers could also find an honored place, in 
much the same way that the medieval guilds had operated with apprentices, journeymen, and 
masters all, at least theoretically, forming a sort of harmony among themselves. It was this sort 
of mental gymnastics that allowed Riehl to praise Robert Owen’s utopian socialist settlement at 
New Lanark—in Riehl’s eyes Owen was a sort of happy patriarch and the workers his children—
while at the same time saving his disdain for the rootless proletariat of the large cities. These 
workers, unlike those who were connected to the land and thus the volk, were disconnected from 
the land and therefore an enemy to be destroyed.35   
Riehl, of course, also viewed the Netherlands as a constituent part of the German nation. 
In his 1854 work Land und Leute, Riehl notes that “the history of Holland is a piece of German 
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history,” but that “Holland has a shorter memory than the German people.”36  But it is in his 1869 
Wanderbuch that the Netherlands receives its fullest treatment.37  Quickly in the first chapter, 
Riehl gets to some of his most important points. Holland and Germany are different, and one can 
see this quickly as one crosses the border. He takes as his comparison the neighboring towns of 
Nijmegen and Kleve, which are: 
hardly three miles apart, but in character of their people lie a world apart, although the villages of Prussian 
Geldern and Kleve are remarkably related to the neighboring Dutch villages.  This state is explained by the 
fact that the original national character, as the peasant most faithfully preserves, was a common one, 
whereas the course of political culture culminating in the cities had torn Holland and Germany apart for 
three centuries.38 
 
But this separate political culture that the Dutch created for themselves was a result of German 
weakness. In the future, the German peoples would reunite into one giant state, including all its 
constituent parts: 
It is therefore not necessary to think of a conquest of Holland and German Switzerland. A nation like 
Germany, once it has regained its full strength and health, will once again attract the formerly detached 
elements ethnographically and then politically. We are and will remain destined to become a federated 
people, and since the old federation is broken, I can only imagine a great German future in the form of a 
larger and more powerful new federation in which the Nordbund, the Südbund, German Austria, German 
Switzerland and Holland form the organic limbs.39 
 
Similar to the villages and people themselves, the Dutch language is, and is not at the same time, 
a German dialect, according to Riehl: 
The Dutch language also leads us out to sea, legitimizing itself solely in the face of the sea. I want to be 
more explicit about this phrase, which sounds strange. It is a bone of contention between Germans and 
Dutchmen, whether the Dutch language still today can be regarded as a mere Low German dialect, albeit 
very independently pronounced and firmly established, or as its own national language, which has long 
since broken through the former barriers of a mere dialect. The literature, as a preliminary point the poetic, 
does not decide in favor of the Dutch. The fame and importance of the Dutch poets is rooted only in their 
narrower homeland, and they share the lot of dialect poets, who are studied abroad at most for 
ethnographic, cultural and linguistic interest, but who are not translated and read because they are poets 
[one] must read. Neither in poetry nor in the art of prose did Holland gain a place in world literature … But 
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across the ocean the Dutch language was attested by trade and shipping and colonialism, and by being 
spoken in the East Indies and in South Africa, and indeed new territory conquered recently.40 
 
Riehl’s stated goal in his Wanderbuch was to “lose his way” as he traveled the 
countryside between the German and Dutch frontiers, for it is in these intermediary, otherwise 
uninteresting small towns and villages, places like Kleve, Geldern, Goch, and Kevelaer, “these 
regions of transition and apparent indifference that first teach us to recognize countries and 
peoples as organisms, connected with limbs; they are the first that open for us the correct 
understanding of the totality of the life of the volk.”41  It was during these wanderings that Riehl 
recognized “how inseparable even today Holland has grown together with Lower Germany.” But 
to even flesh out the full roster of connections between the two peoples and lands would require 
a full scale ethnographic, geographic, and cultural history of Northwestern Europe, including 
Belgium, 
for one cannot fully show how German Holland is, if one does not at the same time show how German the 
greater part of Belgium must be considered even to this day. … It is not nature that separates us, but 
politics. From the centers of both countries, it is easy for everyone to notice the difference that has been 
made over the centuries. On the periphery we find—and this is more difficult—the natural context. All true 
statesmanship should return to nature: the first stage of this journey is the is lived experience of land and 
people through wandering.42 
 
Riehl’s work on the relations between the Netherlands and Germany was meant to stress 
the close relationship between the Dutch and German peoples, and in it, a mostly complete 
völkisch view of that relationship is exhibited.43  Through shared language, social customs, 
religion, and industry—Riehl even takes time out to discuss wooden shoes, that archetype of the 
Netherlands, and their cross-border use44—the two countries are separated not in spirit but only 
in politics. But this is, in Riehl’s view, an artificial construct, for the statesmen of the day, 
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whether in the Prussian capital of Berlin or the Dutch administrative capital of The Hague, did 
not conduct the right kind of politics. Divorced from nature as they were, these politicians could 
not see the forest but for the trees. But as Riehl opined, one day, in the future, that would all 
change, for the natural custom of the German people was federation, best conceived as an 
organism in which the various branches of the Germanic family are little more than limbs of a 
body. 
In addition to his ethnographic work, Riehl was also important for his influence on 
educational reform. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, German educational reformers 
pushed for and succeeded in introducing the subject of Heimatkunde into German schools. Not 
easily translated, but vaguely meaning local studies, Heimatkunde called for education to 
emphasize the German people’s connection to the earth as well as the notion that their customs 
came ipso facto from that very connection.45  Although Heimatkunde did not always necessarily 
emphasize a völkisch view of the world,46 in practice it often did.47  Over the course of the last 
two decades of the nineteenth century, the very idea of the Heimat, its glorification through 
historical societies, museums, and the study of local folklore, was made into a “mediator 
between the local place and the nation [that] … in imperial Germany transformed into an actual 
representation of the nation.”48  The idea of Heimat was an “invented memory” that transformed 
German towns into a state of timelessness, ever connected to the past. Responding to the rapidly 
changing society they saw around them, “Germans manufactured Heimat as a set of shared ideas 
about the immemorial heritage of the German people in local and national history, nature, and 
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folklore.”49  And although the creation of this idea of Heimat and the push for its study in schools 
was not necessarily anti-modern,50 it certainly did hark back to what many perceived to be a 
simpler time and age in a similar way to Riehl’s völkisch ideas during the mid-century, with its 
emphasis on the land and people who inhabited it. Like the physical education exalted by Father 
Jahn, Heimatkunde would become a central element to the educational and pedagogical 
philosophy of National Socialism in the second quarter of the twentieth century. 
In the 1860s and 1870s, as the German nationalist dream of a German nation-state 
became a reality, little changed in the nationalist wing of German politics as regarded the place 
of the Netherlands. The towering figure of the age in the German historical discipline was 
Heinrich von Treitschke. Treitschke, like many other intellectuals before him, had much to say 
about the Netherlands. In his 1869 essay, Die Republik der Vereinigten Niederlande, Treitschke 
notes that the Netherlands: 
This great power without land was and remains an anomaly; it fed on the misfortune of the neighboring 
peoples; it possessed only the rapidly dwindling vitality of a small state, not that happy gift of rejuvenating 
itself, with which great nations victoriously pass through all the storms of history. … The country, which 
united the commerce of all the world in its hands, saw a natural enemy in every nation that awoke to strong 
self-confidence, but its most dangerous rivals were the two Protestant powers [Great Britain and Prussia]. 
Germany's weakness was Holland's strength; the position of the small state at the head of Protestant Central 
Europe immediately swayed as soon as an independent Protestant power rose up.51 
 
As far as Treitschke was concerned, the Netherlands was an unnatural state that could only 
survive through the weakness of more natural states like Great Britain, France, and Germany. Its 
very status as an independent state in the first place had been as much a result of the chaos in 
Germany during the Thirty Years’ War as it had been its own drive for independence from 
Spain.52  Its second independence, this time from French hegemony in the wake of Napoleon, 
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was the result, not of Dutchmen liberating themselves—that was a fairy tale—but of Germans 
(and Russian “Cossacks”) doing the work for them.53 
But that was all in the past. The future held a different place for the Netherlands, 
according to Treitschke. The following year, in his famous work Was fordern wir von 
Frankreich, Treitschke laid bare his thoughts about the contemporary Dutch state: 
It is not the object of this national policy to force every strip of German soil which we ever gave up in the 
days of our weakness, back again into our new Empire. … We have no desire to interfere with the separate 
life of that branch of the German stock which has grown up in the Netherlands into a small independent 
nation. But we cannot permit a German people, thoroughly degraded and debased, to serve against 
Germany, before our eyes, as the vassal of a foreign power.54 
 
He stopped short of calling for outright annexation of the Netherlands, but it was clear that the 
Low Countries must, in his eyes, serve Germany’s interests, not those of other states. Moreover, 
his pamphlet began to sound similar to Arndt—whom he quoted regarding the Rhine being a 
German river but not Germany’s boundary55—when Treitschke claimed that the new German 
state should have its “western frontier indicated to it by the language and manners and life of the 
rural population.”56  He was, in this instance, discussing Alsace and Lorraine but it would not 
take long for Treitschke to set his eyes on the place of the Netherlands. This was, in fact, only a 
step along the path to Treitschke’s final destination: the incorporation of the Netherlands into the 
German Empire. 
In a lecture given to his students at the University of Berlin sometime in the 1880s or 
early 1890s,57 which was copied down and published in 1897, Treitschke could not have been 
clearer on his view of the Dutch people and their little nation: 
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Holland was transformed from a tribe into a nation through a political struggle in which we unfortunately 
left it in the lurch and made its sailor’s dialect with full consciousness a literary language. ... Thus, in the 
West a number of outposts [i.e., the Netherlands and Switzerland] of the empire have developed into 
independent states. That at least Holland once again returns to the old fatherland is [both] possible and 
urgently desired.58 
 
The culmination of a century of German thought regarding the place of the Netherlands, 
from Fichte through Arndt, Jahn, Menzel, Riehl, and Treitschke, can be found in the writing of 
the völkisch, nationalist German historian Julius Langbehn. All of the previously discussed 
intellectuals saw, for either reasons of language and culture or for reasons of state, the need for 
the Netherlands to be a part of Germany, but Germany was always to be the senior partner. 
Langbehn, in his work Rembrandt als Erzieher, turns the tables entirely and views the 
Netherlands, not as a breakaway German province needing reincorporation into Germany, but 
rather as the source of nearly all that is good and decent in the modern world. To be certain, 
Langbehn desires a union between Germany and the Netherlands, but he sees the benefit for 
Germany not in control of the Rhine or the North Sea coast, but in the infusion of all things 
Dutch and the advantages that would bring. Lying where the North Sea “kisses” Germany, 
Holland is a true Heimat of which to be proud, for it is a nation of farmers connected to the land, 
where earth and the smell of sludge permeates the life of the people.  Even the capital was until 
recently little more than a village. “The Dutch are from a special batch; they are sea farmers, as 
the Greeks once were; therewith they are both closely related and at the same time foreign to the 
continental Lower Germans.”59  The conservatism of Northern Germans would do well with an 
injection of Dutch liberalism. But this was a specific German type of liberalism that included 
“the fight for ancient rights … [which are] individual and not doctrinaire, national and not party-
political.” A combination of Dutch liberalism and Prussian conservatism would “lead to true 
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freedom.” Furthermore, the Dutch, more than any other branch of the German family tree, have 
succeeded in state-craft and commercial activity precisely because they understand freedom in 
the correct way—the preservation of their völkisch character.60 
Not only that, but the Dutch had already had an immeasurable impact upon Prussia, 
according to Langbehn. In the olden days, Prussia was partially settled by Dutchmen, and this 
showed even in Langbehn’s time. The Prussian royal house was partially of Dutch origin; even 
Frederick-William the Great Elector was partially educated in Holland, and he brought back 
Dutch technology with him to Berlin. The Great Elector was a constant testament to the “lasting 
connection to the ethnically related Lower German states.”61  King Frederick-William I also had 
a deep connection to the Netherlands. His favorite city, Potsdam, “the most Prussian of all 
Prussian cities,” was built in a Dutch style, and even its name was, according to Langbehn, a 
tribute to Amsterdam.62  What was true of Potsdam, was also true of many other northern 
German cities, including Hamburg, Danzig, Dresden, and Magdeburg; even Berlin once had 
canals just like Amsterdam. “All of northern Germany is filled with a spirit that was directly 
descended from, or closely related to the Netherlands.”63   
In his work, Langbehn exhibits a love affair with the Dutch people and their state, and 
like any true love, he hopes that the relationship will end in marriage. This marriage between 
Prussia and the Netherlands was necessary for “such a marriage would carry long-lasting and 
beautiful fruits. Orange blood is the wedding jewelry; the tried and true saying ‘Oranje boven’ 
would be with a—political—wedding between Germany and the sea, the appropriate wedding 
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jewelry.”64  If, as Langbehn desired, Prussia were to return to the soil as farmers, then they might 
as well also submit to “Dutchification.”65  Just as the royal house has been, so too should the 
German volk be “Dutchified.”  Even better yet, “Germany could best put an end to Holland’s 
fears of annexation, by letting it be annexed by Holland.”66 
Although Langbehn was, by far, the most enthusiastic of German intellectuals, whether 
völkisch-minded or not, regarding the relationship between the Netherlands and Germany, he 
was by no means the last. Toward the end of the century, völkisch thinkers adopted the concept 
of Lebensraum from the German academic Friedrich Ratzel. Ratzel’s views of the nation-state do 
not fit squarely into the völkisch mold. Like many previous thinkers, Ratzel viewed the nation-
state as needing space to grow and succeed. Those states without such room were destined to 
fail. In this need for space to grow and thrive, Ratzel also argued, like his more völkisch 
colleagues, that nations were living organisms, but for Ratzel, the most important element of any 
volk was that it was spatially contained, ethnicity and character were nice, but not necessary.67  
As nations grow, their living space must also grow for the nation to remain healthy. On the 
radical-nationalist wing of German politics, Ratzel’s ideas about the need for expansion in living 
space were most vociferously championed by the Pan-German League. The League was most 
heavily focused on Germany’s eastern borderlands, where Slavs often outnumbered Germans, 
and, after the First World War, the large numbers of Germans who lived in the successor states 
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of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires. But the League members did occasionally also 
turn their attention to Germany’s western borders.68 
Pan-German League member and former German General Staff officer Friedrich von 
Bernhardi notes in his 1911 Deutschland und der nächste Krieg that: 
The German Empire has suffered great losses of territory in the storms and struggles of the past. The 
Germany of today, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old dominions of the Emperors; it 
comprises only a fraction of the German peoples. A large number of German fellow-countrymen have been 
incorporated into other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a 
separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany 
has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristically 
German river, the much-lauded German Rhine, lie outside the German territory.69 
 
Perhaps the most direct threat against the independence of the Netherlands (and Belgium) by a 
League member came from Heinrich Class’s 1913 work Wenn ich der Kaiser wär. In it he goes 
on at length about the future decision the two small states would have to make regarding a 
coming European war. Of course, he believed, they would make “the same mistake” that 
Hannover, Electoral Hessen, and Nassau made in the 1866 conflict between Prussia and Austria, 
that is take the wrong side, but “they cannot be surprised, if the consequences [incorporation into 
the German Reich] are the same.”70  But Class did not base his opinions only on the ethnic 
relations between the people of the Low Countries and Germany, in fact, he disregarded that 
aspect entirely, arguing that the independence of these peoples and the cultures they had 
developed would be a detriment to Germany’s future.71  Rather, it was pure strategic calculus that 
led Class, for the Rhine river must be in German hands. He thus determined that Germany should 
offer the Low Countries the free choice of either siding with the Reich or against it: 
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If they [Belgium and the Netherlands] decide for us, accepting reason at the last moment, they save their 
state independence in the sense in which the individual states of the German Reich possess it; If they strike 
for the other side, they will be annexed.72 
 
Of course, their colonies would also suffer the same fate, with the administration of those distant 
lands falling to the bureaucrats in Berlin.73 
Thus, already by the beginning of the First World War, there was a long-standing history 
in Germany of viewing the Netherlands as a sort of lost child ready to be returned to its 
Germanic family. The reasons for this generally came from either the ethnic, völkisch point of 
view or from questions of pure strategic calculus, but either way, they were relatively common 
views in German nationalist circles.74 Officially, the Netherlands remained neutral during the 
Great War, but that did not keep German planners from including the Dutch into their hoped-for 
post-war settlement. Although it was to remain independent, German Chancellor Bethmann-
Hollweg argued early in the war, when German victories were still fresh in recent memory, that 
the Netherlands must remain politically independent, yet completely dependent in all other ways 
upon the German Reich, including a customs union and the stationing of German troops at key 
points, such as the mouth of the Scheldt River in the Province of Zeeland. Belgium, for its part, 
was to be become “economically a German province,” with some areas to be annexed to the 
Reich directly.75 Of course, these plans for the Low Countries were never realized as the war 
effort turned against Germany and forced its surrender to the Allies in November 1918. 
Defeat in war would not remove Germans’ interests in the Low Countries, however. 
After the end of the First World War, two largely new developments emerged in the academic 
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world—the academic subject of Dutch Studies and the larger, interdisciplinary field of 
Westforschung. Both of these developments marked a sharper concentration among academics 
and independent scholars regarding the relationship of the Netherlands and its people to 
Germany specifically and the relations between the peoples and nations of Western Europe and 
the western German borderlands more generally. Research in both Dutch Studies and the 
Westforschung included, but was by no means limited to, völkisch thinkers, although several of 
the völkisch thinkers who worked in these areas would go on to participate in cultural projects in 
occupied Western Europe during the Second World War. 
The study of the Low Countries, as an academic discipline, had its roots in the pre-war 
period; it was only following the end of the Great War that the study of the politics, ethnography, 
geography, history, and culture of the Low Countries—subsumed under the name 
Niederlandistik—would actually become established, albeit not firmly. Johannes Frank began the 
modern study of the Netherlands in German universities in the late nineteenth century, but 
focused mostly on language, publishing works such as a modern Dutch dictionary and a 
grammar book. He was followed at Bonn, after his death, by Theodor Frings, who was promoted 
to Ordinarius in 1919, although Frings moved on to Leipzig in 1923. Dutch Studies was not 
picked up again by a Professor Ordinarius at Bonn until 1964. The only other Professor of Dutch 
Studies in Germany was located at Frankfurt am Main in the person of M.J. van der Meer, a 
Dutchman. Van der Meer was appointed Professor Extraordinarius in 1920 and then in 1921 
became head of Holland Institute, but never attained the rank for Ordinarius before his death in 
1931, shortly after which the Holland Institute dissolved. Otherwise, there were no professors of 
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Netherlandistic in all Germany, although lecturers could be found at Berlin, Hamburg, Münster, 
Göttingen, Kiel, and Cologne.76   
At Cologne, there were actually two lecturers, Dr. Edda Tille-Hankamer and Dr. Karl 
Menne. After Tille-Hankamer left Cologne for a position at Wellesley in the mid-1920s, and in 
an effort to increase his own standing, Menne, along with his friends—the lawyer Franz 
Schönberg and Robert Paul Oszwald, who worked for the Prussian archive in Potsdam—agitated 
for the creation of an institute similar to the Holland Institute at Frankfurt. The result was the 
Deutsch-Niederländische Institut.77  Proposed originally in 1927, it was only opened in 1931 
through the financial support of the university, the city of Cologne (the university there was a 
public university governed, in part, by the city), and the Dutch government. According to the 
original founders, the purpose of the institute was to be overtly political. As Schönberg put it to 
the Rector of the University of Cologne in 1927: 
As a North Sea-Baltic state, it [Prussia] is called upon to seek the state unification of the entire Germanic 
cultural area encircled by the Germanic Mediterranean [the North and Baltic Seas] under the leadership of 
mainland Germany. Of all the continental Germanics, only the Dutch have developed their own written 
language deviating from the common German written language and have thereby separated themselves 
from the rest of Germandom. Today it is idle to bemoan this fact. It must be accepted as fact. The Dutch, of 
all Germanic peoples most closely related to and direct neighbors to the Germans, represent the bridge 
leading from Germandom to the Germanic nation. If Prussia, if Germany wants to politically unite the 
Germanic cultural sphere under its leadership, then the approach to and alignment of the Dutch nation must 
begin.78 
 
Because of opposition on the part of the Dutch government, the original desire to include 
a research focus on the Flemish portions of Belgium was dropped from the program, while 
opposition from anti-völkisch participants in the venture, not the least of whom was the then 
Mayor of Cologne, Konrad Adenauer, an explicitly völkisch orientation was also avoided. 
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Nonetheless, from the very beginning of the institute, two groups of scholars coalesced there, 
one of which was led by Menne and disseminated an ardently völkisch-oriented research 
program.79  Menne came down with an illness in the mid-1930s and passed away in 1936. He 
was replaced by Dr. Franz Petri. Petri was really the more successful scholar and managed to 
assemble around him a larger cohort of students and like-minded thinkers receptive to his 
völkisch understanding of Dutch and Belgian history.80   
Over the life of the institute, the völkisch tendencies of the faculty would wax and wane 
as scholars joined and left the institute. By 1937, the Nazi government started to exert more 
control over the activities of the institute, forcing the chair to resign because of his “non-Aryan” 
wife. Although the newly installed director, Dr. Hans Kaufmann, was sympathetic to the non-
völkisch side, the appointment of Petri to the position of managing director more or less balanced 
the two groups out. With the appointment of Dr. Walter von Stokar to a professorship in Ancient 
History at Cologne, the affairs of the institute became even more closely watched. Stokar, who 
was trained as an apothecary, gained his position at Cologne due to his close contacts with SS 
functionaries in Berlin.81 His professorship at Cologne was not directly tied to the institute, but 
because he himself was interested in the Netherlands, he involved himself with the activities of 
the institute, much to the chagrin of the non-völkisch group of scholars resident there.82 
With the outbreak of the war in Poland, the institute briefly closed when its rooms were 
turned into a hospital for wounded soldiers. By the time that the institute reopened, the focus was 
placed on preparing appropriate experts for their future roles as occupiers in the Low Countries, 
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even though the invasion had not yet taken place. Several months later, when the Germans did 
invade the Low Countries, the largest portion of the völkisch group were installed in Belgium as 
occupiers. Petri, for example, was responsible for university education and cultural nazification 
in occupied Belgium under the military government that was formed there. Back in Cologne, Dr. 
von Stokar was tasked with leading the institute, until he too was sent to the Netherlands for 
occupation work, where he worked in Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat.83 
Although the institute at Cologne was the only specifically academic organization that 
focused exclusively on Netherlandistic, it was part of a much wider network of scholars and 
independent researchers who focused on the Western borderlands of Germany, subsumed under 
the title Westforschung. The Westforschung did not focus exclusively on the Netherlands, nor 
was it limited to particular research methods. Rather, it was entirely interdisciplinary and 
evolved in the early 1920s at various German universities, especially at Bonn and Cologne, when 
scholars there began to collaborate with each other and their colleagues in other countries with 
the help of significant support given by the Weimar and later Nazi governments.84 Scholars 
associated with the Westforschung as a whole spanned the political and ideological landscape, 
but significant numbers aligned themselves with the völkisch wing of German politics.85   
So for example, Dr. Eduard Schulte, an archivist at the City Archive in Münster, 
researched the relationship between the Germanic nations of Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland and their relationship to the Holy Roman Empire through a specifically völkisch 
lens, specifically as they related to the 1648 Peace of Münster that, among other things, marked 
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legal recognition of Dutch independence.86  At the same time, the historian and archivist Robert 
Paul Oszwald published his Deutsch-Niederländische Symphonie, which focused on the close 
cultural and linguistic ties of between Germans, the Dutch, and especially the Flemish as groups 
of a larger Germanic peoples.87  Alternatively, some scholars started out with more völkisch 
beliefs, but through their research came to questions these understandings of Western European 
peoples. Such was the case for Josef Schmithüsen, whose studies of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg eventually caused him to distance himself from his original belief regarding 
Luxembourg’s place within the larger German nation, although not enough to argue against its 
incorporation into the Reich during the Second World War.88 
Conclusion 
When the Nazis came to power, they stepped into a world in which the German 
nationalist and völkisch right, supported in many cases by German academics, already saw much 
of Western Germany’s neighboring peoples as “Lower German” rather than independent 
nationalities. It is, therefore, little surprise that the Nazis kept moving in the very same direction. 
Hitler made his plans clear to his chief architect, Albert Speer shortly before the 1937 Party 
Congress: “We will create a great empire. All the Germanic peoples will be included in it. It will 
begin in Norway and extend to northern Italy.”89  Expansion started, first, with the annexation of 
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Austria in 1938 and the annexation of the Czech portions of Czechoslovakia the following year.  
On April 9, 1940, Hitler remarked to his subordinates, “Just as the German Empire emerged in 
1866, so will the Greater Germanic Reich emerge from the present day.”90  The invasions of 
Denmark and Norway began that very morning, and after their respective defeats, the Nazis 
turned on the Low Countries and France in May.  In each case, the decision to attack their 
“Germanic” neighbors was made for military strategic reasons. Norway was vital to the security 
of Swedish iron ore shipments, while Denmark protected the Baltic Sea and was a stepping stone 
to the rest of Scandinavia. The Netherlands was invaded preemptively, as the Germans expected 
the British would use Dutch airfields against industrial targets in the Ruhr, while Belgium was 
the main route into the heart of the primary enemy of the May campaign, France. 
Despite the military strategic impetus behind the invasions of the four countries, 
however, the Nazis very much planned to incorporate them into a Germanic Reich. In describing 
the sacrifice these populations would have to make, Hitler directly compared their fate to the fate 
of the formerly independent German states that made up the Kaiserreich and to the fate of the 
recently annexed Austria: 
I understand that it may be hard for a young Dutchman or a young Norwegian to find himself called upon 
to form a common unit, within the framework of the Reich, together with men of other Germanic 
connections. But what is asked of them is no harder than what … was asked of the countries that have 
formed the Second Reich, and to what we recently asked of the Austrians... When speaking to the 
Germanics of the northwest and north, one must always make it plain that what we're building is the 
Germanic Reich, or simply the Reich, with Germany constituting merely its most powerful source of 
strength, as much from the ideological as from the military point of view.91 
 
Himmler’s goal of creating an empire made up of the Germanic peoples of Europe was similarly 
expressed, albeit in a direr fashion, several years prior in a speech to SS officers: “I really intend 
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Zeitgeschichte 8, no. 1 (January 1, 1960): 39. Tellingly, both moments Hitler referred to were German invasions of 
Denmark. 
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to gather Germanic blood in the whole world, to rob and to steal. … What lies ahead for 
Germany is either the Greater Germanic empire, or oblivion.”92  During the occupation, Seyss-
Inquart put it slightly differently, but still effectively the same: 
The German national state idea found its fulfillment in 1938 in Greater Germany. Self-evidently Greater 
Germany is for natural reasons the core of the Germanic Empire, [but] this empire is not a mere 
enhancement of the Greater German Reich, but it is a [new] order that is designed for the sake of the entire 
race and [which] must be borne by the entire race.93 
 
Had he lived a century prior, Seyss-Inquart very well may have described the Greater German 
Reich just as Riehl had done, as a “new federation.” 
In this chapter, I have argued that the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands had a 
long pre-history in German thought. Since at least the Napoleonic period, German nationalist 
agitators have argued for the incorporation of the Netherlands into a German state. While the 
specific focuses of German thinkers and their reasoning behind their desires for an intimate 
relationship between the Dutch and German peoples often varied, these thinkers, especially those 
who espoused völkisch beliefs, nonetheless represent the foundations upon which the Nazi 
occupiers of the Netherlands would build during the Second World War. 
                                                 
92 Quoted in Heinrich Himmler, Heinrich Himmler, Geheimreden 1933 bis 1945 und andere Ansprachen, ed. 
Bradley F. Smith and Agnes F. Peterson (Berlin: Propyläen, 1974), 38n. 
93 Arthur Seyß-Inquart, Idee und Gestalt des Reiches, 1943. 
82 
 
Chapter 3 - Dutch Fascists, National Socialists, and their Educational Policies 
 
It is not our intention to break down the good that education in our country undoubtedly contains. However, it is 
necessary to carry out a radical revision, because the educational system in its honorable form is flawed with very 
large defects. - Anton Adriaan Mussert, 19381 
 
To this end, [students] must be educated in a spirit whereby the Dutch element is accentuated with all proper 
emphasis, but which does not obscure, the relationship with other peoples, in particular the German people. - Jan 
van Dam, December 1, 19402 
 
During the interwar period, several thinkers and agitators assembled around themselves 
like-minded individuals and formed the first fascist and national socialist oriented political 
parties in the Netherlands. Although there were several native, Dutch antecedents to these 
movements, by and large, the bulk of the ideologies espoused by these nascent fascist and 
national socialist groups came from abroad, especially Italy and Germany, for it was in those 
countries that much more organized and powerful interests had coalesced into large mass 
movements that had, whether in the early 1920s or the early 1930s, actually succeeded in 
attaining power and thus became models for emulation. Each of these Dutch groups combined, to 
a greater or lesser extent, elements from the Dutch (and Belgian) past with elements from their 
Italian and German models to create broadly similar political platforms in which ideological 
content differed more in degree of emphasis than in content. The relation of the Netherlands to 
Germany was one such area in which the various national socialist parties in the Netherlands 
differed in emphasis. Indeed, all Dutch Nazi parties agreed that the future of the Netherlands was 
bound up with that of Germany in some way, but the nature of that future relationship differed 
according to each party. 
Most Dutch Nazi parties, including the largest and most influential, the Nationaal-
Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (NSB), saw the future of the Dutch nation in the form of a 
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Greater Netherlands, that would encompass Dutch speaking peoples and their descendants 
around the globe, and that would work in concert with Germany as an equal partner in the new 
European order. Significant minorities, however, supported a more intimate relationship with 
Germany. This was especially true of a loosely organized group of Dutch völkisch thinkers and 
intellectuals who were, while not necessarily members of one of the organized Dutch Nazi 
parties, nonetheless supporters of many of the larger cultural and political goals of German-style 
National Socialism. 
In the education realm, by far the most important of these more independent thinkers was 
the Dutch, völkisch-oriented University of Amsterdam professor Jan van Dam.  After the 
Germans established their hegemony in the Netherlands in spring and summer 1940 and began 
their project of remaking Dutch society along more Germanic lines, Seyss-Inquart appointed van 
Dam to lead the newly created Department of Education, Science, Cultural Administration. In 
this role, van Dam would exercise the single greatest influence of any Netherlander on education 
during the German occupation. Although van Dam ultimately enjoyed the support of both the 
German occupation administration and several influential Dutch, völkisch thinkers, his 
conceptions of educational reform were strictly at odds with those of the NSB. 
The focus of this chapter is two-fold. First it traces the history and trajectory of the 
smaller national socialist groups in the Netherlands, beginning with their precursor groups and 
working toward the establishment and fortunes the NSB, which would, after the Germans 
established their control, become the only legal political party in the occupied Netherlands. But 
the success that the NSB experienced prior to the outbreak of war, as well as the model that 
German Nazism offered it in the 1930s, brought change and instability to the party. The 
established parties closed ranks against it and rival factions vied for supremacy from within the 
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NSB itself. On one side was the larger wing of the party that supported the Greater Netherlands 
ideology led by the party’s founder Anton Adriaan Mussert, while, on the other, was an 
increasingly influential völkisch bloc that was much more closely aligned with the German 
occupiers, and especially with the SS faction thereof. 
The second focus of this chapter is on the educational policies of the NSB and of Jan van 
Dam.  Consistent with its overtly nationalist message and desire for a measure of Dutch 
independence from the German Reich, the NSB program called for a specific mode of education 
known as the Three Pillars system that factored in the unique nature of Dutch history.  
Alternatively, van Dam favored a more unified educational apparatus that was much more in line 
with the type of education preferred by the German occupiers. Although their policies shared 
broad outlines, I argue that given the history of education in the Netherlands, especially the 
School Struggle of the nineteenth century, the educational “reforms” proposed by van Dam were 
almost certain to fail in the face of stiff opposition on the part of the Dutch populace.  At the 
same time, the educational designs of the NSB, while also very radical in nature, were more in 
line with the peculiar nature of Dutch society.  The German occupiers would, however, favor van 
Dam’s vision for the future of Dutch education, putting their efforts at a significant handicap 
from the outset. 
Native Dutch Fascist and National Socialist Movements during the Inter-War Period 
Extreme ideologies gained a foothold in many European countries during the inter-war 
period.  In the midst of a Russian defeat during the Great War, communist revolutionaries 
overthrew the Russian provisional government, instituted a dictatorship of the proletariat, and 
established the world’s first socialist state.  Germany, Hungary, and Italy all saw similar, albeit 
far less successful, communist uprisings after the war ended, while uncertainty and fear over the 
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perceived threat of a future communist uprising could be found in all nations across the 
continent.  In the Netherlands, the Dutch Communist party, the precursor of which had split from 
the Social-Democratic Workers’ Party3 in 1909 partly over issues of educational reform, never 
managed to gain a significant foothold among the electorate and was, for all intents and 
purposes, ignored by the established parties.4  The threat of communism was distant and the local 
working-class population appeared to have little interest in communist politics.5   
Anti-democratic movements could also be found on the extreme right wing of European 
politics.  In 1922, fascist revolutionaries attained power in Italy under Mussolini.  In 1933, the 
Nazis attained power in Germany, while a number of reactionary, authoritarian regimes 
established themselves in various countries in Eastern, Central, and Southern Europe.  The 
Netherlands was not immune to this trend, but unlike many of their neighbors, the Dutch people 
never gravitated towards these extreme ideologies in large numbers.  To be certain, the 
Netherlands did have its share of anti-democratic activists, especially following the expansion of 
the vote to all adults in the second decade of the twentieth century.  There could also be found in 
the Netherlands agitators who experienced the general malaise surrounding the societal and 
cultural changes that became prominent in fin-de-siècle Europe.6  While these early fascist 
parties were certainly reacting to events in the Netherlands, it was, first to Mussolini’s National 
Fascist Party, and then later to the German Nazi Party, that early Dutch fascists looked for 
                                                 
3 The forerunner of today’s Partij van de Arbeid, the Dutch Labor Party. 
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inspiration.  But to the extent that fascism and National Socialism were native movements in 
Italy and Germany, respectively, fascism as a distinct political philosophy in the Netherlands 
must be seen, primarily, as a foreign import.7   
Another aspect of German National Socialism was also, mostly, a foreign import into the 
Netherlands—biological racism. Much like Heine purportedly claimed of all things Dutch, 
scientific racism came late to the Netherlands and was not as quickly adsorbed by the academic 
community in the Netherlands as it was in other European countries and the United States. To be 
certain, eugenics did gain some traction in the Netherlands among a small subset of academics, 
but it was never seriously considered as governmental policy. Moreover, even among researchers 
and intellectuals, the eugenics movement, to the extent that it existed in the Netherlands, focused 
more on alcoholism and other hereditary conditions, not racial factors. Nor was there a large 
following for the idea of a greater Germanic community as was more common in Germany 
during the first part of the twentieth century. There were some proponents, such as the folklorist 
Dirk Jan van der Ven and Jan de Vries, professor of Old Germanic Languages at Leiden 
University, but they and their supporters were a very small minority, even among conservative, 
far-right, and fascist oriented individuals in the Netherlands. Much like fascism, the racist, 
völkisch ideology so prominent in Germany over the previous century, was primarily a foreign 
import in the Netherlands.8 
Historian A. A. De Jonge, in his history of National Socialism in the Netherlands, points 
to four groups that, while not proto-fascist themselves, did hold some views that would later be 
championed by Dutch fascists, and to that extent, could be seen as a native precursor to the 
movements of the 1920s and 1930s.  The first of these groups were the more conservative 
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elements of the classical liberal bloc, personified by J. H. Valckenier Kips. Valckenier Kips was 
an editor of a provincial newspaper in Utrecht and professor at the Technical University there, 
where he was able to spread his ideas among his engineering students.  These conservative 
liberals personified by Valckenier Kips feared the growing influence of socialism toward the end 
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.  For this reason, they opposed the 
further expansion of the vote, which they believed would further increase the pace of creation of 
the nascent welfare state.  As his politics evolved over the first decades of the twentieth century, 
Valckenier Kips argued for a removal of the liberal, democratic state and a return to governance 
by the monarch, who would appoint the government without consulting the Estates-General, as 
in the days of old. These appointed ministers could then work from outside of the party apparatus 
and on behalf of the entire people, thus returning the legislature to nothing more than an “organ, 
through which the government keeps in touch with the people.”9  Like many conservative 
liberals who became disaffected by parliamentary democracy and the increasing influence of the 
Social-Democratic Workers’ Party, Valckenier Kips eventually embraced fascism completely, 
joining first the NSB and then the Zwaarte Front in the 1930s.10 
A second group could be found surrounding the Leiden University Professor of 
Philosophy G. J. P. J. Bolland, who would later be described as the forefather of Dutch fascism.  
Bolland’s political views were very complex.  His philosophy was Hegelian at its base, and he 
supported a form of state absolutism in which the individual could only be fulfilled through the 
state.  Further Bolland was a convinced anti-Semite and opponent of Free Masonry.  Had he 
continued living, he himself might have played a more significant role in the fascist movements 
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of the 1920s, but his 1922 death meant that only his students could carry on his ideals.11  It also 
bears noting that Bolland was part of a much larger strain of Dutch culture that had always 
looked to Germany for new ideas in various aspects of life, but especially in politics and 
philosophy.  Whether liberal, radical, anti-revolutionary, or confessional, political operatives in 
the Netherlands often found inspiration in their neighbors to the east.  The cultural dynamic 
between German-speaking Central Europe (and later the German Empire) and the Netherlands 
was similar in nature to, although not as strong as, the cultural relationship between France and 
Belgium.  Regardless of the cultural influence that Germany, its thinkers, and its politicians have 
had upon the Netherlands, however, the cultural dependence of the Netherlands upon Germany 
should not be overstated, for while Dutch thinkers might have initially looked to Germany for 
inspiration, German culture and politics never dominated the Netherlands in the way that French 
culture and politics, and even the French language, dominated Belgium.12   
The third group de Jonge sees as a forerunner to Dutch fascism was a group of more-or-
less bohemian, highly chauvinistic characters surrounding Erich Wichmann.  Wichmann’s 
political philosophy was overly concerned with the loss of the “heroic” in Dutch society, and as 
such, he was against anything that he saw as contrary to the “heroic,” including universal 
suffrage and gender equality.  He founded the anti-democratic Rapaillepartij13 in 1921 before 
moving to Italy in 1922 to witness the first fascist “age of heroes” first hand.  After returning in 
1924, Wichmann again assembled around himself a group of like-minded activists, and his group 
even managed to win some small local elections in Amsterdam in the mid-1920s, but the group 
fizzled when its founder passed away on New Year’s Day, 1929.14   
                                                 
11 Ibid., 21–23. 
12 Kossmann, The Low Countries, 212–13; Arblaster, A History of the Low Countries, 186. 
13 Literally, the Riffraff Party. 
14 De Jonge, Het nationaal-socialisme in Nederland, 23–25. 
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The final branch on the family tree of Dutch fascism came in the form of certain elements 
within a larger Catholic youth movement.  The Dutch Catholic youth movement of the early 
twentieth century had at its core a generational conflict.  In short, the majority of adult, Catholic 
Netherlanders, who had grown up during the School Struggle and only experienced full 
emancipation in 1918, were, in the minds of the younger generation, still living in the society of 
the past, a society that was foreign to these young people who had come of age only in the very 
late 1910s or 1920s.  The chief unifying element of these youth was their opposition to the 
politics of compromise that had been so essential to their parents’ generation in preference for an 
integration of Catholic principles into the state and society of the Netherlands. But the political 
goals of the Catholic youth movement as a whole were also diverse, and only some Catholic 
youth supported anti-democratic politics, indeed other elements within the Catholic youth 
movement were more concerned with the hierarchical, authoritarian organization of the Church 
itself. Many of the anti-democratic youth had similar intellectual backgrounds to the bohemians 
surrounding figures like Wichmann, and their anti-democratic sentiments often stemmed from 
similar ideas, but their prominence within the Catholic youth movement specifically, gives them 
a slightly different flair from the bohemian chauvinists of the third group.  Moreover, were it not 
for the significant numbers of individuals who would later make their way to overtly fascist 
parties, this final group would not so easily be characterized as a forerunner to fascism.15 
In addition to these four precursor groups, there was a current within nineteenth century 
Low Country Catholic culture that advocated for closer cultural ties among Dutch language 
speakers.  Chief among such individuals is the Catholic novelist and poet Joseph Alberdingk 
Thijm.  Born in Amsterdam in 1820, Thijm came of age during the 1830s, a decade that began 
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with the Belgian revolution and ended with Dutch recognition of Belgian independence.  When 
he founded the journal De Dietsche Warande16 in 1855, the events of the revolutionary decade 
and their roots in religious prejudice, would have still been well within living memory.  In his 
journal, he attempted to bridge the divide between Catholic Flemish and Protestant Dutch 
authors, artists, and other important members of the cultural elite.17  Although the impetus behind 
these efforts lay more in combating the social exclusion faced by Catholic Flemish speakers from 
their Protestant Dutch counterparts in the middle of the nineteenth century, not in racialist ideas 
regarding an inherent connection between the two peoples, the shift from conceiving of the 
people in the Low Countries as being united by language, rather than divided by confession, 
should not be overlooked.18  By the early twentieth century, notions of an inherent connection 
between Flemish Belgians and their Dutch counterparts had gained somewhat more ground.  One 
of the leading figures in this regard was a Dutch born, Flemish nationalist, Protestant pastor 
named Jan Derk Domela Nieuwenhuis Nyegaard.  Nyegaard predicted, already in 1916, that a 
new William of Orange would come forth to unite the Dutch speaking peoples in a larger 
Germanic brotherhood.  As Paul Arblaster notes, however, “the Führer turned out to not to be 
quite what he had in mind, and during the Second World War, he was imprisoned for insulting 
officers of the German Army.”19 
After Mussolini’s “March on Rome” small, fascist groups sprang up throughout the 
Netherlands, but only one gained any sort of prominence on the national stage.  The first of these 
early fascist groups was the Verbond van Actualisten,20 founded in 1923 by students of Bolland’s 
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at Leiden University and supported by business magnate Alfred Haighton.  It petered out in just 
over four years.  Haighton and one of the co-founders of the League, Hugues Alexandre Sinclair 
de Rochemont, went on to form the Vereeniging De Bezem21 in 1928, another fascist party that 
saw about as much success as the League of Actualists—that is to say very little.  In 1932 Jan 
Baars founded the Algemene Fascisten Bond,22 and he was followed by Arnold Meyer, who 
founded the Zwart Front23—unique only in that it focused its energies specifically in Catholic 
circles—in 1934, as a sort of successor organization to the General Fascist Union after the latter 
disbanded earlier that same year.24  These earlier fascist parties had varied membership rolls, 
including students, workers, managers, and intellectuals.  Their politics were also diverse, with 
agreement limited only to the most basic fascist tenets, such as the need for immediate and 
decisive action, fear of decadence and modernity, anti-democratic and anti-communist agitation, 
racism, the need for national unity, and the need for a great leader to reverse the downward spiral 
the nation found itself in.25  Their movements, and the intellectuals who led them, tended to focus 
more on utopian fantasies, those “wishes, dreams, and idea that were the fascist ideology,” rather 
than the more concrete political issues of the day.26  And as a result, they remained on the fringes 
of Dutch politics, with vote totals of the most successful such party, the Jan Baars’s General 
Fascist Union, ranging only up to about seventeen thousand votes nationwide in the 1933 
election.27 
The only other minor fascist party of note in the pre-war Netherlands was the National 
Socialist Dutch Workers Party (NSNAP), which was founded in December 1931 by Adalbert 
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Smit.  In contrast to the NSB, which mostly copied the form of the NSDAP but had its own 
distinct ideology, the NSNAP was conceived of as a direct copy of the German Nazi Party.  The 
small party was defined primarily by its extremely pro-German position, but its unity was short 
lived.  Within the first six months of the party’s existence, it had split into three factions.  The 
“original” faction, led by Smit (NSNAP-Smit), was eventually fused with Haighton’s De Bezem 
group in 1933 and was distinguishable from the other NSNAP groups through its strong support 
of Greater Netherlandic ideology.28  The second group, originally led by Albert de Joode,29 was 
taken over in short order by former Dutch army major C. J. A. Kruyt.  The NSNAP-Kruyt, as the 
group is known to historians, was little more than a club for extreme anti-Semites, even by Nazi 
standards.  Although all of the NSNAP groups espoused antisemitism to one degree or another, 
the antisemitism of the NSNAP-Kruyt was especially prominent, and it ran so deep that the 
organization was openly hostile even to Italian fascism, which it decried as an outgrowth of a 
Jewish and Masonic conspiracy in its party newspaper De Nederlandsche Nationaal-Socialist.30   
The final NSNAP group was the splinter party formed by Dr. E. H. Ridder van Rappard 
(NSNAP-van Rappard).  Of the three it is most notable because it rejected the idea of a Greater 
Netherlands and even Dutch independence in favor of direct incorporation of the Netherlands 
and Flanders into the Greater German Reich, using argumentation that sounded strikingly similar 
to Hitler’s own private pronouncements regarding the Netherlands and other Germanic nations in 
Northwest Europe.  In his Table Talks on April 5, 1942, Hitler noted that: 
Mussert expressed himself in a rather curious fashion, in my presence … That's why I asked him whether 
he supposed it was in sheer lightness of heart that I divided my Austrian homeland into several Gaue, in 
order to remove it from separatist tendencies and incorporate it more easily in the Germanic Reich. Has not 
Austria, too, her own history—secular five times over—a history that truly is not devoid of highlights? 
Obviously, in discussing these problems one must remain very careful, when confronted by Dutch and 
Norwegians. One must never forget that in 1871 Bavaria would never have agreed to become part of 
                                                 
28 De Jonge, Het nationaal-socialisme in Nederland, 57. 
29 De Joode took the pen name “van Waterland,” given that his surname de Joode means the Jew. 
30 De Jonge, Het nationaal-socialisme in Nederland, 53. 
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Prussia. Bismarck persuaded her only to agree to become part of a great association linked by kinship—that 
is to say, Germany. Nor did I, in 1938, tell the Austrians that I wanted to incorporate them in Germany, but 
I insisted on the fact that Germany and Austria ought to unite to form the Greater German Reich. Similarly, 
when speaking to the Germanics of the North-west and North, one must always make it plain that what 
we're building is the Germanic Reich.31 
 
Eight years prior, in a 1934 pamphlet, van Rappard argued in a very similar manner that: 
The German-Germanic people of our day is formed from tribes, a portion of which, after a long separation, 
reunified in 1871 in the Second German Reich.  Around this middle point and nucleus, there are a number 
of other tribes, including the Netherlands and Flanders, which through location, blood, and the shared 
interests of the people are fused to the nucleus, and are predestined for the German Socialism of the Third 
Reich.32 
 
Van Rappard does not appear, however, to have made the distinction that Hitler and the German 
occupiers would later make between the Greater German Reich and a Greater Germanic Reich. 
For van Rappard, the goal was not just incorporation of the Netherlands into the Third Reich, 
rather, he argued not only that the Netherlands should be reincorporated into Germany—after all, 
centuries prior the Low Countries had been a part of the Holy Roman Empire—but also that the 
Dutch were really just like Swabians or Bavarians, that is, essentially German.33  This stance was 
closest in outlook to that of the SS faction of the German occupation and made the NSNAP-van 
Rappard unique among the various NSNAP groups as well as the broader mass of Dutch fascist 
parties.34  But like the other two National Socialist Dutch Workers Parties, the NSNAP-van 
Rappard was never popular among the Dutch public and found the majority of its members not in 
the Netherlands, but across the border in Germany.35 
Unlike the NSNAP-van Rappard, the rest of the various fascist and national socialist 
parties of any significance all were supporters of the Greater Netherlandic ideology, often called 
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Diets—an academic term referring to the Middle Dutch language but appropriated by these Nazi 
movements as a propaganda tool emphasizing the connectedness between the two peoples.  The 
heart of the Diets ideology was that Dutch speaking peoples across the globe should be 
assembled into a single imperial system ruled from The Hague.  This would include not just the 
Netherlands proper, but Flemish portions of Belgium, Luxembourg, and all former and still 
extant Dutch colonies.  Diets thinkers saw a future world order in which the Netherlands would 
sit as an equal at the table of world powers and at which Hitler’s Germany would be, at most, a 
primus inter pares.  It is important to note that none of these ideologies as articulated by the 
Dutch Nazi splinter parties would have been acceptable to the German occupiers, above all to the 
SS faction of the occupation regime.  The SS strove for the eventual creation of a Greater 
Germanic Reich made up of the various Germanic peoples of Northwest Europe, not the 
incorporation of the Netherlands into Germany, and certainly not for the creation of a larger, 
more powerful Dutch state with more relative equality to Germany.   
The distinction between the creation of a Greater Germanic Reich and incorporation of 
the Netherlands into Germany proper may seem minute but the difference in terms of ideology 
was profound.36  Incorporation of the Netherlands into Germany would not serve the purpose of 
winning over the population to the Germanic ideal.  If anything, such heavy handed geopolitics 
would have aroused suspicion and angst among the Dutch, a point which Hitler himself noted in 
his Table Talks.37  Rather, the German occupiers correctly understood that any attempt to 
incorporate the Netherlands into the Greater Germanic Reich must be handled delicately, as 
evidenced by Seyss-Inquart’s initial mandate to win the hearts and minds of the Dutch people for 
National Socialism, what is often described as “self-Nazification.” Given that most Dutch Nazi 
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parties remained firmly in the Diets camp and none espoused an ideology that meshed 
completely with that of the German occupiers, Seyss-Inquart continued the pre-invasion German 
policy of supporting the largest and most influential of these parties, the NSB.38 
Founded in the central city of Utrecht in 1931 by Anton Adriaan Mussert and Kees van 
Geelkerken, the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging in Nederland (NSB) would become the most 
influential and important native Dutch Nazi movement.39  This was Mussert’s first foray into 
fascist politics, although Geelkerken had been active in fascist circles since the 1920s, having 
been a member of Sinclair de Rochefort’s De Bezem group, and before that a member of the 
Dutch Orange Nationalists, an extremely nationalistic drinking club that recruited from the 
garrisons in Utrecht and Amersfoort.40  Mussert, who was by far the more powerful and 
important member of the duo, was a well-respected civil servant working for the Department of 
Bridges and Waterways who had gained a national prominence in the mid-1920s through his 
opposition to the Dutch-Belgian border treaty of 1927.41  During the great unrest of the early 
1930s, Mussert parlayed his fame from the treaty opposition movement into a new political party 
aligned along fascist lines.  Unlike the more ephemeral fascist parties of the 1920s, Mussert’s 
movement was well organized and showed the growth to prove it.  Already numbering one 
thousand members by the end of its first year, the movement grew fiftyfold over the next five 
years, growing to over fifty-two thousand members by 1936.  In the 1935 provincial elections, 
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the movement garnered some eight per cent of the vote, giving it two seats in the upper house of 
the Dutch parliament and causing concern among the more established, democratic parties.   
Almost certainly, much of this support can be attributed to its propagandistic efforts and 
the economic crisis. Mass meetings began first in the “city of the movement” Utrecht, but by 
1932, these meetings were being held across the country, attracting many listeners.  In 1933, the 
party held its first Landdag, or party congress, in Utrecht.  It was at this congress that the 
marching storm troopers of the party’s Defense Unit first emerged.  Earlier that year, the party 
also published its first edition of the weekly party newspaper Volk en Vaderland.42  The poor 
economy of the Netherlands also likely contributed to support for the NSB.  The great depression 
wrought havoc upon the Dutch economy, destroying the savings of the middle class and putting 
working men and women out onto the street.  Just as in Germany, economic crisis proved helpful 
for the electoral campaigns of Dutch anti-democratic parties.  But unlike in Germany, once the 
established, democratic parties saw the growing influence of the NSB, they closed ranks 
completely, labeled the NSB a fifth column promoting foreign interests above those of the Dutch 
population, and subsequently shut the party out of the political process entirely.43  As a result, 
1935 would prove to be a high-water mark for the movement in free and open elections.  In the 
1937 parliamentary election, the NSB’s vote share was only half of that two years earlier, 
placing it at about four per cent and squarely in the same range as the otherwise wholly 
uninfluential Communist Party.  Around the same time its membership rolls began to decline, 
although it would retain a small core of hardened activists numbering about thirty-two thousand 
clear through to the German occupation. 
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The Mussert Movement was, in many ways, a carbon-copy of the German original.  
Mussert founded the party after the success of the German NSDAP in the September 1930 
German elections.  Its uniforms, symbols, and general organizational structure were copied 
almost entirely.  Nominally, Mussert was the party’s Leider, although he would never command 
the respect within the ranks that Hitler or Mussolini enjoyed in their respective parties.  The 
party established a Weerafdeling (WA) to mimic the SA and a youth group, the Nationale 
Jeugdstorm (NJS) to mimic the Hitler Youth.44  To help spread their message and refine their art, 
Mussert and other early leaders of the party traveled to Germany during the early years of the 
NSDAP regime to see their inspirational fore-runners firsthand and to collect propaganda and 
instructional materials for use in the Netherlands.45  They instituted mass meetings and party 
congresses meant to be every bit the spectacle they were in Germany.  With each change the 
Nazis instituted in Germany, the NSB happily cheered along.  First came the destruction of the 
Weimar democratic system, then economic and agrarian reforms.  Especially popular was the 
Reichsarbeitsdienst, a Dutch version of which Mussert hoped to create to spur development 
along the Zuiderzee.  In the international sphere, the NSB championed Germany’s attempts to 
counter French hegemony on the continent and bolstered the Nazis’ status as a bulwark against 
Soviet Bolshevism.  But the more that the NSB cheered on the successes of Hitler’s Germany, 
the more the established parties labeled them foreign lackeys and, thus, the more the NSB 
became alienated from the majority of the Dutch populace, leading to their declining share of the 
vote after the 1935 elections.   
Despite this close organizational association to German National Socialism, however, the 
NSB was a distinct political movement with significant philosophical differences from German 
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Nazism.  The relative lack of importance placed on the leadership principle is one such 
difference.  But much more important was the lack of a racialist element in the early days of the 
party, a characteristic of the movement that the NSB attempted to promote as evidence of its 
independence from the NSDAP.  Mussert himself was not an avowed anti-Semite, although he 
certainly held racist views of the colonial subjects of the Dutch Empire.  He claimed to have 
never heard of the so-called “Jewish Question” nor to have read Mein Kampf before he formed 
(i.e., copied) the original NSB program in the early 1930s.  This is even more clearly shown by 
the fact that the NSB admitted Jewish members, and Mussert himself would be instrumental in 
saving many of these individuals from deportation to the east later in the war.46  Further major 
policy differences between the NSB and the NSDAP included the NSB’s support for the Diets 
model of a Greater Netherlandic Empire which the Germans simply could not accept47 and the 
NSB’s limited support for the system of verzuiling of the Dutch populace.48  Fascist oriented 
parties in general decried the pillars as obstacles to national unity and as emblematic of the 
failures of democracy to strengthen the nation.  The NSB was no exception in this regard, but its 
rejection of the system of pillarization was not so complete, especially as it related to the 
influence exercised by the Churches.  Mussert and his supporters were not happy with the 
increasing pressure the Hitler regime placed upon the Church in Germany and saw no 
contradiction between being both an ardent national socialist and devoted Christian, whereas 
German Nazis tended to be much more suspicious of Christianity as a possible competitor for the 
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souls of the masses.  Further, the NSB supported an educational system in which parents could 
continue to send their children to confessional schools as had been allowed since the School 
Struggle of the early part of the twentieth century.  This sort of influence on the part of clerics in 
the education of the youth simply could not be allowed in the eyes of German Nazis and went 
directly against the grain both of the reforms the Nazis instituted in Germany in the 1930s and 
those they would eventually institute in the Netherlands during the occupation. 
Much like the occupation regime with which the NSB would collaborate, the Mussert 
Movement was not a completely united organ throughout its existence.  By the late 1930s, the 
movement had split into two main camps, with the defining difference being the projected place 
of the Netherlands within the German orbit.  Like most Dutch Nazi parties, the NSB was 
originally a supporter of the Diets model and a Greater Netherlandic Empire.  But in the mid-
1930s the racist influence of German Nazism began to gain traction among the movement and a 
second wing developed around the völkisch Dutch agitator, Meinoud Rost van Tonningen.  Rost 
would join the NSB in 1936, after he returned from a long stay in Vienna working as the League 
of Nation’s representative following the Austrian financial turmoil of 1931. It was in Vienna that 
Rost first got involved in politics, originally with the Austrofascist Fatherland Front of Engelbert 
Dollfuss and then, from 1934, with Austrian National Socialism.49  Despite his joining the NSB, 
Rost felt himself more ideologically at home in one of the smaller, more explicitly racist Nazi 
movements, such as the NSNAP-van Rappard.  His reasons for joining the NSB were very likely 
purely pragmatic; if he were to have any success in politics, the NSB was the only available 
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vehicle to get there.  The various NSNAP factions were far too unimportant to matter on the 
national political scene. 
Once he did join, he rose quickly through the party ranks, not least because of his already 
close contacts with Austrian Nazis.  It was, for example, through Rost’s connections in Vienna 
that Mussert was able to get his first meeting with Hitler.  The year after he joined, Rost 
successfully stood for election to the Second Chamber of the States-General and became one of 
only four NSB members of the Dutch Lower House.50  Later the same year, Mussert appointed 
him editor of Het Nationale Dagblad,51 a daily NSB oriented newspaper with a wide readership 
among movement members and second in importance to the party only to the older, weekly, 
party publication Volk en Vaderland.52  In 1939, he founded the Mussertgarde,53 which was to be 
a more völkisch oriented counterpart to the Jeugdstorm, but was ultimately unsuccessful as a 
separate faction, was disbanded, and its members were mostly subsumed into the Dutch SS, 
much to Mussert’s consternation.54   
Shortly after the invasion, Rost was tasked by Seyss-Inquart with the liquidation of Dutch 
Marxist parties, a task which became moot when all non-fascist political parties were outlawed 
by the occupiers in July 1941.55  By September 1940, Rost, who by that point could be fully 
considered as Himmler’s Dutch protege, was the third in command of the NSB, behind only 
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Mussert and Geelkerken.56  The following spring, Seyss-Inquart appointed him to the position of 
Secretary-General in the Department of Finance and to the leadership of the Netherlands Bank, 
making him, after Tobie Goedewaagen and Jap Schrieke, only the third NSBer to be appointed to 
the chief bureaucratic post in a Dutch ministry.57  In 1942, he founded the Dutch East Company,58 
which aimed to settle Dutch farmers in the newly depopulated areas of Eastern Europe 
conquered by the Nazi war machine.59  Finally, in 1944, after completing his military training 
with the Dutch Waffen-SS unit Landstorm Nederland, he was promoted to the rank of 
Untersturmführer in the Waffen-SS.  During this entire time, Mussert floundered.  He was 
singularly unable to push through his own designs, even after the NSB was the only legally 
permissible political party, with his single political victory being his appointment by Hitler as 
Leider of the Dutch volk in 1942—a meaningless title that offered him no further authority than 
that which he already commanded.   
It is unclear when, exactly, Mussert began to realize that Rost was leading a fifth column 
against him.  Musset’s support for Rost in the late-1930s and his post-war admission that he had 
not recognized Rost as a Trojan horse clearly evidence his initial ignorance regarding Rost’s 
motives.  Only at the end of 1944, when defeat was all but certain, did Mussert, who was 
undoubtedly thinking of his own future in a post-occupation Netherlands, gain enough of an 
upper hand vis-à-vis Rost that he was able to dismiss him from his leadership positions in the 
NSB.  Despite his ultimate failure to wrestle control of the NSB from Mussert, Rost was 
successful in dividing the movement and positioning himself as the party leader most closely 
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aligned with the German occupiers, especially with the SS faction of the occupation regime.  
When Himmler visited the Netherlands in early June 1940, he met with Seyss-Inquart and Rost, 
while Mussert was excluded from the meeting entirely.  It was during this meeting that it was 
likely decided to appoint Rost as the Commissioner for the Marxist Parties (officially announced 
in July 1940), and it was also there that the first discussion regarding the formation of Dutch SS 
units and the recruitment of Dutchmen for the Waffen-SS took place.60  Rost then proceeded to 
rub Mussert’s absence from the meeting in his face the following day, as indicated in Mussert’s 
diary.61  His appointment as Secretary-General of the Department of Finance must be seen as 
further evidence of the occupiers’ favor toward the völkisch faction, as would the appointment of 
Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, a völkisch NSBer, to the position of Secretary-General of the 
Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts, especially given Seyss-Inquart’s general 
reluctance to rely on the NSB for personnel.62  A full-fledged split within the movement was 
already clear at this early point of the occupation.  As Rost wrote to Seyss-Inquart shortly after 
the latter’s installation as Reichskommissar, the NSB was made up of two factions: a “bourgeois, 
fascist, Christian” faction led by Mussert and a smaller, völkisch, national socialist core.63  This 
split mirrored, in many ways, the split within the occupation regime itself between the power 
centers surrounding Seyss-Inquart and the NSDAP on the one hand and Rauter and the SS on the 
other.  Just as the influence of the SS in the Netherlands increased over the course of the 
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occupation, the more völkisch wing of the NSB also gained prominence over the life of the party, 
and this only changed as defeat became inevitable and the war drew to a close.    
Already by the eve of the invasion then, Rost had become a figurehead for a much more 
explicitly pro-German, völkisch wing of the NSB.  This völkisch wing’s rise in popularity over 
the late 1930s within the Mussert Movement as a whole contributed to the growing sense among 
the wider Dutch public that the entire movement was made up of little more than German 
puppets, thus exacerbating the movement’s already strained public image.  The split between the 
Diets and völkisch wings of the NSB also helped contribute, at least in part, to the eventual 
appointment of Jan van Dam to the position of Secretary-General of the Education Department.  
It was the closeness of the NSB to Nazi Germany that the democratic parties had used as a stick 
with which to, quite effectively, beat the Mussert Movement since the middle of the 1930s.  
While the Diets wing of the party had never proved especially popular among the Dutch public, 
the völkisch wing was even less so.  Placing such individuals in positions of power carried risks 
of public backlash, something the occupation regime was trying to avoid during the early “hearts 
and minds” period.  Yet it was the völkisch wing whose ideology was most closely aligned with 
that of the German occupiers.  Under the circumstances, it is no surprise then that the German 
occupiers would select a völkisch thinker with no direct connection to the NSB to lead the 
education department.  Van Dam, it would turn out, was the man for the job, but his vision for 
education was not the only vision competing for influence.  The NSB and Mussert specifically 
also had very concrete ideas about the reform of Dutch education along more national socialist 
lines, as the NSB defined them, but which allowed for a certain particularly Dutch twist born out 
of the unique history of public education in the Netherlands.   
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The NSB’s Plans for Educational Reform 
“As the son of a school head,” Anton Mussert would have been very familiar with the 
School Struggle of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it was with that history 
in mind that he would develop his Three Pillars system for educational reform.64  Dutch fascists 
in the inter-war period were confronted with an inherently problematic situation regarding 
education.  On the one hand all of the fascist groups opposed the system of pillarization.  These 
fascist movements all saw the pillars as obstacles to national unity and as such, believed they 
should be done away with.  The NSB was no different in this regard.  But at the same time, one 
would have to have been incredibly obtuse to introduce an educational reform proposal that 
attempted to undo the political compromise surrounding confessional education that had been a 
century in the making.  Politically inept as he may have been compared to those surrounding 
him, Mussert was clearly not so foolish as to believe he could persuade, or force, the religious 
segments of Dutch society to give up their hard-fought victories in the education realm.  Instead, 
he developed an educational policy known as the Three Pillars system, which he outlined in an 
article in the party newspaper Volk en Vaderland,65 and published as the expanded pamphlet 
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Grondslagen voor het lager- en middelbaar onderwijs in den nationaal-socialistischen staat.66  It 
was this system that would be the preferred official policy of the NSB during the occupation.67 
In the forward to the pamphlet, Mussert explains that many falsehoods have been spread 
about National Socialism in the Netherlands.  Among these were the claims that the NSB stood 
for the “degradation of education, [the] elimination of parents and churches from education, 
[and] state absolutism.”68 With his pamphlet, Mussert hoped to “arm [his readers] against the 
threat” these falsehoods posed to the party and the Dutch state and to inform them of the real 
goals of the NSB in the realm of education.69  The problems Mussert saw in the Dutch 
educational establishment were multiple.  There was too much fragmentation in the education 
sector, classes were too large, and teachers, who were paid via perverse, anti-social 
compensation systems, were reduced to little more than serfs under the not-always-helpful 
patronage of school administrators and religious clerics.  Dutch education was too “anti-
national” and even “a-national”; it was not focused strongly enough on the character building or 
physical education of the youth so necessary for creating future citizens.  And to make matters 
worse, compulsory education ended too early, with students able to leave school as early as 
fourteen years old.70  And all of this was the case, despite the immense sums the Dutch 
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government—both the central government and the provincial and local governments—disbursed 
for education, which amounted to about one hundred, thirty million guilders per year.71  What 
was necessary was “a new powerful current, animated by faith in God, love for volk and 
Fatherland, respect for labor and a great sense of social justice,” which the NSB, in consultation 
with parents and clerics, would institute after their eventual assumption of power.72 
The soul of Dutch education, Mussert explained, must be “national in character.”73  By 
this, he meant that the greatness of Dutch culture would be emphasized, without whitewashing 
the evils the Dutch had committed.  This was no blind nationalism, rather, education in a national 
sense would promote the greatness of the small volk by the sea, its “great past and great future,” 
without ignoring the crimes committed in its name.74  As regarded other cultures, students were 
to be taught that those cultures too had a right to exist and that the future the national socialist 
state would work toward is one in which all cultures of Europe would collaborate to defend their 
unique and collective interests.75  Further, Mussert imagined that his national socialist state 
would stay out of religious instruction completely; that was to remain the realm of parents and 
church clerics, not the state.  However, the state would do what it could to help the Churches in 
their missions.  The starting principle, Mussert explained, was that “Catholic parents should have 
the complete freedom to educate their children in schools with a Catholic atmosphere and 
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Catholic character, wherein religious instruction is given by people designated by the Catholic 
church.”76 The same was to hold for Protestant parents and students.  For those parents who did 
not wish to send their children to religious schools, a new Volksschool was imagined that would 
not give religious instruction at all, although the Christian character of the Dutch people would 
still be emphasized.77  In all cases, Mussert maintained that greater emphasis should be given to 
character building and physical education.  While the focus on those subjects was to be increased 
during the regular week, Saturday was set aside entirely for character formation and physical 
education, to be promoted by an as yet non-existent organization created specifically for that 
purpose.78 
Under Mussert’s plan, education and caring for children up to six years of age was the 
responsibility of the parents, although the national socialist state would provide optional 
kindergartens for children ages three to six so that their mothers could work.  From age seven, 
children would enter a five-year primary school, which they would complete in their eleventh 
year.  From this point, the system split students based on their abilities, save for the disabled, 
who will have been provided for separately.79  Most students would attend a three-year finishing 
school80 where the subjects of reading and writing, mathematics, history of the Fatherland, 
geography and the basic sciences would be taught.  But the emphasis would be placed upon 
physical education and character building.81  As Mussert explained, students at this age 
(generally their twelfth through fourteenth years) need lots of physical movement, so subjects 
where students sit for long periods should be less emphasized.  In their stead should be subjects 
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like hand-working for boys and home-crafts for girls.  These reforms were essential, Mussert 
argues, because those years “are the three most fruitful years for education.”82  After graduating 
from the finishing school, these students would enter an apprenticeship for the next four years 
before serving labor service and military service in their nineteenth and twentieth years 
respectively, only reaching adulthood and full inclusion into the national socialist state during 
their twenty-first year.83  The remaining ten to twenty per cent of the student population would 
not attend the finishing school, but, rather, were destined for secondary education.  The larger 
portion would attend a series of three-year schools from their twelfth through eighteenth years, 
before performing their labor and military service.  The final group, those bound for higher 
education, would attend a two year “expanded primary education” school before moving on to a 
college preparatory secondary school, which itself came in three variations—the gymnasium, the 
lyceum, and the hogere burger school,84 depending on whether the student was likely to follow a 
path in the natural sciences or the arts.85  In the pamphlet, Mussert leaves all of these reforms 
open to possible changes in the future, noting that only three elements are absolutely critical.  
First, allowing children to work before their fifteenth birthday is tantamount to child exploitation 
and should be banned, which meant that, second, education should be compulsory through the 
end of a child’s fourteenth year.  Finally, the nineteenth and twentieth years should be reserved 
for civilian and military service, only after successful completion of which could a young person 
fully enter Dutch society.86 
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The administrative organization of the educational system was to be carried out along 
corporatist lines, and it was here that the NSB’s educational plans most starkly contrasted with 
those of the later German occupiers.  Primary education would be split into three corporations—
one for Catholic education, one for Protestant education, and one for public, secular education—
the members of which would be made up of parents, teachers, and representatives of the state.  
The specific inclusion of clerical input into the two religious corporations was promised, but the 
actual mechanism was not addressed, only stating that their input speaks for itself.  Making 
allowances for the pillars of Dutch society by segregating children into schools reserved for each 
pillar was both the most significant difference between the NSB’s proposed educational system 
and the one element that was certain to make its adoption a non-starter during the occupation. It 
is difficult to say whether Mussert’s plan was based on a sincere desire to accommodate the 
peculiar differences within Dutch society or a more tactical proposal designed to make his 
system more palatable to the average Dutch parent. Either way, as a sort of middle ground 
between a completely unified, national educational establishment as favored by the German 
occupiers and their more völkisch Dutch collaborators and the more stratified educational system 
already in place favored by the majority of Netherlanders, the likelihood of the Three Pillars 
system actually being adopted were very slim indeed. 
The heads of each corporation, known as Directors-General, were to be nominated by the 
corporations themselves, but appointed and dismissed by the state.  The schools would be larger, 
incorporating kindergartens, primary schools, finishing schools and expanded primary education 
schools in a single complex, rather than smaller individual institutions, so as to be able to assign 
teachers according to their abilities, rather than to have only a handful of teachers who 
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functioned more as generalists than specialists.87  These reforms, Mussert insisted, would 
produce the necessary results of ending the fragmentation of education, removing teachers from 
positions of serfdom to their administrators, reducing costs, reducing teacher unemployment, and 
increasing results, all while guaranteeing the influence of the Churches in their respective 
spheres and ensuring the sound education of the youth along lines acceptable to the national 
socialist state.88  After spending several pages explaining how he would pay teachers based on 
their familial status—married teachers earned more than single teachers, teachers with families 
earned more than teachers without, etc.—Mussert concludes his pamphlet by arguing that the 
outlines he has drawn for educational reform would restore justice to the Dutch volk, including 
all its constituent parts, parents and children, church and state.89   
He spends little time discussing secondary education, and almost no time discussing 
higher education.  The reason for this, he states, is that the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth 
years of life are the most important of a child’s development, and it is during those years that all 
children receive education, so it is there that he focuses his attention in his short brochure.  This 
explains the amount of space dedicated to describing his proposed finishing school, designed 
explicitly for students of those crucial ages, which Mussert argues would be attended by between 
eighty and ninety per cent of that age cohort.  To the extent he does discuss secondary education, 
he notes only that the broad outlines he has painted regarding primary education—aspects like 
the teacher payment schedule—would be duplicated for secondary education.90 
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Mussert’s pamphlet would remain the only significant contribution to the question of 
education reform on behalf of the NSB before the German invasion.  But once Gerrit van Poelje, 
the Secretary-General of the Education department at the time of the invasion, was arrested, 
Mussert saw his chance for action.  He assembled around him the brightest educational minds the 
NSB had to offer to determine their strategy.  Most immediate was the need to organize NSB 
oriented teachers into a coherent bloc in order to flex their muscle.  The same month, the NSB 
founded the Opvoedersgilde,91 and placed the Belgian-born jurist Robert van Genechten as 
head.92  Mussert appears to have believed that if he could nominate the head of such an 
association to succeed van Poelje, he was more likely to encounter success with the German 
occupiers—a belief what turned out to be wholly incorrect.  Van Genechten had no experience in 
educational matters but was a competent administrator who took his position seriously.  The 
growth of the guild reflected this seriousness, growing to about one thousand members by the 
end of 1940 and doubling each of the next two years, reaching a height of four thousand four 
hundred members by the Spring of 1943.  By and large, members were made up of two groups, 
committed national socialists and hangers-on hoping for a teaching position or promotion.93  
Membership in the guild was not an especially poor path for a young teacher hoping to find a job 
either.  Vacancies were regularly published in the organization’s publication, and as the 
influence of the guild specifically and the NSB more generally grew, primarily through placing 
their members in important administrative positions, such as mayors and education inspectors, 
their ability to further influence the hiring and firing of teachers grew commensurately.  But as 
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with so many other aspects of occupation policy, the NSB’s aspirations were always much larger 
than their ability or popularity would allow.   
In early 1943, van Genechten, who had always been an ardent NSBer and proponent of 
the Diets ideology, came into conflict with his German overlords who were increasingly 
beholden to the ideals of the SS.  He was fired from his day job as Procurer-General in The 
Hague in February and promoted elsewhere.  After attempting suicide in May, van Genechten 
spent the rest of the war in isolation, ostensibly working as a professor at Leiden University, a 
job that gave him precious little to do, since the university had been closed by the occupiers in 
1940 and would not reopen until after the war ended.94  Although the newly installed head of the 
guild, J. Jeswiet, attempted to infuse new life into the movement, it fizzled anyway.  Coercion 
was attempted next, with some NSB mayors making attendance at Opvoedersgilde events 
mandatory for teachers in their towns, while other mayors allowed for the introduction of 
Opvoedersgilde propaganda placards in the schools.  None of the efforts were successful.  The 
following year saw a reboot of the guild, with a complete reorganization initiated.  It too did not 
have the desired effect.95  The fact of the matter was that, by mid-1943, the tide had turned in the 
war effort, and the once grudging acceptance of German authority turned to a willful resistance 
on the part of much of the Dutch populace.  The education sector was not immune to these 
forces.  The most hardened core of NSB oriented educators remained true to the end, however, 
with some following Mussert and other high ranking NSB functionaries over the German border 
just ahead of Allied troops.96 
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The guild was never an especially strong force among the more than thirty thousand 
teachers working in primary education, let alone the entire educational establishment.  It did 
attempt to influence events, however.  It held annual meetings highlighting the work of the guild, 
and it recruited for teacher retraining seminars held in Germany at Oldenburg, the completion of 
which would allow those teachers a position at a school in Germany, which given the high 
unemployment rates for teachers was not an insignificant incentive.  It also was mostly 
successful at infiltrating the Avlon, the German-created, state-sponsored teachers’ union, 
although the value of that infiltration is questionable beyond the monetary gains it afforded the 
guild.97  Its most influential work, however, was the publication of a weekly journal Opvoeding 
in volkschen geest.98  It was in this journal that the educational ideology of the members was put 
on full display. 
Given the frequency of editions that were published during the war and the numerous 
authors that wrote articles for the journal, it is difficult to assign an overall tenor to the writings.  
Most authors believed that the fundamental building blocks of human society were a set of 
communities, and it was only through these that the individual could achieve his or her 
maximum potential.  The smallest and most important community was the family, but a close 
second in importance was the volksgemeenschap,99 although who, exactly, constituted the 
volksgemeenschap varied depending on which author was writing.  Most authors in the journal 
argued that only the citizens of the Netherlands themselves were members of a specifically 
Dutch volksgemeenschap, while others pushed for a Diets understanding of the idea, while still 
others spoke of a Germaansche or Groot-Germaansche100 ethnic community that spanned the 
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Germanic nations of Europe.  Sometimes there was a mixture of ideas, such as when one author, 
who stressed the importance of physical, spiritual, and political education for the formation of 
the youth who would one day be the “carriers of the blossoming Diets culture [that is] an 
essential part of the Greater Germanic and European development.”101 But whichever 
understanding of the volksgemeenschap an individual author supported, all agreed that the 
education of the youth must be based squarely on the firm foundation that was the ethnic 
community.  Further, education of the youth was the primary function of the ethnic community, 
for it was only through the youth that the ethnic community could perpetuate itself.  For this 
reason, “all education must then also be in the first place social development.”102 
As might be expected, the writings regarding the volksgemeenschap took on a völkisch 
flair.  The social formation of the student into a fully-fledged member of the ethnic community 
was possible through emphasis on particular subjects in the educational realm.  Consistent with 
the educational emphases of other fascist movements elsewhere, the writings of Opvoedersgilde 
members stress the importance of physical education for the youth.  Physical education created 
healthy bodies and sound minds.  Healthy individuals, together, constituted the living, organic 
whole that was the ethnic community, a type of larger social organism.103  Part and parcel of this 
idea of an organic whole was the need to protect the soil from which the people had sprung, for it 
was only in nature that healthy bodies and sound minds could be formed.  A healthy body would 
exist in harmony—harmony between body and spirit and harmony between man and nature.  
Some of the more explicitly völkisch leaning writers introduced directly the German Nazi 
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concept of Blut und Boden into the pages of the magazine, arguing that humanity’s connection to 
nature had two aspects.  Not only did the people spring from and most completely fulfill 
themselves in nature, but that the ethnic community was a natural unit based on the racialist-
scientific understanding of the period.104   
Historical education, too, was supposed to help the student feel part of the larger organic 
whole that was the ethnic community.  Rather than focusing on facts or names and dates—that 
was too intellectual—historical instruction should teach students love of the Fatherland, respect 
and honor for one’s ancestors, and love for the volk, which is really just “a big family, without 
partitions of confession and class.”  Or, when more honestly put, the NSB’s vision of history was 
one in which “we pick out the facts that are best suited to serve in the development of a national 
and social youth with a firm character.”105   Much like historical education, political instruction 
was necessary to “cultivate a specific mentality” not of critical thinkers, but of a strong youth, in 
both the physical and spiritual sense, for politics “forms the basis and the synthesis, of the entire 
public life, which our boys will also one day have to face.”106 
Perhaps most exciting to the journal’s authors was the subject of heemkunde.107  The idea 
of heemkunde was not new in the Netherlands, it had been a particular wish of educational 
reformers prior to the outbreak of the war as well, dating back to the late-nineteenth century as a 
school subject (Heimatkunde) in Germany, and to the political, völkisch thought of Riehl at mid-
century.108 In the Netherlands, the subject was valued for its integrative nature, and like in 
Germany, was not solely supported by völkisch or racist elements.109   A field trip to a local 
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agricultural site, for example, would offer teachers the opportunity to instruct students on the 
local flora and fauna, farming, local history, basic principles of economics, and geography, all 
while taking part in physical activity.  In the eyes of many pre-occupation reformers, such an 
integrative school subject was superior in form, if not content, to the more traditional lesson 
hours in individual subjects while sitting behind a desk in the classroom.  The authors of 
Opvoeding in volkschen geest saw in heemkunde the same methodological advantages, but added 
to them an ideological element that was, for all intents and purposes, lifted from German 
völkisch thinkers and their fore-bearers dating back to Wilhelm Riehl.  Heemkunde was able to 
fuse various subjects into an organic whole, much as the individual was part of the organic ethnic 
community.  In this way, all of the elements of the NSB’s educational ideology, such as it was, 
could be inculcated among the students all at once, in a more natural setting.110   
Taken together, these major strains of education would produce total education. This 
total education was meant to foster a greater appreciation for the volksgemeenschap in all of its 
aspects, with all elements of the teaching program working together to produce a sum greater 
than the combination of its parts. 
Everything had to do with everything else … Harmony of body and soul, of blood and soil, of individuals 
and the volk, of leader and follower, of ancestry and progeny, of intellect and emotion, of nature and 
culture. Everything that was different threatened to disturb the beautiful, pure harmony; thus, threatening 
the volksgemeenschap itself.111 
 
The articles found within the pages of Opvoeding in volkschen geest, as a whole, betray a 
lack of significant theoretical or practical educational expertise on the part of the authors.  Those 
ideas that could be found in the journal were almost wholly lifted from elsewhere.  Policies 
tended to be either generally hoped for educational reforms with a particularly NSB bent, such as 
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the introduction of the subject heemkunde, or they tended to be taken from the writings of more 
famous German educational theorists—Hans Schemm and Ernst Krieck were both especially 
popular.112  Originality was not the strong suit of the guild.  As Henk van Setten notes in his 
study of the guild, the members of the movement, even the leading members, were often scholars 
and educators of the second or third tier.113  The heavyweights of the Dutch academy were, by 
and large, absent from the pages of the journal and the membership rolls of the guild. 
The NSB and the writers of Opvoeding in volkschen geest owed a significant amount of 
their educational theory to German Nazis, which is not entirely surprising given the history of the 
organization. The focus on physical education, the “ethnic community,” historical instruction, 
the nature of the community as a sort of “social organism,” the individual’s connection to the 
environment, national unity, and even the subject of heemkunde were all elements of educational 
reform stressed by the Hitler regime across the eastern border. Indeed, many of these elements 
could rightly be understood as explicitly German-style reforms with only a local flavor added to 
them. At the same time, much of the NSB’s educational ideology was based upon Dutch history 
and pedagogical theory, albeit with different emphases compared to their non-Nazi Dutch 
colleagues.114 The sole exception here is the Mussert Movement’s focus on the Three Pillars 
system of allowing for separate education for the pillars of Dutch society. Unlike the rest of its 
educational program, which was either an absurd reworking of Dutch educational theory or a 
foreign import, the Three Pillars system showed that Mussert and the NSB were well enough in 
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tune with the majority of the Dutch populace to know that re-litigating the School Struggle of the 
nineteenth century was political suicide. 
The Opvoedersgilde and the NSB more generally were mostly unsuccessful in pushing 
through their agenda on the national stage.  As will be discussed in later chapters, many of the 
reforms championed by the guild and outlined above would be implemented during the 
occupation, but not because of the efforts of the NSB or its educators’ guild, rather because those 
particular reforms found a broader consensus within the Reichskommissariat, especially in the 
persons of Heinrich Schwarz and Jan van Dam.  The real weakness of the NSB and the guild is 
shown when one sees the many “reforms” that Mussert and the NSB opposed, but that were 
implemented anyway.115  While the party and the Opvoedersgilde never managed significantly to 
influence education policy on the national level, they did have some success at installing their 
members into important positions within the education department.   
The first major success the NSB encountered was when, on November 15, 1940, Seyss-
Inquart appointed the NSB secondary school teacher Piet van Rossem as the Gemachtigde van 
den Rijkscommissaris voor het Toezicht op de Orde en Rust in de Scholen.116  Van Rossem was 
tasked with maintaining peace and order in the schools, which was a euphemism for removing 
any anti-German or anti-NSB elements in primary and secondary education.  For this purpose, he 
was allowed two colleagues, J. J. Valkenburg and P. Dijkema, both of whom were also NSBers.  
Although he was working in the education field, administratively, he was placed directly under 
Commissioner-General Wimmer, making him not responsible to the Secretary-General of the 
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Education Department, at least in theory.  The extraordinary inspectors were extremely diligent 
in their work, so much so that they quickly engendered much anger and resentment not just 
among the teaching corps, but even within the Reichskommissariat itself.117  Van Dam, who was 
appointed Secretary-General after van Rossem’s installation quickly decided that he needed to 
first contain under his own authority, and then finally to remove van Rossem and replace him 
with a less objectionable figure, a coup he was able to accomplish in mid-1941 when van 
Rossem was sacked from his position as extraordinary school inspector and replaced with van 
Dam’s old friend and colleague, Dr. D. G. Noordijk.118 
Shortly after van Rossem was appointed, G. F. Vlekke was appointed on December 1, 
1940 to lead the First Main School Inspectorate, which encompassed the provinces of 
Gelderland, North Brabant, and Limburg in the east and southeast of the country. This position, 
which was within the already existing School Inspectorate did allow for a certain influence on 
the part of NSB circles on teachers in those provinces, and, in fact, Vlekke suggested that his 
appointment was a sign of the times to come during his first meeting with the local school 
inspectors.119  But Vlekke’s appointment would actually mark a stall in the aspirations of the 
NSB, for the next major functionary the party managed to install would not come until the 
appointment of Noordijk in May 1941. Noordijk was a figure who was both professionally and 
personally close with van Dam and as such, his appointment did not really represent an upswing 
in the fortunes of the NSB itself. 
The appointment of W. Terpstra, Mussert’s brother-in-law and a prominent figure of the 
Opvoedersgilde to lead the Sub-Department of Primary Education in summer 1942 did, however, 
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represent an upsurge in the NSB’s influence. Especially in the latter half of 1942, Noordijk and 
Terpstra managed to install eleven NSB school inspectors, out of a total of only forty-nine across 
the country. But that would mark the high-water point of the influence of the NSB within the 
education realm. Additional attempts to appoint NSB functionaries to prominent positions such 
as school inspectors would be blocked by van Dam, with the support of Schwarz.120 
Despite the relative success the NSB enjoyed in the second half of 1942, by and large, 
when the interests of the NSB or its members came into conflict with the interests of the German 
occupiers or their chosen proxy in the education realm, Jan van Dam, the NSB ended up on the 
losing side.  Sometimes this was because of power-political reasons, as was the case with van 
Rossem. Van Dam refused to allow an extraordinary school inspector to remain outside of his 
control and so worked to both bring van Rossem within his control and eventually to have him 
sacked.121  But in other cases, the difficulty for the NSB and its members lay in the fact that there 
were sometime substantive policy differences between the NSB proper and the goals of the 
occupation regime or its local proxies.  This was the case in the education field as well.  In 
contrast to the highly nationalistic education policy of the NSB, which made room for the 
peculiarities of Dutch society, van Dam’s reform proposals, which he released before his 
appointment, were much closer in spirit to the efforts of the Nazi occupiers directly, even though 
van Dam would be loath to admit as much.122  Where the NSB hoped to strengthen the Dutch 
nature of the Netherlands, despite his denials, many of the “reforms” van Dam would propose, 
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when taken together, appear much more like a policy of educational Germanicization.123  In one 
of the first major defeats of the NSB in the education field, the German occupiers chose the 
forty-four year old University of Amsterdam Professor of Ancient Germanic Languages and 
Literatures Jan van Dam  over the NSB’s preferred candidate and Opvoedersgilde leader Robert 
van Genechten to lead the newly reformed education department. Part of the reason van Dam 
was chosen was explicitly because he was pro-German, but anti-NSB.124 
Jan van Dam and the Reform of the Dutch Education System 
Jan van Dam was born to a middle-class family in Amsterdam in 1896 and after attending 
primary and secondary school, where he was by all accounts an exceptional student, van Dam 
moved on to the University of Amsterdam in 1914.125  Originally intending to study natural 
philosophy, at the urging of his German professor, Dr. Jan Hendrik Scholte, van Dam chose 
instead to study German and Dutch language and literature.  After successful completion of his 
studies, he stood for and passed the necessary state exams to become a secondary school teacher 
and spent the 1919-1920 school year as a German teacher in the towns of Haarlem and 
Amsterdam.  After only a year, again at the urging of Scholte, van Dam moved to Bonn, 
Germany and began his graduate studies there at the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität.  
After two years in Germany, van Dam returned to Amsterdam, continued his graduate studies at 
the university there, and earned his doctorate a year later in 1923.  His dissertation, which 
focused on medieval German literature in the Rhineland was well received and, for his trouble, 
van Dam was appointed as lecturer at the University of Amsterdam.126  By the end of the decade, 
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he would be promoted to the position of Professor for Old German Languages and Literatures 
and cemented his reputation as one of the most well-respected academics in his field.127 
In addition to his academic work at the university, van Dam kept a dizzying pace of 
various professional side projects.  Because only three Dutch universities of the day even had 
modern German language professors, the oversight and examination of teachers-in-training in the 
German language fell to those few professors.  Additionally, van Dam was a board member of 
several Amsterdam secondary schools and a member of the Commission for the Oversight of 
Secondary Schools, through which he had some influence on the curriculum at those schools.  
He also spent his Saturday afternoons instructing teachers-in-training.128  Finally, van Dam spent 
the 1930s assembling around himself a group of like-minded Dutch Germanist thinkers.  In part, 
he managed this by publishing two periodicals aimed at promoting German language, literature, 
and culture.  The first, Het Duitsche Boek: tijdschrift voor de vrienden van het Duitsche boek in 
Nederland,129 found little success from its inception in 1930 and folded after only a few years.130  
Despite the failure, however, van Dam was able to find a new publisher for the magazine, newly 
titled De Weegschaal: maandblad voor de vrienden van het Duitsche boek131 in 1934 and would 
continue his work promoting German language, literature, and culture for the remainder of the 
decade and beyond.132 
Up to this point, van Dam had shown little interest in politics and had never joined a 
political party.133  Certainly, he was already well known as a Germanophile and he made little 
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secret of his fondness for the German people and their culture, but politically he remained aloof.  
Scholars debate when exactly van Dam’s politics began to lean more toward the still nascent, 
völkisch, nationalist wing of Dutch politics, but by the late 1930s, he was firmly entrenched in 
those circles, and when he was recommended to Seyss-Inquart by Snijder for the position of 
Secretary-General, Snijder’s recommendation specifically stated his politics were based in 
National Socialism, but that he was not connected to the NSB.134  It is possible that his 
transformation dates as far back as his time in Bonn, when he was present for some of the worst 
years of Weimar’s democratic instability.135  More likely, his transformation was a result of the 
circles in which he moved in the 1930s.  His periodical Het Duitsche Boek was not overtly 
political and contained essays by authors of various political affiliations on various topics, 
including topics that would have been impossible in Germany proper, such as extolling the 
virtues of the German expatriate writer and noted anti-Nazi activist Thomas Mann.  Once that 
periodical was reformed as De Weegschaal, however, the number of openly national socialist 
authors increased while essays by authors who had been condemned by the Nazis became scarcer 
and scarcer, until they stopped appearing entirely.  It was around this time in the mid-1930s that 
van Dam became the chairman of the Amsterdam branch of the Nederlands-Duitse 
Vereeniging,136 an historically and still ostensibly politically neutral organization that had 
abandoned almost all pretenses of neutrality in favor of a strongly pro-Nazi attitude after Hitler’s 
“seizure of power.”  Also, in the late 1930s van Dam joined the Amsterdam branch of the 
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Nederlands-Duitse Werkgemeenschap137 as well as the Amsterdam Waagkring,138 both of which 
functioned as salons for the intellectual creme of the Dutch, völkisch, but not necessarily NSB-
oriented crop.139 
Van Dam’s meteoric rise was nearly capped off in January 1940 when he was invited to 
work as a guest professor for the 1940-1941 school year at Harvard University in the United 
States.140  Van Dam appears to have desperately wanted to go to Massachusetts, no doubt because 
of the prestige such an appointment would have afforded him, but fate had other plans for the 
still young scholar.  Having seen the writing on the wall, the Dutch government ordered a 
general military mobilization at the end of August 1939 and van Dam, who was a reserve captain 
in the artillery, was forced to limit his professional activities in favor of military training.  With 
their star professor’s academic activities already curtailed because of his military responsibilities 
and faced with losing him entirely for a whole year, his superiors at the University of Amsterdam 
initially refused his request for leave to work in the United States in April 1940.  Although 
several important and powerful individuals intervened on his behalf, including the Minister of 
Education and the Minister of Defense, the curators of the university were only willing to allow 
van Dam a three-month sojourn to America, and then, only beginning in March 1941.  
Administrators at Harvard were unenthusiastic about the timing, which would place van Dam’s 
arrival directly in the middle of the spring semester, but the point became moot, as so many other 
matters did, only weeks later when German tanks crossed the border.141   
                                                 
137 Netherlands-German Working Society. 
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By the time of the invasion, then, van Dam was a nationally known and respected 
professor of Germanic languages and literatures with a growing international reputation.  He was 
intimately connected with the secondary school establishment in the Netherlands through his 
work in Amsterdam as well as his work in teacher training and he also had important connections 
in the academic world both in the Netherlands and in Germany.  He was a well-known 
Germanophile, but, importantly, was not a member of the NSB, the members of which he mostly 
considered brutes and ruffians, and therefore carried little of the stench generally associated with 
the Mussert movement.142  His affinity for the cultural aspects of National Socialism—especially 
the Nazis’ emphasis on their Germanic past, which was van Dam’s chosen academic 
specialty143—had been on public display for several years through his publications, but at the 
same time, any affinities he did have for National Socialism as a governing philosophy resulted 
from its apparent successes in Germany and Austria in the 1930s, not in any particularly strongly 
held political beliefs.  As he stated after the war, one 
got the impression that the [Hitler] regime had done much good and that the communists would be the 
bosses had Hitler not won.  Immensely important was the abolition of unemployment.  You could also see 
this in Austria.  My wife and I were there the summer of ‘37—everywhere misery, and in the summer of 
‘38, after the Anschluss, everyone had work again.144 
 
Despite his initial mostly only pragmatic embrace of National Socialism as a governing system, 
van Dam was in complete agreement with other völkisch, Nazi-oriented thinkers in seeing a great 
need for the reform of the Dutch school system along more nationalist lines.  In essence, he was 
ideologically a supporter of Greater Germanic concept, with a much lesser emphasis placed upon 
the racial elements of that ideology. For van Dam, it was culture alone that was most 
important.145 As part of his task to coordinate public life in the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart asked 
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University of Amsterdam Professor of Archeology and noted völkisch thinker Geerto Snijder to 
begin that process sometime in late Summer 1940.  For reasons that remain unclear, Snijder was 
not keen to take a leading role in the occupation regime, preferring an equally important, yet far 
less public role.146  Instead, Snijder asked his colleague and friend Jan van Dam to formulate his 
ideas on education reform.  Van Dam put his thoughts into writing—in German, no less—on 
September 2, 1940 and released his Gedanken und Vorschläge zur Neugestaltung des 
niederländischen Unterrichtswesens147 on seven typed pages.  He then released a slightly revised 
version of the same document entitled Reform des niederländischen Unterrichts148 later that 
month.149  The “reforms” that van Dam suggested in these works can be broadly classified into 
three categories: strengthening the national character of education, eliminating rampant 
intellectualism, and fostering the unity and national self-consciousness of the Dutch populace. 
First and foremost among the changes van Dam suggested implementing was a 
strengthening of the national character of education.150  To accomplish this, he proposed a much 
greater emphasis be placed upon Dutch language instruction.  The importance of Dutch language 
instruction was somewhat of a hobby horse for van Dam and a cause for which he had agitated 
already in the 1930s, a fact that is unsurprising given his position as a language professor.151  He 
suggested doubling the hours given for Dutch language instruction; the creation of a Dutch 
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language institute that would work on spelling, grammar, and the creation of a Dutch language 
dictionary; and the introduction of newer teaching methods.152  In addition to an increased stress 
on Dutch language instruction, German language instruction was to receive greater emphasis as 
well, not just through an increase in lesson hours dedicated to German language in the higher 
grades, but also through the introduction of German language instruction at the lower levels.  
This greater emphasis on Dutch and German language instruction was to be combined with a 
greater emphasis on certain aspects of historical instruction, the majority of which was to focus 
on the Germanic nature of the Netherlands and its connection to other Germanic peoples, 
especially Germans and Germany proper.153  Beyond emphasizing the völkisch and Germanic 
character of the Netherlands and the Dutch people, historical instruction was to be reduced to the 
major outlines of Dutch history.  With an eye toward producing better future citizens, van Dam 
proposed strengthening physical education and suggested that schooling generally should 
emphasize the joy of working and the dangers of negativity and non-conformism.  As a final 
measure toward this end, van Dam proposed the introduction of the Führerprinzip154 into the 
educational establishment.155 
To make room in the curriculum for the new emphases he proposed, van Dam suggested 
a reduction in scientific instruction.  Lesson hours in mathematics, physics, and chemistry were 
to be reduced, while bookkeeping was to be eliminated altogether.  Instruction in the French 
language, which had up to this point enjoyed the status of being the primary second language 
taught in Dutch schools, was also to be a further victim of van Dam’s “reforms.”156  But the 
                                                 
152 Knegtmans, Schulten, and Vogel, Collaborateurs van niveau, 245. 
153 De Pater, Het schoolverzet, 42–43; Knegtmans, Schulten, and Vogel, Collaborateurs van niveau, 245–46. 
154 Leadership Principle. 




reduction of subjects deemed to be overly intellectual was not limited to the student curriculum.  
Recognizing that it would to little good to change the curriculum if the teachers giving lessons 
were not on the same page, van Dam also suggested “reforms” of the teacher training system.  
Here the emphasis was on turning out teachers of a more “proletarian”—that is less 
intellectual—character and this was to be accomplished by emphasizing the same subjects in 
teacher training colleges as in primary and secondary schools.  Additionally, van Dam proposed 
the dismissal of Christian clerical instructors and Jewish instructors.  While the latter were not 
terribly numerous in the Netherlands, Christian clerics held teaching positions in many Dutch 
schools and their elimination from the teaching corps would, van Dam proffered, free up much 
needed funds that could be earmarked for increasing the salaries of the newer, proletarian 
teachers coming on the job market.157 
While these changes would be sure to arouse opposition, it was van Dam’s planned 
“reforms” of confessional education that showed how truly out of touch he was with the majority 
of Dutch society.  Unlike Mussert and the NSB which supported the Three Pillars system, van 
Dam argued that all education must be unified under the purview of the state.  The separate 
system of confessional schools, financed by the state, but with little government oversight into 
the curriculum, was, in van Dam’s eyes, anathema to national unity.158  Only through a unified 
elementary education, to be accomplished by the replacement of public and confessional primary 
schools with a single type of Volksschule, could national unity be strengthened and the 
corrupting influence of the churches diminished.  To his credit, van Dam recognized that this 
final step was too far, too fast, and as such suggested as an initial salvo in that direction, that the 
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state reserve the right to appoint and dismiss teachers at confessional schools as well as the 
ability to shutter smaller schools incapable of maintaining adequate enrollments.  In addition to 
incorporating confessional schools under the umbrella of state control, van Dam proposed a 
reorganization of secondary education for males between three main branches: gymnasia; a new, 
middle school that would incorporate elements from both the gymnasia and hogere burger 
school; and a third professionally oriented school designed for future middle managers and 
shopkeepers.  Women were to be excluded from this third professional school in favor of a 
school form that van Dam had not yet determined, but one what would be more oriented towards 
the female psyche.  Taken together, the two papers could easily be misinterpreted as job 
application for the position of a school reformer.159  Van Dam does not appear to have had his 
eye on the position of Secretary-General of the education department at this early point.  Rather, 
in his second piece, he described the position he would prefer, one that was situated directly 
under the Reichskommissariat itself, and in which he would work hand in hand with the 
Secretary-General, but also one which would give him the final say.160   Regardless of the 
position he was to receive, however, what is abundantly clear is that, given the history of 
education in the Netherlands, his proposed “reforms,” which in some ways echoed both the 
criticisms of  and proposals for education made the liberal faction during the School Struggle, 
were certain to engender opposition among the Dutch populace and educational establishment.161 
Van Dam would not have to wait for very long to start down his proposed path.  Already 
in late September 1940 van Dam was appointed by the then acting Secretary-General of the 
Department of Education, Arts, and Sciences to lead a commission tasked with “cleansing” (i.e., 
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censoring) school texts books of anti-German passages or passages that could be understood as 
potentially detrimental to the occupation authority, such as those praising the House of Orange or 
those written by Jewish authors.162  Continuing to display what can only be described as an 
incredible work ethic, van Dam’s textbook commission managed to work through some nine 
thousand works in only two months, striking anti-German passages from many and outright 
banning over four hundred from use in school instruction.  During the interim period, the 
occupation authority decided to split the pre-war Dutch Department of Education, Sciences and 
Arts into two separate departments.  As van Poelje had been arrested on September 2 for taking 
part in celebrations of the Queen’s birthday, both new departments were in need of bureaucratic 
leaders.163  The top position in the newly formed education department was initially offered to 
Geerto Snijder, but Snijder again declined a public role.  For its part, the NSB hoped to install 
Robert van Genechten, the Belgian-born head of the Opvoedersgild, in the post, but Seyss-
Inquart and Dr. Heinrich Schwarz, head of the Hauptabteilung Erziehung und Kirchen in 
Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat, both hoped to limit, not expand, the influence of the deeply 
unpopular movement, and especially not that of the faction led by Mussert.164  Shortly after 
Snijder’s decline, D. G. Noordijk, a German teacher, NSB and Opvoedersgilde member, and old 
acquaintance of van Dam recommended the latter to Wimmer for the position of Secretary-
General.  Around the same time, Snijder passed along van Dam’s two writings on school reform 
to Schwarz as well as a written recommendation noting that van Dam was much involved with 
German-Dutch language and cultural relationships as well has had a great interested in Germanic 
cultural history.165  A consensus quickly formed that van Dam was the man for the job. 
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There were many reasons that Seyss-Inquart’s choice of van Dam to lead the new 
education department was well advised.  He was well known in the academic world, with direct 
experience in secondary schools, higher education, and teacher training.  He was one of the best 
known Germanists in the Netherlands and was supported by various important players on the 
völkisch wing of Dutch politics.  Further, his interest and specialization in Old-German language 
and literature fit in very nicely with the Germanic ideal promoted by the SS.  He could be 
reliably counted on to promote the interests of the German occupiers, but at the same time, he 
was not tied to the deeply unpopular NSB and, even more importantly, did not subscribe to the 
educational reforms the Mussert Movement hoped to achieve regarding confessional education.  
His approach toward “reform,” aimed at eliminating confessional schools entirely, was preferred 
by both Seyss-Inquart and the deeply anti-clerical SS-man Schwarz.166  Jan van Dam contained 
within himself all of the qualities the Nazi occupiers could have hoped for in a local proxy, and if 
there were any reservations on the German part, it was only because van Dam was not radical 
enough, although Snijder was able to convince Seyss-Inquart that, at least in this case, discretion 
was the better part of valor.167  Van Dam’s suitability for the role was likely reinforced from the 
German perspective when, a year after his appointment in September 1941, van Dam joined the 
Germanic SS as a patronizing member, making it absolutely clear where on the ideological 
spectrum between the NSB and the SS he stood.168  For his part, van Dam was initially unsure 
whether he should take the job.  After asking several colleagues and friends for advice, van Dam 
decided that Germany’s influence in the Netherlands would remain after the war ended, whether 
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by German victory or negotiated peace.169  Given this apparent fact, and his own mastery of the 
German language, knowledge of German culture and society, and his already expressed interests 
in pacifying the unrest in the schools, van Dam saw himself as a perfect middle-man, able to 
work with both the Dutch populace and the German occupiers to the mutual benefit of each.170  
With van Dam’s willingness assured, and despite Mussert’s disapproval, his appointment to the 
position of Secretary-General of the Department of Education, Sciences, and Cultural 
Administration was made public on November 25, 1940.171 
A week later, on December 1, van Dam delivered the first of several nationally broadcast 
radio addresses to the Dutch people.  The address, which was also transcribed and published by 
newspapers across the country, was partly a formal defense of the coming “reforms” and partly a 
directive against agitation.172  He began by attempting to reassure the populace that although the 
present era of war and occupation was difficult, all societies face difficulties and that history had 
shown that all such difficult times eventually pass.  But in contrast to previous periods of 
difficulty, the difficulties of the present moment were not of a material nature, but of a “spiritual 
nature.”173 This spiritual deficiency was also manifest in the schools, and its symptoms, 
“restlessness, confusion, lack of concentration, agitation surrounding rumors, [and] voluntary or 
involuntary misinterpretation of policies and regulations, [were] the order of the day.” While 
noting that these symptoms must be combated, he assured Dutch parents that education would 
“accentuate the Dutch element,” and that the lines between the Dutch and other peoples, 
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especially the German people, were not blurred: “We are all Dutch and want to remain so.”174  
The Germans, van Dam explained, also wished that educational instruction was given in a 
“Dutch sense,” and he assured his listeners that the occupiers would not prevent the 
implementation of these “reforms.” Further, he attempted to assuage fears regarding the 
censorship of school textbooks, about which misunderstandings and rumors were running 
rampant.  Denying that any books had been banned, he instead noted that some books had only 
been “taken out of circulation” and some of those only because they had not yet been inspected.  
Only those books that contained passages that were “unfit for the present situation,” by which he 
meant books that “contained offensive passage against the German people or their leaders” were 
actually removed, van Dam insisted. 
At the same time, van Dam interspersed his speech with dire warnings for teachers and 
students that they should not do anything to endanger their position, and by extension, the future 
of the Dutch volk.  Teachers were warned not to allow instruction to spread enmity or falsehoods 
about the German people or its leaders.  Students in elementary schools should avoid speaking 
about politics or the other events that were unfolding around them on the streets and in the public 
sphere.  Rather, these students should spend their time discussing their daily lives (as though the 
invasion and occupation had had no impact upon them!) or engaging in physical education and 
sporting activities.  Secondary school students should quit dividing themselves into groups by 
political persuasion and they should recognize that those students who incite other students to 
enter the conflict in any way do those students and the entire nation a disservice.  Rather, 
secondary students, van Dam explained, should take their colleagues with differing opinions by 
the hand and be friends.  Van Dam left his strongest language for university students.  Their 
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protest activities had already led to the closure of some universities, and should the situation not 
change, he assured them that more closures would follow the winter break when classes 
resumed.175  These closures were harmful, he warned, not just to the students themselves, as they 
would prevent the students from continuing with their education, but also to the nation as a 
whole, as the closures prevented the students from entering adult society and thereby 
contributing to the future of the nation.  Van Dam allowed that in different times, he would 
support the students’ right to air their grievances through protest, but not now.  Rather, he 
exhorted the nation that “this is a time in which much work must be done.  Therefore, discipline 
is necessary; and the best form of discipline is self-discipline.” 
The only actual point of policy he introduced to his audience in the entire speech dealt 
with his hobbyhorse, the importance of Dutch language and literature instruction.  He hoped that 
instruction in such subjects would be “substantially expanded and renewed,” eventually to be 
incorporated into a new subject of heemkunde.  This new heemkunde was to include, in addition 
to the expanded and renewed Dutch language and literature instruction, lessons in cultural and 
art history, geography, and ethnic studies.  All of this combined would prepare young Dutchmen 
and women “to spread the knowledge of the treasures of Dutch culture” around the world.176  
Although the concept of an integrative subject like heemkunde was already supported by 
educational reformers before the war as a methodological innovation, its support ended there.  
Van Dam’s overtly nationalistic conception of heemkunde, which he intended to use to extol the 
virtues of the Dutch nation and people, however, was more in line with the ideas that would, later 
during the war, be promoted in the pages of the Opvoedersgilde’s journal.177 
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Taken together, van Dam’s writings on school reform and his radio address to the nation 
show van Dam’s overriding concerns regarding the national character of education, the 
maintenance of order in the schools, and the importance of the relationship between the 
Netherlands and Germany.178  He continually framed his “reforms” as necessary for the renewal 
of the Dutch people and any opposition, whether on the part of parents, teachers, or students, was 
a danger not only to themselves, but to the very existence of the Dutch nation.  The threats were 
multiple and manifest.  Whether by the internal, spiritual degeneration of the nation or through 
external reprisals by the occupiers, resistance to van Dam’s changes to education was tantamount 
to a strike against the very people those resisters ostensibly aimed to help.  Instead, Dutch 
teachers, parents, and students should move forward with their lives, heads held high, into a new 
future brought about by the near certain German victory and guided by van Dam’s steady hand.  
Van Dam would spend the next three years attempting to guide the Dutch education system into 
this new future, but his efforts were ultimately a failure.  Some scholars, such as Loe de Jong, 
have argued that this was a result of van Dam’s political ineptness, but this negates the fact that 
many of the changes that were implemented during the occupation in the education realm came 
directly out of van Dam’s early wartime writings.179  While van Dam did experience an 
increasing political opposition to his position within the occupation apparatus as the occupation 
went on, focusing only on that later period of the occupation ignores the many successful 
“reforms” he was able to push through in his first years atop the education department.  He might 
not have operated like a seasoned politician, but there is no good reason to dismiss the real, 
tangible effects of his efforts.   
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At the same time, other scholars, and van Dam himself in his trial, have argued that he 
had always had the best interests of the Dutch people at heart and that he had only worked to 
protect the Dutch nation from German aggression.180  In this view, van Dam gradually lost 
confidence in the German occupation and slowly settled on passive resistance himself.  There is 
some evidence that this was the case.  Van Dam was, for example, instrumental in helping to 
save a number of Jews from deportation.  These individuals were usually highly acclaimed 
persons, artists, academics, and others working in the cultural sphere, some of whom were, 
through the intervention of van Dam personally, spared by Seyss-Inquart from deportation “to 
the east.” Although these Jews were eventually deported first to the transit camp Westerbork and 
then to Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia, they were spared from the more usual and lethal 
deportation destinations of Bergen-Belsen and, worse still, Auschwitz.  At least partly because of 
van Dam’s intervention on their behalf, many survived the war.181  Scholars are uncertain what 
motivated van Dam to help save these individuals from deportation.  Van Dam does not appear 
to have been a committed anti-Semite, despite his völkisch leanings, and it is possible that his 
desire to help stemmed more from the perceived loss to the Dutch nation that the murder of these 
esteemed individuals would cause.  Whatever the case, this single act, commendable as it was, 
cannot negate the overwhelming evidence showing that van Dam not only supported the efforts 
of the German occupiers, but that in many instances, the eventual changes instituted by the 
occupiers and the designs he spelled out in his Thoughts and Suggestions and Reform pieces in 
Fall 1940 were substantially the same.   
Regardless of van Dam’s political ability, the “reforms” he instituted were met with stiff 
resistance by teachers, parents, and students.  This resistance to education reform was combined 
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with an ever-increasing resistance to the German occupation more generally as the war carried 
on into its third and fourth years.  By mid-1943, at the very latest, the goals of the German 
occupiers had shifted from a more stable, less repressive occupation aimed at incorporating the 
Dutch into the wider Germanic world to a much more repressive occupation aimed at resource 
extraction in support of the ever-worsening war effort.  It was also at this time that van Dam 
appears to have mostly stopped performing everything but cursory duties over the department.182  
As the German occupation got more repressive, Dutch resistance activity increased at an inverse 
proportion, creating a violent, negative feedback loop that threatened to, and eventually would, 
spiral completely out of control.   
Conclusion 
The systems of education that were preferred by the NSB and Jan van Dam had several 
important similarities. Both held that education should be given in a “national sense,” 
emphasizing the Dutch character, physical education, history instruction, and the importance of 
the individual’s relationship with the volksgemeenschap. In both reform proposals, 
intellectualism was to be reduced in favor of an education that focused on the emotion and 
feelings of unity among the Dutch people.  Intellectualism was seen as a barrier to national unity, 
and as such, the higher sciences and even French language should be replaced in emphasis with 
subjects more likely to foster love and appreciation of the fatherland, the volksgemeenschap, and, 
at least in van Dam’s case, the larger Germanic race.183  For the mass of Dutchmen and women, 
fostering a greater national unity required a reduction in the educational niveau of the populace. 
Overt intellectualism included too much individualism, too much critical thinking, and too little 
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unquestioning acceptance of proper authority. As one writer in Opvoeding in volkschen geest put 
it: 
We see the school much less as a learning institute, where almost exclusively the intellect is developed, but 
we place, much more than usual the emphasis on emotional life; one always feels oneself bound to the volk, 
[one does] not “think” oneself bound to the volk.184 
 
The irony, of course, was that van Dam, Mussert, van Genechten, and many of the other leading 
educational thinkers among the NSB and the völkisch wing of Dutch politics were, themselves, 
intellectuals. Van Dam, who was trained as a specialist on ancient Germanic languages and 
literatures and who had spent his entire adult life in academia, was the very model of a successful 
intellectual, while Mussert and van Genechten were both university trained, the former as an 
engineer, the latter as a lawyer.  The leaders of the German occupation regime, at least those who 
oversaw educational policy, were similarly well educated, with Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and 
Schwarz all possessing doctorate degrees. 
But there were also significant differences between the educational reform proposals 
adopted by van Dam and the NSB. Van Dam was much more in favor of specifically German 
elements, such as the introduction of German language instruction into primary education and 
was himself a believer in the völkisch ideal of a Germanic community of peoples, whereas 
Mussert and the majority of the NSB were simply too nationalistic in their outlook to allow for 
anything that even resembled Germanization or Germanicization.185  But, by far, the most 
important difference between Mussert and the NSB’s proposals for education and those of van 
Dam was the question of unity in education versus allowance for separate confessional 
education. 
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Mussert and the majority of NSB members favored the Three Pillars system of 
educational organization which allowed for separate, confessional “special schools.” This system 
was very much in line with the peculiar nature of Dutch education that had formed over the 
previous century and that became firmly established as a result of the victory of the confessional 
pillars in the School Struggle. Although the NSB, more generally, was not in favor of the 
pillarized nature of Dutch society, Mussert and the thinkers in his faction of the NSB were all too 
aware of the dangers of trying to undo the gains the confessions had gained and so made an 
exception for their interests in the educational realm. Yes, the ultimate leadership of each 
educational pillar would be in the hands of the state, but relative independence would be granted 
under Mussert’s scheme. 
Alternatively, van Dam, much like the eventual German occupation regime, saw 
confessional education as anathema to national unity and thus believed it must be done away 
with. It is difficult to say from where van Dam got this notion. Given his education and 
experience, he must have been familiar with the School Struggle of the previous century, and he 
came of age during the height of the struggle in the second decade of the twentieth century. But 
he was also raised in a non-religious household, and it is possible that his anti-clerical opinions 
as regarded confessional education found their genesis there.186  Moreover, before the Second 
World War, he had generally voted for one of the liberal parties, and so it is equally possible that 
his support for unified public education first surfaced during his young adult life.187  His plan for 
educational reform, after all, had significant overlap with the liberal agenda of the nineteenth 
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century as it related to confessional education—namely the elimination of separate, confessional 
schools and the unification of all education under the direct purview of the state.  Either way, his 
background suggests that his opposition to confessional education was not a direct result of his 
adoption of völkisch politics in the 1930s. 
The position of the German occupation leadership is more difficult to determine. Seyss-
Inquart, more generally, tried to minimize direct confrontation with the Dutch churches, knowing 
that they would provide stiff resistance and could not as easily be pushed aside as, for example, 
the political parties.188  At the same time, however, when the Catholic Church began preaching 
against the NSB in spring 1941, Seyss-Inquart decided it needed to be punished and chose the 
issue of confessional schools as his weapon of choice, yet again showing that his political power 
base was the Catholic Seyss-Inquart’s chief concern. It was only through van Dam’s sage advice 
against reigniting the School Struggle that the most extreme measures were not taken.189 
Wimmer, on the other hand, was somewhat more favorable, at least personally, toward 
Catholicism specifically, as he was and always had been a practicing Catholic. In fact, this was 
one of the downsides Rauter saw in him when Himmler requested an evaluation of Wimmer in 
reference to a possible promotion within the SS. According to Rauter, although politically 
Wimmer supported the Greater Germanic concept, he was, in terms of his Weltanschauung, 
purely Catholic.190  Schwarz for his part, was a true believer in the SS world and, as was typical 
in SS circles, strongly anti-clerical.191   
For the most part, however, it was van Dam and Schwarz who would become the driving 
forces in the education realm, working together and forming a relatively friendly relationship 
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over the next several years. While their feelings regarding the place of the churches in education 
likely stemmed from different origins, they were generally in complete agreement about the need 
to remove clerical influence from education entirely, even if, as it would turn out, they were 
largely unsuccessful in doing so. In fact, most of the “reforms” that the pair attempted to institute 
would fail over the course of the occupation, but before we can turn to the reactions of the Dutch 
populace and the ultimate failure of the educational “reforms” implemented during the 
occupation in chapters seven and eight, we must look more closely at the specific “reforms” 
themselves, who supported which “reforms,” the goals of those “reforms,” and their 
implementation, often uneven, at the local level.  It is these topics to which we turn in the next 
three chapters.    
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Chapter 4 - The Direct Path to the Greater Germanic Reich 
 
The overall mandate of the Reichskommissar [is] to induce the Dutch people into a positive cooperation in the 
Greater Germanic area. … [to] win young people to the Reich. For this there [are] two ways, the direct: to win the 
Reich and thus to win National Socialism, and the indirect: to win National Socialism and thus to win the Reich. 
Both paths must be taken. - Heinrich Schwarz, March 22, 19411 
 
In the field of education, there were two paths that the German leadership saw for the 
creation of a Germanic identity among the Dutch, each with its intended audience and each 
necessary for the creation of the Greater Germanic Reich. The first path, described as “indirect,” 
involved Dutch youth, and put succinctly, was to win the youth over to National Socialism, and 
then their acceptance of the Greater Germanic Reich would follow naturally. The second method 
involved German educational institutions in the Netherlands, especially the German Schools and 
the Reichsschulen, which were attended by German and German-friendly Dutch students. This 
process, described as the “direct route,” involved German educational institutions as models for 
other schools in the nation; they were to become the goal toward which Dutch schools would 
strive. Winning the battle through the German Schools in the Netherlands would mean a 
strengthening of the Reich, and with that strengthening, National Socialism would conquer.2 
This chapter focuses on the “direct path” toward the Greater Germanic Reich as practiced 
in the educational realm in the Netherlands. It begins with a brief look at educational practices in 
Germany during the 1930s, before moving to German institutions in the Netherlands prior to the 
Nazi invasion. These schools had been present in the Netherlands for many decades, but with the 
Nazi “seizure of power” in 1933, they began focusing more explicitly on imparting Nazi values 
to their students. With the invasion and occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, these schools 
were significantly expanded, increasing the total number of students, both Dutch and German, 
who were educated along explicitly German lines. The education provided to these students 
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would, in theory, stand in stark contrast to the overly intellectual education students received in 
Dutch schools and would, by their very nature as superior institutions, slowly bring Dutch 
educators and parents over to the Nazi side.3 
The chapter then moves on to the establishment of three separate educational institutions 
meant to instruct the future elite of the Nazis’ pan-Germanic, European empire. The first of these 
projects was the NIVO, or Dutch Institute for Völkisch Education, which was established by the 
occupiers as a Dutch counterpart to German National-Political Educational Institutes (Napola). 
Owing to infighting between the German leadership, as well as staunch opposition from Dutch 
Nazis to the NIVO project, the Germans scrapped it after the first year and turned to the 
establishment of German style Napolas in 1942, although for political reasons, they were called 
Reichsschulen, instead of National-Political Educational Institutes. These schools, one for boys 
and one for girls, would last until fall 1944, when both schools, which were located in the 
southern province of Limburg, were evacuated to Germany in advance of the Allied onslaught 
expected to come later that fall.4  As with so many other efforts at “reform,” the turning tide of 
the war meant and end for the Germans’ efforts. 
Education in Nazi Germany 
Education as a tool for the social formation of the next generation has a long history in 
Europe. Most, if not all, Western European states attempted to use their school systems in the 
nineteenth century as “instruments of nation-building,” that is, the training of a loyal citizenry.5  
The Nazis were no exception to this trend, and when they came to power in Germany, they made 
a concerted effort to use education to influence the next generation toward the ideals of National 
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Socialism.6  Hitler directly stated as much in one of his rambling “table talks” with his 
subordinates: “In the same way as the press, the school also must be used as an instrument for 
the education of the people.”7  This process, in and of itself, is not nefarious so much as it is 
universal to formal education. The Nazis, who certainly attempted to use education to build the 
next generation of Germans, did not invent this idea; it was common to the other major political 
parties in Germany during the early part of the twentieth century.8  Moreover, the Nazis’ efforts 
were not limited to the creation of better Germans, but were also aimed at turning the Dutch, 
whose almost three hundred years of independence from their “ethnic kin” in Germany had 
allowed for the creation of a separate culture and national identity, into the Germanic brothers 
and sisters Nazi racial theorists saw in them.9  Central to my overarching argument, however, is 
the realization that the goals of the occupation regime in the field of education in the occupied 
Netherlands went beyond the Nazis’ corresponding efforts in Germany, to include the 
redefinition of what it actually means to be Dutch and the creation of a new national identity 
based on their Germanic past. In order to make this larger point, however, a short survey of the 
Nazis’ educational goals in Germany in the 1930s is necessary. 
Like many aspects of German life, the Nazis saw the Weimar period’s influence on 
education as extremely problematic. Instead, Nazi educational theorists looked back to cultural 
critics from the previous century, especially Lagarde and Langbehn, who criticized industrial 
society and the developments that led to it, especially the Enlightenment, liberalism, socialism, 
and parliamentarianism. These völkisch thinkers instead romanticized about a pre-industrial, 
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agricultural past, with its unquestioned norms and, ostensibly, charismatic political leadership.10  
These thinkers professed a racial unity between the volk and the land, and among society as a 
whole, based upon racialist lines. Indeed, it would be the influence of race that stood at the center 
of Nazi educational policy.11 
The prevailing trend in Weimar education, on the other hand, was that of 
decentralization.12  Because educational policy was determined by the sates, new types of schools 
became common under Weimar, including Montessori schools; “worldly schools,” secular 
schools that usually also had a pedagogical reform element included; and schools promoting 
“democratic” reforms (i.e., schools giving students a greater say in their own education). For its 
part, the central government did promote guidelines for education that suggested education 
should be of a “German-National” character, in which the individual was subordinate to the 
larger nation—a concept that dates back to the Romantic era and notable thinkers such as Fichte 
and Hegel13—but the government had little ability to enforce these guidelines among the various 
states. As a result, there was a large proliferation of new schools and pedagogical techniques 
under the Weimar Republic, a proliferation the Nazis and other conservative, nationalist, and/or 
völkisch elements found distressing. Despite Weimar’s encouragement of educational reforms, 
however, the overwhelming nature of the German teaching corps remained conservative, “anti-
democratic, anti-liberal, authoritarian, and sexist.”14  The nationalist and völkisch parties, the 
Nazis among them, fought these reforms tooth and nail. For the extreme right wing of German 
politics, education in Weimar was too formulaic, focusing too much on intellectualism and 
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bookishness to the detriment of the nation. Instead, these right-wing parties, the Nazis included, 
preferred an education that was based more on cultivating the spiritual and physical 
characteristics of the student in order to make them loyal to the German nation.  Learning, 
according to the most völkisch elements of German society, was to be rooted in one’s 
connectedness to the soil that allowed for the spirit to flourish, rather than the production of 
intellectual automatons.15  These characteristics of Weimar education, which the Nazis 
consistently labeled as “liberal” and “Marxist,” were to be rejected completely in favor of a 
national education that would produce a future Aryan ruling class in Europe. 
When the Nazis came to power, they immediately began to shape education in Germany 
in a more national socialist mold. In doing so, they were building on an already long tradition of 
using education as a method for forming and inculcating particular sets of values among the 
youth.  Already in the nineteenth century, German education theorists recognized that education 
was an effective, even necessary, vehicle for transmitting specific values to the next generation. 
Educators such as Friedrich Froebel, the mid-nineteenth century founder of the kindergarten, 
argued that education must start in the home and that it should be intimately tied to education in 
the school. For Froebel, who saw the family as the basic building block of society, the child’s 
understanding of the unlimited love of a mother for her child, and understanding the virtue of 
that love, was paramount. Only then could the child grow up to exhibit the ideal purity of heart 
and mind that was so important to Froebel’s conception of proper society.16 Later, in the Weimar 
period, reflecting the republican individualism of that period, works of youth literature such as 
Emil und die Detektive emphasized the individual’s (in this case the child’s) ability to overcome 
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great odds in the big city to prevail over injustice, while at the same time completely ignoring the 
systemic causes of poverty and crime that shape the main character’s world.17  Once they gained 
power, the Nazis were, in some ways, simply following in the footsteps of their Kaiserreich and 
Weimar forbearers. 
Almost immediately after Hitler established his dictatorship in March, 1933, the Nazis 
took the first steps in their institutional coordination of the German education apparatus. Shortly 
after assuming power, the regime identified those individuals determined to be undesirable 
elements and then dismissed, transferred, or demoted them from positions of authority in the 
schools. Through laws such as the Gesetz gegen die Überfüllung deutscher Schulen und 
Hochschulen18 and the Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums,19 both from April 
1933, put limits on the number of Jewish students who could attend schools and gave the 
government the authority to remove public servants, including school faculty, administrators and 
education officials, for reasons of “race” or previous political activity. These dismissals had 
significant impacts on the German educational establishment. Although they varied by region 
and province, the numbers of dismissed or demoted teachers, school administrators, and state 
education officials could range upwards of twenty-five per cent, and this does not count those 
who resigned or those who, for reasons of self-preservation, joined the NSDAP to prevent their 
previous political activity from counting against them. When some administrators ignored the 
laws regarding the dismissal of undesirable elements, they themselves were dismissed. Naturally, 
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these politically or racially undesirable elements were mostly replaced with regime loyalists, 
especially the so-called Alte Kämpfer.20 
In addition to the removal of politically and “racially” undesirable elements, the Nazis 
took aim at entire educational institutions. Chief among these, in the early days of the regime, 
were schools that promoted new pedagogical techniques, such as the “democratic reform” or 
Montessori schools. The “worldly schools” and even schools with a history of political activity 
among their teaching corps and students were also targeted for closure. In Berlin, some fifty-
three schools were closed, their teachers and administrators either dismissed or transferred to 
other schools, while their students were divided up among neighboring schools. When closure 
was not an option, personnel changes were in order. The numbers of teachers who were harassed, 
dismissed, demoted, of forcibly transferred is in some cases absolutely astonishing. In Hamburg, 
one of the main centers of the school reform movement, as many as fifty-five per cent of school 
directors were dismissed and replaced with party loyalists, as opposed to the comparatively 
paltry fifteen per cent who were forcibly removed from service in Berlin (the other major center 
of such reform movements). In some cases, dismissal was not enough, as the now unemployed 
former teachers and administrators continued to face discrimination in future employment, 
harassment by the SA, and even outright murder.  But pressure on teachers and administrators 
for conformity was felt even by those who were not dismissed. Evaluations by their superiors, 
the constant threat of being labeled “suspicious” by party loyalists, and the enforced declarations 
of one’s independence from political organizations opposed to the regime were all methods used 
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to keep otherwise apolitical teachers in line, to say nothing of those teachers and administrators 
witnessing the dismissal and persecution of their erstwhile colleagues who did not fall in line.21 
Running in the opposite direction was, contradictorily enough, the establishment of 
schools specifically for Jewish students on the one hand and various forms of “elite” schools for 
the creme of the Aryan crop on the other. Some of these Jewish schools had existed for some 
time, just as confessional schools of all stripes had, but others were newly established to accept 
the influx of Jewish students and teachers who were increasingly leaving the state run public 
schools because of harassment but could not forgo school altogether because of the universal 
schooling requirements. The percentage of Jewish students in “regular” schools decreased by 
some fifty per cent by 1935, and then by another third in 1936.22  After the November Pogrom of 
1938, all Jewish pupils were required to attend Jewish schools until they were banned from 
school attendance altogether in 1942 in favor of deportation “to the east.”  At the same time that 
the Nazis were expelling Jewish Germans from public education and relocating them in 
segregated classrooms, they were establishing other segregated schools for the future elites of the 
elites. They took two forms: the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten23 (Napola) and the 
Adolf-Hitler-Schulen.24  The goal of these schools was to train the next generation of German 
leadership, although they targeted different groups. The former were meant to educate those 
students who would enter the civil service and serve the state, while students at the latter were 
meant to enter into leadership positions within the party and its connected mass organizations.25 
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Reorganization of the schools was another change that the Nazis instituted. Even before 
the Nazis attained power, nationalist, völkisch, and conservative elements had been pushing for a 
reduction in the numbers and types of public schools found in Germany, which in all of their 
variations numbered more than a dozen types of secondary schools. Although it must also be 
noted that the impetus behind these desired reforms differed among groups, with völkisch 
thinkers espousing a more populist, revolutionary ideology aimed at national unity. In 1938, a 
school reform was instituted that allowed for three basic types of secondary school: the 
Oberschule, the Aufbauschule, and the Gymnasium.26  The Oberschule, which returned to the 
system of separate education for boys and girls that had been abandoned by some schools 
promoting new pedagogical techniques during Weimar,27 was by far the most attended, with 
more than eighty per cent of German students attending these schools during the Nazi period. 
Conceived as a “unity school,”28 the Oberschule was to focus on those core subjects necessary to 
the creation of a German (history, German, physical education, etc.), as opposed to the more 
universalistic, humanistic, and, therefore, un-German education given to Gymnasium students, 
the attendance at which was restricted to males.29 The increased importance placed on the “core 
subjects” of history, physical education, and German language, combined with a reduction from 
nine to eight years of compulsory education, lest students become too intellectual, allowed these 
new schools to be “instruments of nationalism” that “pushed humanistic education into the 
background.”30  At the same time, even the humanistic education given at the Gymnasium was 
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rolled back as Latin and Greek, long-standing features of humanistic, continental education, were 
removed from the required courses list, betraying the radical, populist nature of the reforms. 
The make-up of the civil service and student bodies were far from the Nazis’ only 
concern. Further regulations were issued along similar lines that encompassed wide-ranging 
topics related to schooling, such as the replacement of non-aryan and politically suspect parental 
representatives with candidates whose political inclinations could be trusted, that is until they 
were abolished altogether in 1934 as too democratic.31  Under pressure from the regime, most 
educational associations were also incorporated into the already existing National Socialist 
Teachers Union32 by mid-1933, and although some groups, such as religious associations, were 
able to hold out somewhat longer, they too were eventually forcibly “coordinated.” Some groups, 
which for political reasons refused to join the NSLB simply dissolved themselves. The pressure 
to join the NSLB was intense, and the participation rates prove this, as by the end of the Nazi 
period, some ninety-seven per cent of teachers and administrators were members; of those a full 
quarter were members of the Nazi Party itself, a higher percentage than in most other sectors of 
the civil service.33  Other “reforms” that touched upon school life, but not yet on the curriculum, 
included the replacement of holidays that celebrated democratic institutions, such as the 
Verfassungsfeiern34 with those more directed towards Nazism and its ideals, such as new 
holidays celebrating Hitler’s Birthday, the Tag der nationalen Arbeit,35 or Mother’s Day.36  
Further, laws allowing for punishment of teachers and administrators for their political affiliation 
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with Nazism were repealed, while laws promoting the wearing of symbols and uniforms of 
national movements (i.e., the NSDAP and its affiliated groups, such as the Hitlerjugend and 
Bund deutscher Mädel37) and the introduction of the Hitler greeting were promulgated.38  These 
new holidays helped engender a sense of community by their very simultaneity, by the mere fact 
that students and teachers were participating in them, regardless of whether specific individuals 
actually believed the message these reforms imparted.39 Centralization of German education 
followed in 1934 with the establishment of Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung, und 
Volksbildung40 and the appointment of Bernhard Rust, formerly the head of the Prussian 
education ministry, as Reichsminister. This process of Gleichschaltung was completed the 
following year when the various education ministries of the German provinces were incorporated 
into the Reich Education Ministry.41 
In addition to laws dealing with the coordination of educational institutions and 
associations, the Nazis introduced changes into the actual curriculum as well. Although many of 
the changes were decreed early in the regime, their introduction was cemented through the 
control and regulation of school textbooks. As the regime solidified control, fewer and fewer 
publishers were allowed to publish school text books, until, finally, in 1941, only the official 
publishing house of the Nazi Party, Eher Verlag, was allowed to publish school texts.42 By and 
large, these changes can be grouped into four major categories: introduction of the leadership 
principle and its accompanying effects, an increased emphasis on physical education, a complete 
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reevaluation of history, and the racialization of instruction and content. Each of these can be 
directly traced back to Mein Kampf.43  The Führerprinzip, or leadership principle, was one of the 
defining characteristics of National Socialism. It called for complete subordination to one’s 
superiors, especially the decisive actions of the Führer himself, creating a hierarchical society in 
which decisions were made at the summit and were to be carried out by those below. Like many 
Nazi ideas, the authoritarian roots of the leadership principle have existed previously in German 
schools, but the Nazis took the concept to an entirely new level. Its extension to the classroom 
made the teacher a petty-tyrant and the school director a not-quite-as-petty-tyrant, and it 
proceeded up the chain until it reached the Führer at the summit. Already instituted in 1933, the 
inclusion of the leadership principle affected almost all facets of education, ranging from a 
deemphasis on actual classroom instruction in favor of character development or physical 
education, to curriculum changes and the grading of exams.  The ban on corporal punishment 
passed by the Weimar government was repealed on Jan. 31, 1933, the day after Hitler took 
power, putting discipline squarely back in the hands of the teacher. Further, as part and parcel of 
the co-optation of Mother’s Day by the regime, school teachers were instructed to use the 
holiday to counsel students on the importance of the German mother and the value of respect and 
gratitude to their parents, the parents being the petty-tyrants of the German family.  School 
administrators, especially, gained new powers with the introduction of the leadership principle. 
Whereas school directors had been first-among-equals under the Weimar government—a change 
that was in itself instituted in the immediate post-war period—the Nazis gave school directors 
complete authority over their schools, from administration to teacher evaluation to student 
                                                 
43 George F Kneller, The Educational Philosophy of National Socialism (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 1941); Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (München: Eher Verlag, 1937), 451–75, 491–93. 
154 
 
discipline. At the same time, the influence of the faculty on the operation of the school was 
reduced to an advisory role at best, insignificance at worst.44 
An increase in the importance of physical education was another of the most prominent 
elements of Nazi educational reforms. The overriding goal here was the creation of future 
mothers and future German soldiers.45  Only by perfecting the human body could the future of 
the German nation and people be preserved, and so physical education was seen as paramount to 
the future success of the German volk. As with the leadership principle, the roots of the Nazis 
fascination with physical education can be traced back, at least, to the beginning of the 
nineteenth century with Friedrich Jahn’s gymnastic associations. Even the militarization of 
physical education predated the Nazi seizure of power, but the Nazis, again, took it further. 
Physical education instruction in the schools was increased both in primary and secondary 
schools from their Weimar levels and a new emphasis on sport, especially team sports, was 
introduced. In secondary schools, the number of periods spent on physical education in a given 
week amounted to a more than eleven per cent increase, while in primary schools, the time spent 
on physical education doubled.46 Further, the centralization of physical education teacher training 
was implemented in 1936 through the Reichsakademie für Leibesübungen,47 which was founded  
in the Berlin suburb of Spandau in 1936.48  Importantly, however, the promotion of physical 
education was not limited to formal education, but was included in the informal educational 
system of youth associations such as the Hitler Youth and the League of German Girls. In terms 
of physical education (and many other aspects of Nazi youth socialization), these organizations 
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served alongside the regular school system as creators of a future national socialist German 
ruling class. Further, the informal system of physical education instruction extended beyond the 
student’s school years when, at least in the case of young men, students were encouraged to enter 
into voluntary work service49 and then into the German army, what Hitler referred to as “the 
highest school of patriotic education.”50 
If proper physical education was the highest priority for the body of the next generation 
of Germans, then a proper understanding of the national socialist view of history was the most 
important for the minds of the next generation. Of all the traditionally academic subjects students 
encountered in the nazified classroom, the study of history, or more accurately the study of the 
politicized notion of history held by the Nazis, was the most important to Nazi leaders. Like so 
much of Nazi ideology, historical instruction in the schools was to be reorganized around racial 
lines. According to Hitler, in Mein Kampf, “It is the task of the national state to see to it that a 
world history is finally written in which the race question is raised to a predominant position.”51  
And so historical instruction was remodeled around these lines with little regard for any sort of 
objective accuracy. Of primary importance for history instruction was pre-history. The Prussian 
education ministry published a set of “guidelines for history books” in August 1933 that give an 
overview of just how important the Nazis saw race. 
According to these Richtlinien für die Geschichtsbücher,52 the differences between the 
races were already formed in pre-history and were evidenced through the superior handicrafts, 
whether made of stone or bronze, that they left behind. From Europe, the Nordic race spread 
throughout the Near East, North Africa, and South-Central Asia already some five millennia 
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before the time of Christ. This, of course, meant that the Ancient Egyptian and Sumerian peoples 
were originally Nordics, or, at least, conquered by Nordics who would have then installed 
themselves as a ruling class; the author of the document, most likely Prussian Education Ministry 
official Wilhelm Stuckart, was not entirely sure which was correct. The Greeks and the Roman 
patricians (but not the plebeians) were also Nordic, the former having died out because of a low 
birth rate, the latter dying out because of infighting and, eventually, intermixing with the plebs.  
All that was good and decent in the Middle Ages was the result of the spread of Germanic tribes 
throughout the continent, which allowed for a fresh infusion of the Germanic blood that had been 
nearly wiped out by Roman intermixing. With the coming of the early modern period and the 
rise of nation-states, the importance of the German state begins to take center stage. But here, the 
emphasis is on the degradation of the German people and state through foreign influences. It is 
against these foreign influences that the Nazis were fighting by trying to build up an explicitly 
nationalist, German Weltanschauung among the German population, the history of which was to 
be especially emphasized in history textbooks.53  In reality, Nazi history texts were 
overwhelmingly concerned with the “great men” of German history (and only German history), 
especially Frederick II. “Old Fritz” was the exemplar of a heroic military leader whose only 
desire was to serve the state. The intended parallel with Hitler is patent. That he was a 
Francophone lover of Enlightenment philosophy was shunted aside.54  The purpose of all of this 
historical revisionism was to inculcate an extreme sense of nationalism among the next 
generation of Germans. In his summary of German history texts, Gilmer Blackburn accurately 
sums up the Nazis’ use of history: “The central theme of the history written by the National 
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Socialists [was] to arouse in the student a sense of Germanness [Deutschtum] in accordance with 
the most exclusive definition of the term, which would kindle the urgent desire to secure 
Germany's permanent hegemony in the world.”55 
Following closely behind the importance of history in Nazi educational policy was the 
introduction of disciplines such as Rassenkunde, Vererbungslehre, and Rassenhygiene.56  In these 
classes, which were required from 1935 and given greater precedence at the expense of 
mathematics and foreign languages, students learned about heredity, racial hygiene, racial 
demography, and the importance of the family for the continuation of the German people and 
Aryan race.57 The goal of this instruction was to educate the student of his or her proper place in 
the hierarchy of races, as well as to warn them of the dangers of intermixing with “inferior races” 
and/or the so-called Minderwertigen.58  Further, Rassenkunde was a prototypical exercise in 
community building (and exclusion), by showing German students that they belonged (or not) to 
a racial community, the vaunted Volksgemeinschaft, that stood at the pinnacle of human 
society.59  Central to the notion of race, as the Nazis conceived it, was German blood. It was in 
German blood through which the soul of the German people was passed down, and it was the 
threat to that same German blood that made other races and the physically and mentally disabled 
so dangerous in the Nazi mindset. Although these new subjects were mostly meant to be 
included in biology classes, especially in the higher grades, in truth, racial ideology spread 
throughout the curriculum at all levels. So, for example, an arithmetic textbook for elementary 
students had problems that asked students to determine how much the state pays extra, per 
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person, for physically and mentally disabled students versus their non-disabled peers.60  The 
intended lesson is clear. 
Although the preceding is but a short summary of the most important changes the Nazis 
implemented in German education during the 1930s and ‘40s, it bears emphasizing that the 
importance of German blood, German culture, German history, and the German state are front 
and center. Education in Nazi Germany was geared, explicitly towards all things German, to the 
complete detriment of anything deemed “foreign,” including liberalism, Judaism, and Marxism. 
As will become clear in later chapters, the Nazis’ efforts in the occupied Netherlands were, in 
many ways, very similar to their efforts in Germany, right down to the creation of elite schools 
for future leaders of the Greater Germanic Reich. 
But there is an extremely important difference: the Dutch are not German, they are 
Dutch. Despite many leading Nazis’ views on the Dutch as nothing more than Germans with a 
funny sailor’s dialect, the preceding three centuries of Dutch independence had led to the 
creation of a distinct culture that was separate from their German neighbors. Even if Dutch racial 
theorists agreed with their German counterparts about the ethnic relationship between the two 
peoples, and there were several who did, Dutch culture was clearly distinct from that of their 
Teutonic neighbors.  When the Nazis were extolling the greatness of the German people and 
Nordic race to German students, they were not attempting to completely overhaul German 
culture so much as to elevate certain aspects while silencing others. Alternatively, in the 
Netherlands the Nazis were forced to try and inculcate an entirely new concept of what it meant 
to be Dutch. Therein lies something of a difference. 
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The Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden before the Nazi invasion 
The German presence in the Dutch educational system predated the Nazis’ arrival in the 
country by more than forty years. Being neighbors, the Netherlands hosted a large German 
expatriate community.  As is not uncommon when large communities of foreigners are collected 
in a single region, schools were erected to cater explicitly to that community. By the 1930s, there 
were eight such Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden ranging from the major western cities of 
Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, clear across to the German border, in border adjacent 
towns such as Steyl and Vlodrop.61  Because of a unique twist in the history of Dutch education 
policy resulting from the School Struggle, these schools were partially subsidized by the state, 
but mostly financed through tuition fees levied on the students.62  Although the Dutch 
government maintained legal oversight of the German schools, which was necessary to maintain 
the mutual reciprocity of diploma recognition between German and Dutch schools that had been 
established under Dutch law in 1906, by the time the Nazis attained power the majority of the 
administration and curriculum was determined with significant input from Berlin, although 
meddling by Dutch authorities in the administration of the schools was a constant concern.63  In 
the words of one German school inspector, these schools acted as an “outpost of Germandom” in 
the Netherlands, and, according to Wimmer, would become, during the occupation, models for 
the reform of Dutch education and the strengthening of Germandom in the Netherlands.64  
Schwarz, who would come to directly oversee the German Schools during the occupation was of 
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a similar mindset, arguing that the German Schools played a central role in what he described as 
the “direct route” of winning the Netherlands over to the Greater Germanic Reich.65   
In the pre-Nazi period, the purpose of these German Schools was two-fold.  On the one 
hand, they acted as one of several nexuses for the German expatriate community in the various 
towns in which they were located, and on the other, as a form of cultural foreign policy in which 
the German state attempted to mold the expatriate community into a bastion of “Germandom” in 
the Netherlands.66  As Dr. Jungbluth, the head of the German secondary school in Rotterdam, 
noted in 1927: 
The more flourishing and powerful a colony, the more developed and powerful their school system. The 
florescence and esteem of their schools is, to a certain degree, the gauge of the importance and prestige of 
the German colony itself.67 
 
Unfortunately for the German administrators of these schools, there were significant obstacles to 
attaining these goals. First, the language of instruction in the primary schools was usually Dutch, 
owing to the Dutch state’s financial support and legal oversight. Moreover, most of the teachers 
were also Dutch because Germans with the necessary Dutch state teaching certificates were 
difficult to locate. This was especially prevalent at the German Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule in 
Amsterdam, where, beyond the school head Rector von Diepenbroek, only a single teacher was 
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German after the end of the First World War.68  These factors called into question the entire 
nature of these schools as purely German schools in the first place.69 
Secondary schools, which in some cases were part of a larger school that also included a 
subsidized primary school, were not required to adhere to the same restrictions as their primary 
school counterparts and thus were supervised by German authorities through the Foreign Office. 
The lack of Dutch governmental supervision meant that the German secondary schools could 
have a higher percentage of German teachers, as they were not required to have Dutch teaching 
certificates, although most of the schools still employed Dutch teachers to a greater or lesser 
extent.  This also freed the German Schools to organize their curriculum along more German 
lines.  But the lack of Dutch state financial support brought with it financial constraints, as these 
secondary schools were only partially funded through the German Foreign Office, albeit at a 
higher level than many German schools in other countries,70 requiring them to get the majority of 
their financial support through tuition fees.  This was not always an easy task, as the economic 
situation in the Netherlands, during the 1930s especially, was unfavorable, with high 
unemployment, including within the German colonies there.  This meant that some parents were 
not able to pay the full tuition fees, creating additional financial hardships for the schools.71   As 
a result, some of the schools switched the status of certain classes, such as when the German 
School in Rotterdam first removed the two highest classes of the nine-year primary school from 
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Dutch oversight in 1914, only to return them to Dutch school oversight in 1919 because of an 
intense need for Dutch state financial support.72 
Financial constraints were compounded by the fact that many Germans in the 
Netherlands were not members of the school associations and did not send their children to 
German Schools when they were available, choosing instead to send their children to Dutch 
schools.  There were many reasons for this.  For starters, many Germans, especially those who 
had married Dutch partners, had no intention of returning to Germany, but rather intended for 
their families to remain in the Netherlands, and for those parents, sending their children to Dutch 
schools was the more appropriate choice.73  Other times the choice to send one’s children to a 
Dutch school was based on more mundane factors.  The location and amenities of the German 
Schools were not always the best.  This was particularly evident in Amsterdam, where the 
German School there was located in a run-down building in a poor neighborhood.  Similar 
mundane factors plagued the German Schools in The Hague and Rotterdam.74  It stood to reason, 
the German leadership thought, that if the facilities could be improved, it would lead to higher 
enrollments and greater success in strengthening both the German colony and the German nature 
of the student bodies.75  Finally, financial constraints on the part of parents cannot also be 
overlooked, especially during the economically turbulent period after the New York stock 
market crash of 1929. Taken together, all of these factors contributed to an overriding fear in the 
German expatriate community of its members becoming “Dutchified.”  As Jungbluth noted, 
Dutch culture and language was so essentially similar to that of Germany and that even 
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“educated Germans are easily ‘Dutchified.’”76  German Schools were meant to prevent just this 
problem from infecting the larger community. 
With the assumption of power by the Hitler regime in Berlin, the focus on the German 
nature of the German Schools in the Netherlands only grew in importance. From 1934, the 
supervision of the German Schools in the Netherlands was removed from the Foreign Office and 
was placed under the purview of the newly created Reich Ministry for Education, Science and 
Culture, headed by Bernhard Rust. Consequently, a third goal would be added to these first two 
functions—the use of the schools as a tool of political indoctrination such that students attending 
German Schools would become appropriately acquainted with and bound to the political outlook 
of the new Germany.  It was a process that was relatively quick and seamless.77 
As part of its oversight, the Education Ministry sent German education officials to help 
administer the final exams of the graduating students at each of the German schools annually. At 
the same time these officials filed detailed reports that betray the Nazis’ overriding concern with 
entrenching Germandom in the Netherlands. Most of the reports began with a notation on the 
make-up of the student body. In the reports, the students were divided between Reichsdeutsche, 
Volksdeutsche, Netherlanders, and foreigners. Included among the foreign element were any 
Jewish students who happened to be attending. So, for example, at the German School in 
Amsterdam, officially known as the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, in 1934, of the 290 students, 205 
were Germans from the Reich, 53 were Dutch, 9 were Jewish (“israelistisch”), and the remainder 
were of other nationalities. By 1941, the ethnic makeup of the school had grown significantly 
more German, with 308 Reichsdeutsche, 153 Volksdeutsche, 117 Dutch, and 5 of other 
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nationalities; Jewish students disappeared from the roster completely.78  Similar demographic 
changes occurred in the other German schools.79  Somewhat ironically, in the very earliest years 
of Nazi rule in Germany, the number of Jewish students actually increased at the German 
Schools, likely a result of large numbers of Jewish emigrants from Hitler’s Germany who wanted 
their children to maintain some connection to their country of origin, although this increase was 
short-lived as the number of Jewish pupils began to decline by the later 1930s because of the 
increased stress laid upon racial factors at these schools.80 
Beyond their pure statistical value, these numbers show a large increase in the student 
body of these schools which can be, on the one hand, attributed to a larger number of Dutch 
parents deciding to send their children to German schools, presumably for the benefits it would 
grant their children in the new Nazi-controlled Europe, and, on the other, because of a greater 
attendance by the children of the German community in Amsterdam, which numbered more than 
seventeen thousand individuals. Both of these factors were of intense interest to the inspectors 
sent from the German Education Ministry, although in differing ways. The inspectors were 
generally very pleased with the increase in German students, as their attendance at the German 
schools would prevent their “Dutchification” in Dutch schools, a severe threat to the status of 
Germandom in the country. This was doubly important as, in the estimation of the inspector who 
wrote the 1935 report, far too many German adults in Amsterdam had been, essentially, 
“Dutchified,” weakening the German nature of the entire community.  At the same time, the 
increase in the number of Dutch students offered the possibility that the school would be unable 
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to succeed in its work of strengthening Germandom in Amsterdam.81 For the German leadership, 
the appropriate ratio was about one-third Dutch, and two-thirds German, which they believed 
sufficient to maintain the German nature of the student body, but also not so low as to remove 
any possibility the German schools’ influence upon the wider Dutch public.82    
In addition to the ethnic make-up of the student body, the inspectors were particularly 
interested in the cultural disposition of the students and teachers, among the latter of which both 
Germans and Dutch could be found. This is unsurprising, as the stated purpose of the schools 
was to foster the “life and spiritual being” of the students, which directly affected future 
generations of Germans. As one 1938 advertisement for the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, noted: 
A German child who doesn’t attend a German school is inevitably lost to Germandom. Even if he succeeds 
in preserving the German language, he nevertheless grows up without the educational, spiritual, and 
emotional values that make up the German people. A language without these contents, however, is like an 
empty glass. Only a German school is able to convey these values, only here do these values flock to the 
child through daily and hourly lessons from all subjects, mainly from German lessons, reading lessons, 
history, geography, music and religious instruction.83 
 
Among the students, membership in national socialist organizations was also consistently 
noted, whether the students were members of youth organizations such as the Hitler Youth, the 
League of German Girls, and the youth branch of the Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft84; the 
freiwillige Arbeitsdienst85; or in some cases, after 1939, even the German army.86  Importantly, 
the focus was always on the students’ participation in German national socialist organizations; 
the participation by Dutch students in national socialist organizations such as the Nationale 
Jeugdstorm87 was given little attention. In addition to their participation in German Nazi 
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organizations, the school inspectors consistently noted whether the students appear to be 
accepting of the new national socialist ideology slowly being implemented in the various 
German schools. For example, in the 1934 report on the German School in Steyl, near Venlo in 
the eastern part of the Netherlands, the report’s author, Dr. Klemmer, notes that the students at 
the gymnasial section of this catholic school were surprisingly well versed on Hitler's Mein 
Kampf, the basic principles of National Socialism, the history of the Nazi movement, and the 
changes introduced in the first year of Nazi leadership in Germany. The teachers in the primary 
school section had not yet begun teaching the tenets of National Socialism in earnest, but both 
the teachers and students were interested and willing to learn, all the more surprising to the 
inspector because of the confessional nature of the school and the suspect nature of the teachers 
whose loyalty, according to Klemmer, was to the Catholic church first and foremost and only 
secondarily to the German people and the national socialist state.88   
The cultural disposition of the teachers was also extensively noted in the reports, 
regardless of whether the teachers were German or Dutch, including their membership in 
national socialist organizations, although, as with students, only German organizations—whether 
the NSLB, the German Labor Front, the Reichsdeutsche Gemeinschaft, the NSDAP, and even the 
SA—were considered.89  In the 1934 report on the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule in Amsterdam, the 
author, Senator für das Bildungswesen90 Dr. Richard von Hoff, notes that, while both the 
Germans and Dutch teachers appear effective educators, he was unable to ascertain the Dutch 
teachers’ positions as regards the new Germany. Regardless, however, the advanced age and 
imminent retirement of many of these teachers and the school director offered a chance to 
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strengthen Germandom with the introduction of younger teachers more in tune with Nazi 
government’s educational and cultural policies, a change the school board and Education 
Ministry did not miss.91  By the time the Second World War began, the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule 
began experiencing shortages of German teachers, with many of the teachers having been called 
up for service in the armed forces. As Senator von Hoff notes in his 1941 report, the Dutch 
teachers who have replaced the departing Germans all seem to be oriented toward Germany, and 
although they were “undoubtedly keen to teach and work in the German sense to the best of their 
ability,” they simply could not replace German teachers in their entirety.92   
In 1934, Ministerialrat Billen commented that students at the Kolleg St. Ludwig in 
Vlodrop exhibited “unrestrained enthusiasm for the völkisch state and its leader,” and further 
noted, “the school is a real German oasis in an otherwise not entirely scenic green belt.”93  A year 
later, his praise was even more emphatic: 
One feels [this to be] as an outpost of Germandom in the frontier region, and indeed as an outpost of the 
völkisch-unified Germandom of the national socialist state.  The German Greeting [Nazi salute] is a matter 
of course, and I have seen images of Hitler in classrooms as well as in the reception rooms.  I have not had 
the impression that in these uncomplicated people, the denominational attachment affects a national 
socialist way of life and life guidance.94 
 
To be certain of his assessment, he interrogated several students away from their 
teachers, and came away from the encounters with the impression that all of the students in 
Vlodrop would be “excellent assistants in the further development and expansion of our völkisch 
state.”95  Such was the concern about the internal mindset and political persuasions of the 
students and teachers that when, in his 1938 report on the Kolleg St. Ludwig, Ministerialrat Liep, 
who had written the two previous reports on that school, omitted any lengthy discussion of the 
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political orientation of the students and faculty regarding National Socialism and the new 
Germany, the Reich Education Ministry replied to him specifically requesting it.96  Liep 
responded noting that the reason for his curtailed mention was that they were still being educated 
in the same manner as the previous years and he did not think it necessary to repeat the 
information again.  Nonetheless, he proceeded to do just that, and in much more detail than his 
previous reports.  As far as he could see, and he believed he was getting an accurate portrayal of 
the situation in Vlodrop, the teachers tried in earnest to impart a national socialist worldview to 
the students.  All of the secular teachers were already members of the National Socialist 
Teachers League, and several were party members.  Additionally, among the entire student body 
and faculty, even the clerical teachers, members of various national socialist organizations could 
be found, including the German Labor Front, the Sturmabteilung, the Hitler Youth, and the 
League of German Girls, among others, while many of the students who had been drafted into 
the German Labor Front appeared to have enjoyed the experience.97   
According to the 1936 report on the German school in Rotterdam, the teachers, both 
German and Dutch, were all very much oriented toward the new Germany, with many students 
and teachers who were members of national socialist organizations. Hoff, who wrote the 1936 
report, noted however that the school board did have some reservations about the school director 
of the primary school, who was Dutch. Two years later, the school board decided that the 
primary school director needed to be replaced with a German more closely oriented with 
National Socialism. The preferred candidate was already a teacher in the seventh grade of the 
primary school, although his promotion would create a vacancy that would need to be filled, 
naturally only with a German. The solution the school board came up with was a complete 





reorganization of the school such that the seventh grade was removed from the primary school 
and attached to the secondary school. This was not entirely unproblematic, as it would mean that 
the primary school no longer conformed with Dutch education law, thereby putting state 
subsidies at risk. Regardless, the school board desired to go through with the changes because it 
would help to better foster the new German consciousness among the students in Rotterdam.98  
At the St. Michaels Gymnasium in Steyl, Dr. Huhnhäuser reported in 1937 about his gratification 
regarding the positive opinions that could be found among the student regarding the “racial 
question.”  This was a result of the inner stances of those at the school, especially the teacher of 
Rassenkunde.99   
The political and cultural disposition of the students and teachers, with which the Nazis 
were so eminently concerned, was furthered through many curriculum reforms the Nazis 
instituted in these schools during the 1930s. In contrast to schools in Germany, where the Nazi 
government had free reign, the German schools in the Netherlands had to perform a delicate 
balancing act resulting from the dual oversight of both the Dutch and German governments. On 
the one hand, the German schools in the Netherlands were, legally, Dutch schools that happened 
to cater to the German community in the Netherlands, not entirely dissimilar to confessional 
schools that catered to religious families.100  On the other hand, some level of de facto oversight 
by the German government was necessary in order to, from the German point of view, guarantee 
the integrity of the education provided to the students, many of whom both governments 
recognized would return to Germany for higher education or work after their schooling in the 
Netherlands was completed. This system of dual oversight had functioned successfully for at 
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least twenty-five years before the Nazis came to power. When they did achieve power and began 
implementing educational reforms in Germany, the Dutch Education Ministry started taking 
note, for the Dutch government had little desire to finance the importation of National Socialism 
in the Netherlands via the German schools there.101 This necessitated a certain amount of caution 
and outright secrecy on the part of the Nazis in implementing their educational reforms in the 
German schools in the Netherlands. So, for example, when Dr. Usadel, the inspector for the 
Kaiser-Wilhelm-Schule, arrived in Amsterdam in April 1935 to administer the final exams, he 
was warned by the school director and head of the German colony to say nothing in his speech 
before the German community—formal gatherings in honor of the school inspectors were 
usually held so that the inspectors might get to know the members of the local community—that 
might upset the Dutch education officials who were also in attendance. Highlighting the double-
speak that he employed in his speech, Dr. Usadel noted to his superiors in Berlin: “In this way it 
was possible, without the use of the word ‘National Socialism,’ to explain the nature of the 
national socialist Weltanschauung before this extraordinary public, which also included 
Dutch.”102 
Despite the secrecy that was necessary to avoid arousing the suspicions of the Dutch 
government, the Nazis proceeded with the curriculum changes in the Netherlands they felt 
necessary to help strengthen Germandom in that country and educate the next generation of 
German Nazis. On the one hand, there was the introduction of new subjects that more closely 
aligned with the mindset of Nazi Germany.  These included Rassenkunde, and neuzeitliche 
Biologie,103 among others, and often their implementation came at the expense of other subjects, 
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such as Greek language or mathematics.104  Moreover, traditional topics began to take on a 
specifically national socialist bent.  Geography lessons emphasized themes such as “blood and 
soil,” “living space,” the “races of Germany,” while history lessons focused on the history of the 
national socialist movement, Mein Kampf, and the changes that Hitler’s regime had introduced in 
Germany since it came to power.105  In some instances, these changes took place relatively 
quickly after similar changes were introduced in Germany. For example, the September 1933 
directive of the German Interior Ministry mandating Rassenkunde in schools in the Reich was 
followed by the introduction of “racial studies” and “contemporary biology” at the Kolleg St. 
Ludwig in the 1934-35 school year.106 Given institutional hurdles of changing the lesson plan 
during the school year, a quicker adoption of such nazified subject material is hardly 
conceivable. 
By the time of the German invasion, the German Schools in the Netherlands were largely 
in lock step with their counterparts in Germany. This already existing system would provide 
Schwarz with one of the main tools he thought useful for the spread of the Germanic ideal in the 
Netherlands. All that was necessary, in Schwarz’s eyes, was the expansion and consolidation of 
this system throughout the country, a task he was largely able to accomplish. In fact, the 
expansion of the German Schools in the Netherlands was so dramatic that growing pains ensued 
as a shortage of qualified teachers quickly became a problem, leading to the creation of teacher 
retraining seminars held in Germany aimed at producing Dutch teachers with the proper 
ideological mindset and pedagogical training to teach the next generation of German and pro-
German Dutch students. 
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Deutsche Schulen in den Niederlanden after the Nazi invasion 
Shortly after his arrival in August 1940, Schwarz gained control over the German 
Schools in the Netherlands. Up to that point, they had been the purview of the 
Reichserziehungsministerium since 1934, and before that, of the Foreign Office, but from 
October 1, 1940, they fell under the jurisdiction of the Reichskommissariat, and within that 
institution, under Schwarz’s Hauptabteilung Erziehung und Kirchen.107  Although control of the 
schools changed, their purpose largely remained intact—to protect the German community in the 
Netherlands from the influence of the Dutch.108  At the same time however, two new entirely 
purposes were added: the education of the next generation of Dutch leadership under a largely 
German curriculum in a German context and the establishment of these schools as models for 
their Dutch counterparts.109   
When Schwarz arrived in the Netherlands in August 1940, he found eight German 
schools that educated, in total, about eighteen hundred students.110 These included three 
secondary schools in Amsterdam, The Hague, and Rotterdam, as well as mixed school in 
Haarlem, and four primary schools in Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam, and Venlo.111   The 
expansion of these German schools was of unmitigated importance to the German leadership in 
the Netherlands, such that they subsidized the schools making them tuition free for students. 
Already by March 1941, they had expanded the German School system in the Netherlands to 
twenty schools, when they went on a founding spree and increased the number of German 
schools to forty-three by the end of July.  A year later, in July 1942, that number had increased to 
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forty-nine schools serving nine thousand students in all areas of the country—only the province 
of Zeeland lacked a German school—although a large proportion of these were concentrated on 
or very near the German border.112  The number of German schools topped out at fifty such 
institutions and ten thousand students in Schwarz’s last report in November 1943.113  At least 
part, but certainly not all, of this increase was due to German occupiers sending their own 
children to German schools; Dorothea Seyss-Inquart, the Reichskommissar’s younger daughter, 
attended the German School in The Hague.114 
Because of the increase in the number of schools, there was a constant need for teaching 
personnel. Already at the beginning of the occupation, there was a shortage of qualified teachers. 
By and large, the teachers at these schools in the 1930s were Dutch, as Dutch law required that 
teachers in schools in the Netherlands have Dutch teaching certificates, although there were also 
many Germans who had the necessary qualifications and thus also taught at these institutions.115 
By 1940 however, that had changed as the Germans placed emphasis on recruiting German 
teachers in these schools in order to strengthen their specifically German nature. They did this by 
bringing in young teachers from Germany and placing them in these German schools on a 
temporary basis. No matter the nationality of the teaching staff, however, there was a constant 
shortage at most schools that needed to be addressed.116  There were two primary methods for 
solving this problem. The first was trying to incentivize more German teachers to teach at the 
German Schools, and when, necessary, to force their travel to Holland using the German 
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government.117 The other method was to train Dutch teachers, primarily those who already had an 
affinity for Germany and German culture, in the proper German way of doing things. 
Already in October 1940, Dutch teachers were offered the option of taking retraining 
courses in the German town of Oldenburg, after the completion of which, they could be placed as 
teachers in German schools, both in the Reich proper and in the German Schools in the 
Netherlands.118  Initially, these seminars were meant to, on the one hand, decrease the high 
unemployment rate of teachers in the Netherlands, and, on the other, to increase the quality of 
instruction offered by Dutch teachers at the German Schools in the Netherlands. At Oldenburg, 
Dutch teachers were taught an array of subjects that would make them, in the eyes of their 
German supervisors, more capable teachers of German students, including German educational 
theory; racial studies; German language, history, poetry, geography, and ethnic studies; music; 
and physical education.119  The re-education seminars, which admitted both men and women, 
graded each of the teachers in the various subjects. Even by 1941, it is clear that the shortage of 
teachers at German schools and in Germany was causing reductions in quality among teachers. 
At the July and October 1941 sessions of the teacher training seminar in Oldenburg, most of the 
students received, on a one to five scale, where one is excellent and five is inadequate, threes, 
fours, and fives. Only a few of the students received a two in any subject, and none received a 
one. The refrain that strict supervision of these teachers was necessary was quite common.120 
The shortage of teachers in German Schools in the Netherlands was a constant theme 
throughout the war period, especially as those young German teachers who had been brought to 
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the Netherlands returned to Germany or were called into military service.121  Although one might 
expect that the teacher training seminars in Oldenburg would have been heavily attended, at least 
initially, once van Dam introduced his “reforms” for the education sphere in February 1941 that 
partially aimed at reducing unemployment at Dutch schools, the impetus for young Dutch 
teachers to go to retraining seminars in Germany declined. In the first year of the German 
occupation, about one hundred Dutch teachers went through the teacher re-training course in 
Oldenburg. The following year, only twenty did so, despite the fact that teachers at German 
Schools were better paid and that service in such schools still counted as government service for 
the purpose of Dutch state benefits.122  Moreover, the disappointing quality of these Dutch 
teachers remained a constant source of concern in the upper levels of the Reichskommissariat. As 
a result, the German leadership was left to trying to recruit teachers from Germany. They were 
offered additional pay in the form of a per diem for German teachers willing to relocate to the 
Netherlands. When this proved insufficient, they resorted to begging German government 
officials in various locales for the release of teachers from their service in Germany and their 
transfer to German schools in the Netherlands.123 These efforts were largely ineffective because 
Germany was also experiencing a shortage of teachers as a result of the war effort, especially 
after the invasion of the Soviet Union began, which only worsened as the war went on. 
By 1942, Wimmer was forced to beg old colleagues in leading positions in Austrian 
Reichsgaue for help with teaching personnel, but he met with only mixed results. The Gauleiter 
of Styria, Siegfried Uiberreither, responded that of the 480 male teachers in his district, 300 had 
been called into the military, necessitating the combining of classes and even entire schools, and 
                                                 
121 BAL R83/29. 
122 NIOD 020/2047. 
123 BAL R83/29. 
176 
 
thus sending Wimmer any teachers would be impossible. Friedrich Rainer, in Gau Kärnten, 
responded that he was more of the mind to ask Wimmer for teachers than to send his own to 
Holland. Baldur von Schirach (Vienna) and Albert Reitter (Salzburg) both responded that they 
might be able to send some teachers later, but not now, and that they would get back to Wimmer 
at some later date (they never did). Only August Eigruber, Gauleiter of Oberdonau, was able to 
answer Wimmer’s request affirmatively, making four teachers available for service in the 
Netherlands.  Eventually, the shortage of teachers became so dire that, in 1943, the German 
secondary school in Rotterdam, the oldest German school in the country, was forced to close 
down. The following spring, the German secondary school in The Hague was threatened with the 
same.124 
Despite the setbacks that the Reichskommissariat encountered with the German Schools 
in the Netherlands, the German leadership there was determined to press on. German Schools 
were seen, not only as defenders of Germandom in the Netherlands, but as competitors for 
students. According to Schwarz, if the niveau of German Schools could be raised, it would create 
a positive feedback loop in which Dutch schools tried to keep up, thereby making the political 
task of the Germans that much easier.125  Wimmer felt similarly regarding the importance of the 
German Schools: 
The German schools have the task of pushing forward the development of the Dutch school system. The 
advantages of the complete education of the German school stand out clearly from the Dutch school, which 
is generally good in practice, but too intellectual, so that every new German school establishment can act as 
a new example in the sense of our schooling and education principles. … This influence of the German 
schools, which follows from the very fact of its existence alone, but which is strengthened by constant 
contact of the German teachers with Dutch teachers, will be steadily increasing, the better and more 
exemplary the German schools are being developed.126 
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The examples that both men discussed relate to not just the niveau of the schools, but also 
the content of the courses taught within. In most German Schools, the subjects taught were more 
similar to those taught in the Reich than in the Netherlands. Physical Education, for example, had 
long been a component of the curriculum at German Schools. With the Nazi seizure of power, 
subjects like “racial studies” became prevalent as well, as did the teaching of politics and history 
along Nazified lines. Because Seyss-Inquart decreed that the schools should be made up of two 
third Germans and one third Netherlanders, this content was certain to seep into the general 
population eventually acting as a further influence upon the Dutch populace, especially as the 
schools grew in importance and size. 
Furthermore, the content that was being taught at these schools was clearly aimed at 
conditioning the students to see the world through the lens of the Greater Germanic Reich 
already coming into being. For the 1942 Reifeprüfung (the secondary school exit examination) at 
the German secondary school in Rotterdam, which was at that time located in Bad Wörishofen, 
Bavaria as a result of the Kinderlandverschickung, the graduating students were tasked with 
writing an essay on the developments in the Netherlands since the occupation began. The student 
respondents, who both received positive marks for the content of their essays but who also had 
several grammatical errors, were clear in the purpose of the German occupation: 
The Führer sent the Reichskommissar to the Netherlands with the clear and unambiguous assignment to 
prepare the Netherlands for integration into the Greater Germanic living space. … I am firmly convinced 
that we are on the correct and best path toward the realization of the Führer’s great mission and that the 
Netherlands in the not too distant future will [become] a worthy member and strong cornerstone in the 
Greater Germanic living space.127 
 
 The other student was of a similar mindset: 
… From all these attempts, a people will be formed, ready to occupy its natural place, intended for it in the 
Greater Germanic living space, and to see [itself] as an outpost of a firm block on the North Sea. For if 
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Europe, or rather the Germanic race, wants to persist, it must not mutilate itself and waste valuable blood, 
but must join forces to resist the attacks of the rest of the world in a strong and powerful way.128 
 
As examples for the future of Dutch education, the German Schools in the Netherlands 
experienced both success and failure. They had trouble with recruiting enough staff, but that was 
a problem that was encountered throughout Germany as well and was not specific to German 
International Schools. The huge increases in the student body of these schools and the 
establishment boom that took place under Schwarz could only be, and in fact were, viewed quite 
positively from the German perspective. It is more difficult to say what effect they had directly 
on the Dutch system, however. While many of the changes that took place at the German schools 
were carried over into Dutch schooling, this was not explicitly because the Dutch leadership of 
the Education Department saw the examples set by the German Schools and wanted to emulate 
them, rather it was because the Nazis were ultimately in charge of Dutch education. Whether 
they would have eventually provided the desired example, as Schwarz and Wimmer predicted 
they would, remains pure speculation, although, given the generally negative view of the German 
occupation held by most Netherlanders, it seems highly unlikely. In either case, neither man 
believed the change would happen overnight and so the short period of German dominance 
proved too short to have a lasting influence, and in that sense, they were a failure. Regardless, 
the German Schools in the Netherlands were not the only schools that were representative of the 
“direct route” that Schwarz discussed in his reports back to the Party Chancellery. The other type 
of schools were also German institutions, but unlike the German Schools, were meant 
specifically and only for the future elite of the proposed Greater Germanic Reich—the NIVO and 
the Reichsschulen. 
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Nederlandsche instelling voor volksche opvoeding (NIVO)129 
On August 12, 1941 in a nationally broadcast speech van Dam announced several major 
changes to Dutch education. A short paragraph toward the end of the speech that had not been 
contained in any of the draft versions was inserted which announced the formation of so-called 
Nederlandsche instellingen voor volksche opvoeding, or NIVO (Dutch Institutes for Völkisch 
Education).130  The reason for its late addition to the speech is unclear, but was likely because this 
was one development of which van Dam did not personally approve, although this was only 
because the NIVO, in many ways, was an attempt to circumvent van Dam’s personal authority in 
the Education Department.131  Van Dam did not personally support the creation of the NIVO; 
what work he did on its behalf was, apparently, merely because Schwarz presented the NIVO to 
him as a fait accompli.132   
The development of the NIVO as one possible “direct route” toward the Germanicization 
of Dutch youth had been under consideration for the better part of a year by the time it was 
announced to the public.133 The idea was that the Dutch, as ethnic and racial kin to the German 
people, needed an institution similar to the Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten (National 
Political Education Institutes, or Napola) that had been operating in Nazi Germany since shortly 
after the Nazi seizure of power.134 The goal of the Napola was the select education along national 
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socialist lines of the next generation of the German bureaucratic elite and had as their spiritual 
forefathers the British public school system, the military cadet academies of the Kaiserreich and 
the Landerziehungsheimen.135 Where the military cadet academies were to produce future 
officers for the German military, the Napola was to produce the leadership in the political war 
for the future. Like the British public school, the Napola would produce the ruling elites of the 
coming generations, and like the country education homes, the Napolas were boarding schools 
that placed a special emphasis on one’s connection to the land. All in all, they were models of the 
Nazi view of what ideal education in a national socialist world would look like. 
Education in the German Napolas had a similar focus to the various later “reforms” that 
would be implemented in the Netherlands by the German occupiers and their Dutch 
collaborators. There was an increased emphasis on those subjects thought to be most beneficial 
to the creation of future Germans such as history, racial studies, music, physical education and 
sport, politics, German language, biology, and geography. At the same time, other subjects were 
deemphasized, including mathematics, foreign languages, and religious instruction. The schools 
offered a “complete education,”136 and in many cases, offered additional courses such as 
horseback riding, automobile driving, and sailing, that lent them the veneer of elite schools for 
the sons of the wealthy, even though they drew students from all social classes.137  This was made 
even more prominent by the focus of the Napolas upon education in a camp-like setting, rather 
than in school buildings. Especially as the war went on, and the Germans resorted to sending 
children to the countryside to escape bombing raids in the Kinderlandverschickung, which many 
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Napolas took part in, the ability to fuse education via the Napolas with political acculturation via 
service in the Hitler Youth allowed students to receive the type of “total education” most revered 
by Nazi educational theorists.138 
Like many aspects of Nazi bureaucracy, the Napolas were the center of a power struggle 
between the regular government, in the form of German Minister of Education Bernhard Rust, 
and the institutions of the party, especially the mass organizations such as the SS.139 Whereas the 
Nazi party had managed to establish the Adolf-Hitler-Schulen, that would prepare the next 
generation of party leadership, the SS had no such direct institution, so it was little surprise that 
Himmler attempted to co-opt the Napola for his own purposes. Rust, however, was mostly able 
at least initially to keep the SS at bay and maintain his own authority over the Napolas, of which 
there were more than forty throughout Germany by the later war period.140 By 1936, however, 
with the appointment of SS-Obergruppenführer August Heissmeyer as Inspector of the Napola, 
the SS began to make inroads into the institution and turn it ever more into an institution of racial 
and ideological indoctrination, although, formally, the Napolas remained under the control of the 
German Education Ministry.141 
A similar dynamic threatened to play out in the Netherlands with the creation of the 
NIVO. There were, for all intents and purposes, three sides in the mix. The first was that of the 
Reichskommissariat itself, including especially Wimmer and Schwarz who were mainly 
concerned with maintaining their own authority over educational installations in the occupied 
Netherlands. The second group was that of the SS in Germany, in the form of Heissmeyer, who 
also had Himmler’s support and who hoped to control the Dutch institutions via his power center 
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in the Reich, while the third side was that of the NSB, specifically the Mussert wing of the party, 
which was entirely against the idea for fear of it being an institution of Germanization, which 
was at odds with the Diets ideology of the Mussert wing of the party.142   
The initial impetus for the creation of the NIVO lay with Wimmer, who took up contact 
with Heissmeyer in November 1940 suggesting the creation of a Napola-like institution for the 
education of the elite of the next generation of Dutch youth.143 The question was, however, how 
to go about erecting such an institution while keeping all of the players satisfied with the 
eventual outcome. There were several potential options that were considered. First was the 
establishment of a Napola in the Netherlands but that was generally ruled out as a violation of 
Seyss-Inquart’s sole authority over the political indoctrination of the Dutch people. Moreover, it 
was feared that the creation of such a school might engender fears among the Dutch about the 
annexation of the Netherlands into the Reich. The second was the creation of an NSB-oriented 
institution, but that too was ruled out because the NSB’s conception of education was at odds 
with the Germans’ goals.144 The third option was the creation of the NIVO. The NIVO could be a 
singularly Dutch institution, funded by the Reichskommissariat but whose mission was 
essentially similar to that of the Napola in Germany. By mid-1941, this third option had been 
decided upon and work began for the creation of such a school.145 
After much back and forth, the former Koningsheide Sanatorium in the village of 
Schaarsbergen near Arnhem, which had been first occupied and then relinquished by the German 
military, was chosen as the site for the first NIVO. Over the summer of 1941, advertisements 
were spread out across the country in order to recruit the appropriate youth to attend the school. 
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While their previous academic qualifications were taken into consideration, the most important 
selection criteria for the some 500 hundred applicants were their physical state and their racial 
qualities.146 In the end, after two rounds of selection in which applicants were put through various 
tests to determine their qualifications, only twenty were chosen to attend the first class at the 
NIVO Koningsheide, although they were accompanied by a smaller group of German students 
from the Napola Bensberg, near Cologne, in order to ensure that the right cultural values were 
maintained in the school.147  The school officially opened in September 1941, with trials for the 
second and third cohorts held in November.148 
For their part, the teachers were chosen carefully. Schwarz had been on the search for 
appropriate Dutch teachers for most of 1941.149  Those he selected were sent to various Napolas 
in Germany for several months so that they could be trained in the appropriate educational 
methods by their German colleagues. There were seven Dutch teachers in total, six of whom 
were chosen from the ranks of the NSB, but importantly, all were believers in the Greater 
Germanic ideal and did not stem from the Diets wing of the party. The sole exception was a 
teacher from the NSNAP-van Rappard, the most extreme of the minor Nazi parties which 
advocated for a direct re-incorporation of the Netherlands into the German Reich. Both the 
school head and the head of instruction were Dutch.150 In addition to these seven Dutch teachers, 
several teachers from the Napola Bensberg were sent to NIVO Koningsheide, including the chief 
of staff who stood as second in command of the institution.151 
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The fate of the NIVO Koningsheide was not what the Germans had hoped for. As it 
would turn out, the various political entanglements between the German and Dutch sides proved 
too great to overcome.152  Although it had originally supported the idea of the NIVO, the NSB 
soon resorted to an active anti-NIVO propaganda campaign, similar to the way their campaigns 
against the German Schools in the Netherlands had been orchestrated.153  In short, these 
institutions went against everything that the Mussert wing of the party stood for in the realm of 
education and so could not be supported by the Mussert Movement.154  The Germans, especially 
the SS faction, wanted the school to be controlled from Germany so as to make the NIVO as 
similar to the Napolas as possible; the NSB wanted to control the school themselves. The Dutch 
side wanted a school for only Dutch students, but the Germans, especially Heissmeyer and his 
lieutenant Wilhelm Kemper, who had temporarily run the Napola at Bensberg and was sent to 
the Netherlands to get things in Koningsheide in order, wanted a school that included German 
students from the Reich. The NSB saw the German language as, at best, the first foreign 
language, while the Germans wanted German to be the language of instruction.155 
Moreover, Seyss-Inquart was dissatisfied with the quality of the education being given to 
the students. This was, according to Seyss-Inquart, a result of the lack of political awareness of 
the Dutch teachers, which is not terribly surprising given that their training had consisted of little 
more than a couple of months at German institutions. In one example of such inappropriate 
political indoctrination, a student asked the school head and P.E. teacher Bossong, whether a 
person should give his seat in a full tram to a Jewish woman. After polling the class as to the 
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correct answer, Bossong, replied that, of course one should give up their seat in such a 
situation.156  This was, obviously, not the politically acceptable type of instruction expected at 
such an august institution. 
Finally, the problems of the NIVO were exacerbated by a lack of demand on the part of 
Dutch students to attend the NIVO, as those same students could get many of the advantages of 
attendance of the NIVO by attending one of the, by this point, several dozen German Schools in 
the Netherlands. Yet, by February 1942, Seyss-Inquart was in contact with Himmler regarding 
the establishment of actual Napolas in the Netherlands that would be based on the Greater 
Germanic ideal. By the end of April, shortly after the Easter holiday, the school was shut down, 
with the building reverting back to Luftwaffe control and the majority of the students being sent 
to the Napola in Bensberg.157 
The Reichsschulen 
When the NIVO experiment ended in failure because of opposition from all sides, the 
German regime in the Netherlands and their counterparts in the Reich turned to a new 
educational institute that would better serve their purposes—the Reichsschulen. This time, there 
would be no mistakes. Because the NIVO had been created through the apparatus of the Dutch 
state, several sides, including van Dam and the NSB were able to attempt to influence the 
institution. The Reichsschulen were created directly by the Reichskommissariat itself, completely 
outside the purview of the Dutch government and securely under German control.158  The very 
name of the institutions signified this explicit connection to Germany and disconnect from the 
Netherlands. Although the Reichsschulen were supposed to be near carbon copies of the German 
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Napola, Himmler and Seyss-Inquart, with Hitler’s blessing, chose the name “Reich School” 
because they felt that National-Political Education Institute should be reserved for institutions 
within Germany, but also wanted to signal that the education provided at these schools would 
serve the future elite of the Greater Germanic Reich.159 
As with the NIVO, there was some concern within the German side who, exactly, would 
be in control of the institution. On the one hand, there was the question of which entities in the 
Reich would control the Reichsschulen, with both Reichserziehungsminister Rust and Himmler 
vying for complete control. The result was a sort of reversal of the status of the Napola in 
Germany, with Himmler directly controlling the Reichsschulen and the German Education 
Ministry offering support, while in Germany the Napolas were controlled, technically, by the 
Education Ministry with the SS offering support.160  On the side of the Reichskommissariat, the 
exact opposite happened, with the schools being technically under the jurisdiction of Wimmer’s 
Generalkommissariat für Verwaltung und Justiz, but with any and all SS oriented issues going 
through Rauter’s office.161 
There were two such institutions, one for boys in Valkenburg and one for girls in 
Heythuysen, both in the southeastern province of Limburg, although Himmler had wanted to 
create a third school in 1944, but a lack of funds and the Allied invasion prevented the 
establishment of this third institution.162 On June 23, 1942, the Deutsche Zeitung in den 
Niederlanden published a lengthy report on the plans on its front page calling for applicants. The 
newspaper noted that these schools were “not intended for the broad masses, rather [would] take 
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in students, who are able to demonstrate their special spiritual, temperamental, and physical 
aptitude in a strict selection procedure.”163  The “Reichsschulen want to educate their students 
into strong, active, self-sufficient boys and girls, that the new Europe urgently needs.”164  
Moreover, selection would not be based on the material means of the parents; any qualified 
student would be admitted regardless of financial ability to pay.  The education would be similar 
in nature to a regular Dutch secondary school, but “but beyond that, they [the Reichsschulen] 
give and demand significantly more.” After successful completion, students would be free to 
choose any course of study at any university or enter any occupation they saw fit. The call for 
applicants asked for boys between the ages of ten and eleven and girls between ten and 
thirteen.165 
The purpose of these institutions, and their connection to the Napolas in Germany was 
spelled out explicitly: 
The idea that was decisive in founding the Napola [in Germany] was to secure the next generation of 
leaders for the Greater German Reich created by Adolf Hitler. After this war, however, it will be a matter 
of securing the next generation of leaders for the Greater Germanic Community in the new Europe. For this 
reason, the establishment of the Reichsschulen in the Netherlands on the model of the Napola is justified, 
since the Netherlands will be a constituent [part] of the Greater Germanic-European community. This all 
the more justifies the entitlement of the Reichsschulen in the Netherlands to take over the education of 
German children as well as the education of Dutch children, since the Dutch should also be represented in 
this ideologically, temperamentally, and spiritually uniformly trained leadership class.166 
 
Seyss-Inquart was of a similar mind about the purpose of these schools. In a letter to Himmler 
during their initial discussions regarding the replacement of the NIVO with the Reichsschulen, he 
noted that 
The curriculum would need to take more into account the history of the Netherlands and the nature of the 
Dutch people, but through the pan-Germanic point of view, so that the boys who have gone through these 
institutions will receive the best possible understanding in order to eventually fulfill Germanic task in this 
area [i.e., the Netherlands]. For this reason, the institutions in the Netherlands should also teach Dutch 
                                                 






language, for example, so that Dutch is the native language, but German is the overall Germanic language 
of spirit and mutual understanding.167 
Or, in the words of Heissmeyer, who oversaw the two Reichsschulen in the Netherlands, the 
purpose of the Reichsschulen was to strongly bind the “Germanic tribes with the Germanic 
heartland—and that is Germany.”168 There can be no mistaking that these schools were meant to 
produce the leadership of the future Greater Germanic Reich. 
The Reichsschule for boys was located in a former Jesuit monastery, the St. Ignatius 
College, which had stood on the site since the 1870s.169 The Jesuits were kicked out of the 
monastery in July 1942, when the local SD commander, with several SS officers and German 
soldiers in tow, came to occupy the grounds. The friars were given only a few hours to prepare 
their belonging before being sent via truck to their new locations. The official reason given was 
that the buildings were a military necessity.  The next month, the preparations for the conversion 
of the former monastery into the Reichsschule for boys began.170 
It formally opened in September 1942 with a not insignificant carryover from the NIVO 
Koningsheide in Schaarsbergen. Wilhelm Kemper, Heissmeyer’s assistant who had significant 
experience with the NIVO and was previously an interim head of the Napola at Bensberg, was 
tasked with leading the new institution, although because his presence in the Hague was 
necessary, an adjutant was put in place as chief-of-staff.171 This was E. Debusmann, who had 
previously served in the same role at the NIVO, and who, prior to his work at the NIVO, had 
worked at the Napola in Bensberg as well. There was a total of nine teachers, two of which had 
previously served at the NIVO and had been sent with those students to Bensberg in spring 1942. 
Most were members of Germanic organizations, including three who were members of the 
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Waffen SS.  All, save one, were proponents of the Greater Germanic ideal, rather than the Diets 
ideals of the NSB. The lone outlier, the art teacher, seems to have been a complete fluke. It was 
only when he arrived at Valkenburg that he realized he was working at an explicitly Nazi school, 
but he stayed on because if he left and was unable to find other work, he could be sent to 
Germany as part of the forced labor drafts.172 
The student body was mixed, with sixty-six Germans and fifty-seven Netherlanders, 
which was slightly below the desired two-thirds German preference.173 Of those sixty-six German 
students, thirty-eight had been transferred from the Napola in Bensberg in order to strengthen the 
German element, especially because the majority of the Dutch students had difficulty with the 
German language, which was the sole language of instruction.174  The number of Dutch students 
actually climbed the following year such that they became a majority, threatening the German 
nature of the school.175 The education these students received was also heavily German, that is, 
German language instruction was given the heaviest emphasis in academic subjects. In addition 
to German language and physical education, the students also received instruction in music, art, 
Dutch language, mathematics, history, geography, and English. French language and the hard 
sciences were not taught at all, while Dutch language was given second footing, with only two 
lesson hours per week, compared to the five hours given to German language instruction. 
Physical education, which was also given top billing next to German language, was divided into 
several different specialties, including light athletics, gymnastics, and even shooting, although 
shooting was reserved for the higher classes.176   
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Great emphasis was placed upon the military element at the school, which was supposed 
to foster a sense of community. The students did everything together. They woke together and 
went to the flag raising in the morning in columns. The students would then eat together, 
participate in sports together and, of course, go to class together. In the evening it was again a 
community experience as the flag was lowered together. Even at night, students marched to their 
dormitories in columns. Military precision was key. In addition, the students were given 
extraordinary tasks in which they looked after the school and each other. For example, one 
student would be in charge of making sure that the lights went out at night and that the other 
students were actually resting during the lights out period. Older students took charge of younger 
students as well. Even the teachers were included in this, for they too lived on site, and were 
required to be available at any and all times. The teachers were to act as models for the good 
behavior of the students, especially those who were at any given time tasked with supervising the 
daily operations of the school and the students, a position which rotated among the teachers 
every couple of days.177 
Once the children got older, they were expected to go out into the world and fulfill a 
Landdienst,178 which was a requirement of the upper levels of the Napolas in Germany as well. In 
the last year of the Reichsschule for boys, the highest levels, those students who were seventeen 
and eighteen, were actually sent to the Warthegau to help with the harvest. So confident were the 
German supervisors that they sent the boys not to politically reliable farmers, but to those who 
were politically suspect, believing that the hard-working boys of the Reichsschule would bring 
their suspicious hosts around to the proper way of thinking.179 
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The parents, too, were largely happy with the education provided for their children, 
establishing a parents’ committee that raised additional funds for the school. Of course, part of 
this was also likely because their children no longer had to endure harassment at regular Dutch 
schools by their fellow students and teachers, as all of the children at the Reichsschule were pro-
German.180  In fact, the school was so highly thought of that it received visits from all of the 
major players of the Dutch occupation. Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, Schwarz, 
Reichserziehungsminister Rust and Heissmeyer all paid visits to the school. In February 1944, 
even the Reichsführer-SS himself, Heinrich Himmler, visited the school. By nearly everyone’s 
estimation, the Reichsschule in Valkenburg was a stunning success.181 
But the glossy picture painted by the Reichskommissariat and the SS was hiding deeper 
problems. As might be expected, the NSB largely opposed the school. Its opposition only grew 
when, after the initial class was matriculated, the majority of those students who had previously 
belonged to the NJS were recruited to the Hitler Youth. This was all the more problematic 
because Hitler Youth membership had previously been limited to German students, so the 
inclusion of Dutch students, which Debusmann had advocated for, angered the NSB even 
more.182  Van Genechten, who had been opposed to the use of German language as the primary 
instruction language at the NIVO was equally opposed to the Reichsschule for the same reason. 
He was not wrong that it was causing problems, for many of the Dutch students did not have the 
necessary command of the German language, and it was feared that their education was being 
hurt as a result; his objections were ignored.183   
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There were also concerns on the German side that the SS was not influential enough, 
despite the fact that the head of the school was himself an SS man. Heissmeyer wanted to make 
sure that all decisions regarding students and teachers went through the SS-Hauptamt in Berlin, 
while all other matters went through his own office, and not through the Reichskommissariat, 
which was footing the bill. In his reply, which seems to have satisfied Heissmeyer, Klemper 
noted that the question of choosing teachers and selecting students was run through the hand-
selected deputy of Rauter, who himself was Himmler’s personal representative and protege in the 
Netherlands. Despite the strict selection criteria that were used in the selection of teachers, 
Debusmann, the school’s chief of staff, complained in his initial report to The Hague that the 
teachers treated the students as a junior officer might treat raw recruits. One teacher even 
resorted to punching and kicking children to get them into line.184 
Despite the difficulties that the school faced initially, it did manage to function 
adequately for two full years. It probably would have continued to function except that by 
summer 1944, Allied armies were firmly established in Northern France. Valkenburg, situated as 
it was in the very south of the Netherlands, was quite exposed to Allied forces, and so the 
Germans decided to evacuate the students and teachers to Germany. Before the beginning of the 
1944-45 school year, the school was evacuated in its entirety first to Napola Bensberg, and 
eventually to the Napola Naumburg am Saale, southwest of Leipzig, where the teachers and 
students stayed until further Allied advances pushed them north to the Napola Plön in Schleswig-
Holstein. It was there that the remaining students experienced the German defeat.185 But in what 
must truly stand as a testament to the success of the education the students at Valkenburg 
received, at least nine of the older boys opted to join the Waffen-SS in January 1945. Even 
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though the noose was clearly closing in on Germany’s neck, true faith in the ultimate Nazi 
victory could still be found.186 
The Reichsschule at Valkenburg was accompanied by a similarly named institution for 
girls at Heythuysen, just to the northwest of Roermond. But if the school in Valkenburg was a 
relative success, the girls’ school was an abject failure. For the most part, the blame for this lay 
with the person chosen to direct the school, Julia op ten Noort. Op ten Noort was the daughter of 
a minor noble house; her brother was also active in Nazi politics and, in addition to working with 
the Royal Marechaussee was appointed to head the Sub-Department Higher Education in the 
Education Department in fall 1941.187  Julia op ten Noort had a long history in Nazi politics as 
well, dating to well before the Nazi invasion. In the split in the NSB that occurred between the 
Diets and Groot-Germaans wings of the party in the latter half of the thirties, op ten Noort stood 
solidly on Rost van Tonningen’s Greater Germanic side. It had been her, she claimed, that had 
arranged the first meeting between Rost and Heinrich Himmler in 1937.188  She had also been 
instrumental in to the creation of the Dutch Nationaal-Socialistische Vrouwenorganisatie which 
was officially separate from the NSB.189  Op ten Noort hoped to bring this organization around to 
the Greater Germanic thinking as well, which would have stood in direct conflict with the NSB’s 
Diets ideology, but was unsuccessful in doing so, eventually being pushed out of the 
organization in early 1941.190  Finally, along with Rost, op ten Noort attempted to create a 
separate youth organization, De Nederlandsche Jeugd, a co-educational organization oriented 
along Greater Germanic lines, and even accompanied fifty former NJS members to Berlin in 
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summer 1940, but that effort too fizzled out. The children were not as enthusiastic about the 
Greater Germanic concept as op ten Noort herself was.191 
Later in 1941, as plans were being made for the NIVO, Himmler, who had a soft spot for 
the baroness, interceded with van Dam, via Rauter and Wimmer, to get op ten Noort appointed to 
lead the planned NIVO for girls. The problem was, however, that she had absolutely no 
experience in the education realm beyond the three years of gymnasium she completed as a 
child. She had never attended higher education, taught, or directed a school in any way, but she 
had good contacts with high ranking Nazis and the right ideological outlook and so she got the 
job.192  Because of her lack of necessary experience, she was shipped to Germany to take a crash 
course at the two Napolas for girls in order to learn her trade. By the time she had returned, in 
February 1942, the NIVO experiment had been scrapped in favor of a Reichsschule, the 
directorship of which she also received.193   
Plans for the establishment of the school had not gone as well as the school for boys and 
so when the first students arrived in fall 1942 in Heythuysen, they were put to work getting the 
former monastery—the St. Elizabeth Monastery—ready for use as a school. There were forty 
students selected from a larger group of six-hundred, fifty applicants, all of whom were selected 
for their health and racial qualities by the same SS-Hauptsturmführer Aust that had been 
instrumental in selecting the students for Valkenburg.194  The teachers for the school were 
selected mostly by op ten Noort herself, which, given her own background, did not bode well for 
the functioning of the school, even though Kemper took part in the process as well. The average 
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teacher at Heythuysen was a young woman under thirty who, like op ten Noort herself, had only 
a middling education; only two had any academic training.195 
In terms of the education provided for the girls, it was essentially similar to that provided 
for the students at the Napolas for girls in Germany, and included math, biology, history, 
physical education, geography, home economics, agriculture, and German. Additionally, there 
were Dutch language courses for the German students, which stood in stark contrast to the 
Reichsschule in Valkenburg, where the Dutch students had to learn German.196  The education 
the girls received at Heythuysen, however, was clearly directed at their planned future place as 
mothers in the coming Greater Germanic Reich. In an advertisement for the school in the NSB-
connected magazine Werkend Volk, where education at traditional schools, such as the 
gymnasium or the HBS were predicated on little difference between men and women:   
Education at the Reichsschule is, on the other hand, is precisely tailored to that difference. … Certainly, we 
imagine the wife as a housewife, but then as head of a family in all daily difficulties, as a comrade of the 
man whom she promised to follow through life, and who promised to help, to support and to care for her. 
… 
Sport is also in its entirety adapted to the feminine. Here [there will not be] military exercises as in 
Valkenburg, here [there will be] no hardening as with the boys. Here the purpose is much more focused on 
the healthy, flexible, [and] resilient body… A school where children are prepared for life in a way that 
actually has never been done before… 
They will all later play a confident role in society, they will occupy leading roles, but they must be in the 
first place spouses and mothers—that is thus “women.” This school will make them such, that is its duty to 
the community of the coming Greater Germanic Reich.197 
 
Despite the lofty ideals portrayed by the school, however, it was unsuccessful in almost 
every way.198 Unlike in Valkenburg, the parents complained about the education given and the 
building was unkempt such that disease was common forcing some girls to be sent home.199  NJS 
students were treated as second-class students; op ten Noort took a provocative attitude in stark 
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contrast to Debusmann at Valkenburg. Both had favored the Hitler Youth over the NJS, but 
where Debusmann advocated mutual respect between the two groups at the school and for the 
opening of the Hitler Youth to Dutch students thereby diffusing the tension, op ten Noort 
enflamed the animosities between the two groups by obviously privileging the League of 
German Girls over the NJS.200 A former teacher at one of the Napolas in Germany, Elfriede 
Hiess, was installed as assistant director of the school, and she found that instruction was 
lacking; the teachers at Heythuysen were as ill-prepared for their functions as op ten Noort was 
for hers.201 In early 1943, op ten Noort followed through in her teachings regarding motherhood 
when she became pregnant by an unknown SS officer during a visit to Berlin—it was rumored 
that the father was Himmler himself owing to the child, who was born in early 1944, being 
named Heinrich. She was sent to a Lebensborn house in Bavaria and would not return to the 
school.202  Directorship of the school was handed over to the assistant for the remainder of the 
school year, but that was all. When the students were released for summer vacation, plans were 
made to transfer the school to the Napola for girls at Reichenau on Lake Constance, but only 
nine of the girls actually went to Germany.203 
Conclusion 
The German International Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen were the extent of 
the “direct route” that the Germans took during the occupation.  The German International 
Schools encountered undeniable success during the occupation, increasing in both total number 
and student population, receiving benefits from the state, and obtaining full legal equality for the 
German-style education within the larger Dutch state. On the other hand, this success was 
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directly a result of support offered by the Reichskommissariat, not because of any inherent 
advantages these schools offered their students. This is all the more surprising because of the 
strict opposition of the NSB to these schools, as NSB children would have been a natural fit for 
the Dutch element there.204  Had the occupation regime’s support for these schools been less, they 
likely would not have encountered the success they did, instead languishing in the state of 
relative obscurity and unimportance that they had been in before the occupation began. 
For their part, the NIVO and the Reichsschule for girls were both failures, while the 
Reichsschule for boys was more of a mixed bag. All three institutions encountered stiff 
resistance from the NSB and had little support within the Dutch bureaucracy. These were, for all 
intents and purposes, entirely German affairs. But unlike in Germany, the structural support was 
not available in the Netherlands. The Netherlands did not have the long history of internment 
schools or military academies that served as precursors of sorts to the Napolas in Germany. Nor 
did the Nazi regime enjoy the support of the Dutch people in any way similar to the support the 
Nazi government in Germany received from German citizens. Given these setbacks, the school 
in Valkenburg, in particular, must be seen as a relative success. In two years, the regime 
managed to create an institution that was generally well regarded by both the teachers, students, 
parents, and the regime itself, which was no mean feat, especially considering the fate of the 
other institutions. 
But there was one way in which the direct path was entirely ineffective—as models for 
Dutch education. This was mostly due to the lack of time involved and the relatively closeted 
nature of the various institutions. Most of the German International Schools and both of the 
Reichsschulen were located very near the German border, far away from the densely populated 
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provinces of the Randstad. And while there were German schools in the large cities of the 
western provinces, they were small in comparison to the much larger numbers of Dutch schools. 
Furthermore, their ability to serve as models for Dutch schools was limited by the relatively short 
rule of the German regime in the Netherlands and, especially, the general antipathy the Dutch 
populace displayed toward their German overlords and any local representatives of that regime. 
Ultimately, the changing tide of the war brought an end to the direct path toward 
Germanicization for both the German Schools and the two Reichsschulen. The overwhelming 
majority of the German International Schools closed shortly after the war ended, while the two 
Reichsschulen did not even survive that long. 
In the next two chapters, the focus turns to the “indirect route” for the Germanicization of 
the Netherlands. This path involved the introduction of “reforms” into Dutch schools directly, 
with the aim of cultivating a new cultural identity among Dutch students. Unfortunately for the 
German occupiers, their efforts in this realm would be equally ineffective, and because of the 
increasingly repressive nature of the regime, there would be even less time for the “indirect 
route” to become effective than for the “direct route” through German institutions.
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Chapter 5 - The Indirect Path to Germanicization 
 
We Germans, who go through this land with an eye that is sharpened by understanding for the value of bonds of 
blood and the decay of blood in a people, rejoice in the Dutch people. We rejoice over the children, we wish, that the 
boys here become brave, powerful, and energetic and that the girls become happy mothers in large families.  - 
Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart, May 29, 19401 
 
In his speech to the Dutch nation held in the Ridderzaal of the Binnenhof in The Hague 
on May 29, 1940, the newly installed Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart told the Dutch 
nation, “We do not come here to oppress and destroy a nation, and to take liberty from a country 
… We do not want to imperialistically put this country and its people in a tight spot, nor impose 
our political convictions on them.”2  This would prove to be a hollow promise. Over the next five 
years, the German occupiers in the Netherlands did make a maximum effort to ingrain within the 
Dutch populace the notion that they were, like the German nation itself, members of a larger 
Germanic community of peoples. This expanded community was to be the future leaders of 
Europe with all other peoples, Slavs, Southern Europeans, and minority populations such as 
Jews, slated to be, at best, second class citizens in the new Nazi controlled Europe, or, at worst, 
eliminated entirely.   
In the Netherlands, this process took many forms. In his initial mandate from the Nazi 
leadership in Berlin, Seyss-Inquart was tasked with winning over the Dutch populace through 
peaceful means. As fellow “Aryans,” the Dutch were to be treated relatively well and they were 
to be convinced, rather than cajoled, into joining Hitler’s Germanic project or in the words of 
Schwarz, “to move the Dutch volk to a positive collaboration in the Greater Germanic realm.”3  
As a result, the German leadership in the Netherlands initially settled on a course of relatively 
benign stewardship over the Dutch, Christian population aimed at inculcating Nazi values 
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through various initiatives, but, as the Nazis fully recognized, key among these initiatives was 
their stewardship of the youth, and key to that was their control of the schools.4  As has been 
noted by other historians, this process, in many ways, mirrored the process of Gleichschaltung in 
Germany itself.5 But, as I argue, the process of gelijkschakeling in the Netherlands included not 
only the process of coordination as found in Germany, but also a second level of cultural 
development aimed at turning the independent-minded Dutch nation into members of the Greater 
Germanic Reich. It was a process aimed at bringing the Dutch back into the Germanic fold from 
which it had ostensibly deviated, as so many German nationalist and völkisch thinkers had 
argued for decades prior. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the German leadership in the educational realm saw 
two paths toward the Germanicization of Dutch youth via education. The direct path, which 
focused on German educational institutions, and the indirect path, which focused on Dutch 
institutions. This chapter focuses on the administrative and curricular changes that the Germans 
and their Dutch collaborators introduced during the first year and one half of the occupation that 
fall along the indirect path that Schwarz envisioned. These included the removal of Jewish 
persons from the schools, the school book control commission, attempts at suppressing the 
influence of the confessions in education, and attempts to increase the power of the state 
apparatus. This chapter further looks at the developments in educational organization, including 
the attempted reorganization of primary education and the attempts to introduce new subjects 
while changing the weight other subjects were given in the curriculum. 
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Depending on the perspective taken, these efforts can be seen as either an astounding 
success or a relative failure. The German leadership, especially Schwarz, certainly thought them 
to be a great achievement, and stated as much in multiple reports back to the Party Chancellery, 
as well as in letters to other colleagues.6  Despite that outlook, however, these attempted changes 
to education were only a success to the extent that official rules had been changed. When one 
dives further and looks at whether those changes were actually reflected at the local level 
through the work of teachers and administrators on the ground, the astounding successes appear 
much less amazing. Most of the attempted changes were only partially implemented whether 
because of a lack of necessary resources or because of administrative and logistical restraints. 
And of course, even when those structural challenges could be overcome, the resistance of 
teachers and administrators blocked the occupiers’ path forward. 
Because this chapter focuses on the higher-level attempts by the Germans and their Dutch 
collaborators to change education in the Netherlands, the focus here will remain on Seyss-
Inquart, Friedrich Wimmer, Heinrich Schwarz, and Jan van Dam.  Although these individuals 
had significant support from lower ranking bureaucrats and other individuals, this chapter will 
not dwell on the efforts of these lower level operatives in detail. A closer look at the events on 
the ground at the local level, which will include the efforts of the extraordinary school inspectors 
as well as reactions by Dutch teachers, parents, and students, will follow in chapter seven. 
Anti-Jewish Measures 
 The first incursions of the German occupation into the education sphere were not 
actually directed at educational institutions specifically. Rather, they were directed at the 
Netherlands’ Jewish population and directly affected education only because some teachers, 
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administrators, and students were Jewish. Using as an excuse that the legal Dutch government 
had fled to London, Seyss-Inquart decreed on August 20, 1940 that the Reichskommissariat 
could hire and dismiss civil servants as necessary.7  A similar order the following month, on 
September 13, incorporated any institutions that received financial assistance from the state 
under the purview of the Reichskommissariat’s hiring and firing authority—confessional schools 
were explicitly named as one such institutional form.8 In the interim, on August 28, 
Commissioner-General Wimmer sent instructions to the College of Secretaries-General ordering 
that no Jewish persons be hired or promoted in the Civil Service, an order that was in direct 
violation of several clauses of the Dutch constitution, which was quickly noted by the College.9  
When the obvious questions came regarding who, exactly, was to be considered Jewish, circulars 
from the Reichskommissariat were dispatched on September 30, followed by an official decree 
October 22, that defined anyone with two Jewish grandparents as Jewish. Those grandparents 
were considered Jewish if they had taken part in the Jewish religious community.10   
On October 17, the occupation authority sent orders, via the College of Secretaries-
General, to all government departments demanding that civil servants fill out one of two forms, 
declaring whether or not they were “aryan,” specifically asking the respondents whether they had 
“Jewish blood, ” which, according to the instructions forwarded with the forms meant any person 
with a single grandparent who had been a member of the Jewish community.11  Most civil 
                                                 
7 Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Verordnungsblatt, 108/1940. 
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servants, whether Jewish or Gentile, signed the forms without recognizing the danger in helping 
the occupation create a registry of Jewish civil servants. Despite the willingness of most civil 
servants to sign the form, the so-called Aryan Attestation was met with some protests in the 
educational sector.  Ben Telders, Professor of International Law at Leiden University, appealed 
to the High Court in an appeal that went unanswered, while Paul Scholten, Professor of Law at 
the University of Amsterdam, organized a petition to be sent directly to Seyss-Inquart in 
protest.12  It, too, was ignored. At the same time, the teachers and administrators of the 
Amsterdam Lyceum and one Christian school in The Hague refused to sign the forms as a group. 
Student groups at various universities across the country sent their own petitions to the 
Reichskommissar protesting the Aryan Attestation, some gaining thousands of signatures, but 
these petitions had no more effect as Telders’s. Protests were not limited to the educational 
sphere, either, as both the Roman Catholic and Dutch Reformed churches spoke publicly, from 
the pulpit, in protest.  But the protesters were, almost always, a minority among a much larger 
group of their colleagues all too willing to return the forms back up the chain. Protesting the 
Aryan Attestation was one thing, but a willingness to quit in the face of the Germans’ demands 
was quite another.13    
The Aryan Attestation set the stage for the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, including 
teachers and other instructional faculties, from their posts. This was ordered by Seyss-Inquart, 
via Wimmer, on November 4, 1940, but, importantly, not as an official decree published in the 
Official Register for the Occupied Dutch Territories, as other official decrees had been and 
would continue to be.  Rather the order came as a circular to the various departments.  It was 
                                                 
12 Presser, Ashes in the Wind, 20–21. 
13 Moore, Victims and Survivors, 55. Presser, Ashes in the Wind, 20–24. 
204 
 
almost as if he hoped to slide the order in under the door, where it was less likely to be noticed.14  
Almost immediately, in the face of protests from the Secretaries-General, the Germans agreed to 
making the dismissals “temporary” and allowed the newly dismissed Jewish civil servants to 
retain some of their pay and pensions. Although this concession did bring the acquiescence of the 
Secretaries-General, the promises were broken quickly, when in late 1940, the dismissals were 
made permanent.15 
Public resistance to the dismissals of Jewish civil servants was more widespread than it 
had been to the Aryan Attestation of the previous month. In perhaps the most famous event, on 
November 26, three weeks after the circular was published to the various governmental 
departments, Professor Rudolph Cleveringa, Dean of the Faculty of Law at Leiden University, 
delivered a damning speech against the dismissal of a Jewish colleagues. Held in the main hall of 
the Academy Building and attended by numerous faculty and students, Cleveringa’s 
denunciation of the occupiers’ anti-Jewish measures was transcribed by a student in attendance 
and quickly spread throughout the country. In an attempt to disrupt the Germans’ plans, the 
students at Leiden erupted in strike shortly thereafter, to which the Germans responded by 
arresting Cleveringa and shutting down the university entirely on November 27.16  Although the 
Schwarz and Wimmer both hoped to use the closure to reconstitute Leiden University as a 
“Germanic university,” their plans for this reconstitution never materialized.17  At the same time, 
van Genechten, head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde wanted to reopen the university as a 
“volksche” university, that is an NSB-oriented, nazified institution, while van Dam simply hoped 
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to reopen it for reasons of his own prestige.18 But none of these plans came to fruition, and 
Leiden University remained closed for the next four years, reopening for classes only after the 
end of the war for the 1945/1946 winter semester.19 
In contrast to the professors at Leiden, it was the students at the Technical University of 
Delft who led the anti-dismissal agitation. A few days prior to Cleveringa’s speech at Leiden and 
upon finding the lecture hall of Prof. A.C. Josephus Jitta closed due to his dismissal, one student 
leader delivered an impromptu speech to his classmates denouncing the Germans’ anti-Jewish 
measures. Later that evening, when other students went to the lecture hall of Professor David van 
Dantzig, who had also been dismissed, the present students determined that they would strike the 
following Monday. That Monday, November 25, the student body at Delft erupted in a strike that 
lasted well into the night and the following day, in what was one of the first public protests of the 
Nazis’ anti-Jewish measures in the Netherlands.20  Just as in Leiden, the Germans reacted harshly 
with the complete closure of the university. Although it was reopened the following year because 
the Germans needed trained engineers, the student leader, Frans van Haselt, was later arrested 
and sent to a concentration camp in Germany, perishing there in 1942.21 
A smaller protest erupted at Wageningen University but bore little effect, while the 
rectors at the universities of Amsterdam and Utrecht successfully prevented the students there 
from engaging in desired strike actions, the former by closing early for the winter holidays, the 
latter by convincing the students that a more strategically timed action would be more effective, 
although that better timing never materialized.  Protests against the dismissal of Jewish 
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instructors also took place in high schools across the country, from Friesland in the north, to Tiel 
in the south, from Amsterdam in the West, to Doetinchem right on the eastern border with 
Germany.22  Most of the protests were small, with only a handful of students or instructors taking 
part, but they show that even at this early stage some Netherlanders were prepared to resist the 
imposition of Nazi values upon their country. Only in Leiden and Delft were the protests large 
enough to engender a significant response by the German occupiers, and in each case, that 
response was loud and clear. The closure of the oldest and most respected university in the 
Netherlands at Leiden and the similar fate of the Technical University of Delft sent a direct and 
very visible message to the Dutch populace that the new occupation authority was willing to take 
drastic measures to enforce its prerogatives, even in the face of outright revolt and even in this 
early phase in which Seyss-Inquart still hoped to win the Dutch over to Nazism. Moreover, it 
would stand as a near constant reminder to everyone else in the educational establishment about 
the costs of defying the Germans’ plans for Dutch education.23 
It would become clear in the near future that the dismissal of Jewish teachers was only a 
first step in the Germans’ anti-Jewish persecutions in the educational realm. On January 10, 
1941, Seyss-Inquart required that all Jewish persons in the Netherlands register themselves with 
the government, decreeing that any person who had a single grandparent who had taken part in 
the Jewish community was considered Jewish.24 This was followed, on February 11, by the 
introduction of a numerus clausus for Jewish students in higher education and a near ban on new 
enrollments by Jewish students seeking post-secondary education, all of whom now had to seek 
the personal approval of the Secretary-General for admission.25  The Deutsche Zeitung in den 
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Niederlanden, an organ of the German colony in the Netherlands, noted that the decrees were 
direct responses to the protest actions in Leiden and Delft two months prior.26 
These anti-Jewish actions that affected the educational sector were but a small portion of 
the Germans’ larger efforts at isolating Jewish Netherlanders from their Christian co-nationals. 
Resentment and agitation on the part of the persecuted Jewish minority boiled over later that 
month, when, on February 19, a German police patrol entered a Jewish owned ice-cream parlor 
called Koco in Amsterdam. Koco had been a popular locale for both Jews and Gentiles alike, and 
owing to that popularity, was afforded a sort of clandestine security by neighborhood youth, who 
fashioned improvised weapons and stood patrol. But as minor successes against Dutch Nazis 
emboldened them, their attempts at remaining inconspicuous unraveled, leading to direct 
German intervention. On that fateful February 19, when the German police entered the parlor, 
they were assaulted with ammonia gas. The German police patrol responded by emptying their 
guns into the shop and arresting the German-Jewish proprietors.27 
Three days later, on Saturday, February 22, the occupation authorities responded even 
more violently, as razzia patrols descended upon the Waterlooplein square, in the heart of the old 
Jewish Quarter, and rounded up 425 Jewish “hostages,” all of whom were promptly shipped off 
to the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria.28  It was followed by another razzia the next 
morning which led to even more arrests. But the Germans had overplayed their hand and had not 
expected the response of the citizenry to this ghastly affront. On the very same Saturday evening 
as the first razzia, Jaap Brandenburg, Amsterdam district leader of the outlawed Communist 
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Party of the Netherlands and witness to the events at the Waterlooplein, used the underground 
party apparatus to spread the word of the Germans’ actions among the working-class community. 
The following day, other communist functionaries arrived from neighboring towns and agreed to 
issue a manifesto calling for a general strike. Two local Amsterdam civil servants and 
communist agitators, Piet Nak and Willem Kraan, took the lead. They arranged a gathering of 
sympathizers to be held the evening of Monday, February 24, at the Noordermarkt and pushed 
the entire party apparatus to help spread the word and get attendees there. At the meeting, Nak, 
Kraan, and other CPN leaders whipped the crowd into a frenzy, declaring that they had seen how 
the Nazis had acted and that they, the working class of Amsterdam, stood hand in hand with their 
Jewish friends.29 
During the meeting, the recently drawn-up manifesto was distributed among the crowd, 
which numbered several hundred strong, to spread the word that the following day, the workers 
of Amsterdam would bring the city to its knees. The next morning, February 25, 1941, the city 
erupted in anti-German protests. What had begun with tram drivers in the city center spread to all 
sectors of the populace, as hundreds of thousands of enraged, protesting Netherlanders shut 
down the city. The strike effort quickly spread to other neighboring cities, but was suppressed by 
German security forces, who managed to reassert control over the next two days. The February 
Strike of 1941 was the first truly large-scale protest against anti-Jewish efforts in Nazi-occupied 
Europe and would mark the end of the initial phase of the German occupation of the 
Netherlands.30  Seyss-Inquart had begun his tenure as Reichskommissar hoping to win the Dutch 
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over to the German cause through persuasion, but the February Strike proved that this hope was 
very much in vain.   
Although anti-Jewish measures would ramp up over the course of the first full year of the 
occupation, their effect upon the educational sphere was briefly paused simply because the 
Germans had not yet specifically targeted Jewish individuals in education. By and large, the only 
anti-Jewish action up to that point that had directly affected the education realm was the 
dismissal of Jewish civil servants, and then, it disrupted education not because the Germans were 
attempting to interfere with education specifically, but because teachers and administrators were 
civil servants.  Seyss-Inquart turned directly to the place of Jewish individuals in schools in 
summer 1941, when he informed van Dam that Jewish pupils were to be removed from public 
schools. In an August 16 circular directed at the various community and town councils 
throughout the country—marked “not for publication in any form”—van Dam asked local 
authorities across the country to reply with the number of Jewish students in their charge so that 
he could make the necessary arrangements for the creation of “segregated schools”31 for Jewish 
students.32  Later, on August 25, in a new circular, van Dam informed mayors and town councils 
that Jewish pupils would no longer be allowed to attend public or confessional schools as of 
September 1 and further told them that the goal was to establish segregated schools with such 
speed that Jewish pupils miss no more than four weeks of lessons.33 On August 29, the news was 
released to the public, but with a propagandistic twist. Instead of saying outright that Jewish 
pupils were being removed from public and private schools and forced into their own segregated 
schools, the occupiers noted that Jewish students would, as of September 1, receive instruction 
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from Jewish teachers. As reported in the Algemeen Handelsblad, “as a consequence, … the 
above-mentioned students will no longer be permitted admission in educational institutions, 
unless the institutions are intended for these students only.”34 
Education at the schools for Jewish students was essentially similar in nature to that of 
the public and confessional schools, such that the exams and diplomas they granted during the 
war were honored by the post-war Department of Education.35  Dr. Jacob Presser, who after the 
war would go on to write the leading work on the Nazi persecution of Jewish persons in the 
Netherlands, was a teacher at the Jewish Lyceum in Amsterdam during the period of segregation 
and devotes several pages in his magnum opus to that experience. He notes that the organization 
matched the public schools, religious instruction was optional, and although there were certainly 
shortages of both school material and qualified teachers, they made do with what they had. But 
there was one overriding difference that Presser stressed both in his own experience and in that 
of his colleagues at other schools designated for Jewish pupils: absent students, a normal event 
for any school, but which were especially troublesome for the Jewish schools, because absent 
students rarely returned.36  This was, of course, because of the deportations of Jewish individuals 
that picked up in the first half of 1942. The waves of deportations began by emptying the towns 
and provinces of their Jewish inhabitants and sending them to Amsterdam, which was followed 
in the second half of the year by deportations from Amsterdam to Kamp Westerbork in the far 
northeast of the country, from whence the inmates would be deported “to the east,” usually 
directly to the extermination centers at Auschwitz and Sobibor, although other camps, such as 
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Bergen-Belsen, and even the Jewish ghetto Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia were occasional 
destinations. 
The schools for Jewish pupils in the provinces were shut down as their students were 
deported to Amsterdam. Of the two main secondary schools for Jews in Amsterdam, the Joodse 
Hogere Burger School was actually a pre-war invention for Amsterdam’s sizable Jewish 
community. The other, the Joods Lyceum, was established in September 1941 specifically as a 
result of the occupiers’ anti-Jewish measures. Although both schools had high enrollments by 
mid-1942, the weekly deportations to Westerbork took their toll on the student population. 
Presser reports that by May 1943, only four students remained in his class.37 By September, both 
schools sat empty and were shuttered by the government. The education of Jewish pupils had 
long since been removed from the authority of the Education Department, however, when, in 
November 1942, it was placed under the supervision of the Jewish Council in Amsterdam.38 
Education for Jewish pupils continued in Westerbork, in theory if not always in practice, where 
there were at least three schools, one of which had been founded during the early days of the 
camp when it was an internment camp for German-Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany in the 
late 1930s.  But schooling in Westerbork was even more difficult on pupils and teachers alike. 
The school rooms were often requisitioned for other purposes, and all too often, students arrived 
for school in the morning to find that their teachers had been deported the night before. The 
regular shipments of new inmates into the camp from Amsterdam, as well as the regular 
deportation of inmates further east, of both students and teachers, meant that it was rarely 
possible to offer regular instruction. This, coupled with the total lack of teaching materials, 
meant that often untrained and unqualified teachers provided lessons to an entirely transient 
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student body. In Westerbork, despite camp decrees that children attend regular lessons, all 
semblance of normality in education was gone.39 And so it would remain until the last transports 
deported the final inmates “to the east” in September 1944. 
The removal of Jewish students and teachers from the schools was one of the few 
changes the German occupiers were able to fully institute. And this success on the part of the 
Nazis was not limited to the education realm. In fact, throughout the country, the Nazis 
encountered considerable success in rounding up Jewish individuals and deporting them first to 
Amsterdam, and from there on to Westerbork and to other camps in Central and Eastern Europe. 
With more than 100,000 Jewish deportees murdered at the hands of the Nazis, out of a 1940 
Jewish population of roughly 140,000, the Netherlands saw, by far, the highest numbers of 
Jewish Holocaust victims of any Western or Northern European nation, both in real numbers and 
as a percentage of the pre-war Jewish population.40  The legacy of the Holocaust in the tolerant, 
liberal Netherlands has been a haunting specter over the country for decades, with few satisfying 
answers as to how or why the Nazis were so successful there, when they were comparatively 
unsuccessful in other Western and Northern European occupied countries, such as France, 
Belgium, and Denmark.41   
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As yet, there is no overriding consensus on why Jewish people in the Netherlands were 
murdered at comparatively higher rates than their counterparts in other Western and Northern 
European countries. All of the usual explanations, from the geography of the Netherlands and the 
collaboration of Dutch authorities, to the deference of the Jewish and Gentile civilian population 
to authority and the near complete registration of the Jewish population of the Netherlands, lack 
the necessary nuance to explain why survival rates varied so heavily by particular region. Marnix 
Croes, of the Research and Documentation Center of the Netherlands Ministry of Justice, offers 
perhaps the most intriguing explanation that does account for these variably rates of survival. 
Through the use of statistical analysis, Croes argues that it is likely that significantly larger 
numbers of Jewish individuals in the Netherlands went into hiding than previously thought, for 
not all such individuals caught in hiding by the Germans were registered as having gone 
underground. Croes then argues that the particular success and ferocity of the German 
Sicherheitspolizei and their Dutch collaborators at hunting down and finding hiding Jews was at 
least partly the cause of the lower Jewish survival rate in the Netherlands, although Croes freely 
admits that much more research is necessary to come to a fuller understanding of the entire 
phenomenon.42 
The “Cleansing” of anti-German School Books 
Although the first major incursions into the educational sector had been directed at 
Jewish individuals, those efforts were not directed solely at the schools. The extent to which they 
had affected Dutch education resulted from the presence of Jewish persons in Dutch schools and 
universities. The first direct action specifically into the realm of education actually occurred 
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before van Dam was even appointed to the position of Secretary-General, although he was very 
much involved in the process, for he was the head of the Commissie van Voorlichting voor 
Leerboeken.43 
Of all of their goals in the education realm, the Germans put forth the most strenuous 
efforts into making sure the published materials fit the occupiers’ ideological outlook.  This 
started almost immediately after the Dutch surrendered on May 14, 1940.  Just a week later, on 
May 20, Willi Janke, who would later become the Chief of the Press Department in Seyss-
Inquart’s personal staff, met with officials from various publishing associations to inform them 
that the sale of any and all anti-German books, pamphlets, or brochures, as well as French and 
English newspapers was now banned.  He further informed his audience that that the attitude of 
the German authorities would largely depend on the loyalty of the Dutch publishing industry, 
bookstores, and libraries.44  There would be no mistaking the Germans’ demands in this matter.    
Very quickly after the installation of the Reichskommissariat, the new German civilian 
leadership in the Netherlands became aware of anti-German school textbooks.  This took many 
forms.  First and foremost were any books that had negative statements regarding Germany, 
National Socialism, the NSDAP or its leaders, or fascism more generally.  Already on August 3, 
1940, Seyss-Inquart’s representative in the province of Groningen sent a letter to Wimmer 
reporting anti-Hitler statements in a school history book.45  In response, on August 8, Wimmer 
sent instructions banning anti-German text books from the schools to the then Secretary-General 
of Education, Gerrit van Poelje, wondering in the process how such a state of affairs was ever 
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left to be in the first place.46  In the same note, he warned van Poelje that any oral transmission of 
said views or material by teachers at public or private schools or universities was also banned.   
Two weeks later, on August 23, Wimmer sent another letter to van Poelje that was 
similar in content but harsher in tone.47  Importantly, whereas in the previous note of August 8 
Wimmer had only questioned why anti-German books had not been pulled from use, the harsher 
note of August 23 made mention of a larger-scale operation: the “cleansing” of school books:   
I would have taken it for granted that the Dutch school inspectorates would, on their own initiative, take 
into account the changing circumstances of the occupation in every way and, immediately after checking 
the teaching materials of all schools, take every precaution to cleanse all the hints, indications, allegations 
and suspicions, that degrade or are apt to degrade the Greater German Reich and its development, regarding 
the German people in all of its strains, as well as regarding its national socialist leadership and worldview.48 
 
Moreover, to the extent that any school books discuss: 
racial or völkisch, historical, geographic, political, cultural, or economic states of the Greater German Reich 
and its people, they should take the form such that a worthy attitude regarding the German occupation is 
guaranteed and such that they are suitable for bringing forth a better attitude toward the German people.49 
 
To make sure that these changes were made, Wimmer further made van Poelje personally 
responsible for the implementation of book cleansing and promised to hold him responsible 
should the necessary changes not be made. 
At the same time, Wimmer sent a circular to the college of Secretaries-General informing 
them that similar books should be taken out of circulation where ever they might be found, such 
as in departmental libraries, giving the Secretaries-General four weeks to comply.50  Just in case 
things were not clear, Albrecht, who worked in Wimmer’s Generalkommissariat, sent along 
further instructions to van Poelje listing a few dozen authors whose books were to be removed 
from use in the classroom and from school libraries, although he did make an exception for 
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certain works by authors who would otherwise be proscribed, such as Marx and Freud, but only 
in the case that those works were used for purely scientific purposes, with the further limitation 
that they could not be taken off library premises.51  Originally, Wimmer had wanted to make the 
individual school heads themselves responsible for removing the newly banned books from 
circulation, but van Poelje’s successor as interim Secretary-General of the Education Department 
Hendrik Reinink, in consultation with both Schwarz and Albrecht, advised against it. It was 
feared that the resulting large influx of letters from school officials asking for clarification would 
overwhelm the resources of the department.  Instead, they decided to turn direct responsibility 
for the physical removal of school books over to the local school inspectors.52   
Van Poelje went right to work on this much larger project that Wimmer understood 
should have naturally come from the initiative of the Dutch bureaucracy and established a 
departmental commission to look into the matter, although it was Reinink who gave the 
commission the direct task of censoring school books, as van Poelje was sacked on August 31.  
Probably on the advice of Snijder, who was always willing to recommend van Dam to the 
Germans as a willing collaborator, Wimmer appointed van Dam to lead the commission.53  Van 
Dam got to work quickly as he and the seventeen other members of the commission went 
through thousands and thousands of school books, removing more than four hundred from 
circulation in 1940 alone.  By summer 1941, that number had climbed to more than seven 
hundred.  Lists of authors were handed down whose works were to be removed.54  Of course, 
Jewish authors were prominent on the lists, but others, such as the now highly regarded Thomas 
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Mann, who was an outspoken critic of National Socialism, and the rest of his family were also 
included.55  By 1942, the list of banned literature included any and all books by Jewish, Marxist, 
anti-German, and or anti-national socialist authors, while later that year, many books that were 
considered “liberal” or “democratic” were added to the lists of banned books.56   
This ended up causing several problems, as questions began coming in to the department 
in droves.  One secondary school director in Tiel noted that almost all history books were not 
directly based on national socialist ideals and questioned whether those could be considered as 
“anti-national socialist.”  Moreover, he questioned what, exactly, “literature” entailed.  Van Dam 
replied by noting that banned literature written by Jewish authors was meant to include those 
works that exhibit a “Jewish spirit,” although he did not define, what, exactly that meant, while, 
at the same time noting that his commission had cleansed the extant history books such that they 
should not cause any problems.57  In another case, a historical atlas that included a Jewish co-
author was simply recommended by van Dam to have that author’s name stripped and replaced 
by a non-Jewish coworker.58  Similar questions were often posed regarding socialist and/or 
Marxist authors, such as one school director questioned whether a history book on Renaissance 
art written by a known Marxist fell under the ban (it did not).  The questions were so common 
that the replies took on the appearance of a form letter.59   
In some cases, the removal of the book was not desirable, if for no other reason than the 
offending passages being short and not entirely germane to the rest of the work.  Or, especially 
as the war went on and paper shortages became more pronounced, it would have been a waste to 
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replace those books that contained only short, offending passages with more suitable new 
works.60  In these cases, the book control commission resorted to gluing over the offending 
passages and putting more ideologically favorable statements in their place.  For example, in one 
history book used in confessional schools, a passage regarding Jewish people in the Middle Ages 
was replaced with more ideologically fitting material.  Originally, it had read, not entirely 
innocently: “The Jewish diaspora surely rests upon God’s judgment, but no one is innocent who 
persecutes Israel.”  The commission replaced it with: 
These vagrants were hated and persecuted the world over in the Middle Ages for their rule over money.  
Therefore, the diligence of the Church came to convert them, which was always done with great vigor.  
Against the authority of the princes and the clerics, they maintained their finely woven ruses; against the 
power of steel, the power of silver.61 
 
In another instance, the new government-approved passages took on an overtly political 
tone.  For example, in one book on recent history, a passage over the inauguration of Queen 
Wilhelmina in 1898 was changed to emphasize what the Germans saw as the slow death of the 
Dutch Royal House.  Originally, the passage read: “Then the entire Dutch people celebrated 
enthusiastically.  There was joy in the heart of Queen Emma and there was joy in the heart of her 
people.  Joy—about our first Orange queen.”  This was changed to the much less festive, “Now 
there were two royal women who survived the last Prince of Orange: mother and daughter.  The 
Orange tree had almost stopped blooming.  Would God allow further growth? …”62  As Loe de 
Jong notes, these changes were not limited to historical instruction, but could be found in many 
subjects.  So, for example, in a textbook for beginning English instruction, in which the passage 
had originally read: “Immediately (fill in: after or before) the peace, the Germans began to 
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prepare themselves for a new war,” was replaced with “Immediately (fill in: after or before) the 
shipwreck the sailors were taken to hospital (sic).”63 
In other cases, schools were simply instructed to cut the offending passages from the 
books entirely, such that the resulting book had gaps in pages.64  Again, De Jong offers several 
examples that range from the obviously political to the not so obviously antagonistic.  In one 
history book for secondary schools, a passage regarding anti-Jewish measures in Germany since 
1933 was removed entirely.  Similarly, in a Dutch language grammar textbook for primary 
school students, several individual sentences had to be removed, such as one sentence that read: 
“The German armies devastated and burned the wealthiest cities and the most flourishing 
villages of Belgium,” or another that simply stated: “On Queen’s Day [the national holiday] 
everyone wears orange.”  In other instances, songs used in musical instruction were removed 
from instruction booklets, even those traditionally sung in confessional schools.65   
In some instances, van Dam even got help from members of the general public in his 
efforts at “cleansing” textbooks.  For example, in November 1943, he and Goedewaagen 
received a letter from one F. J. Meijer, who was the director of an insurance cooperative, that 
noted that one history book used in a primary school in The Hague contained such “true 
nonsense” about the Germanics that he lacked for both time and paper to explain it all, although 
he did, apparently, have enough time and paper to explain that the teacher of that particular class 
found it necessary to exaggerate and claim that the Germanics made hammers from the thigh 
bones of their defeated enemies and pendants from collar bones.  The archival file does not make 
clear how this insurance cooperative director was aware of such claims made by the teacher, 
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although it seems likely that he had a child in the class.  Either way, he requested an update on 
what actions Goedewaagen and van Dam had taken.66 
Not only did van Dam’s committee inspect existing books, as of fall 1941 it also censored 
newly published works.67  In order to pass the censors, no book could contain anti-German 
sentiments, whether about the German people; its leadership; or its past, present, or future.  Such 
books could also not glorify the House of Orange, pacifism, or Marxism.  The League of 
Nations, should it be addressed, must be addressed only as a historical artifact.  And of course, 
no books may be printed (or reprinted) that were written by Jewish or emigrant authors (that is 
authors who fled Nazi-controlled Europe).68  Along with these limitations outlined in van Dam’s 
guidelines came inclusive points that books should contain.  The should “fit into the framework 
of the present times” by being “conducive to the pursuit of unity in our people” while also 
lacking anything that might “awaken or accentuate disunity”—the latter elements almost 
certainly referring to Marxism, democracy, or the pillars.  Further, they should “acknowledge the 
scope of the developments in the Netherlands and Europe, which are aimed at achieving the idea 
of the ethnic community.”69  This was, however, less important after January 1942, when the 
publication of most, but by no means all, new school books ceased.70  As will be shown in the 
following chapter, some efforts to produce new school books, especially those explicitly 
designed by the occupiers or their Dutch collaborators did indeed continue.   
Over the course of the occupation, van Dam’s school book commission would censor 
thousands of books.71  Given the limits of what was acceptable, it is no surprise that many history 
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books fell victim to the “cleansing.”72  Noting that the list of book characteristics that would 
make a work inappropriate for use in the classroom was growing ungainly, the commission 
began to establish a catalog of books that could be used in instruction and libraries.73  The 
catalog, which contained roughly nine thousand titles that were “indispensable” for educational 
purposes, included the only books that were allowable after that point.  While it was not ordered 
that schools must use books from the catalog, all others were to be considered banned from use 
in instruction, making the choice to use other works technically impossible.74 
Despite the incredible effort of the Commissie van Voorlichting voor Leerboeken, there 
was only so much they could do to prevent anti-German books from being used in the classroom. 
As with other new regulations promulgated by the occupation regime, the prohibition against 
anti-German textbooks was exceedingly difficult to actually enforce. The most offensively anti-
German books were, by and large, successfully removed from the classroom, but those were only 
a small portion of banned books. Schools across the country continued to use the same liberal 
and democratically oriented books they always had.75 Even when offending passages were glued 
over, that was hardly enough to keep students’ prying eyes from looking underneath. 
This problem was not helped by the lack of punishment meted out by the government. 
When a teacher at the Marnix Gymnasium in Rotterdam continued to use a geography book with 
anti-national socialist passages in early 1941, Albrecht only issued a warning.76  Later that year, 
at a public gymnasium in ‘s-Hertogenbosch several teachers had continued to use banned books. 
As a result, the mayor, whom van Dam tasked with investigating the use of prohibited books 
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there, passed around a pledge that multiple teachers signed stating that they would follow the 
rules regarding banned book going forward, which van Dam accepted as a reasonable reaction.77 
Similarly, the director of the Catholic boys school in Wijk, near Duurstede, refused to implement 
the orders of the van Dam’s book “cleansing” commission. He kept the school library entirely 
intact and reportedly told the “willing public” of the area that the new regulations were in 
conflict with the constitution and that the occupation authority should not concern itself with 
such matters. When questioned by the local school inspector, the head noted that he had not 
noticed any books in the library that fell under the ban, although he himself did not supervise the 
library—that responsibility fell to another teacher. The inspector saw right through this rather 
hollow excuse but declined to press the issue any further than by telling the school head he 
needed to get his act together or face actual consequences.78   
Because of the unwillingness of the government come down hard on teachers and schools 
that violated the rules regarding prohibited textbooks, the work of van Dam’s school book 
commission was only half effective. While it managed to censor thousands upon thousands of 
books over the course of the occupation, its work was, in many cases, for naught. Even book 
publishers did not always follow the rules, likely because they did not want to spend the money 
necessary to convert already published books into acceptable versions.79  As would happen again 
and again over the course of the first couple of years of the occupation, the German occupation 
authority and its Dutch helpers would establish new rules for the educational sphere, rules that 
were often simply ignored at the local level. 
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Increasing the Influence of the State and the Appointment Decrees 
Censoring offensive text books was only the first step in coordinating the educational 
sphere. On November 15, 1940, Seyss-Inquart took further action toward bringing the 
educational sphere—that is the sector that provided for Dutch Gentile students—to heel with the 
appointment of secondary school teacher and NSB functionary Piet van Rossem as “Authorized 
Representative of the Reichskommissar for the Supervision of Peace and Order in the Schools.”80  
Although van Rossem was a member of the NSB, he was not close to Mussert or van Genechten, 
head of the Opvoedersgilde, and was seen, much like van Dam as not being under the influence 
of the NSB, and so he could be counted on as reliable from the German point of view.81  Van 
Rossem’s appointment carried great authority and he became a sort of all-purpose inspector of 
primary and secondary education throughout the country. Along with two deputies, he was 
afforded the right of entry into and inspection of all schools, including the right to sit in and 
observe classroom instruction at both public and confessional schools; the right to inspect the 
files of all school heads, teachers, and other personnel; to carry out any investigations he deemed 
necessary in furtherance of his mandate; and he was to be afforded any and all assistance he 
deemed necessary by school heads, teachers, and other organs of the state.82  The position of 
school inspector, itself, was not a new invention of the occupation regime—such offices had 
existed for several decades and served the central government in its efforts to better control 
provincial schools. However, van Rossem’s positioning as a representative of the 
Reichskommissar himself, outside of the authority of the Department of Education, Arts, and 
Sciences, most certainly was a new development. 
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Seyss-Inquart had seen in van Rossem a useful tool for the quick nazification of the 
Dutch educational establishment, and his appointment was, essentially, an attempt by Seyss-
Inquart to have “two irons in the fire.”83 Van Rossem and his two deputies, Dr. J. J. Valkenburg 
and Dr. P. Dijkema, exercised an out-sized influence in the educational sector for the first six 
months after their appointment, but the vociferousness with which the three men worked 
engendered significant resistance on the part of all sides of the educational establishment, 
including van Dam. Van Dam had been angling for some time to gain administrative control over 
van Rossem, but those efforts were always rejected by the Authorized Representative. By May, 
van Dam had convinced Schwarz that, if van Rossem and his subordinates continued on the path 
they had started down, a general revolt of teachers and administrators would follow.84  Schwarz 
then convinced Wimmer of the need to sack van Rossem, ordered van Dam to take the necessary 
steps, drafted the dismissal order, and personally put it in front of Seyss-Inquart for his signature. 
Seyss-Inquart’s reaction to Schwarz’s actions remain unknown, but he signed the dismissal 
notice in any event. Van Rossem and his deputies were dismissed on May 26, 1941 and, in 
accordance with the instructions Schwarz had given him, van Dam laid the groundwork for a 
replacement.85 This new inspector responsible for maintaining peace and order in the schools 
would be subordinate to van Dam directly, not to the Reichskommissar, and was filled in late 
June 1941 by Dr. D. G. Noordijk, a German language teacher from The Hague who was also an 
old professional acquaintance of van Dam’s.86 The actions of the two extraordinary school 
inspectors will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, but it is important to note here that 
the first major inroad into the realm of education specifically that the German occupation 
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authorities made was both direct and far reaching.  There would be no mistaking that the 
occupation authorities viewed the schools as an area of immense importance for the future of the 
Netherlands, and they—the Germans—were more than willing to side-step the traditional 
channels in order to carry out their aims in the education realm. 
Shortly after van Rossem’s appointment, Seyss-Inquart made direct changes to the Dutch 
bureaucracy itself when he split the pre-war Department of Education, Arts, and Sciences into 
two new departments - the Department Education, Science, and Cultural Administration and the 
Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts.87  As this proved to be the only major 
bureaucratic restructuring of a pre-war Dutch ministry, its importance should not be overlooked. 
In both new departments, an emphasis was placed upon the development of the Dutch nation for 
the future, and this is borne out even in the names of the two new departments. While the pre-
war department had used the more innocuous onderwijs to refer to education, the new 
department referred to education as opvoeding, a term which carries with it the connotation of 
social and cultural development. In this way, it is similar to the German term Bildung, which also 
can be translated as both education and as cultural development. 
Moreover, the new Education Department also received a third titled section, to replace 
the lost Arts of the pre-war department, in Cultuurbescherming, or Cultural Administration.  The 
Dutch term bescherming carries dual meanings, including administration and protection. In this 
way, it is a sort of combination of the two German words Verwaltung, which means 
administration, and Beschirmung, which means protection.  Although the German language 
name for this department used the term Kulturverwaltung, or Cultural Administration, the 
Germans were not entirely unaware of the dual meaning of the term, such that, occasionally, 
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even they used the German term Kulturschutz, which also translates to Cultural Protection, in 
their internal paperwork.88 Under the auspices of Cultural Administration, a new Bureau of Folk 
Culture and People’s Development was established that was tasked with supervising courses in 
folk music, folk dance, and the volksuniversiteiten which were dedicated to adult and continuing 
education.89  Additionally, the bureau had oversight of all non-commercial and non-scientific 
libraries.90 The new Education Department was accompanied by what was essentially a 
Propaganda Department, ostensibly named the Department of Public Enlightenment and Arts, 
but which was, in reality, a near carbon copy of Josef Goebbels’s Propagandaministerium in 
Berlin. The leadership of these two new departments was entrusted to the völkisch minded Dutch 
intellectuals Dr. Jan van Dam and Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen.91 
Van Dam’s stewardship of the Education Department, which began on November 25, 
1940, would last for the remainder of the war, but it was during the first two and one-half years 
in the position of Secretary-General that he had the most impact. He wasted little time in 
implementing the “reform” proposals he had outlined earlier in the year in his Gedanken und 
Vorschläge and Reform pieces.92  The first major initiative van Dam undertook was directed at 
confessional schools. There are several reasons why this would be an initial step, but first and 
foremost was that this was seen as a necessary first step by the German authorities themselves. In 
his initial report back the office of Deputy Führer Rudolf Hess, whose office had been 
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responsible for Schwarz’s appointment to the Netherlands, Schwarz noted that, astonishingly, 
some two thirds of all Dutch students attended confessional primary schools, and, to make 
matters worse, roughly eighty-five per cent of the costs for those schools was paid by the state in 
some way, but the state had little control over either the personnel or the curriculum of these 
confessional schools. For the deeply anti-clerical Schwarz, as well as for the rest of the Nazi 
leadership in The Hague, this situation was untenable.93  In a follow-up report dated March 22, 
1941, Schwarz notes that breaking the confessional dominance in the education sector was of 
primary importance for the furtherance of his duties in the Netherlands—“to move the Dutch 
volk toward positive collaboration in the Greater Germanic sphere.”94 
Already in mid-December, only weeks after he took office, van Dam floated the idea at a 
departmental leadership meeting of possible ways to increase the influence of the state on 
confessional education, which he proposed doing by giving the department the duty to confirm 
or veto the hiring choices of school boards and local councils.95 Recognizing that this might 
encroach upon the authority given by the Reichskommissar to van Rossem’s office, he suggested 
that the various sub-departmental leaders think over their options and get back to him with 
suggestions.96  Over the next month, little appears to have actually taken place, however, as 
correspondence between Wimmer and Schwarz shows they were discussing the option of simply 
taking over the appointment of all teachers directly. Schwarz suggested to Wimmer that this was, 
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ultimately, van Dam’s goal and that this would be the end result over the course of the next 
year.97   
In the meantime, Seyss-Inquart was making plans of his own. When the Catholic Church 
began using the pulpit to agitate against the NSB in January 1941, Seyss-Inquart decided that the 
Church needed to be punished and came up with three proposals, each more severe than the last. 
He suggested an across-the-board reduction in the pay of clerical school instructors, the firing of 
said instructors, or the complete dissolution of clerical schools and their absorption by the state. 
Van Dam recognized immediately that the third option was untenable, as it would cause an 
outright revolt among the Protestant churches, to say nothing of the reaction by the Catholic 
Church, and he was able to persuade Seyss-Inquart of this apparent fact. Seyss-Inquart, however, 
saw a mere reduction on clerical teaching salaries as not going far enough, and so decided on the 
second option of firing all clerical teachers, a suggestion, it should be remembered, that was 
contained in van Dam’s “reform” proposals the previous autumn. But this too would cause many 
problems. Given that there were some five thousand clerics teaching at Catholic schools in the 
Netherlands, firing them would create huge shortages among teachers at these schools that could 
not easily be replaced. Non-Catholic teachers were a non-starter. The whole idea of Catholic 
parents being able to choose Catholic schools in which instruction was given by Catholic 
teachers had been one of the fundamental demands of the Catholic pillar during the School 
Struggle. This meant that an outright dismissal of Catholic teachers would force many Catholic 
schools to close outright, thereby shifting much of their student bodies into the public schools. 
Van Dam recognized that this might lead to a re-igniting of the School Struggle and would likely 
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lead to a unification of efforts among the Catholic and Protestant churches in the field of 
education, which would be dangerous for van Dam’s and the Germans’ “reform” efforts.98 
During the drafting of the order, protests from within the Education Department grew so 
strong that van Dam decided he needed to revisit the issue with Seyss-Inquart. He delivered his 
objections to Schwarz, who, along with Wimmer, interceded with Seyss-Inquart. The internal 
departmental memos went through various alterations to the proposed changes, but eventually, 
on February 14, settled on a final form, or so van Dam thought. Clerics were to be removed as 
school heads, while clerical teachers were to receive a forty per cent salary deduction, which 
would then be used for other educational purposes, specifically the reduction of class sizes and 
the hiring of new, young teachers to help alleviate the unemployment rate in that group.99  This 
latter effect was especially welcome in the eyes of Schwarz, who believed that it was the 
youngest cohort of educators that could be most easily co-opted for the Germanic cause because 
of their miserable economic situation.100  During the resulting meeting, which was attended by 
Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, Schwarz, and van Dam, this compromise was agreed to and was made 
possible by removing state subsidies that had previously been granted to Catholic schools.101 
The decision was somewhat of a political coup for van Dam. Although he had already 
suggested in his Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform pieces the previous fall that clerical 
instructors should be released entirely to free up much needed funds for other areas, van Dam 
correctly recognized that there was a real difference between suggesting such a move to a few 
high ranking German administrators and actually carrying out such a change in public. The 
salary reduction was the next best option and it still gave him the ability to use those funds for 
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other projects. Chief among these other projects was the hiring of more teachers, the 
unemployment of whom had been high during the 1930s, and the consequential reduction in 
class sizes. Furthermore, because the order had come from Seyss-Inquart, not from van Dam 
himself, he was able to distance himself from the new orders that had actually originally been his 
proposal in the first place.102 The penalties against clerical instructors were made public on 
February 23 during van Dam’s second radio address to the Dutch nation.103  In the speech, which 
lasted about fifteen minutes, Van Dam noted that he did not wish to put forward his program for 
the educational sector the previous November because he was unsure whether he would be able 
to carry it out. During the present speech in February, however, he did feel he could go into more 
details, but only about those points which he was confident he could carry out. They numbered 
six in total: the place of the Dutch language, the strengthening of state influence upon the 
schools, universities, physical education, teacher training, and the position of the occupation 
toward education law. 
As regarded Dutch language instruction, van Dam noted that lesson hours must be 
expanded and its implementation carefully administered via a shortly forthcoming manual on the 
topic. Dutch language instruction should be geared toward increasing the student’s love of his or 
her mother tongue and the cultural values expressed through it. The Dutch language was now 
more than ever exposed to danger and the correct education of the youth must awaken 
knowledge of that danger. For this reason, van Dam announced that he planned to establish a 
scientific center for the study of Dutch language and heemkunde, that would influence the 
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development of the Dutch language and the education thereof. Finally, he noted that, although it 
was not an easy task, he hoped to eliminate the differences between the spelling of Dutch taught 
in the schools and that used in official documents.104   
He went on to note that his second program point would be received with distrust by 
some Netherlanders, but that the strengthening of the influence of the state upon education was a 
necessity. Van Dam recognized that he was entering a minefield with this part of his program, 
but defended it by noting that the state, as yet, had little influence upon education beyond footing 
the bill. The current situation of unrest among parents and students, as well as the increasing 
political activity of the students demanded, he argued, that the state have other recourses beyond 
calling the police. For this reason, he was preparing a decree that gave the state the right of 
approval of all appointments, and, as it concerned the universities, the right of the Dutch 
administration to make appointments. The universities must, he claimed, have a stronger central 
authority so as to prevent a repeat of the situations that occurred in Leiden and Delft, although 
van Dam did not state, explicitly, how the decree he was preparing for this would work.105 
Regarding the universities specifically, there were two major questions of import. The 
first was the position of Jewish students, which van Dam argued was solely the purview of the 
German occupiers. Given that, he argued it was better to sacrifice the future attendance of Jewish 
students so as to allow current Jewish students to finish their studies and take their exams. The 
second was the fate of the universities of Leiden and Delft. Van Dam bemoaned some “fools or 
malicious people” who had demanded via an ultimatum that the occupiers reopen the university 
in Leiden. This was, van Dam noted, the worst possible way to achieve this goal.106 






Van Dam’s fourth point focused on physical education. Because physical education was 
only made a mandatory subject on January 1, he noted that it was important that P.E. teachers 
were properly qualified and that he was undertaking the necessary steps to make that a reality. 
Whereas currently, a teacher could achieve the right to teach P.E. based on his/her abilities in the 
“so-called intellectual subjects, while the examinees [i.e., the teachers being examined for their 
competency in specific subjects] are completely incompetent to teach the subject [of physical 
education].”107 Finally, all students should know how to swim, not just from a health perspective, 
but also as a point of safety. 
The last two sections, on the betterment of teachers and their training and the position of 
the occupation vis-à-vis the education sector, took up an out-sized proportion of his speech and 
testify to the importance van Dam placed in them. The training of apprentice teachers was to be 
increased to four years, but the curriculum would not change, such that teachers-in-training 
would be able to spend more time learning the material fully. As a result of this lengthening of 
the teacher training college study period, there would be no final exams held in 1942.108  Here, it 
is important to note that during the 1930s, owing to the Great Depression, a financial crisis hit 
the educational sector in the Netherlands. As a result, thousands of teachers, called 
kweekelingen-met-akte (“apprentices with certificate”), taught in primary schools for 
significantly reduced pay, sometimes even without financial remuneration at all.  The problem of 
the kweekelingen-met-akte had caused much consternation among the Dutch populace in the 
1930s. Van Dam’s changes in the teacher training schedule were meant partially to solve this 
problem by temporarily decreasing the number of new teachers, while allowing regular turnover 





to increase the number of vacant, paid positions, thereby reducing the overall unemployment 
among teachers. 
 But this was not a complete solution, either. Van Dam reckoned that he could add some 
4150 new positions to the payroll through various restructuring efforts. The holdover of the 1942 
cohort of new teachers from the Kweekscholen (teacher training colleges), would open up 1500 
new positions. This was in addition to the two thousand positions that currently stood vacant 
because of financial constraints at the local level, which were not already filled by the 
kweekelingen-met-akte. Moreover, because school boards and municipalities shifted students to 
save costs, classes were larger. Once this practice was ended, another 650 positions would open 
up, van Dam calculated. These more than 4000 new teaching positions could be, at least 
partially, paid for by the forty per cent reduction in the pay of clerical instructors, who numbered 
about 5000 throughout the country. He was certain to note that this particular measure had been 
ordered directly by the Reichskommissar, omitting, of course, that his own proposal prior to 
assuming his office had been to fire them outright. Finally, van Dam explained that he intended 
to significantly reduce the teacher training colleges and the use of apprentice teachers, because 
once his “reforms” had been implemented, the budgetary crisis that had precipitated their 
existence would have been solved, which, he noted, would be regretted by no one.109  Van Dam’s 
numbers were somewhat off, as there were, at that time, some six thousand such kweekelingen-
met-akte in the Netherlands, and so his budgetary restructuring would not completely solve the 
crisis, but it was a good start toward that end. Although it took some time, the use of 
kweekelingen-met-akte was finally, completely phased out in January 1943.110 
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The entire speech can rightfully be seen as a sort of carrot and stick arrangement. On the 
one hand, van Dam meant to overshadow the negative aspects of his proposals, such as the 
reduction in clerical salaries, and the recent dismissal of clerical school heads and Jewish school 
teachers, both of which went entirely unmentioned in the speech. On the other hand, he hid these 
destructive changes with the positives of reducing (non-clerical) teacher unemployment, 
increasing teacher pay, reducing class sizes, and getting rid of the teacher training colleges that 
had caused such consternation during the 1930s.111  It should also be noted that, although he did 
not say as much, these points all came, more or less, directly from his Reform and Gedanken und 
Vorschläge pieces written the previous fall, even if, as was the case with the reduction in clerical 
pay, he tried to cloak his position as the originator of these policies. This would be the tenor of 
van Dam’s first year on the job. He was able to push through various “reforms,” such as the 
institution of mandatory physical education, the increase of state influence over the school 
system, and the increased emphasis on Dutch language instruction while claiming, in the event 
he expected these changes to be negatively received, that he had been forced to implement them 
by the occupation authority. But despite his decrees, whether originating from him or from the 
Germans, the institution of his “reform” plans were not always successful. 
Van Dam scored a political victory with the restrictions on clerical salaries, since he had 
been able to push through his own ideas while gaining credit both within the department by 
working against Seyss-Inquart’s worst impulses and with the public by noting that he was only 
carrying out Seyss-Inquart’s orders. But this was quickly followed up by a major political defeat. 
Shortly after his second radio address, the Germans finally got back to him about the question of 
teaching appointments.112 He had mentioned in his radio address that a new decree would be 
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coming regarding the appointment of teachers, but did not go into any details beyond reassuring 
his listeners that there was no intention of making teaching appointments the sole prerogative of 
the state.113  He was able to keep that promise in the new decree. The political defeat came from 
the fact that he was forced by Seyss-Inquart to issue it himself.114 
On April 9, about six weeks after his radio address, van Dam issued the first appointment 
decree.115  The order called for the local authorities—whether school heads, municipal councils, 
or school boards in the case of confessional schools—to put forth a list of three proposed 
candidates to be approved by the Secretary-General or his designated representative. Should the 
Secretary-General have reservations about one or more of the candidates, he could strike that 
person from the list, making them ineligible for appointment. Should all three candidates be 
found undesirable by the Education Department, then a second list of three candidates could be 
proposed, and should those three be rejected, then local authorities would have to proceed with 
individual nominations. Van Dam gave himself six weeks to reply to any appointment proposals, 
meaning that the failure of school boards, local councils, or school heads to propose appointees 
who were acceptable to the Secretary-General would cause longer teaching vacancies. The only 
apparent loop-hole in the order was that the right of appointment oversight was limited to those 
positions that were longer than four months.116 
At the same time, van Dam gave himself limited authority over the firing of any school 
personnel, which also had to be approved by the Secretary-General or his appointed 
representatives. This was, of course, meant to prevent school heads or school boards from firing 
those teachers who had shown themselves to be in any way unacceptable to local administrations 
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(that is due to their pro-German, pro-Nazi, or pro-NSB attitudes).117  The appointment decree did 
not, however, give him the right to fire teachers as he saw fit. Although the department did have 
the authority to fire teachers for certain reasons, through the office of the school inspectors, that 
right was not absolute. It was expanded, however, in January 1942, when van Dam gained that 
right through two new decrees issued by Seyss-Inquart.118  The first of the two new decrees, 
known as the second appointment decree, allowed the Education Department to directly appoint 
teachers when the first two rounds of suggested appointments were both rejected. The second 
allowed van Dam to fire inspectors and teachers, an authority he would quickly delegated to 
Noordijk as Educational Inspector in General Service. It was with this new authority, combined 
with an already existing authority of the Department to punish schools which did not follow the 
orders of the central government that dated back to the early days of the occupation, as well as 
his authority to change the curriculum, gained in July 1941, that van Dam gained near complete, 
legal control over education, subject, of course, to veto by his superiors in the 
Reichskommissariat itself.119   
Although the Appointment Decrees gave the government technical control over personnel 
questions in the schools, they were, mostly, unsuccessful. Confessional schools, which were the 
real targets of the decree, did not take the issuance of the Appointment Decree lying down.120  In 
many cases, school boards simply appointed teachers for four-month periods over and over. 
When this finally became untenable, they simply stopped sending the lists of suggested 
appointees to The Hague for approval. For example, in the 1942-1943 school year, 672 teaching 
appointments were made throughout the nation, but only 212 of those were forwarded to the 
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Education Department for approval, about thirty per cent of the total.121  Additionally, the 
problem arose that the local school inspectors, to whom in practice the suggested appointments 
were made, did not always have the local authority to push through their influence. In Assen, in 
the province of Drenthe, the local supervising inspector of primary education noted in a report to 
van Dam in November 1941, that the appointment decree is understood to be nothing more than 
the department “blowing smoke” and that local mayors (who appointed teachers in this town) 
would propose a list of candidates, as the law required, but then simply pick which ever one the 
mayor had originally intended to hire in the first place, without any input from the school 
inspector.122  At least in part, this was a result of the greenness of some local inspectors, who, 
being new to the job, were reliant upon the mayor to smooth over any difficulties, which those 
mayors then used to their advantage to make appointments as they saw fit. As the supervising 
school inspector put it: “the state has little influence on the lists of candidates and appointments 
of teachers in the public schools, and absolutely no influence on appointments in private 
schools.”123  In a similar vein, the dismissal of clerical school heads was only half effective. 
While some forty-eight such clerics were successfully dismissed by the government or stepped 
down from their positions as school directors, at least fifty stayed on in defiance of the new 
regulations.124   
Finally, in spring 1943, an attempt was made to impose a reduction in funding for some 
of those confessional schools that had defied the appointment decrees. At first, van Dam wanted 
to remove state subsidies from those schools entirely, but his chief of staff De Bloc convinced 
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him only to reduce the subsidies, and even then, the reductions were not always implemented.  
Later that year, the department, at the Reichskommissariat’s behest, threatened to send teachers 
in violation of the appointment decrees to work in Germany as part of the forced labor service. 
Again, resistance came from De Bloc, who managed to slip a list of the proposed deportees to 
the Dutch resistance, giving those teachers time to go underground.125  When the German 
leadership decided to apply further pressure to van Dam to punish the school boards for refusing 
to abide by the rules, he turned the cases over to Jap Schrieke, the Secretary-General of Justice, 
for prosecution.  Although criminal investigators were dispatched to look into the issue, no 
prosecutions resulted from the inquiries, despite Wimmer’s demands. Schrieke tried to throw van 
Dam under the bus for the failures, but in reality, the Department of Justice simply failed to 
adequately engage the issue and Schrieke was not competent enough to oversee the prosecutions 
dutifully, and so they never moved forward, sitting in limbo. By August 1944, Wimmer declared 
that the instructors who had not been adequately approved were no longer teaching anyway and 
that the schools had received enough of a punishment through the reductions in funding.126  
Wimmer essentially swept the issue under the rug, which is not terribly unsurprising, given the 
approaching Allied armies, which were already in Belgium. By this point, Wimmer had bigger 
problems to worry about. 
The issuance of the April 1941 Appointment Decree was a singular political defeat for 
van Dam in this early phase of the occupation during which he had otherwise enjoyed much 
success. To be certain the general idea of the decree was suggested by van Dam himself in his 
Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform writings. It was not the content of the decree that made its 
issuance a political problem for the Secretary-General, to say nothing of the fact that it was not 
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always, and often never would be, followed by municipal councils, school boards, and mayors on 
the ground. Rather, the problem lay in the very fact that he was forced to issue it himself, rather 
than it being issued by the Reichskommissar. With the other politically problematic decrees that 
had been issued thus far, van Dam was able to keep his own name out of the fray, such as with 
the dismissal of Jewish civil servants—which van Dam protested in writing along with every 
other member of the College of Secretaries-General, including the antisemitic Goedewaagen—or 
the regulation cutting the salaries of clerical instructors.127  Because he could argue that he was 
merely carrying out the orders the Reichskommissar, even if those orders had originated in his 
own writings, in whole or in part, van Dam was able to save face with both his colleagues in the 
College of Secretaries-General and with the wider public.  He had even passed along the protests 
regarding anti-clerical moves up the chain and managed to obtain minor concessions, despite the 
fact that Seyss-Inquart’s original intention to dismiss clerical instructors outright was exactly 
what van Dam had suggested in his Reform and Gedanken und Vorschläge pieces.  These actions 
gained van Dam a certain amount of credit among the other Secretaries-General, which would 
allow him, after the war during his trial, to argue that he had always had the best interests of the 
Dutch populace at heart. But despite these political successes, van Dam was reminded, after co-
signing the protest letter against the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, that his position was 
tenuous.128  He had been appointed by Seyss-Inquart and was serving at the pleasure of the 
Reichskommissar. Should his efforts not be pleasing to the Germans, he could be sacked at any 
time. His room for maneuver was thus extremely limited. 
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Physical education was one of the many subjects that van Dam laid emphasis on in his 
Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform pieces. Of course, van Dam was not the only education 
specialist who supported the introduction of P.E. into the schools as a mandatory subject. The 
various members of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde were also in support. For many of these völkisch 
thinkers, physical education was a completely indispensable part of total education.  Physically 
fit members of society helped make society a more healthy, organic whole. As such physical 
education and sporting activities were fully one half of the “psycho-physical totality” that 
encompassed the individual. But health was not the only reason many such thinkers supported 
physical education. P.E. gave students concrete knowledge and experience that not all humans 
were equal—some simply were better than others, which of course was part and parcel to the 
larger racialist thinking of National Socialism. Furthermore, much as in Germany, where 
physical education took on a pseudo-militaristic form, völkisch thinkers in the Netherlands also 
saw P.E. as a way of solidifying the volksgemeenschap upon which society was based. Finally, 
physical education led students to recognize the beauty in their own bodies, and hence their 
race.129  Naturally, this was above and beyond the more pedestrian reasons one might support 
physical education as a mandatory subject in the schools, such as for personal safety, as in the 
case of making certain all students could swim in this nation of seafarers and canals, which van 
Dam used as justification during his second radio address to the nation in February 1941.130 
Although physical education was not unknown in the Netherlands before the war, it had 
never been a core subject in any Dutch schools prior to the occupation. On January 1, 1941, a 
little more than a month after van Dam took charge of the Education Department, it was made 
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mandatory in all Dutch primary schools. At the same time, the Education Department erected the 
new sub-department of Physical Education and Sport in order to oversee the introduction of the 
subject and a separate inspectorate was established exclusively for physical education.131 But 
despite this, the implementation of P.E. in the primary schools encountered various problems. 
First and foremost was the lack of qualified teachers and space. Because it had never been a 
required subject at the primary school level, few teachers possessed the necessary qualifications 
to teach the subject. As such, many teachers were granted the right to teach P.E. based upon their 
mastery of so-called intellectual subjects. 
The Germans got right to work on training P.E. teachers. Shortly after the implementation 
of the requirement to teach P.E. the Germans established a training seminar in Neustrelitz, in 
Mecklenburg, for the training of Dutch physical education teachers along German lines. By June, 
it had admitted one hundred applicants. While most of these applicants were simply to return to 
their schools to give sport instruction, forty of them were intended to fill out the new role of 
inspector  for physical education and sport, which would observe instruction in P.E. at Dutch 
schools to make sure that those teachers were passing muster.132  The P.E. training seminars in 
Neustrelitz continued regularly until at least November 1943, training hundreds of Dutch 
teachers in the finer points of physical education in the German sense, when the records of those 
seminars end.133  As of July 1, 1941, physical education was also given increased prominence at 
the Dutch teacher training institute in Oldenburg, Germany, receiving more hours of instruction 
than any other subject, even pedagogy.134 
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More problematic was the lack of physical space in which to give lessons in physical 
education. Generally speaking, this was not a huge problem for those schools in the countryside 
where students could simply go outside to a nearby field to perform their exercises, at least when 
it was warm. But no such options were available during the winter months, when it was raining, 
or for those students who went to school in the larger towns and cities of the western part of the 
country along the coast, where the majority of the population lived. For students in The Hague, 
Amsterdam, or Rotterdam, there were no fields near enough to their schools, and given the 
population densities, building new P.E. halls was both expensive and time consuming.  And this 
was before the ban on new school buildings went into effect on June 1, 1942.135 
This was coupled with the fact that the department did not give sufficient financial 
support for physical education, certainly nothing in proportion to the ideological importance that 
völkisch thinkers placed upon the subject. In 1942, about one million guilders was reserved for 
physical education and sport, totaling about one-half of one per cent of the total budget. In 1943 
and 1944, those numbers shrank significantly.136  Given the initial outlays for physical education, 
the timing of the cuts, the very high costs of building new sport fields and gymnasiums, the 
effort to train new P.E. inspectors and teachers, and the near universal support for physical 
education among the NSB, the German occupiers, and Van Dam, it is likely that the budget cuts 
were purely financial. By the latter half of the occupation, there simply was not enough money to 
go around when the Germans were most interested in extracting resources from the Netherlands 
in furtherance of the war effort. Nonetheless, according to the inspectors for Physical Education 
and Sport many schools made do with what they had and did the best that they could.137   
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The introduction of Physical Education as a required subject in primary schools was 
somewhat of an outlier in the “reforms” van Dam implemented. Unlike many of the other 
“reforms” he would implement, it was actually relatively popular among the population as a 
whole. It was seen as so useful, in fact, that after the war ended and democratic rule returned to 
the country, the newly elected government did not roll back the clock on physical education 
instruction, but rather gave renewed support for the further implementation of the subject, and 
eventually expanded its mandatory status to secondary schools as well. This stands in contrast to 
almost every other change van Dam and the German occupiers implemented in the field of 
education during the war, which were thrown out almost entirely by the country’s new 
democratic government. 
A Change in Course 
As noted above, the February Strike of 1941 is often seen by historians as a turning point 
in the occupation.138 Protests up to this point had been localized to specific places or sectors of 
society—such as the student protests at Leiden and Delft. Henceforth, protests were no longer 
regional. The February Strike, which started in Amsterdam but quickly spread across the nation, 
shows that large segments of the population were willing to take to the streets to agitate against 
German domination generally, and their anti-Jewish measures specifically. Two weeks after the 
strike, on March 12, 1941, Seyss-Inquart spoke at a large gathering of the North Holland branch 
of the Arbeitsbereich der NSDAP in den Niederlanden139 held in the Amsterdam Concert House. 
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In his speech, which lasted almost two hours and was covered by newspapers around the 
country, Seyss-Inquart stressed the close relationship of the Dutch and German peoples.140 They 
were not to become one people, but rather, on the basis of their racial and blood ties, were to 
“build a new community of fate that encompasses all Germanic peoples.”141  The independent 
spirit of the Dutch, which had led to the recent anti-German provocations, was a result of 
historical circumstance. Whereas the German people was mostly surrounded by “foreign” 
elements, the Dutch were not surrounded by those of foreign blood, but rather by their racial kin. 
This geographic position, combined with the Netherlands’ large empire, led the Dutch toward a 
feeling of complacent self-fulfillment and a desire to maintain peaceful relations at all costs. But 
this “Dutch culture” was, essentially, Seyss-Inquart intoned, un-völkisch and a result of the 
“liberal-international Jewish-influenced spirit” which dominated in the Netherlands.142  But the 
Dutch need not worry, because “while the power of the Reich is expressed through the 
Wehrmacht, National Socialism convinces through the power of its ideals.”143 The German 
invasion allegedly allowed the Netherlands to be “awoken from a centuries-long dream,” and “it 
is self-evident, that the terroristic spirit, which has at the moment broken out in all liberal-
democratic nations against national socialist movements after National Socialism came to power 
in Germany, will be broken in the Netherlands.”144  But Seyss-Inquart also noted that, “we do not 
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want in the least to remain in the country as the occupying power forever. We want that the 
Dutch, from inner persuasion and with their whole being, join in the great work of building of 
our Germanic community area and therewith a new Europe.”145 
The rest of Seyss-Inquart’s speech touched upon various topics meant to reassure his 
listeners in the Concert Hall and those reading the speech in the newspaper the next day, that 
Germany had the best interests of the Dutch at heart. Regarding the food supply, he noted that if 
the English repeated the blockade of the First World War, the Dutch would have just as much 
food as the Germans. Winterhulp—a charity organization aimed at creating a sense of solidarity 
among the Volksgemeinschaft and which had been exported to the Netherlands after the 
invasion—had, according to Seyss-Inquart, nothing to do with charity, but with the responsibility 
of racial comrades and the fulfillment of a higher duty. Germany did not consider Jews to be 
members of the Dutch people; they were the enemy with whom there could be neither a ceasefire 
nor peace. Industrial orders were being sent from Germany with the aim of increasing 
employment and keeping people at work. Taxes had gone up, yes, but because they had been 
reorganized along social norms, a household with three children would now pay less than 
previously under the “liberal, capitalist, and class-based” system, while the bicycle usage tax was 
to be rescinded entirely. And lest anyone fear that these changes were not to last, Seyss-Inquart 
reassured his audience that England would not win the war, and Europe would never return to 
the situation of September 1939.146 
But in addition to these various topics, Seyss-Inquart spent considerable time discussing 
education in its various forms. He noted that the Opbouwdienst, the reconstruction service aimed 
at rebuilding after the invasion, was really an educational institution meant to foster the “völkisch 





solidification of the nation.”147  It did this by focusing on the “basic element of work on the 
ground and in the soil.” But Seyss-Inquart’s reassurances hinted at the Dutch populace’s already 
fraught relationship with the labor service. Negative beliefs about the labor service had circulated 
in the Netherlands even before it became mandatory for young people to register for the 
Arbeidsdienst, the successor to the Opbouwdienst, and only increased after compulsory 
registration began in 1942. By the end of the occupation period, more Dutch Gentile youth 
would be in hiding from the labor service than Jewish people hiding from deportation “to the 
east.” Nonetheless, Seyss-Inquart hoped to reassure his listeners that there was nothing nefarious 
about the labor service and that, far from being a negative experience, it would return every 
young Dutchman “feeling himself as a young man of his people, for whom an appreciation of 
actual work had been instilled.”148  Moreover, it was a training course for future leaders, “because 
we cannot give them a right to lead in absence of Germanic substance. The Arbeidsdienst is 
really an excellent training for leaders.”149 
After justifying the reduction in clerical teaching salaries with the audacious reasoning 
that clerics had taken vows of poverty and that there was no use in using state funds to 
circumvent the clerics’ own vows, he noted that the reduction in clerical salaries would allow for 
the installation of new teachers, a decrease in class sizes, and the ability of young men to start a 
family.150  He then moved on to language instruction.  Much like the rest of his speech, his focus 
on language at first was presented as beneficial, but then showed a truer motive. As he 
understood it, there was a great need for spelling reform in the Dutch language,151 and once this 
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was completed and the education of Dutch children in the Dutch language and its associated 
cultural treasures was guaranteed, it would be possible to teach Dutch children in the German 
language, which “is the leading language of the coming Germanic community.”152 He justified 
this by accurately comparing the much larger German-speaking population with the 
comparatively smaller Dutch-speaking population, but then suggested that instruction in the 
German language was for the benefit of the Dutch, because it would allow for future freedom of 
movement in Europe, where German would certainly be the leading language, and perhaps even 
the entire world. Thus, German, he said, should not be limited to those who were able to attend 
higher education or the children of the elites, but rather should be available to all.153  What Seyss-
Inquart did not say, but would become clear soon enough, was that the occupation authority 
planned to introduce German language instruction in primary schools. 
German language instruction, which was mentioned only as a vague thought in the 
speech, was not meant to take away from the Dutch character, however. Seyss-Inquart noted that 
his previous praise of Dutch history, colonialism, sea-faring, etc., showed that he truly 
understood the Dutch. But he then returned to the complacency that he attacked at the beginning 
of his speech, exhorting his audience not to fall for the trap of trying to work through a “so-
called Fatherland Front,” by which he meant the Nederlandsche Unie—a conglomeration of the 
established parties aimed at reaching a middle ground between collaboration and 
accommodation—as had been attempted in Austria.154 The problem with such an organization is 
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that it did not give enough weight, and could even act against, the völkisch interests, which were, 
Seyss-Inquart argued, the future of the Dutch nation.155 
The tenor of Seyss-Inquart’s speech was clear; he stated it directly: “with us or against 
us.”156 The Dutch public could not have missed that the Reichskommissar had veiled direct 
threats to the Dutch nation with platitudes about its past greatness. But in the event some people 
missed it, the free press was quick to remind them. As, for example, the underground newspaper 
Het Parool noted, it was: 
all lies about the increased prosperity in our country, about our livelihood, the reduction of unemployment, 
the “voluntary nature” in which our workers go to Germany, the false representation of our free political 
will, which will only be allowed if they adapt to the principles of the most despised people in Holland, 
namely the traitors of the N.S.B. We want to be free, [and] to the extent that we have been secured in the 
dungeon of National Socialism, we can still move.157 
 
The authors of the illegal paper promised the Reichskommissar to fulfill his previous promise 
that the Germans would not leave unless they are cut to pieces. “If you give us no other choice - 
well now, we assure you: then your will shall be done.”158   
Where the underground press took a much more combative tone, the Bataviaasch 
Nieuwsblad, published for the Dutch community in Batavia and thus outside of the control of the 
Reichskommissariat, decided to mock Seyss-Inquart: 
He knows the cheese head so much better! Seyss Inquart [sic] held a speech in the Concert Hall this 
afternoon in which he varied threats with flatteries, fury, or fear, promises of political freedom with the 
announcement of a Dutch incorporation in the Greater German Reich. In summary, the reason was the 
impression of great weakness, above all of confusion.159 
 
If the Reichskommissar had hoped to reinvigorate the process of self-nazification with which he 
had begun his tenure in The Hague, then the reaction to his speech must have been disappointing. 
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The February Strike had emboldened the Dutch nation and from this point forward, things went 
slowly but surely downhill. 
German Language Instruction and an Eighth School Year 
The most important educational “reform” that Seyss-Inquart had hinted at in his March 
12 speech was the future introduction of German language instruction in primary schools. By 
May 1941, Schwarz and van Dam were working on that very effort at “reforming” the 
curriculum to better meet the needs of the German occupier.  In van Dam’s view, German 
language instruction was meant to strengthen Dutch interests, which only coincidentally, by 
nature of the seemingly secure political position of Nazi Germany in Europe, were directly 
aligned with those of the Germans. The introduction of German as primary school subject had, 
after all, been one of the central proposals in van Dam’s Gedanken und Vorschläge and Reform 
pieces the previous fall.160  Regardless, van Dam had two primary concerns. First, he recognized 
that he did not actually have the authority to change the curriculum in confessional schools. 
Traditionally, the number of hours afforded to any particular subject was left to local 
administrators. Van Dam believed that he could persuade school administrators and local 
councils to agree to the proposed three hours per week of German language instruction, but 
recognized that, in the event that was not possible, a change in the law would be necessary. 
Second was the question of teaching material, as there was no such German language instruction 
book available.161 
On May 12, 1941, a meeting was held with all of the important players concerning the 
newest school subject. Seyss-Inquart; Commissioners-General Wimmer, Schmidt, and 
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Fischböck; Secretaries-General van Dam and Rost van Tonningen; and Schwarz together came 
up with a two-part plan for the introduction of the new subject. As of September 1, 1941, 
German would be introduced in Dutch primary schools, while on September 1, 1942, an eighth 
school year would be introduced to help further the goal of teaching every Dutch child the 
German language.162  With the support of everyone of importance secured, Schwarz proposed to 
Seyss-Inquart that the Reichskommissariat produce a German language instruction book 
designed for primary school students, the costs of which would be borne by the government. It 
had actually been van Dam’s idea for the government to pay for the new book; he hoped the 
financial savings would smooth over the adoption of the book when it was, at this point, still not 
within his legal power to enforce its use writ large. While Seyss-Inquart agreed on the production 
of such an instruction book, he deferred the costs to Dutch parents. The creation of the new 
school book would be supervised, on the government’s side, by Dr. Noordijk, the newly 
appointed School Inspector in General Service who had been trained as a German language 
instructor for secondary schools, while the authorship was left to G. F. E. Blijdenstein and K. E. 
König.163   
By mid-summer 1941, van Dam’s plans for “reforming” the education curriculum, which 
he had been working on during the first half of the year, were finally coming to fruition. In a 
radio interview on July 4, 1941, van Dam made public the first of the curriculum changes he 
intended to implement.164 Most important were the changes to Dutch language instruction, which 
van Dam wanted to increase. Gymnasiums and Hogere Burger Scholen would increase the total 
number of hours per week of Dutch language instruction, beginning in the 1941/42 school year 
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by at least five and two hours respectively.165 While this would, at this point, surprise no one 
listening, given van Dam’s previous pronouncements about the importance of Dutch language 
education for Dutch youths, the next change would have been somewhat abrupt. Going against 
all tradition in Dutch schools, German language instruction was to be increased at the expense of 
French language instruction. 
The question was then immediately put to van Dam what might happen with the Dutch 
school system’s tradition of learning three foreign languages, to which the Secretary-General 
responded that he had no intention of changing this time-honored tradition, only the importance 
of those languages traditionally taught. French, which had enjoyed a preeminent position as the 
first foreign language in Dutch schools was relegated to third place behind German and English. 
German, which had traditionally been the second foreign language, was slated to become the first 
taught foreign language. Although these changes in hours were meant to apply to secondary 
education only, van Dam also noted that the teaching of French in primary schools would be 
ended entirely.166 What he did not say, but would become public about a month later, was that 
German would take the place of first foreign language in primary education as well, while in 
addition to French, English language instruction in primary schools would also end, although he 
was clear to note that this change in the hours afforded certain subjects was not the totality of the 
reforms he had planned.167 
In addition to changes in language instruction, van Dam noted that physical education 
hours would be expanded, which he more or less correctly viewed as a rather uncontroversial 
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topic. He then announced that, although he was hoping to have announced his changes earlier, he 
did so at this date so that schools could prepare for the following school year by hiring the 
necessary teachers of German and Dutch language to make up for the increase in hours. 
Recognizing that this could be problematic, however, he noted that the changes would only take 
effect for the first two grades of secondary education, with the rest of the higher grades having 
their hours increased annually as each age cohort moved up the ladder.168 
On July 25, 1941, through an order of Seyss-Inquart, van Dam was empowered to make 
direct changes to the curriculum of confessional schools, giving van Dam complete personal 
authority, limited only by the superior authority of the Reichskommissariat, over the lesson plan 
in all Dutch primary and secondary schools.169 Should school boards try to hinder van Dam in 
these efforts, the latter was empowered to appoint representatives who could take control on the 
ground, and should that not suffice, van Dam was given the authority to shutter the offending 
schools entirely. Van Dam did not wait long make changes to the education curriculum. 
About a month after his radio interview, in an address broadcast to the Dutch nation on 
August 12 that had gone through the rounds of the Reichskommissariat for approval of various 
officials including Wimmer and Schwarz,170 van Dam announced a second round of changes that 
would be carried out in the curriculum and applied to both public and confessional schools.171 He 
justified these changes as being necessary given the new situation in Europe: 
The leaders of the spiritual and political movement of today are aware that for the construction of the 
world, which after this war will no doubt be different from the previous one, it will be necessary to have a 
young generation, which is conscious of the ideas and ideals which are the basis of this newly constructed 
world and who have assumed these as their own viewpoint. I have the difficult, but for the future of our 
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volk fruitful, task to steer in this direction the education of the youth, which will, in my estimation, lead to 
this goal.172 
 
After noting that he had received from the Reichskommissar complete understanding for the 
necessity of these changes, he implored his audience to trust in him that he was making these 
changes for the benefit of the Dutch nation, that “we correct ourselves in various points” in order 
to achieve the “fruitful future” that he envisioned and which was based squarely on “Dutch 
interests [and a] Dutch future.”173 
The changes that van Dam planned to make were of a “general administrative-technical” 
nature and should not be seen as undermining the freedom of education that was the basis of the 
Dutch educational establishment that resulted from the struggles of the previous century. It was 
under this guise that he characterized the appointment and dismissal decrees, which he freely 
admitted were aimed at confessional education, and which, in his estimation, had caused little 
trouble in the intervening months. But these steps were not enough, according to van Dam. 
Further changes were necessary in two directions. First was the maintenance of peace and order 
in the schools, while the second encompassed changes to the curriculum and school books. 
Regarding the former, he noted that Seyss-Inquart has already afforded him significant leverage, 
above and beyond the authority previously granted to the Education Department, to enforce rules 
in the schools, both public and private, up to the closing of offending institutions should they 
refuse to submit to the central authority. As part of this effort, he had appointed Dr. D. G. 
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Noordijk as “School Inspector in General Service,” whose aim it was to enforce peace and order 
in the schools and carry out the orders of the Education Department in those areas of the country 
that were otherwise resistant to van Dam’s “reforms.”174 
Noordijk, it should be recalled, was a replacement for the fired P. A. van Rossem, the 
former “Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar” tasked with the very same goals 
and who had made himself and his subordinates much resented during his six months on the job. 
Importantly, Noordijk was subject to van Dam’s authority, whereas van Rossem was, at least 
initially, administratively stationed outside of the purview of the Education Department. But van 
Dam was clear to stress that he did not desire to use the new powers granted him, especially 
those harsher punishments which allowed him to shutter schools entirely. Rather, he appears to 
have hoped that the threat of such action would force the offending parties into line. 
The announcement regarding Noordijk’s appointment was of secondary importance in 
van Dam’s radio speech, however. It was the changes to the curriculum that was the real news of 
the day.175  After having noted that much discussion had taken place over the preceding month 
following his radio interview in which he announced the increased hours for German language 
instruction and physical education in secondary education, he went right in for the kill. German 
language would be taught at primary schools in the Netherlands as the first and most important 
foreign language. Initially, in discussions with his superiors in the Reichskommissariat, van Dam 
had suggested three hours of German language instruction per week in the primary schools, but 
when questions arose from Schwarz about whether even more hours could be devoted to German 
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language instruction, van Dam suggested that the draft law be amended to read “at least” three 
hours per week. Schwarz enthusiastically agreed.176  Schwarz’s desire for increased German 
language instruction could also be found in his insistence that the new subject be taught in the 
third year of primary education, but in that case too, van Dam was able to convince his superiors 
that such an early introduction would be problematic, to say the least.177 
Van Dam informed his audience that his reasons for the introduction of German language 
instruction in primary schools were multiple. Knowledge of German would allow for greater 
contact between the Dutch and the Germans, which of course was necessary given the new order 
that ruled Europe (and which was certain, in van Dam’s view, to remain). German language 
skills would also alleviate unemployment by allowing Netherlanders to go to Germany for work. 
Moreover, it would allow for ease of travel from the Netherlands to Germany. But most 
important in van Dam’s eyes was that increased German language instruction would actually 
bolster Netherlanders’ knowledge of the Dutch language. He reasoned that, given the similarities 
of the two languages and the increasing influence of the German language upon the Dutch 
language, which, he argued was growing every day, if every Netherlander learned German, it 
would allow the Dutch to maintain the distinctiveness of their own mother tongue, by learning, 
via German language instruction, both the similarities and the differences of the two languages. 
As he informed his listeners, “this influence can only be combated and put to good use if one 
knows the German language.”178 
Whether van Dam actually believed that learning German would help Dutch students 
with the Dutch language is unknown. On its face, the argument is not entirely implausible, 
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although it disregards the totality of effects that his reorganization of the curriculum was aimed 
at: a closer cultural association of the Dutch with Germany and the European, Germanic new 
order. The Germans authorities, however, were clear in their understanding of the importance of 
German language instruction. For example, Dr. Wimmer, Commissioner-General for 
Administration and Justice, noted in a letter to various Gauleiters in August 1942, in which he 
requested additional teachers to help fill vacancies in the German Schools in the Netherlands, 
that: 
The Dutch, already very difficult to influence by nature, and made bourgeois by an almost uninterrupted 
250-year period of peace and prosperity, are predisposed to conservatism and are hardly amenable to new 
developments. In such an attitude, the adult Dutch people are often unable to reach the Reich at all. It is 
more promising to deal with the youth; which have not yet consciously experienced the peaceful state of 
satiety, nor have they acknowledged it as the inner foundation of their existence. They are also hard to get a 
grip on, because … the schools, as the only opportunity to reach the entirely of the youth, have long been 
recognized by our political opponents, especially the confessions, as the best source of influence upon the 
youth, and therefore are stubbornly obscured against our influence. 
We have already done a great deal by regulating the rule of the churches over the schools, by bringing 
Dutch National Socialist schoolmasters and teachers to the crucial positions in school organizations and of 
the actual education system, and to a large extent cleansed the teaching material. 
But it is also a question of instituting reforms in our interests. In order not to enter into an open cultural 
struggle, the reforms have to be tackled mainly from the pedagogic point of view, and thus the practical use 
for the population must be clearly shown. Toward this end, the introduction of the compulsory teaching 
subject in [the] German [language] will have an effect in the primary school, which has already taken place 
in the past school year and will be significantly expanded in the coming year.179 
 
While van Dam might have understood the introduction of German language instruction as a 
method to increase the independence of Dutch culture and to bolster the population’s knowledge 
of the Dutch language, the upper echelons of the German leadership in the Netherlands had no 
such ideas. German language instruction was aimed at converting the independent-minded Dutch 
toward German interests, which included the incorporation of the Netherlands into the Greater 
Germanic Reich that would rule the future of Europe. 
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In addition to the introduction of German language instruction into primary education, 
van Dam also announced in his August 1941 speech that primary schools would, through a 
massive reorganization, be extended to an eighth year, which was to be introduced for the 
1942/43 school year.180  Seyss-Inquart ordered van Dam to begin preparations for the 
introduction of the eighth year of primary school in April 1942, and van Dam got right to work 
along with his subordinates in the department.  After much discussion from within the 
department and between van Dam and his superiors at the Hauptabteilung Erziehung und 
Kirchen, van Dam released two decrees, dated August 26, 1942, which changed the 1920 
Education Law to include both the lengthening of compulsory education through the eighth 
school year, although with some exceptions, and the introduction of the new eighth year of 
primary education.181 
Previously, primary education had stopped after the seventh year, and of those, only the 
first six were entirely compulsory, meaning a child could leave school when they turned 
fourteen. Van Dam, like Mussert and many educators, saw this as problematic on a fundamental 
level. As it stood, there was a significant drop off in attendance for the seventh school year of 
primary education, which van Dam reckoned to be between seventy and eighty per cent. Those 
students who did not attend the seventh year of primary education either dropped out of school 
entirely or went to one of the various secondary schools available to them, whether the 
Gymnasium, the Hogere Burger School, or extended primary education, the so-called MULO 
schools, which were similar in nature to the German Hauptschule.182  Because of the significant 
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drop in attendance rates for the ordinary primary schools, many municipalities concentrated all 
students in the seventh year of primary education into a single school for ease of teaching, which, 
van Dam proffered, would make the addition of an eighth year relatively easy to accomplish.183  
This new school, which van Dam called voortgezet gewoon onderwijs184 was meant to catch 
those students who dropped out entirely after the sixth school year and those students who 
continued on to the seventh year of primary education but did not attend one of the various types 
of secondary schools. Because of the niveau of students that would attend the continuing primary 
education school, the focus of these years was to be life skills, but with a special emphasis on the 
worker and his wife’s place in the Volksgemeenschap: 
The school will thus become an instrument for influencing the Netherlander of the future, in so far as the 
education of Dutch self-awareness, the shared community of fate with the German people, and Germanic-
European bonds will be at the forefront.185 
 
The extension of primary education to an eighth year, along with the consequent 
lengthening of compulsory education through a child’s fifteenth year (which would include that 
eighth year of primary education for most students), as well as the introduction of German 
language instruction into the curriculum meant that there would be a shortage of both teachers 
and learning material for this purpose.186 Regarding the shortage of teachers, van Dam gave little 
insight into his thinking save to mention that the department recognized it might be necessary for 
schools to share German language teachers.187  The latter problem of teaching material could not 
be solved by simple means because there was, as yet, no material designed for teaching German 
to primary school children and so van Dam announced that a new German language instruction 
book would be prepared. In fact, by this point, the preparation for the Deutsches Lehr- und 
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Lesebuch für die niederländische Volksschule were well underway under the supervision of Dr. 
Noordijk such that the book was expected to be ready for use by the 1941-42 school year for the 
7th year of primary school education.188 Van Dam promised that this new book would be free of 
any sort of political or ideological indoctrination and would focus purely on teaching the basics 
of the German language.189   
Only half of van Dam’s expectations came true. The Deutsches Lehr- und Lesebuch was 
only first published in March 1942, which meant that German language education had to be put 
off until the 1942/43 school year.  On the other hand, König and Blijdenstein, the book’s authors, 
stuck with van Dam’s promise to avoid any sort of ideological indoctrination. The instruction 
book takes a straight-forward approach to teaching German language that focuses on children’s 
rhymes, songs, and games aimed at making learning German both fun for the students and useful 
for establishing a basic understanding of the language.190  The only content that could be, in 
theory, conceived of as ideological, was to be found in the included songs that were suggested 
for use in lessons, many of which were religious in nature, especially Christmas songs such as 
Stille Nacht, Heilige Nacht, but that would not have been out of the ordinary for the time.  Even 
so, their inclusion certainly could not be accurately construed as Nazi-oriented pieces.191 
Like so many of the other changes to education introduced by the occupiers and their 
Dutch helpers, German language instruction and the extension of primary education to an eighth 
school year were not entirely successful. German language instruction, while technically 
mandatory, could not always be adequately enforced. Teachers could easily keep teaching the 
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same foreign languages they always had, as a local inspector noted in Apeldoorn.192 Only a little 
subterfuge was necessary to make it appear as though German language was being taught when, 
in reality, it was not at all. Part of the problem was that the NSB was against the introduction of 
German language instruction, for the party feared that it was a further step toward 
Germanization.193  Had it been more supportive of the effort, it is likely that German language 
instruction would have, at least, been more successful in those towns controlled by NSB mayors 
and in those inspectorates staffed by NSB inspectors. But given that both the populace and the 
majority of Dutch collaborators were against it, German language instruction did not really stand 
a chance. 
As it stood, there were simply not enough inspectors who were both willing and able to 
enforce the mandated changes. It was not a question of whether inspectors were falling for 
teachers’ ruses. Many local inspectors very clearly knew that German was not being taught. As 
the inspector in Helmond noted: 
Education in the German language in this inspectorate has become a giant farce … Instruction is for all 
intents and purposes not given. Always there are a few sentences and words on the board, but always the 
same ones. A few nice, innocent German songs are taught. Everything in case of inspection.”194 
 
 Or as Terpstra, the chief of the Sub-Department Primary Education, noted at one school he 
visited in ‘s-Hertogenbosch: 
there is reason here to surmise that [teaching] is not proceeding with the necessary diligence, by the way of 
the school director [who taught the class and] gave the impression even during our visit, that the 
educational material interested him so little, that he had trouble keeping his eyes open.195 
 
Because German language instruction was seen as an imposition by most people, according to 
the inspector in Arnhem, “nowhere is [German] taught with enthusiasm, and in almost half of the 
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schools in the Arnhem inspectorate, there is simply no German taught at all.”196  Such was the 
case throughout much of the country.197 
And unwillingness of many teachers was not the only hindrance for German language 
instruction. Somewhat counter-intuitively, there were numerous teachers who actually wanted to 
teach German language, but these teachers were simply unable, for lack of proper training and 
German language skills. The reason behind such an odd situation was the importance placed 
upon German language instruction by the government. It exempted German language instructors 
from foreign labor service or re-internment as prisoners of war, thus making the position quite 
popular among teachers. The inspector in Zwolle summed up the odd nature of German language 
instruction after the war: 
Very little or nothing came of the education itself ... Yet that measure [German language instruction] of the 
occupier is one, perhaps the only one, for which we could be thankful. It did no damage, it did not bring the 
Dutch youth a step closer to Germandom, to the contrary. But it did provide an unbeatable opportunity to 
indemnify dozens of teachers from re-internment as POWs or from [having to go] underground.198 
 
Even if the introduction of German language instruction can be seen as at least partially 
successful, the expansion of primary education to an eighth year certainly cannot. The necessary 
reorganization of the educational system proved too difficult to implement by the 1942-43 school 
year. Although the law had been altered to require the introduction of the new continuing 
primary education schools no later than September 1, 1942, exceptions were made allowing 
those municipalities that were unable to implement the new orders by the beginning of the 1942-
1943 school year to delay its introduction until the 1943-44 school year.199  The problems in 
implementation of the eighth school year were multiple. There was a shortage of teachers 
qualified to teach the subject even for seventh year students, let alone for eighth year students. 
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There was a shortage of classrooms in which the lessons could be taught, which was exacerbated 
by the ban on new school construction aimed at saving valuable building resources.200  At the 
same time, shortages of paper and other learning materials had begun to be felt within the 
department, while, by this time, the confessional schools were in open revolt against the 
Education Department and the “reforms,” especially the appointment decrees, it had instituted. 
Moreover, the extension of compulsory education through a child’s fifteenth year was met with 
significant resistance, especially in the countryside where those students were often expected to 
begin working instead of returning to school.201 Finally, and in reversal of their previous position, 
Mussert and the NSB actually came out against the lengthening of compulsory education, fearing 
that it would, just like German language instruction, lead to an increased Germanization of the 
population.202 
1942 had been unfavorable for the introduction of an eighth school year, but by 1943, it 
was nearly impossible. With the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, 
Sicherheitsdienst reports show an uptick in belief among the population that the Germans would 
eventually lose the war, and the subsequent defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, where hundreds of 
thousands of German troops were captured, meant even greater numbers of forced laborers 
would be sent to Germany.203  At the same time, material shortages became worse as almost 
anything of value was deemed necessary for the war effort, which included the more mundane 
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items, such as paper.204  The entry of the United States into the war in late 1941, coupled with the 
German defeat at El-Alamein in late 1942 and at Stalingrad in early 1943 led to a large increase 
in resistance activity among the Dutch, which further exacerbated labor shortages by drawing 
otherwise working age adults into resistance networks and away from German labor service. 
During 1941, it had appeared to most people paying attention that the Germans were the 
uncontested masters of Europe and would not be leaving any time soon. This had, of course, 
been one of the primary motivations van Dam himself repeatedly gave for his cooperation with 
the Nazis, both during and after the war. But by early 1943, German domination of Europe was 
not nearly as certain. The resulting increase in resistance activity, along with the loss of the 
Dutch East Indies to Japanese occupation in spring 1942 and the ever-increasing need for labor 
from the Netherlands following the German defeats of winter 1942/43, led the German occupiers 
to increase repression of the Dutch population. The tenor of the occupation had changed 
significantly and caught in the crossfire, among many other elements, was the introduction of 
German language instruction and the eighth school year. 
Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs Film 
At around the same time that van Dam and Schwarz were making their initial 
arrangements for the introduction of German language instruction, in May 1941, A. A. 
Schoevers founded the Dutch Educational Film Foundation (Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs 
Film) in The Hague. The idea of such a foundation reached back at least to January 1941, when 
Schwarz put Schoevers put into contact with Dr. K. Zierold, an official at the 
Reichserziehungsministerium in Berlin. Ostensibly, the foundation was tasked with using the 
new medium of film as a tool for education in the schools, but the propagandistic opportunity 
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was hard to pass up. Technically placed under the purview of the Dutch Education Department, 
and therefore under van Dam’s authority, the foundation nonetheless received significant support 
from the Hauptabteilung Volksaufklärung und Propaganda in the Generalkommissariat zur 
besonderen Verwendung, led by Commissioner-General Fritz Schmidt and which was tasked 
with the ideological coordination of the Dutch public with National Socialism.205 Regardless of 
where, administratively, it was placed within the Dutch bureaucracy, the leadership and control 
of the foundation was strictly in German hands.206 
The foundation had a dual purpose to fulfill. One the one hand, it was tasked with 
importing films from the German Education Ministry for use in Dutch schools. In the first year 
alone, it obtained more than four thousand copies of German films used in education for Dutch 
schools, in addition to some seven hundred, fifty film projectors. On the other, it was supposed to 
create new films on Dutch culture and history that could be used in the classroom. Mostly these 
dealt with geography and the natural sciences. It was the latter subjects that the Germans thought 
would be most useful for their propagandistic purposes as they could be used to counter the 
religious education given in the confessional schools. Schwarz, in one of his many reports back 
to the Office of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery noted that in the confessional schools, 
“every technical innovation [i.e., film] and the clarification of natural laws are treated as the 
devil’s work.”207 But as far as Schwarz was concerned, anything that hurt or hindered the 
confessions in carrying out their work was a benefit to the Reich. 
Despite the benefit the Germans saw in using film in the classroom as an educational 
tool, the foundation experienced considerable difficulties in obtaining the necessary materials to 
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further its intended purpose. Shortly after its foundation, it ordered forty thousand meters of 
blank film for use in copying German films and for shooting new material, deliverable in 
monthly installments of ten thousand meters. A year later, it had received only a fraction of that 
from the Kodak factory in occupied Paris where the film was produced. This was mostly a result 
of infighting among the German administrations in the Netherlands and in occupied France, with 
both administrations claiming a higher need for very limited amounts of film. In the end, the 
foundation was forced to make due with a monthly allowance of only three thousand meters of 
film.208 
Despite this, the Dutch Educational Film Foundation managed to produce a relatively 
stunning number of films for use in Dutch schools, many complete with teachers’ manuals 
designed to help teachers in using these films to their fullest extent in the classroom.209 Entire 
film series were produced on topics ranging from geography to traffic management, from botany 
and biology to winter sporting activities. Noticeably absent from the catalog of produced films 
are any that have to do with politics, history, or “racial studies,” subjects that one might more 
regularly expect of an institution with an overtly propagandistic purpose.210 Likely for this 
reason, those few works that have looked at propaganda in the schools during the occupation 
have left the foundation completely out of their works, or, in a single instance, discounted it as 
nothing more than a sideshow with little effect.211 But despite the dismissal of later historians of 
the work of the foundation, it is clear from the historical record that the Germans themselves saw 
the film foundation as a propaganda tool worthy of their support. Schwarz, for example, lists it in 
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every report back to Berlin as one of the accomplishments he oversaw during his time leading 
the Main Department of Education and Churches in the Reichskommissariat, while the officials 
in the Main Department Enlightenment and Propaganda repeatedly refer to the propagandistic 
nature of the foundation in their letters in support of obtaining more film for the foundation’s 
use.212 So while more research on this particular area is needed, outright dismissal of the work of 
the foundation would be a mistake. 
Conclusion 
By the end of Schwarz’s first year in office, the situation was looking relatively good 
from the German perspective. He noted to a colleague, Dr. Benze of the Deutsches 
Zentralinstitut für Erziehung und Unterricht in Berlin in a letter dated March 12, 1941, that the 
“reform” of Dutch education along the German model had only just begun, but that he was 
hopeful that, in the very near future, these changes would reap dividends.213 In his activity report 
dated July 31, 1941 he reported back to the Party Chancellery the state of affairs in the 
Netherlands as concerned his Main Department Education and Churches. Among the positive 
developments in the realm of Dutch education, Schwarz counted German control of the 
curriculum, personnel, and school books; the introduction of German in the 7th and 8th school 
years as the first and most heavily taught foreign language; general school reforms along German 
guidelines; the introduction of German educational/propaganda films; the introduction of 
equivalency between German and Dutch school finishing exams; the lengthening of teacher 
training; the removal of anti-German school inspectors and their replacement with German-
friendly inspectors; the guarantee of peace order in the schools via the introduction of a General 
Inspector; the removal of clerical school heads and the reduction of clerical teaching salaries by 
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forty per cent; the removal or cleansing of anti-German school books; and the forced relocation 
of Jewish students to Jewish schools.214  In previous reports, but left out of the July report, he had 
also emphasized the establishment of physical education as a required subject in the schools. 
And that was only in the realm of primary and secondary education in Dutch schools. 
In Dutch universities, he counted further successes, including state control of private 
universities; cleansing of the personnel; the appointment of three German and six Dutch national 
socialists as Professors; the establishment of an SS-Kameradschaftshaus (SS-Camaraderie 
House) in Leiden and the concentration of national socialist students there; exchanges of Dutch 
and German students via the German Academic Exchange Service; the introduction of the Führer 
principle in the universities through the strengthening of the curators and rectors; the closing of 
new enrollments to Jewish students; and the limitation of Jewish students to no more than two 
per cent of the total, all of whom were confined to Amsterdam.215  Finally, he noted great gains in 
the area of German Schools in the Netherlands, which had been increased in number from eight 
to forty-one, with triple the number of attending students, of whom about a third were Dutch, a 
third Reichsdeutsche (Germans from Germany), and a third Volksdeutsche (ethnic Germans).216 
This was helped by the removal of parental costs for the intuitions (which were now subsidized 
by the Dutch state), and the granting of equivalency between German and Dutch schools. 
Moreover, a shortage of teachers had been overcome through the hiring of ninety Dutch teachers 
for the German schools, many of whom had completed a teacher training course in Oldenburg, 
Germany designed for this purpose. Student difficulties with the German language were being 
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overcome through the establishment of special summer courses designed to improve these 
students’ facility with German.217 
By most measures, these changes must be understood as an astounding success on the 
part of the Germans. Schwarz certainly believed them to be, noting in a previous report that 
many of these advancements were simply unimaginable given the state of Dutch education prior 
to the German invasion.218  The Dutch had, after all, engaged in a long fight amongst themselves 
regarding the nature of education, one that lasted the better part of a century and that concluded 
with a system that was both varied and mostly out of the control of the Dutch state. The Germans 
had managed to completely upend this system in a little over 15 months and without even 
encountering the level of resistance they had originally expected.219  But the successes of the 
German occupier during the first war were also superficial in nature, as they amounted, mostly, 
only to the introduction of new regulations. Only in the removal of Jewish students and teachers 
could the Germans claim real success; every other initiative was limited in some significant way, 
while the hoped-for introduction of heemkunde was never even attempted.220  As the occupation 
went on, the implementation of these new regulations proved ever more challenging at the local 
level. Sometimes the hurdles were structural, as was the case with the introduction of physical 
education, propaganda films, and the eighth school year. Other times outright resistance on the 
part of local officials and teachers was the cause of the ineffectiveness of the new regulations. 
This was especially true of the appointment decrees, the use of banned school books, and the 
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introduction of German language instruction. In reality, despite Schwarz’s glowing reports, the 
successes of the Reichskommissariat and its Dutch helpers were much more limited. 
In the following chapter, the focus changes slightly to look at one specific subject—
history. Historical instruction was seen as especially important by the German occupiers and 
their Dutch collaborators, which was, for example, why so many history books had been affected 
by van Dam’s textbook censorship committee. But removing offensive material was problematic 
in two ways. First, so much was deemed offensive to the occupiers that it left few acceptable 
history books available. More importantly, however, the occupiers and the local collaborators 
recognized that historical instruction could, and should, be used to help them in their goals. 
Merely removing material was insufficient from an ideological point of view.221  In order to 
infuse a more Germanic view of history into the education of the youth, the German occupiers 
and their Dutch helpers attempted to introduce several völkisch history textbooks into the 
classroom. Some were more successful than others, but all shared in the same essential purpose 
of fostering a Germanic identity in the Dutch.
                                                 
221 NIOD 020/436. 
270 
 
Chapter 6 - Changes in Historical Instruction 
 
With this booklet we want to demonstrate on the basis of facts that the Germanics were, neither in [the stone age] 
nor long before, “wild, uncivilized, nomadic hordes,” but peasants with a high culture connected to the soil. The 
reader can then judge [for] himself about the boisterousness of the inhabitants of these lands at the beginning of our 
era, which these days the youth are so often forced to accept. - F. E. Farwerck, Het is anders dan men ons leerde, 
19381 
 
One Europe will finally emerge from this war. But was there no Europe [before]? No! There were only a number of 
European states. ... Now there will be one Europe, a European togetherness, led by the Germanics. - Anonymous 
author of Over Volk en Vaderland - Geschiedenis voor het lager onderwijs, 19442 
 
In the previous chapter, the focus remained on the administrative apparatus of the 
German occupation and the Dutch Education Department.  Most of the changes discussed there 
focused on the higher levels of the administrative state’s attempts to inject a national socialist 
and Germanic theme into instruction and school administration.  This included attempts by the 
government to gain control over confessional education, attempts to remove both Jewish pupils 
and Jewish instructors from the schools, the censorship of school books, the introduction of 
German language instruction, physical education, propaganda films, and the attempted extension 
of primary education to an eighth school year.  When the focus did turn to actual changes in 
classroom instruction, such as the introduction of physical education as a required subject, the 
attempted introduction German propaganda films into the classroom, or the introduction of 
German language instruction, it was noted that these efforts were met with little relative success, 
despite the Germans’ and their Dutch collaborators’ best efforts.  Mostly, this lack of success 
stemmed from two major factors.  The first were institutional hurdles that the government was 
unable to overcome.  The fate of physical education and the Stichting Nederlandsche Onderwijs 
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Film are prime examples here, as in both cases, material shortages hampered the occupiers’ 
efforts before any significant traction could be made.3   
On the other hand, both passive and active resistance from local administrators and 
teachers was the cause of the failure to fully implement the book cleansing regime or to gain 
control of confessional education.4  In these cases, it was a matter more of the affected groups, by 
and large, not being willing to follow the new rules placed upon them.  At the same time, the 
extension of primary education to an eighth school year failed as a result of both major factors, 
as shortages in classrooms, teachers, and paper were combined with resistance on the part of 
confessional schools and even the NSB, such that the eighth school year had to be continually 
pushed back as the occupation progressed and was eventually scrapped altogether.5 
The Germans and their Dutch collaborators did experience some success with the 
introduction of German language instruction, to the extent that it became an official subject, a 
book was produced and sometimes actually used, but even here, resistance from teachers, school 
heads, and local administrators meant that many, if not most, students received only cursory 
instruction in the German language, and certainly nothing at the level that was intended.6  Only 
in the removal of Jewish individuals from the schools did the Germans experience any real 
measure of success in their efforts, and in this case, it must be noted, they were all too successful.  
But even in this instance, the impetus was not confined to the educational sector, but rather the 
effects of the Germans’ actions were felt in the educational sector simply because Jewish people 
could be found in the halls and classrooms of the nation’s educational establishments.  Indeed, 
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throughout occupied Europe, the Germans put great emphasis, sometimes even to the detriment 
of the war effort itself, to affect their genocide of Europe’s Jewish population, so it is 
unsurprising that they were equally effective in these efforts in the Netherlands.7 
But there was one other area in which the government enjoyed comparatively greater 
success in its efforts to change classroom instruction—historical education.  This chapter focuses 
on the question of historical instruction through an examination of history textbooks designed for 
school instruction that offered a view of Dutch history from a national socialist perspective.  
These works, by and large, were representative of the larger body of Nazi scholarship that 
viewed the Netherlands as a Germanic nation whose history and destiny was tied forever to that 
of the German Reich and whose people were essentially Germanic brothers.  This view as 
promoted by national socialist thinkers and, as portrayed in history textbooks intended for 
adoption in the schools, was largely incompatible with the type of historical instruction taught in 
Dutch schools prior to the invasion. The final section of the chapter focuses on an older historical 
textbook that was used prior to and during the early years of the occupation that was specifically 
singled out by the occupation authorities as being anti-German and deemed inappropriate for use 
in the schools.   
Although the introduction of a new form of history education was comparatively more 
successful than other attempted “reforms,” it should be noted from the outset that this greater 
measure of success was still extremely limited in nature.  Significant opposition occurred at the 
local level, such that the implementation of the government’s “reforms” was just as hampered as 
the occupiers’ attempts to, for example, gain control over appointments in confessional 
education.  Nonetheless, these attempts at re-forming Dutch history deserve a closer look for two 
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reasons.  First, attempts to alter history textbooks and introduce replacement texts more 
favorable to a Germanic worldview explicitly lay out the occupiers’ plans for the future of Dutch 
education and the new national identity historical education was meant to foster.  While 
bureaucrats like Schwarz could, and did, argue in their writings that their efforts at reform at the 
administrative level were aimed at instilling a more völkisch, Germanic mindset in Dutch youth, 
beyond their own words indicating as much, there is in many cases little that differentiates their 
“reforms” from the liberal efforts of the previous century.8  But in the area of historical 
instruction, these differences are much more obvious, and in this case, the end goal of fostering a 
more Germanic identity can most readily be shown.  Second, unlike many other efforts, the 
Germans and their Dutch collaborators viewed historical instruction itself as one of the most 
important aspects of their educational agenda, and so put comparatively greater efforts toward its 
“reform.”9 
A New Historical Instruction 
Although van Dam’s censorship committee had done much work on historical texts by 
erasing offensive passages, removing certain works from circulation, and censoring new 
publications, this was not entirely sufficient.  As one complainant noted, almost all historical 
works might be considered anti-national socialist in their basic foundations, at least to the extent 
that they were not based on the racist and chauvinistic tenets of the ideology.  The school book 
cleansing commission had been so thorough in their efforts regarding history books that a near 
emergency resulted because of a lack of acceptable history texts.10  The German occupiers were 
well aware of this problem, as were their collaborators in the Dutch government.  As F. J. Los 
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noted in the völkisch, Nazi publication Volksche Wacht in 1941, “None of the subjects taught … 
needs reform in objectives and methodology [as much] as the subject of history.”11  For this 
reason, several attempts were made to write new history books that would more effectively instill 
among the student population the national socialist view of history.  The most successful of these 
was Prof. Jan de Vries’s Onze Voorouders.12   
De Vries was a well-known intellectual and member of the Royal Dutch Academy of 
Sciences, and as such, was in many ways an excellent candidate for writing a new national 
socialist history textbook.  He had been a Professor of Old Germanic Literature and Languages at 
Leiden University since 1925 and was an active participant in the small völkisch movement in 
the Netherlands during the 1930s. With the coming of the occupation, became even more 
influential.  In 1942, he was appointed vice president of the Nederlandsche Kultuurraad,13 which 
was headed by G. A. S. Snijder, and tasked with paving the way for National Socialism in 
scientific and cultural life in the Netherlands.  Later that year, he was appointed vice president of 
the Nederlandsche Kultuurkamer,14 which was led by Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, who was also the 
Secretary-General of the Department of Arts and People’s Enlightenment.  That body was tasked 
with the general cultural coordination of Dutch society.  Also, in 1942, he was appointed to head 
the Institute for Dutch Language and Folk Culture in The Hague, the Dutch language institute 
that had first been proposed by van Dam in his inaugural radio address.  He was also one of the 
main Dutch intellectuals who worked with the SS-Ahnenerbe research institute, although in some 
Ahnenerbe circles, he was seen as insufficiently committed to the cause.15  Regardless of this 
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relative mistrust he received by some workers at the Ahnenerbe, his work was continually 
financed by the German leadership and he never lost the respect of the higher levels of the 
Dutch, völkisch elite in the Netherlands. 
The impetus for the book reached back, at least, to December 1941, when van Dam 
exchanged notes with Goedewaagen regarding the creation of two history books designed for use 
in the classroom.16  Onze Voorouders was the first of the two, and the only one that would make 
it to publication.  By June 1942, de Vries had finished the work and passed it along to 
Goedewaagen, who then sent copies to van Dam to proof so that van Dam could, should he see 
fit, test its use in the schools.  After seeing the book first hand, van Dam appears to have had 
varied reactions.  At first, he declined to put it to use in the schools as a textbook, but only as an 
instructional manual for teachers.  But he quickly reversed himself, noting that the book was 
“topnotch,” and decided that it could be made compulsory throughout the education system, 
although he wanted to wait and see if any objections materialized.  However, he again walked 
back that choice as well, noting that because of Article 200 of the Basic Law, confessional 
schools retained the right to choose their own school books.17  Of course, he certainly could have 
asked Seyss-Inquart to make the necessary changes to the law, but apparently decided against it, 
likely for political reasons.  Regardless, he did inform Goedewaagen that he would suggest its 
use in public schools and would make it required for the two Reichsschulen, but even then, not as 
a text book, but only as an instruction manual for teachers.  He did not have to wait long for the 
response from the confessions to the examples he sent out requesting feedback.  Representatives 
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of both the Catholic and Protestant communities objected to the book, and it was made clear that 
were the book made compulsory, resistance to its use would be palpable.  Specifically, the 
Protestant side objected to the idyllic portrayal of the Germanic past which, when one read 
between the lines, clearly argued that Christianity disturbed this idyll.18   
Over the next several weeks, both Schwarz and Wimmer requested copies of the work for 
their own perusal, and by the end of November, Schwarz specifically was in agreement with the 
current state of the project and its use in the schools, although he did note that he thought it 
necessary to create a new history book specifically for primary education, as de Vries’s book was 
intended for the middle grades, whether the extended primary education schools or the first 
classes of secondary education.  By December, van Dam had apparently changed his mind again, 
although the cause of this change of course is unclear, it was likely because of pressure from 
Schwarz.  Regardless, he determined that the book should be prescribed for Reichsschulen, the 
seventh and eighth year of extended primary education, expanded primary education schools, the 
first years of secondary education, and the teacher training colleges, although, when it came to 
confessional education, he only strongly encouraged its use.  It was this final version of the 
requirement that was published on January 15, 1943.19  Despite this requirement, however, the 
publisher of the work wrote to van Dam in May 1944 noting that he still had some 100,000 
copies of the book for sale, although at least some of the difference in sales versus expected sales 
can be attributed to financial shortages on the part of the various municipalities.  Several mayors 
wrote directly to the Secretary-General noting that their budgets for school books had already 
been maxed out.20  Presumably, many more asked their local school inspectors directly, as would 
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be the usual way of making such inquiries.  Regardless, given that many schools, by this point in 
the war, were controlled by NSB-affiliated mayors, it is likely that usage of the book in schools 
was relatively widespread.21   
The second work that Goedewaagen and van Dam envisioned for use in the classroom 
was to be written by Dr. H. Krekel.  Krekel had previously worked for the newspaper Het 
Vaderland22 but was fired from his position after making some positive comments about Hitler in 
1939, although he was allowed to retake his position after the German invasion, as the paper was 
interested in currying more favor with the occupier.23  In the autumn of 1940, Wimmer had 
hoped to appoint Krekel, along with van Genechten and Goedewaagen, to professorships at 
Leiden University, but their appointments were voted down by the faculty.  That plan would 
have to wait until the following summer to be pushed through, but pushed through it was.24  An 
NSBer, Krekel became a member of the Nederlandsche Kultuurraad, along with both Snijder 
and de Vries when that body was established in 1942.   
Krekel’s dissertation had focused on English foreign policy during the late nineteenth 
century, and so, he was not entirely unqualified to discuss the history of recent events in Europe 
after the end of the First World War.  Regardless, however, he believed that in order to give a 
full recounting of the important events of the previous two decades, it would be necessary to 
stretch his history back, at least, to the foundation of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 
the immediate aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat.  But he did not feel himself entirely up to that 
task.  By mid-1943, had only completed a rough outline of the material, portions of some 
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chapters, and various notes, which, he admitted to van Dam, could not be brought together as a 
competent and complete work.25   
Moreover, he noted that “no one at the moment desires a purely factual consideration [of 
the material].  I can, however, not give any other form of work than factual.”26  Although Krekel 
did not spell out, exactly, what he meant by “factual” and how the Germans’ and their Dutch 
collaborators’ desires were not “factual,” the difference probably lies in the fact that Krekel was 
a supporter of the Diets ideology that called for a Greater Netherlands.27  He had been one of a 
number of signatories, over one hundred forty, who had put their name to a “Greater Netherlands 
Declaration” in May 1940 that called for “a secure Greater-Netherlandic community in a 
reorganized Europe,” although that declaration never managed to gain any traction.28  Given this, 
it is somewhat surprising that he was chosen in the first place, although his close connection with 
Goedewaagen may have been a factor.  Either way, the ultimate approval of the works rested 
with van Dam (and necessarily therefore also with Schwarz), which had been one of van Dam’s 
conditions for going along with the project in the first place.29  Had the resulting work been too 
heavily influenced by a Diets ideology, it could have still been scrapped.  As a result of Krekel’s 
admitted inability to complete the new history book, van Dam advised Schwarz that they must 
free Krekel from the task at hand and find a replacement.  Van Dam then turned to his SS 
colleague Henk Feldmeijer, the leader of the Germanic SS in the Netherlands, in the hope that he 
might know of someone capable of taking up the task of writing an acceptable history book but 
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the request was either never answered or the reply went missing.30  Either way, the book was 
never completed, whether by Krekel or any other author.   
In addition to these two efforts, the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators put 
forth several other attempts, as did other organs not directly affiliated with the occupation 
regime, such as Nazi-oriented publishing houses.  A closer look at some of these works will 
show that they are all of a basic type, that is, intended to foster a new Germanic identity among 
their student readers.   
Onze Voorouders 
 
Although Onze Voorouders was not included in every classroom across the nation, nor is 
it entirely possible given the extant records to know in how many Dutch classrooms the book 
was used, it can be easily surmised that it found its way into many schools given its mandatory 
status, even if those schools were in the minority, which seems likely given the large numbers of 
extra copies that remained with the publisher.  Regardless, the work is an important example of 
how the Germans and their Dutch collaborators hoped to change historical instruction.   
De Vries begins his work—which at only thirty-four pages hardly deserves to be called a 
book in the first place—by trying to define what Germanics are.  He begins with a short 
overview of the Germanics in the Roman period, noting that the Romans were well aware of 
Germanic peoples living from Eastern Gaul well past the Oder River in Central Europe and 
further north into the Scandinavian Peninsula.  These Germanics began as a small people on the 
southern coast of the Baltic Sea, according to de Vries, and spread out from there until they 
covered the major portion of Central and Northern Europe.  Quoting Tacitus, de Vries notes that 
the Germanics had bright blue eyes, red-blond hair, and strong bodies, which are “to this day the 
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characteristics of the Germanics living in Scandinavia and on the North Sea coast; thus these 
people have best preserved the old properties.”31  De Vries goes on to note that this Nordic race, 
according to classical authors, stretched much further south, and that “they were probably in 
these parts the rulers of an older population, with whom they intermixed over the course of the 
centuries.”32  He ends his first chapter by contesting the contention made by classical authors that 
the Germanics were a wild, nomadic people, which he steadfastly denies.  Rather, they were 
farmers who “for many thousands of years … have made their living by working the earth with 
plows and scythes.”33  Already in the first three pages of text, de Vries hit upon several of the 
major themes of völkisch ideology.  Blond-haired, blue-eyed farmers, living in concert with the 
earth have kept their blood pure and free of mixing with other peoples.  They were a war-like 
people who managed to hold their own and force the Romans to keep their border at that most 
German of rivers, the Rhine.  The message the author intended his school-aged readers to take 
away from the work could not be clearer.   
De Vries spends his second chapter going into further detail about why the Germanics 
should not be thought of as primitive barbarians by looking at, in turn, their buildings, clothing, 
tools, armaments, and ship building capabilities.  In those areas where the Romans contrasted 
their more developed civilization with their Germanic neighbors, such as through their urban 
lifestyles with large amphitheaters, palaces, and aqueducts, de Vries is sure to note that the 
Germanics were every bit as praiseworthy, noting that the Romans’ outlook toward the 
Germanics was just as bothersome as the urban dwellers of the twentieth century looking down 
on the simple farming life of the countryside.  Yes, the Germanics made their houses out of 
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wood, not of stone, but that was only because stone was not abundant in Northern Europe.  But 
their wood dwellings were both large and ornate, proper farm buildings made by skilled 
carpenters which caused the Germanics to want for nothing.  Where the Romans described the 
Germanics as half-naked wild men, in truth, de Vries argued, they had ornate clothing made from 
wool and cloth, including belts of woven and patterned bands with hanging tassels, which of 
course was a skill not lost over time, as evidenced by the wool working and cloth spinning 
industries of the early modern period in the Low Countries.  Their tools were also advanced for 
the period.  Their plow was better than the Roman plow and their wheels were spoked wheels, 
which were more modern than the flat wooden disks that were used in Eastern Europe into de 
Vries’s own time.  Their armaments and ships were also advanced for the period, with the use of 
chain mail and sailed ships that could reach speeds of ten or eleven knots.  In case the students 
reading de Vries’s work were unable to imagine his descriptions, there were several pictures that 
had been mocked up to help them visualize these advanced characteristics.34   
De Vries’s adulation for the lives of the Germanics continues into his third chapter, in 
which he discusses the society of these peoples.  Naturally, the most basic unit of society was the 
family, but not the family of the modern period, rather larger blood-based kinship groups.  These 
extended kinship groups often lived together, with the oldest male in the central line leading the 
family, which would pass to the oldest son each generation.  These oldest men were given the 
right to vote upon the future of the community in a democratic fashion, with the leading families, 
over generations, turning into a nobility of sorts.  From this nobility, in time, a king might be 
elected to lead the community in times of war.  At the same time, in some societies, powerful 
men in leading families might assemble around them an entourage, made up of both family 
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members and those from other families, bound through mutual love and devotion.  This leading 
group could then assert its power over the rest of the community, establishing the leading man as 
a sort of prince.  Thus, owing to the varied states of community organization over the centuries, 
the Germanics experienced all sorts of government forms, from nearly democratic to purely 
monarchical.  But during all of these periods, the family, tied as it was by blood, was always the 
basis of the larger community.35   
The rest of the work is of a similar nature.  De Vries consistently argues that the 
Germanics were not the backward people he assumes his readers have been taught, but rather, 
were actually a more advanced civilization, taking on the tone of a pure apology of their society 
and culture.  For example, in the fourth chapter, which covers Germanic writing and poetry, he 
notes that the Germanics did not write on parchment or paper, not because they did not have 
access to those technologies, but because they simply had no need of those surfaces for writing.  
After noting that the runic alphabet the Germanics used was best suited for wooden and stone 
surfaces, rather than the curved letters found in the Latin alphabet, he goes on to suggest that 
wooden and stone tablets were perfectly suitable for the short messages the Germanics thought 
necessary to preserve.  For longer works, such as heroic poetry, these ancient peoples had 
professional bards who could, with complete accuracy, recount long poems and songs generation 
after generation, until, eventually, they were written down in the medieval period.  De Vries does 
not appear to see the irony in his own argument, however, when he notes in the very next 
sentence, that the poems and songs of the Batavians are now lost to the modern reader and 
knowledge of those works is available to us only through written Roman sources.36   
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The author moves next to the artwork of the Germanics, arguing that these naturally 
gifted artists preferred to take their inspiration not from nature but from their own imagination.  
De Vries is careful to note that much of their art is lost to the modern viewer, he assumes 
because it was mostly made up of wooden works that have not stood the test of time.  And 
although he discusses a recently discovered shipwreck in Norway which does contain many 
carved animals and figures, after noting the high quality of these artistic representations, he 
returns to his contention that the Germans preferred more abstract works, including bronze 
carvings with ornate designs.  These elaborate patterns, which often took the form of concentric 
circles that appeared to be only a “chaos of lines, a confusing entanglement of seemingly 
goalless garlands, but behind the chaos, an orderly principle is still hidden, and these artists 
indeed have a plan and goal, even if they are covered by whimsical accessory lines.”37 
De Vries’s most flattering words for the Germanics come in his chapter on Germanic 
virtue.  He couches his analysis in supposed objectivity, however.  He reminds his readers that 
the Romans saw the Germanics as, first and foremost, “dangerous enemies” whose “irresistible 
power” was overcome only because they soon lost their resolve during large undertakings.  But 
this was, de Vries notes, only because, as per the old Germanic idiom, “the brave bide their 
time.”38  Foremost among the virtues of the Germanics were, in de Vries’s eyes, their courage, 
faithfulness, and gentleness, all of which the Germanics saw as the height of virtue.  But lest his 
reader think he would paint the Germanic as the ideal person, he then discusses the two main 
vices of those peoples, specifically excess and gambling.   
As far as excess goes, he limits it only to consuming alcohol, but further notes that this 
was most common during festivals and feasts, and de Vries further argues that even in the 
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present day, the 1940s, similar features could be ascribed to the rural population, but that “no one 
would conclude, that drunkenness was a distinguishing mark of our farming population.”39  As 
for gambling, he first notes that this is one tradition that does not persist to the modern period, 
but suggests that, despite this, the modern reader should not discount Tacitus’s descriptions of 
such a practice as being completely untrue.  Rather, de Vries argues, Tacitus likely 
misunderstood religious practices, such as a sort of divination practice used by priests to predict 
the future and determine how the gods would prefer men to proceed in a given circumstance.40   
To the extent that the Germanics had other weaknesses, however, their description by de 
Vries is entirely didactic: 
The Germanics were not ideal people, but they were a tough and healthy race, distinguished by indomitable 
courage, but no less by an iron energy. … Remarkable as well is their open-mindedness, through which 
they accepted and used everything that was foreign to them, but which they also independently worked 
themselves and further developed.  However, there was also a danger that lurked here, to which the 
Germanics often fell [victim].  They let themselves be blinded by the exotic and thereby underestimated 
themselves.  The tribes who lived in our country did this as well; is it not a matter of fact that the Batavian 
freedom hero carries the Latin name Claudius (actually Julius) Civilis?  Here lurks the danger that many 
Germanic tribes had become corrupt.   
This is most evident when, during the Migration Period, Germanic peoples settled in the area of the Roman 
Empire; after a few generations they had already adopted much from Roman culture.  Also, in our own 
history, we can see multiple examples of a repeated, exaggerated tendency to follow foreign peoples.41 
 
This is, of course, what in many cases happened to Germanic tribes, especially those that later 
settled in the areas controlled by Rome, and who, after the fall of the Western Empire established 
petty kingdoms in Italy, France, Spain, and North Africa.  It was, according to de Vries, a boon 
for the Roman peoples who lived there and who were thus “strengthened by the virtue of a strong 
Germanic element.”  But these Roman peoples nonetheless managed to maintain their Latin 
languages and civilizations instead of adopting that of their conquerors.  Regardless of the 
benefits afforded to the newly conquered peoples, however, de Vries maintains that for the 
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Germanic peoples themselves, this intermixing was, ultimately, the cause of their downfall in 
these regions.42   
The only part of the text in which de Vries does not bestow greatness upon the Germanics 
of the Classical Age is that which concerns their religion.  Here he contents himself to describe 
the ways in which the Romans compared their own gods to those of the Germans, which he does 
by both excusing this practice—he finds it reasonable that Roman authors saw Germanic gods as 
their own gods in different names—and by noting that the Romans were not always correct in 
assuming a one to one correlation between the two groups.  Otherwise, the chapter on the 
religious practices of the Germanics is mostly descriptory.43  This is, given the Christian nature 
of the Netherlands in the twentieth century, not entirely surprising.  Where everything else about 
the Germanics showed their greatness compared to both their contemporaries and, in some cases, 
even people in the modern age, in their religious practices, he sticks to a purely neutral tone, lest 
he offend the religious sensibilities of his readers, or their parents.   
The entirety of de Vries’s history of the Germanic peoples, with the sole exception being 
his discussion of Germanic religion, is clearly meant to engender respect and awe for these 
ancient peoples, and by extension, for the Germanic peoples of the twentieth century, including 
the Dutch.  The Germanics of the Classical Age were, after all, “Our Forefathers,” and it was 
those forefathers whose work resulted in “an important part of what has been achieved in our 
continent.”  “The awesome colonization work done by the Dutch and the English and the 
development of modern technology, which is founded in significant part upon the work of 
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Germanic researchers” are but a few examples de Vries cites of the important and lasting 
influence that these ancient peoples contributed to the modern world.44   
This was the type of history that both the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators 
thought was most relevant for school instruction; this was what “top-notch” history looked like.  
That van Dam ultimately decided to make it a compulsory text in many classrooms, and 
available for use in those schools in which it was not compulsory, reveals the conception of 
history that the Nazis hoped to foster in the Netherlands.  The focus is on the heroic, ancient 
race, which through its virtues created much of what was good in the world.  Its downfall, such 
as it was, was said to be a result of racial mixing with other peoples, which caused the Germanics 
to lose sight of their own culture and be subsumed into that of the Romans.  And this is all 
polished with the veneer of objectivity.  The author is certain to point out certain flaws of the 
Germanic peoples, but then consistently notes that they are either not really flaws at all, such as 
their excessive drinking, or that they are merely misunderstandings of the Roman writers, 
especially Tacitus, whose writings form the bulk of de Vries’s written source material.  
Importantly, de Vries’s work also makes clear that the various Germanic peoples of modern 
Europe are also the direct descendants of these ancient Germanics.  The English, Icelandic, 
Scandinavians, Germans, Danes, and Dutch all share the same past and are, therefore, part of the 
same larger family.  Only in these places was the Nordic Race not polluted with the racial 
element of foreign peoples.  These peoples, therefore, are the inheritors of all that was good in 
the Ancient World as part of a single, Germanic family of peoples.   
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Over Volk en Vaderland 
 
Onze Voorouders had been intended for the middle grades, whether the final years of 
primary education or the initial years of secondary school.  It had not been intended for the 
earlier years of primary school, and as such, a new Nazi-oriented history textbook was needed to 
reach those students.  In 1943, in an effort to rectify this shortage, van Dam decreed that a 
competition would be necessary.  Under the auspices of the Department of Primary Education 
(one of the sub-departments of the Education Department), such a competition was established, 
through which a jury of experts would judge submissions for eventual use in the classroom.  The 
jury, the composition of which was the subject of some debate within the department, ultimately 
consisted of Chairman G. F. Vlekke, a Dutch Nazi pedagogue and Chief Inspector of Education 
in the First Main Inspectorate, which covered the provinces of Gelderland, North Brabant, and 
Limburg; Dr. Paulina Havelaar, a völkisch minded Dutch historian who had appeared in various 
Nazi-oriented publications; and Dr. Johan Theunisz, a secondary school teacher in Zwolle who 
also had a long history of publishing in national socialist, völkisch publications.45  On February 
15, 1944, this jury council met and developed a six-point criteria for the to-be-completed history 
book that included: 1) the book should be between one hundred and one hundred twenty pages, 
2)  a broad view of history, including prehistory, must be presented, 3) it should be, in the first 
place, a volksche and not mainly a political history, 4) separate lessons should be devoted to 
individuals, who through their character, have influenced the spiritual, moral, and cultural 
development of the Dutch volk, 5) the book should not just cover the history of Holland, and 6) 
                                                 




the book should emphasize the shared destiny of the Dutch volk and the larger Germanic 
whole.46   
The selection process had specifically excluded the names of the authors and instead 
mottos were used to identify the works.  For this reason, the ultimate author of the winning work, 
entitled Over Volk en Vaderland: Geschiedenis voor het Lager Onderwijs,47 is not known for 
certain, although Ivo Schöffer suggests that the author was Dr. M. O. Albers, a historian by 
training and frequent contributor to Opvoeding in volkschen geest, the NSB education 
periodical.48  Other scholars are not so sure of Schöffer’s contention, while the NIOD archive 
that houses the manuscript states only that the author is not known.49  Had the work eventually 
been published, that information would have come to light, but as it remained in manuscript 
form, the ultimate author will likely never be known with absolute certainty.  Regardless, both its 
selection by the jury as well as its approval by van Dam strongly suggest that it was considered 
an acceptable work for introduction into the school system, even if the jury had suggested that 
the manuscript needed to be reworked with expert guidance, as it contained too many 
shortcomings and even some unacceptable mistakes.50  In fact, the manuscript itself contains 
numerous deletions, additions, and other changes, summarized in a list format at the beginning.  
Because it is unlikely that the author would have submitted a manuscript with entire sections 
crossed out in red ink or with penciled in marginal question marks, it is likely that many of these 
edits were made either by the jury or by an expert on behalf of the jury or van Dam.51  But 
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despite these edits, the manuscript never went any further in the development and publication 
process.  By this point in the occupation, Allied armies had already stormed the beaches of 
Normandy and begun the liberation of France, which meant that questions of school textbooks 
were simply not a priority for anyone of importance.52   Nonetheless, the stillborn manuscript 
offers yet another view into what the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators, in this 
case especially those in völkisch NSB circles, had in mind for historical education in the 
Netherlands.  Furthermore, because this is the only work that was both intended for school 
instruction and that covers the modern period, it deserves a closer look.   
Over Volk en Vaderland contains seven chapters spread out over 126 manuscript pages, 
including deleted sections but not later additions, ranging from the first human inhabitants of the 
Rhine Valley clear through to Second World War, and thus spanned tens of thousands of years.  
It begins with a short recounting of the “person from Hengelo,” a set of human remains 
discovered along the eastern border by excavators building a new canal in that town.  Noting that 
this person was most likely a forefather of the modern Dutchman, the author then goes into the 
life of the people who lived at this period.  With vivid imagery, the author relates how these 
ancient people would have set traps for mammoths and hunted reindeer, while their womenfolk 
and children gathered fruits and greens from the surrounding area.  To put emphasis on the 
violent nature of this lifestyle, the author stresses “from the very beginning, was conflict.”53   
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After noting that there is much that cannot be known about pre-history, the author, 
without any hint of intended irony, moves into the development of the Nordic race, which he or 
she argues originated in either Denmark or southern Sweden, and which owes it vitality to the 
harsh climate which allowed only the fittest to survive.  These people, who originated some six 
thousand years before the author’s day, were livestock breeders and farmers who kept a variety 
of animals and developed various grains.  And then they conquered the world! 
They spread out from Northern Europe to Persia, Greece, Italy, Egypt, China, and India, 
the latter group taking the name Aryans, or rulers.  And although these Nordic peoples ruled over 
other peoples for centuries, because they were small in number, they eventually succumbed to 
intermixing with their charges and thus, the Nordics vanished from most of the world.  But they 
left behind hints of their greatness, through language, literature, and art, whether in India, Persia, 
Greece, or Italy.54  After a short section on stone age peoples, including the Funnelbeaker and 
Beaker cultures, the author ends the first chapter by noting that “the Nordic race made great 
conquests and laid therewith the way for the later dominion of Europe over the world.  The 
greatest steps toward the current situation were caused already in pre-history.”55 
The second chapter of Over Volk en Vaderland covers the “Germanic period,” which is 
roughly defined as the period from 2000 BCE through 1000 CE.  The Germanics, according to 
the author are the descendants of the Nordic race that remained in their original homeland of 
Denmark, northern Germany, and southern Sweden.  Like their Nordic ancestors, these 
Germanics: 
… had excellent qualities of body, head and heart.  They were powerful and hardened.  They were clever 
and resourceful.  They were simple, laborious, brave and faithful.  We must therefore regard it as a great 
honor to descend from such forefathers.  In many things they have been the teachers of the world, e.g., in 
agriculture, handicrafts and shipping.56 
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In their religion, they worshiped the sun, whose most common symbol is the swastika, but 
additionally worshiped man-like gods, the greatest of whom was Odin, the father of gods and 
men.  The daily life of a Germanic person, shown through vignettes about an imagined young 
man named Segismund, focuses on hard work as a farmer and sporting events such as racing that 
acted as entertainment.  Segismund’s father, who stood in for the head of the Germanic 
household, lived on a homestead which would pass to Segismund’s older brother.  As a result, 
Segismund would have to venture off to claim his own homestead, thus expanding the Germanic 
presence.  As a result, “all of us, without exception, are descended from farmers.”57 
 But Segismund and the Germanics were not just farmers.  They were also warriors who 
would conquer man, beast, and nature.  Strong Germanics like Segismund marched outward 
from their homelands and conquered neighboring peoples.  After their conquest, they returned to 
the lands of their fathers, gathered their brides and children, wagons and breeding stock and 
ventured out to settle their newly conquered homelands.  “Thus, the Germanics spread out over 
the course of centuries over the North of Europe.”58  And it was these Germanics that soon 
encountered the Romans.   
The Romans, of course, were also partially descended from the Nordic Race.  It was this 
Nordic blood that had allowed the Romans to conquer the entire Mediterranean, but by the time 
of the fall of the Republic, that blood had been lost, and instead of fighting for themselves, they 
let those whom they conquered do their fighting for them.  It was this sort of Roman army that 
encountered Arminius in the Teutoburger Forest.  Arminius, the son of a Germanic prince, was 
an officer in the Roman army and so learned their strategy and tactics.  And as a result of his 
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learning, he was able to lead the Germanics to victory against the Romans, freeing Germania, 
“once and for all.”59  Shortly after securing Germania proper, Germanics on the left side of the 
Rhine rose in revolt, this time led by the Batavian chief Claudius Civilis.  Civilis’s plans started 
with great success.  He had allied his Batavian people with both Germanics from across the 
Rhine as well as a cohort of Gallic peoples, and everywhere they beat back the Romans.  But 
Civilis’s fatal flaw was trusting his Gallic allies, whom he had instructed to occupy Alpine 
passes to prevent Roman reinforcements from Italy reaching Gaul.  They failed in this mission 
and eventually turned against the Germanics, allowing the Romans to eventually prevail.  
Despite the ultimate defeat, which was not even Civilis’s own fault, “we like to consider 
Claudius Civilis as the first great hero in our history.”60 
This was, however, only a temporary setback, for soon the Roman Empire fell and the 
“Germanics conquered the world.”  This conquest, which is how the author describes the 
Germanic migrations of Late Antiquity, saw the Germanics spread out through all of Europe and 
into North Africa.  But just as the Nordics of pre-history had intermixed with those they 
conquered, so did the Germanics, with only England retaining a pure Germanic character.61  This 
was the fate of the great Frankish empire as well.  Up through the period of Charlemagne, the 
Franks had remained true to their Germanic heritage, but “under his successors, it was 
completely different.  The memory of the old Germanic life was canceled out as much as 
possible and the assembled sagas were destroyed.”62  It was also in this period that Christianity 
first became entrenched among the Germanics.  Initially resistant, the new religion was forced 
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upon them at the point of a sword.  Thousands died staying true to their old customs, but 
eventually Christianity won out over the pagan religions of old.  But in order to put as positive a 
spin on it as possible, the author notes that “Christianity could only fully unfold on Germanic 
soil.  The pure and simple Germanic national character gave the new leather a cleaner and deeper 
shine.”63 
And then the Germanics conquered the world—again.  This time it was the Vikings, with 
their various conquests and settlements from England to the Mediterranean to the Russian steppe.  
Like the Nordics before them and the Germanics of the great migration period, the Vikings left 
their mark, just as the Dutch would do in the future during the age of European imperialism.  It 
was all one and the same: 
But the nature of our fathers lives on in us! Like them, we too will be able to build a new future.  Every boy 
and every girl must make an effort to do so with all their strength.  Our own happiness should not be our 
goal, but a glorious recovery of the Netherlands.64 
 
The section on the Middle Ages, which takes up the third chapter of Over Volk en 
Vaderland, contains many more edits than the previous chapters, and is the first to include 
additions proposed for it, likely by the editor or the selection jury.  After a short description of 
the basic tenets of feudalism, which stressed the transformation of farmers into “serfs and 
slaves,” the author moves into the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire.  He notes, in what 
is a gross oversimplification of the Diploma Ottonianium, that Otto, the first Holy Roman 
Emperor, forced Pope John XII to swear him fealty, thus making the Emperor supreme on the 
continent.65  But this supreme authority waned as generations passed both through the 
machinations of German princes, “the old Germanic fault,” as well as rebellions by Italian cities 
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and later Popes, the latter eventually coming under the sway of the French throne during the 
Babylonian Captivity.66  It is here that the editor inserted the first major addition to the text, 
which was clearly meant to highlight the extraordinary character of the Holy Roman Empire as 
compared to the other states and empires of the age: 
We cannot look at the Reich as a state like others.  It had from antiquity an assignment to fulfill in Europe, 
as the leading, protecting, and ordering power.  Through internal disunity, however, it could not answer this 
call.  Now it is again awakened to a new strength.67 
 
The following pages take a look at each of the major duchies, counties and bishoprics in 
the Low Countries that is mostly traditional in its outlook.  Stress is placed upon the major events 
in medieval Low Countries history, such as the Hook and Cod Wars in the County of Holland, 
the First War of the Guelderian Succession, the slow decline in power of the Bishops of Utrecht, 
or the Battle of the Golden Spurs between the French crown and the County of Flanders.  This 
latter event at Kortrijk induced the editor to make his second major addition, noting that the 
battle must be stressed because the Flemish, “as the furthest forward outpost of the Germanics,” 
had successfully defeated a Romanesque army.68   
The rest of the chapter focuses on the Middle Ages and is cursory in nature.  There is a 
basic description of the three estates, city life, and a short mention of the Crusades, with 
emphasis upon the Third Crusade, led by Frederick Barbarossa and, especially the Fifth Crusade, 
led by William I, Count of Holland, which sacked the Egyptian city of Damietta.69  In the end 
though, the author sums up the Crusades as “a new series of Germanic heroic journeys,” which 
earns a large, marginal question mark from the editor.70  Apparently there was such a thing as too 
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much historical revisionism, and this was it.  After a short recounting of the Baltic Crusades, 
which were really just continuations of the Germanic and the Nordic customs of conquest, the 
author notes that by the end of the Middle Ages, the Netherlands had become wholly different 
from the German Reich.  The Dutch had their own language and felt as a separate people, even if 
a feeling of community continued to exist between the two peoples.  But then the author notes 
that this separation brought no advantage for the Netherlands, far from it: 
With a powerful Germany behind us, we would have not needed to fight the Eighty Years’ War against 
Spain.  With a powerful Germany behind us, we would have been able to retain our later conquests in 
North America, Brazil, South Africa, and India.  We would have established a lasting world empire.  But 
then there was no strong Germany.  The Empire had become powerless.  Our volk had to trust their own 
strength.  There was no other choice.  The power of the united Germanic peoples would be irresistible.71 
 
It is only with coverage of the modern period that the author begins to write his history in 
greater detail.  So, while the first three chapters had covered Dutch history from pre-historical 
times through to the Middle Ages, the fourth chapter focuses only on the Eighty Years’ War, 
while subsequent chapters cover the rise and fall of the Dutch Golden Age, the Nineteenth 
Century, and the Twentieth Century respectively.  The chapter on the Eighty Years’ War is 
broken into three main parts.  The first part details the early of the Dutch Revolt and takes on a 
proudly patriotic veneer.  The focus, in tune with the original mandate for the textbook, is on the 
actions of particular individuals and their heroism.  Naturally, William the Silent, he “of German 
blood,” plays a large role, but so too do lesser individuals, such as Jan Haring, whose exploits 
during the Battle of the Zuiderzee are given two full pages.72  Other events that receive special 
attention include the entire town of Haarlem, which struggled valiantly against the Spanish 
during the 1572-73 siege of that city, and Adriaan van Bergen and his crew’s exploits during the 
sack of Breda in 1590.73  Although the recounting of events is entirely patriotic in form, which is 
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unsurprising given that it is a Dutch history book, it is not as overtly völkisch or politically 
charged as previous sections.  The editor also seems to have had little qualms about the subject 
matter, save for one section he struck that mentions the last words of Balthasar Gerard, assassin 
of William the Silent, asking God to take pity on Gerard and the poor people.74   
The second section of the chapter focuses on the discovery of the New World and various 
Dutch exploration ventures, with extended focus placed upon Willem Barentsz’s exploration of 
the Arctic and the creation of the United East Indian Company, before turning back in the final 
section to the period of the Dutch Revolt that occurred after 1600.  Just as in the first section, this 
latter section focuses on the exploits of individuals, in this case Maurice of Nassau, younger 
brother of William the Silent and newly installed Prince of Orange.  Particular focus is placed 
upon his actions at the 1600 Battle of Nieuwpoort.75  In contrast to the first section of the chapter, 
in which multiple heroic events are described in great, yet mostly contrived, detail, the second 
half of the Dutch Revolt, covering the years 1609 through 1648, is wrapped up in just three 
pages.76  The third section ends with a very short explanation of how the southern provinces, 
which had originally bravely fought alongside the northern provinces, remained under Spanish 
control after the fall of Antwerp in 1585 and Oostende in 1604.77 
In the concluding portion, a subsection entitled “Look into the Past and the Future” which 
closes each of the seven chapters, the author notes that the Eighty Years’ War and the Peace of 
Münster had a dark side.  Yes, this was the period during which the Netherlands gained 
independence, and this independence would usher in the Golden Age of the Seven United 
Provinces, but there were still members of the Dutch volk who were not yet free, specifically 
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those of the southern provinces.  Moreover, the greatness of the new young republic would be 
tested in the coming years through wars with both England and France, and it would be shown to 
not be nearly as powerful as it had hoped.  What was worse, the German Reich, which had 
declined in power since the late Middle Ages, was beset by problems both within and without.  
The same treaty that had given the Dutch their independence had ended the Thirty Years War, in 
which the population of the Reich dropped from twenty million to six million.78  “But in 1870 a 
powerful empire arose again and is now more powerful than ever.  The possibility for new 
collaboration is present again.  The future will certainly lead us in this direction.”79 
The following chapter on the Dutch Golden Age and the Eighteenth Century has a dual 
focus.  On the one hand, it celebrates the greatness of the Seven United Provinces, but, at the 
same time, warns against the downfall of the Seven United Provinces before the strength of the 
European Great Powers.  The Golden Age, the author tells the reader was the result of the 
flourishing culture of the seventeenth century.  Artists, poets, architects, jurists, scientists, and 
smiths called the Netherlands, both the northern and southern provinces, home.  But the 
greatness of this age was soon eclipsed by the various wars in which the Dutch found themselves 
engaged.  True, the Dutch acquitted themselves well in the three Anglo-Dutch Wars, and even 
against more powerful France, the Dutch Republic fared relatively well in the Franco-Dutch War 
and the War of the League of Augsburg, with the author noting repeatedly about the two 
outcomes: “He [Louis XIV] sued for peace.”80  At the same time, the Netherlands had heroes 
they could be proud of, especially De Ruyter, Tromp, the Evertsen brothers, and William III, 
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who later went on to become the King of England, and “one of the greatest of his family.”81  But 
the success of these heroes could not prevent the ultimate defeat.  By the end of the War of the 
Spanish Succession, the outcome was much different: “Peace was concluded in Utrecht in 1713, 
wherein the Republic was handled with such disrespect that a French delegate dared to say: ‘We 
negotiate for you, about you, and without you.’”82 
The rest of the chapter comprises a series of vignettes through which the author attempts 
to show the decline of the republic, entitled “rest and decay.”  The first such section is nothing 
more than a vignette in which a son does not wish to carry on the hard work of his father, 
preferring a life of relative comfort that had been provided to him by his father.83  The second 
section recounts the defeat by the British in the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, which the author 
blames squarely on the role of the regents and commercial elites who have neglected the 
maintenance of the Dutch military.  Try as he might, the Stadtholder-King William IV could not 
undo this decline.84  It was, the author argues, a great disappointment: 
At the Peace of Münster we were a people in the fullest blossoming of prosperity, science and art.  Our 
ships sailed all seas, our trade spanned the whole earth. … We were one of the strongest states.  We resisted 
the united power of England and France.  We decided partly on the fate of Europe and of the world.  But in 
the eighteenth century we had become weak and easy-going, and we were glad if we were left alone.  
Obediently our little boat sailed in the wake of England.  If foreign powers threatened us, we had to seek 
help from our neighbors.  We were not able to protect ourselves, as in the past.  After all, we ended up in 
foreign bondage and there followed a period of French domination.  And even after the departure of the 
French, the old spirit power has not yet returned soon enough.85 
 
If the eighteenth century had been one of decline and decay, the nineteenth century was 
one of absolute disaster in the author’s eyes.  It began with the French Revolution based on the 
misguided notions of popular sovereignty, freedom, and equality, all of which were wrong-
headed, although the author’s strongest invective was used against equality: “It does not work, to 
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assign the same rights and duties to a professor as to an idiot, to a breadwinner as to a loafer, to a 
powerful man as to a gray beard.”86  And of course, this equality was enforced with the “equality 
machine,” which took the heads of thousands.87   But despite these misguided ideas, the French 
were successful in imposing them upon Europe during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
wars.  This French domination of Europe was especially bad for the Netherlands, the author 
argues, as it forced the Dutch into yet another war with the English which led to the temporary 
loss of its overseas colonies, including South Africa.  But this was all ended when the peoples of 
Europe awoke to their desire for self-determination.  Strongest in Germany, this feeling of 
nationalism, supported by brave soldiers like Blücher, helped cast off the French yoke, even if 
their desires for a united Germany were undermined by the diplomats at Vienna.88   
One thing that the diplomats did get right, however, was the creation of a United 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, even if “it was a pity for us that it was not born out of our own 
strength, but only from English self-interest.”89  Despite the new-found unity of the Low 
Countries, discord soon broke out as a result of both confessional and economic disunity, leading 
to Belgian independence in the 1830s.  This, of course, was only possible because of French and 
English intervention on the side of the Belgians; the Dutch army had otherwise acquitted itself 
wonderfully, but it was no match for the combined weight of the European Great Powers, 
especially France.90  But if disunity was bad, what came next was worse: parliamentary 
democracy.  The 1848 constitution ushered into being political parties that divided the volk and 
worked only for factionalism.  It was responsible to no one, and certainly not to the entire people.  
                                                 
86 OVV, 71. 
87 OVV, 72. 
88 OVV, 73-75. 
89 OVV, 75. 
90 OVV, 75-77, including 76 addendum. 
300 
 
That would require a singular ruler, the likes of which parliamentary democracy was unable to 
produce.91  And to make matters even worse, parliamentary democracy ushered into being the 
rule of the Jew.   
Capitalism is, according to the author, the “rule of money” over society: “Money rules 
industry, the banks ruled money and ……. the Jews ruled the banks.”  But capitalism was not the 
only invention of the dastardly Jew, for socialism was its counterpart.  Created by Marx, also a 
Jew, socialism argued that the worker had no volk, that all workers, regardless of their 
differences were brothers in arms against owners.  This, of course, made sense, the author 
argues, because Jews have no volk and no fatherland to owe homage to, and so resorted to the 
class struggle, despite the fact that “volk and fatherland are the highest asset of man.”  Luckily, 
“National Socialism will improve this.  The whole population must take care of all its members 
as a family.  And every worker must be able to trust that his people will never leave him.”92 
Lest the reader think that the entirety of the nineteenth century was disaster and disaster 
alone, the author does note that some good came from it.  The royal house was stocked with 
entirely German blood; it had not been degraded with the blood of other peoples.93  Furthermore, 
inventions, such as electric lights, the railway, and the electric telegraph, made life easier for 
many people, although he is careful to warn the reader that these inventions have not made 
civilization.  Rather, civilization, and with it culture, are the result of honoring the inheritance of 
one’s forefathers, the land, architecture, literature, music, and art.  Moreover, even if things were 
bad in the Netherlands, in Belgium, after its independence, the Flemish began to feel their 
“Dutch blood” speaking to them in the face of Francophone dominance, and although the 
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Flemish movement would not gain any real ground until the twentieth century, it came to life in 
the nineteenth.94  The chapter ends, as do all chapters in the book, with a look into the future, in 
which the author notes that all of the bad tidings that came from the nineteenth century would be 
short lived, for “in 1940 he [the Dutchman] was startled from his slumber by a frightful shock.”95 
The final chapter of Over Volk en Vaderland covers the first half of the twentieth century, 
and given the short period that it covers, is the most in-depth chapter of the entire work.  
Beginning with the First World War, the author recounts a history that very well could have been 
written by a German revisionist during the inter-war years.  England caused the Great War, a war 
it had wanted in order to stave off German commercial advances.  On all fronts, the Germans 
were without equal, first defeating the Russians, while at the same time driving deep into France.  
Only because of socialists in Germany, who had threatened the war effort from behind the lines, 
was Germany forced to sue for peace.  In the Netherlands too, the English were the villains.  All 
that was bad, including the food shortage that occurred toward the end of the war, was the result 
of English violations of Dutch neutrality.  Similar violations by the German military are ignored 
entirely.96  The Versailles Treaty that ended the war with Germany was unjust, especially the 
“false declaration … that the war occurred completely and only through German guilt.”  The 
League of Nations was, according to the author and not entirely without logic, doomed to failure 
as the international mediation that the League called for could only be enforced through war and 
violence, the opposition to which was the express purpose of the League in the first place.97   
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The rest of the chapter takes a more topical approach, with subsections covering 
everything from the Zuiderzee Works and Afrikaner nationalist Japie Fourie to Christianity’s 
place in the Netherlands, National Socialism, and the NSB.  Especially telling is a section on the 
various political parties of the inter-war years, in which the author briefly describes, and then 
lambasts, each of the non-NSB political movements.  The party leaders, regardless of party, were 
little more than fat cats living off the hard work of the honest man.  The socialists wanted to 
divide the nation through their focus on class struggle, all the while ignoring the defense of the 
Netherlands through minimal, or non-existent, outlays for the military.  The Free-thinking 
Democrats also neglected the military, while the liberals were too individualistic, thereby 
neglecting the nation.  The religious parties, for their part, were too interested in only their own 
bases in the confessions, and therefore were not supporting the nation as a whole.98   
In contrast to the other parties and their leaders, NSB Leider Mussert was a man of true 
principle.  He had volunteered for service during the First World War, although obviously saw 
no combat given the Netherlands’ neutral status.  He passed his exams “with praise” at the 
Technical University of Delft and quickly rose, while “still a young man” to high station in the 
civil service.  As a result, “a wonderful career was open to him.  Professor, minister, he could be 
everything.”99  But, seeing the “ailments from which our volk was so badly ill,” he wanted to 
heal his people, “to make his people healthy and strong, united and happy.  He wanted to bring 
prosperity and joy to all volk comrades, especially to the hundred thousand unemployed.”100  To 
that end, he founded, along with van Geelkerken, the NSB in 1931, which soon saw meteoric 
growth.  The established authorities threw everything they could at the NSB and its leaders, but 
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were unable, according to the author, to reverse its fortunes.  Their members stayed true to the 
cause, and after the Nazis invaded, its membership rolls reached to over 100,000.101   
In addition to commenting on politics in the Netherlands, the author also devotes several 
subsections to the two major political philosophies of the inter-war period: Soviet communism 
and fascism, especially German National Socialism.  As could be expected, the Bolsheviks were 
the root of all evil in Russia, and even threatened the rest of the world.  In Russia, the author 
claims the Bolsheviks killed 40 million people in their quest for power, including farmers, 
bourgeois, clerics, and officers: “there must be only soldiers and workers.”  In those areas 
conquered by the Soviets, such as Poland, Estonia, and Finland, they were perpetrating similar 
atrocities.  And those that they did not kill, they simply robbed of their possessions.  Even those 
they claimed to want to help were no better off.  Workers were made into “state slaves,” while 
the people starved.  The state itself was controlled mostly by Jews.  And because the Red Army 
was tasked with conquering the world for communism, Germany and its allies “took up arms and 
went to war against Russia.”102 
Faced with this threat, most Europeans reacted passively.  That is, except Adolf Hitler, 
Benito Mussolini, and Anton Mussert.  These men recognized the threat and knew the necessary 
steps to take to counter it.  They understood the need for unity among the people, for strong 
leadership, press restrictions, and service to the state unto death.  These men formed nationalist 
parties that honored their people.  They formed socialist parties that recognized that the people 
needed to be united, not divided.  And they formed workers’ parties, because the well-being of 
the volk was most important of all.103    
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The Second World War, which allegedly began as a defensive action by Hitler to protect 
Germans in Poland, was really a war between National Socialism and Jews, according to the 
author.  After defeating Poland in just eighteen days, the Germans turned to Western Europe in 
order to protect its own flank.  This included the Netherlands, which had, under English 
influence, worked to undermine Hitler’s regime, and therefore could not be trusted and had to be 
occupied.  After reaching the coast, Hitler offered peace, but the English refused, instead inciting 
others to war against Germany.  In 1941, Hitler ordered his armies to invade Russia, but were 
turned back by an extraordinarily early and harsh winter, otherwise the Russian campaign very 
well might have succeeded that first year.  But, at the time of the author’s writing, Germany was 
facing a war against the three leading Jewish powers, Russia, England, and the United States.104    
The Netherlands itself, in the author’s view, was better off under German rule.  The pre-
war government had been weak, betrayed the country through their flight, and was, ultimately 
because of this flight, entirely illegal.  They had been, and continued to be, pawns of the English.  
And what was even worse, they antagonized the Japanese against the Netherlands, allowing the 
nation to lose their last and most important overseas colony, the Dutch East Indies.  The 
Germans, on the other hand, had treated the Dutch with respect.  Hitler had let the POWs go 
while handling the civilian population kindly, save for a few rabble-rousers who had been 
inspired by the illegal government in London.  It was only natural that the Germans had to crack 
down on these rabble-rousers.105   
Interestingly, the final chapter also contains several sections that were blocked out in red 
ink entirely, focusing on the Weerafdeling’s106 resistance to violence by anti-fascist agitators 
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before and during the occupation, the Germanic SS, the Nationale Jeugdstorm107 and the Dutch 
Labor Front.108  There is no obvious reason, such as marginal notes, why these sections were 
blocked out en masse, nor do these sections contain any content that goes against the general 
theme of the larger work about the heroic Germanic past, present, and future.  The section on the 
Dutch Labor Service was most likely scrapped because of the service’s inherently unpopular 
nature, while the sections on the WA and the NJS may have been removed simply because they 
were NSB formations and the völkisch-minded members of the jury did not want to emphasize 
such elements.  It is harder to speculate on why the section on the Germanic SS in the 
Netherlands was taken out, as it was an overtly völkisch organization that opposed the Mussert 
wing of the NSB.  It seems likely that such material was simply considered inappropriate for 
school aged students, but ultimately, the reason is entirely unclear.   
The chapter and book ends, as do all of the previous chapters, with a look at the future.  
The “new Europe” that the Nazis would create would be one that was united, in place of the 
division of the previous centuries that allowed for English domination.  This new Europe would 
be led by Germanics.  By virtue of their place as the second most populous Germanic nation, 
“the Dutch volk will occupy a glorious second position” behind Germany and its ninety million 
souls.109  The Netherlands before the war had been little more than a house of cards that collapsed 
in on itself.  But the war had brought to light the extent to which the state had been weakened 
and its people divided.  It was now “the task of every true patriot to make every effort for the re-
establishment of his people.”  There was much to do: 
Unity and togetherness. 
A strong and decisive administration. 
A courageous self-confidence of the entire nation. 
Security in your own people. 
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Our Fatherland has lost a war.  It is now wounded and impoverished.  Our youth has the clean task, to set it 
up again.  The Young Netherlands will have to show that our people have been hit hard but have not died.   
Live for your volk! Die for it, if it must be!110 
 
The message that the author hoped to pass along to his student readers is clear.  The 
Dutch are a part of a Germanic community, from which all good things in the history of the 
world have come.  Intermixing with non-Germanics had led to the decline of previously great 
civilizations, as has disunity among Germanics.  But in the new Germanic community, led by 
Nazi Germany, the Dutch nation could expect a bright and successful future.  The defeats of the 
past had been the result of liberalism, sectionalism, capitalism, and Jews.  The future would 
include none of those things.  In their place, a strong leadership would pull the nation, indeed all 
Germanics, together into a new and greater world.  Given the triumphalist narrative the author 
had created, it is not surprising that the jury accepted it as the best submission.  Had the 
occupation lasted longer, the work would very likely have been edited, published and introduced 
into schools, but the timing simply was not feasible.  The enemy was fast approaching and 
would, by the end of the very same year, liberate the southern portions of the Netherlands.  The 
following year, the regime would collapse, and with it, any hope on the part of the occupiers to 
introduce the work into the schools.   
De Germaansche Nederlanden 
 
A year after the competition that resulted in Over Volk en Vaderland was held, in mid-
1944, Schwarz returned to the question of historical instruction by asking van Dam to consider a 
new book for use in the schools, this time in secondary schools.  This new work, entitled De 
Germaansche Nederlanden: Duizend jaren Germaansche Geschiedenis,111 was originally 
published in Germany by the W. Cruemwell Verlag in Dortmund.  Written by Werner vom Hofe, 
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Dr. Peter Seifert, and Werner Steinbacher, and translated by J. H. M. Van der Eerden, it 
comprises a total of eighteen chapters and one hundred twenty-eight pages that stretch from the 
pre-Roman period clear through to the reign of Charlemagne and the first Viking invasions.  
Also, unlike de Vries’s Onze Voorouders, which covers roughly the same period and takes the 
format of an ethnography of the Germanics, De Germaansche Nederlanden takes a narrative 
format, marching ever forward from the recounting of one past event to the next.   
 Schwarz had wanted to institute its use in Dutch schools directly but did not get the 
reaction he had apparently hoped for from the Education Department.  Van Dam had two copies 
of the work sent to specialists.  The answer to one such inquiry by A. C. J. Commissaris, a pastor 
in Oosterhout, came back quite negative.  He noted that the work was “fragmentary” and not 
suitable for use as a regular school book.  The uninterrupted heroization of the Germanics would 
cause students to poke fun at them.  Quoting the French proverb, Commissaris noted, “he who 
proves too much, proves nothing.”  For his part, van Dam simply copied much of Commissaris’s 
comments in his reply to Schwarz.  Van Dam was not of the mind to require the book for 
historical instruction but softened the blow by noting that he would have the book made 
available in school libraries.112   
Despite it not becoming required reading in the classrooms, the work is a good example 
of what the Germans’ plans for those classrooms included, as the lessons contained within could 
not be any clearer.  Right from the very first page: 
The territory of the Netherlands belongs to the Lower German flat lands, that stretch out of the east without 
any transition to the IJsselmeer—the former Zuiderzee—and further to the canal coast.  Nowhere does 
nature form—not even through ridges—a German-Dutch border. … No, the geographic condition does not 
give, and never gave, anyone the right to make separations, where the same people has lived for 
centuries.113 
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The authors take their argument even further by noting that the very same race (the Nordic race) 
inhabited the area that is otherwise politically divided and has done so since pre-history.  This 
can be seen in the graves, the living structures, the weapons, and even the names of the locales.  
The Romans, whose motto was to “divide and rule” did not differentiate between the Germanics 
of Northern Europe either.  And of course, these peoples themselves recognized that they were 
the same as well.114   
In their chapter on the Germanics during the period of the Roman Republic, the focus 
remains squarely on the heroic Germanic pitted against the treacherous Roman.  Population 
pressures were constantly forcing Germanic tribes to settle in new areas, which sometimes 
included portions of the Roman Empire itself.  In some cases, access to the empire was granted 
by Roman leaders, but “usually access was refused, or they were held up with false promises or 
even treacherously ambushed.  Germanic tribes put themselves, in good faith, under the care of 
the rulers of the Roman Empire, but they were bitterly disappointed.”115  Caesar, and his exploits 
in Gaul, take up a large portion of the chapter.  The authors note that Caesar viewed the Belgians 
as the bravest of the inhabitants of Gaul and they are quick to note that these people sprang from 
the Germanics themselves.  Recognizing the braveness of the Germanics, Caesar knew he could 
put them to use and so recruited many into his army, and Rome had these Germanic auxiliaries to 
thank for a number of favorable results.  But the authors also emphasize repeatedly that the 
Germanic tribes were honorable people, who were unaccustomed to the treacherous ways of the 
Romans.116  They recount one event in which a large Germanic army crossed paths with Caesar’s 
army, and after the former sent ambassadors to the latter, Caesar detained the ambassadors and  
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“in violation of international law” drove the Germans  into the river.117  As if to stress the evil 
nature of this “crime against Nordic blood” which “drenched and wasted the Dutch-Lower Rhine 
earth with blood in a gruesome way,” the authors note, in the very next paragraph that Caesar 
himself was murdered through treachery only eleven years later.118   
As if in contrast to the treachery of Caesar, the authors then move directly into the single 
longest chapter of the book, which focuses on the great Germanic hero of the Roman period, 
Arminius.  It is here that the near uninterrupted heroization van Dam’s reviewer noted becomes 
most conspicuous.  The Romans, who initially portrayed themselves as friendly, quickly showed 
their “true nature,” that is their treachery and the harshness of their rule.119  In contrast, Arminius 
was an honorable man, whose only duty was to his Germanic fatherland.  That he had served in 
the Roman legions and attained the rank of equestrian—that is that Arminius himself had 
betrayed the Romans—is mentioned but glossed over immediately.  Rather, his knowledge of 
Roman tactics was nothing more than one of the many reasons a band of only six thousand 
Germanics managed to wipe out twenty-five thousand hardened Roman veterans.120  But of 
course, the noble Arminius was later betrayed by weak German princes, hoping to gain by the 
loss of their own people, and who feared that Arminius wanted to establish his own hegemony 
over the various tribes.121  But the authors are clear to note the correct view in a declaration that 
could have easily applied to the political situation in the Netherlands during the occupation: “The 
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great struggle for freedom, the maintenance of the pure Germanic blood on its own soil, was only 
possible with a connection of all the Germanic tribes under the leadership of a few captains with 
powerful wills.”122  To close the chapter, in which it is clear that the heroic Arminius, the would 
be uniter of the Germanic peoples, deserves the absolute highest praise possible, the authors first 
quote Tacitus’s own praise of Arminius, then argue that his story was the likely inspiration for 
one of the most foundational pieces of Germanic literature—the Nibelungenlied.123   
The following chapter, concerning the early Frisians, takes on much of the same 
character as that over Arminius, only lacking a single heroic figure leading the way.  The 
Frisians were a peace-loving people who had long been in peaceful contact with the Romans, 
solemnified via treaty.  That is, until the Romans showed their true colors and tried to repress the 
Frisians, who, after much patience, rose up in rebellion.  The authors quote Tacitus again, this 
time regarding the Frisian victory against Lucius Apronius in 28 CE at the Baduhenna Wood.124  
Otherwise, the Frisians were a peaceful people, more concerned with farming and sea-faring than 
with warring against Rome.  The authors also are clear to note that the Frisians, although a major 
constituent part of the Netherlands, can also be found in North-Western Germany, and so are yet 
another example of the connectedness of the two larger nations.125   
The authors then move on to latter-day examples of Arminius, including Gannascus and 
Claudius (Julius) Civilis.  The pirate Gannascus was turned by the authors into an Arminius of 
the Sea, even though Tacitus, the authors’ source for this section, labels him only a deserter from 
the Roman legions and a pirate.126  But like Arminius, according to the authors, Gannascus was a 
                                                 
122 Ibid., 23. 
123 Ibid., 24. See also Tacitus, Annals 2.88. 
124 Ibid., 27. See also Tacitus, Annals 13.54. 
125 Ibid., 24–30. 
126 Ibid., 31–35. See also Tacitus, Annals 11.17-18. 
311 
 
freedom fighter, fighting against insurmountable odds, insurmountable for a non-Germanic 
anyway, against the world empire that was Rome. Alternatively, Julius Civilis was a latter-day 
Arminius on the land.  His revolt against Rome during the upheaval of 69 AD is marked by the 
authors as a reaction to Roman “treachery” against a people—this time the Batavians—that 
strove only to live in “peace and harmony” with the Romans.127  Just like Arminius, both 
Gannascus and Civilis were former Roman soldiers, and just like Arminius, both united their 
people against Roman injustices.128  Although Gannascus is not afforded the honor, the authors 
even go so far as to say that Civilis was likely another inspiration for Siegfried of Nibelungenlied 
fame. 
One of the more striking elements that is completely out of place for an ancient history is 
the notion of the fatherland.129  Repeatedly, the authors argue that the Germanics were fighting on 
behalf of their fatherland.  Whether Arminius or the Frisians, Gannascus or Julius Civilis, the 
conflict was always in defense of “the fatherland.”  This, of course, was meant to teach the 
students that the highest values a member of the Germanic race could uphold was a defense of 
the fatherland against foreign enemies.  Nor should it be forgotten that the very fatherland as 
described by the authors encompasses not just the Netherlands, but rather the larger Germanic 
community of which the Dutch were members, stretching from the North Sea coast east past the 
Elbe and beyond.  But of course, there was no such fatherland for the Germanic peoples at this 
time.  At best, it could be argued that the Romans’ designation of the territory as Germania 
imbued these places with a sense of connection with the people who inhabited them, but the 
same cannot be said for the Germanic inhabitants themselves, who largely would not have 
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adopted Roman nomenclature for the geographical area between the Rhine and the Elbe.  The 
authors even admit that many of the groups moved around, crisscrossing the Rhine river or 
moving inward from the coasts in search of fertile new lands every generation.  As such, the 
authors’ repeated invocation of Germanic tribes fighting in defense of their fatherland can only 
be seen as an attempt to foster similar ideals in the minds of their young readers.  That the enemy 
in the history text was the “world empire” of the Romans is even further equatable with the 
“international Bolshevism,” the fight against which was at the heart of Nazi propaganda in all 
parts of their nascent empire.   
Moving into Late Antiquity, the authors note that the time of the small tribes had come to 
an end.  The battles of the previous centuries had shown Germanic leaders the need to coalesce 
into larger groupings, thus ushering in the “Greater Germanic period” which would eventually 
culminate in the establishment of the first Greater Germanic Reich by Charles the Great 
(Charlemagne).130  The greatest of these confederations, at least initially, were the Franks, and 
among this group, the Salic Franks were the most powerful.  Quoting from the preface of the Lex 
Salica, the authors note that the Salic Franks were beginning to show a “national and racial 
consciousness” although it was based upon a societal understanding of the world, rather than a 
“völkisch spirit,” when the Lex Salica discusses the “high stature, with white appearance, supple 
and hardened … that with their bravery and great power in battle, shook off the hard yoke of the 
Romans.”131  It was this great confederation of Germanic peoples, the Franks, that “fulfilled the 
Greater Germanic task of organizing and managing Europe, until the German Reich would be 
established.”132 
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After recounting the heroic return of a Frankish colony to the lower Rhine that had been 
established on the Black Sea by the Emperor Probus in the late third century, and which naturally 
overcame all sorts of obstacles put in its way by the dastardly Romans, the authors then move on 
to the early history of the Saxons.133  Although the exact origin of the Saxons is unknown, they 
can be differentiated by the “purity of their blood and the maintenance of their old customs.”134  
Presumably originally from the Jutland peninsula, they proceeded to conquer neighboring groups 
down the northwest European coast until, in the fifth century, they moved to Britain.  It is this 
section of the textbook that begins the discussion of the great Germanic migrations of Late 
Antiquity that led to the final dissolution of Roman rule in the West.  But the authors are clear to 
note that this was more the result of the actions of Germanics than of the Romans themselves: 
“Now the Roman Empire had been germanicized.  Germanic solders, in service to Rome … 
named emperors and deposed them.”135 
In reality, however, the purpose of these sections is to build up to the high point of the 
textbook: the establishment of the Frankish Empire by Clovis and the later history of that polity 
down through Charlemagne, albeit with a short interlude to introduce the Germanic endeavors 
against the Huns.  Atilla and his band of Huns began their conquest in the “East Germanic” lands 
along the Volga, Don, and Dnieper before moving on to the Vistula, Oder, and Danube.136  The 
Huns were stopped only by Flavius Aetius, “Rome’s last great statesman and general,” who was 
“of Illyrian, or perhaps even Germanic blood.”  Either way, Flavius Aetius defeated the Huns 
with an army of “Germanic-Roman legions and the auxiliary armies of his West-Germanic 
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neighboring peoples.”137  The authors end their buildup to the Frankish Empire by noting for the 
third time that the actions of Germanic heroes during the fight against the Huns are immortalized 
as a central part of the Nibelungenlied, although at least this time, the history of the events is, 
more or less, internally consistent with the story itself.138   
The highpoint of the narrative, which takes up the final third of the entire work, details 
the rise and fall of the Frankish Empire and its replacement with the German Empire.  This 
begins with the recounting of Clovis, Charles Martel, and Charlemagne.  In comparison to the 
latter two Carolingians, the Merovingian Clovis gets short shrift.  His ability in battle and his 
victories over the Roman rump state of Soissons, the Alemanni, and other smaller tribal groups 
are mentioned, but the majority of the chapter on Clovis is taken up by issues of religion.  Clovis, 
the text relates, is the one who decided that Roman Christianity, instead of Arian Christianity, 
which “appealed more to the Germanics,” would be the official princely religion of his empire 
because of the large population of Romans and Gallic peoples who inhabited the southern 
reaches of the new Frankish realm.139  And although the authors admit that Clovis’s decision to 
adopt Roman Christianity was the deciding factor in Christianizing Germanic Europe, the 
authors spend many pages extolling the virtues of Germanic resisters to this development. 
The problem, as the authors relate, was that the Germanics outside of the Merovingian 
empire found it difficult to give up their old gods.  They easily enough adopted Christian 
symbolism, but “wanted to remain faithful to the customs of their fatherland [and] could not 
leave their gods.”  Conversely, the Merovingians “had degenerated prematurely, and their rule 
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was stained by kin-slaying and disloyalty.”140  Chief among these resisters to both Christianity 
and the Merovingians was Radboud of Frisia, who, despite experiencing ups and downs on the 
battlefield, “remained loyal to his race and his fatherland.”141  The tenor of the chapter makes 
clear, without disparaging Christianity directly, that the religion of the Romans instituted a break 
with the Germanic past, one that was not for the better.   
After running quickly through the history of the Carolingian family, with a healthy side 
portion of bemoaning the enserfment of the peasantry, which “was completely in conflict with 
the ancient liberty and right of property of Germanic farmers” and was blamed, mostly, but not 
entirely on the Church, the authors move on to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours.142  
Naturally, the Muslim conquerors were supported by Germanic shock troops, descendants of the 
Germanic Vandals and Goths who had inhabited the Iberian peninsula and North Africa in Late 
Antiquity, even if many of those previously pure-blooded people had debased themselves 
through intermingling with local populations.143  But their degeneration had left them weaker 
than the Frankish host, who soundly defeated the invading Muslims and pushed them back over 
the mountains into Iberia. 
“All German races, and also the non-German, Germanic races, who are still aware of 
their ancestry, above all the lower Franks on the Rhine and the Maas, can be proud, that the first 
Emperor of a Greater Germanic Empire is of their own blood.”144  Thus begins the recounting of 
the rise of Charles Martel’s grandson, Charlemagne, whose empire, “for the first time … united 
the six great tribes which would later form the German volk, the Franks, the Swabians, the 
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Bavarians, the Thuringians, the Saxons, and the Frisians.  In this period, we also see for the first 
time the common name ‘Duitscher’—from ‘duitisce,’ that means: volksche.”145  “Charles was 
great in all that he did,” whether as soldier, general, or statesman, and remained “as Germanic as 
the land in which he was born.”  His rule extended across Europe, going so far as to serve as 
protector of the holy sites in the Near East, according to the authors.146  When quoting a passage 
from Einhard discussing Charles’s physical characteristics, the authors note that this described 
his “Germanic character and Nordic blood.”147  In fact, it is this emphasis on the Germanic nature 
of Charles that chiefly differentiates it from a work like Einhard’s, as it is otherwise simply a 
recounting of his great and noble deeds. 
The authors then turn to those Saxons that were not already a part of Charlemagne’s 
empire, noting that, unlike the Franks whose rule had stretched to the south and thus 
incorporated non-Germanic elements, the Saxons “knew how to preserve their pure blood.”  
Quoting Adam of Bremen, the authors note that the Saxons “did not corrupt themselves through 
marriages with foreign and lesser peoples.  They strove to be an independent and pure people, 
that remained true to their own blood.”148  The purpose of this description, beyond extolling the 
values the authors see as important for their readers, is to explain why the Saxons resisted 
incorporation into Charles’s empire.  It was, according to the authors, to remain free of the 
influence of non-Germanic blood and to keep their own Nordic blood pure.  The great hero of 
this story is, of course, Widukind, leader of the Saxons against Charlemagne.  Widukind 
preached to his people of the need to protect “customs of the Fatherland and freedom of belief” 
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against the Christian king Charles, and in this way, he was a latter-day Arminius.  But 
Widukind’s resistance to Frankish expansion was doomed for two reasons: their own disunity 
and the greatness of Charles’s power.149  Despite the defeat of the Saxons, this heroic people’s 
influence could still be felt throughout the Germanic lands between the Rhine and the Elbe, as 
evidenced in any number of place names, and of course, through their blood. Widukind’s 
descendant Mathilde, became queen to Henry the Fowler and mother to Otto the Great, the first 
“actual” king and emperor of the German Empire.150 
After a quick recounting of the dissolution of Charlemagne’s empire by his sons and 
grandsons, the final result of which was the conglomeration of all of the actual Germanic 
peoples, including the people of the Low Countries except the Flemish, into a single empire 
ruled by Louis the German (thus making them German), the authors move on to their final 
chapter, which focuses on the Vikings.151  But this chapter is really just a brief summary of the 
various exploits of Scandinavian raiders and explorers, jumping from their adventures in the 
North Atlantic, including the establishment of the colony of Vinland, to the Baltic Sea and the 
Russian Steppe, down through the Mediterranean, and all parts in between.  Special emphasis is 
placed, of course, on the Vikings’ actions in the Lower Rhine Valley, where the authors argue 
that they helped influence the later culture of the Low Countries in everything from their sea-
faring nature to the building of windmills.152  But beyond that, the Viking excursions and 
settlements in the Germanic lands add the final element the authors see as foundational to the 
establishment of Germany proper.  Just as the Frankish and Germanic tribes had contributed to 
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the decline of Roman power, the Vikings contributed to the decline of Frankish power: “The new 
order, which also ruled the fate of the Netherlands, arose in the German Empire.”153 
Given the repeated references to the heroic Germanics throughout the work, the nearly 
constant extolling of their desires to fight to defend their “fatherland” or “customs of the 
fatherland,” and to keep their “blood pure,” it is easy to see why van Dam’s reviewer was 
unhappy with the work.  The book has little to say about Christianity in general, and even less to 
say that paints Christianity in a positive light, instead extolling the virtues of Germanic pagans, 
which would surely cause problems in the confessional schools, something Schwarz likely was 
acutely aware of given his extreme anti-clericalism.  But in its prescriptive elements, it is also 
easy to understand why the Germans would have wanted to institute the work in the schools as a 
textbook for secondary education.  With its focus on keeping blood pure, on heroic resistance in 
defense of the Fatherland, in ascribing a common, Germanic heritage to all the inhabitants of the 
lands between the Rhine and the Oder, and even further east, it fits perfectly within the ideals of 
the German leadership in the Netherlands and their desire to foster the incorporation of the Dutch 
youth into the Nazis’ Greater Germanic Reich.   
Although the work was ultimately rejected for incorporation into the curriculum, it was 
placed for use in school libraries, where it would be available for students should they or their 
teachers wish to consult it.  While it is difficult to say to what extent students and teachers did 
avail themselves of this option, that question is of little importance when looking at the 
Germans’ plans for Dutch education.  Rather, the Germans’ very attempts betray the ideals that 
leaders like Schwarz had for the areas under their charge—the fostering of a new Dutch identity 
aimed at the eventual incorporation of the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich.   
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Volk en Bodem 
 
Although Onze Voorouders, Over Volk en Vaderland, and De Germaansche 
Nederlanden: Duizend Jaren Germaanse Geschiedenis were the only historical texts that were 
discussed at the highest levels of the occupation regime, other attempts were made by various 
actors to introduce new history textbooks.  For example, in mid-1941, the völkisch publisher 
Volk en Bodem154 in Amsterdam suggested to van Dam that it had several history books that 
would be of use for school instruction.  Included in the list were books designed for primary 
schools, secondary schools, and the teacher training colleges.  Although van Dam indicated 
interest in the works, in his reply to the publisher, he noted that he did not, as yet, have control 
over the curriculum and therefore could not enforce their use in the schools.  But he did offer the 
publisher help in formulating marketing ideas for the books, which, van Dam suggested, would 
make great inroads in teaching circles should they become better-known.155    
Volk en Bodem was a relatively new organization, having been founded in November 
1940, but it did have a longer history than its later foundation might suggest.156  Its founder was 
Evert J. Roskam, who had been active in NSB circles for some time.  Beside Roskam could be 
found other völkisch-oriented thinkers who would later form the core of the SS party within the 
NSB during the German occupation,  including Henk Feldmeijer, later head of the 
Nederlandsche SS/Germanic SS in the Netherlands; J. C. Nachenius, an artist, frequent 
contributor to various national socialist publications, and later member of the Nederlandsche 
Kultuurraad; Dr. Tobie Goedewaagen, who at this point was still not a member of the NSB; 
Geerto Snijder, the University of Amsterdam professor who would be so influential in his more 
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behind-the-scenes role during the occupation; and many others.157  Chief among these, if not 
officially, then certainly in practice, was Frans Eduard Farwerck.  Farwerck had been an old 
member of the NSB and was a close associate of Mussert, serving as propaganda leader of the 
party in its earlier years.  By late 1935 and early 1936, however, he had become the leading 
völkisch thinker and agitator in the NSB, at least until that position was usurped by Meinoud 
Rost van Tonningen after the latter joined the party in 1936 after returning from Austria.  In fact, 
later members of the SS circle during the occupation would look back to this period in late 1935, 
specifically the fourth party congress of the NSB held in Loosduinen on October 12, as the real 
founding of the SS in the Netherlands.158   
On July 7, 1937 Farwerck and several others associated with the völkisch movement 
within the NSB founded Der Vaderen Erfdeel,159 a foundation which was, in many ways, a Dutch 
counterpart to the SS-Ahnenerbe, and although Farwerck’s name did not appear in the 
administration of the organization, he was very much the behind-the-scenes director.160  This 
organization was designed to investigate the Germanic history of the Dutch people, and to 
awaken the völkisch spirit of the Dutch.161  It was this foundation, and its in-house publisher, that 
would publish several historical textbooks during the late 1930s that Roskam would later attempt 
to have introduced into the schools during the occupation.162  However, despite his clearly 
suitable ideological outlook, Farwerck was also a Free Mason.  Free Masons were not entirely 
uncommon in the early years of the NSB, but owing to the deep suspicion of Free Masonry on 
the part of German Nazis, Farwerck lost much of his influence both within the völkisch-oriented 
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group and within the larger NSB shortly after the German invasion.163   As a result, the 
foundation Der Vaderen Erfdeel was disbanded and replaced, mostly in name only, with the 
Volkse Werkgemeenschap164 in late 1940, which was essentially Der Vaderen Erfdeel minus 
Farwerck.165  For his part, Roskam, who had been the head of the in-house publisher of Der 
Vaderen Erfdeel—also called Der Vaderen Erfdeel—re-founded the publishing house as Volk en 
Bodem in late 1940.166 
Roskam, in his letter to van Dam, had offered two works specifically for use in the 
schools (the others were meant for teacher training colleges and a general educational audience), 
both of which had been published in 1938 under the supervision of Der Vaderen Erfdeel.  As a 
result, both works, while certainly influenced by German Nazi, völkisch thought, were not 
directly influenced by the occupation regime itself, but nonetheless reflect the view of history 
cultivated by Dutch volksche theorists who were largely aligned with the ideology of the later 
German occupiers, and therefore deserve a closer look.  The first was a fifty-six-page booklet 
designed for primary school instruction authored by Farwerck himself entitled Het is anders dan 
men ons leerde.167   
The goal of Het is anders dan men ons leerde was simple: to upend the portrayal of the 
Germanics that had, according to the author, been dominant over the last several hundred years.  
This portrayal, which argued that the Germanics were little more than nomadic barbarians 
wearing animal pelts whose culture was significantly beneath that of the Romans who 
encountered them, Farwerck argues, was the result of, on the one hand, a lack of knowledge or 
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interest in Germanic peoples on the part of Roman authors, and, on the other, the result of the 
influence of Christian and later Renaissance thought.168  But unlike earlier authors, Farwerck 
argues that recent work in archeology combined with a more critical eye toward the writings of 
classical authors, could give the reader a much more accurate understanding of their Germanic 
forefathers.   
The work covers much of the same material as Onze Voorouders but does so with less 
pomp and gusto regarding the character of the Germanics and with an eye toward specifically 
overturning the previously held conventional wisdom, which is outlined through a series of 
quotes from other historical textbooks at the end of every chapter.  For example, in the first 
chapter on clothing, Farwerck argues that the Germanics wore spun cloth for clothing, as 
evidenced by spinning rolls found in graves, fastened together with pins made of bronze.169  He 
then proceeds to quote from nine separate school textbooks all of which argue that the 
Germanics wore either much simpler clothing or animal hides instead of spun cloth.170  
Alternatively, Farwerck argues that road infrastructure can be found in Germanic lands centuries 
prior to their contact with Romans, despite other works claiming that the Germanics inherited the 
knowledge of road building from the Romans themselves.171  Similar arguments can be found 
throughout the work, whether dealing with weaponry, agriculture, jewelry, and architecture. 
Unlike Onze Voorouders, Over Volk en Vaderland, and De Germaansche Nederlanden, 
Farwerck gives comparatively little coverage to racial elements.  While he certainly 
acknowledges that the Germanics were a part of the Nordic Race, he does not emphasize this 
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argument nearly to the extent that the authors of those later works would, nor does he posit that 
this racial group was somehow superior to others as work commissioned under the German 
occupation would.  Rather, the mentions of races in Het is anders dan men ons leerde take the 
form of descriptions of various peoples, such as an individual in a grave in which cloth spun 
clothing was also found who was a member of the Nordic race, or the occupants of the territory 
between the Germanics and the Romans, that is the Celts, who were of a different racial group 
called the “western race,” which was differentiated from the Nordic race.  In fact, a third of the 
mentions of the term race come as reference to another work with that word in the title.172  So 
where later works intended as school textbooks focus overtly on the racial element, Farwerck’s 
treatment of the Germanics takes a much less racialist view, even if racialism still can be found 
within.   
It is difficult to say why, exactly, this might be the case.  The work itself appears to be 
much more objective than later exemplars would be, trying to stick as closely as possible to what 
could, at least in the author’s eyes, be supported by evidence, even though he was, at the time of 
its publication, one of the leading völkisch thinkers in the NSB.173  In doing so, Farwerck 
restrained himself from including much of the more outlandish heroization of the Germanics that 
could be found in the works commissioned by the German occupiers, preferring instead to 
content himself mostly with the argument that the Germanics were, as a group, not necessarily 
greater than the Romans or, as in the case of de Vries, greater than even Slavic peoples of the 
modern period, but rather, that the Germanics simply were not as barbaric as was otherwise 
taught.   
                                                 
172 There are twelve mentions of the word race in total, four of which refer to Nachenius’s work described below. 
See ibid., 6, 8, 16, 22, 25. 
173 In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 200–201. 
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Van Dam gives only hollow excuses for his refusal to make the work mandatory, noting 
that he does not have the necessary authority to compel usage of the works in the schools.  While 
that was technically true, his later efforts betray a willingness on his part to work toward the 
introduction of other such works, which suggests that his refusal to Roskam in 1941 was either 
due to timing or to the content of the works, rather than a lack of proper authority.  The question 
of timing cannot be ruled out by any means, nor can its insufficiently racial outlook or the 
question of Farwerck’s authorship of the book, who by this point in 1941 had lost all influence 
within the völkisch wing of the NSB and who had never had any real influence with the 
Germans.  It is also possible that a combination of factors led to van Dam’s decision, but which 
elements were most influential in his refusal will likely remain unknown.   
The second work that Roskam recommended to van Dam was written by Jan Coenraad 
Nachenius, entitled Beknopte geschiedenis van het noordras.174  Nachenius had a long pedigree 
in national socialist circles in the Netherlands.  He gained his interest in völkisch ideology in his 
youth through reading the work of the British-born, German racialist writer Houston Stewart 
Chamberlain.  A painter by trade whose artistic work focused on the landscapes of the Guelders 
province in the Eastern Netherlands, he was also a prominent racial theorist, plying his 
arguments in publications such as De Wolfsangel,175 which was a publication of the NSB’s Raad 
voor Volksche Cultuur176 and which would later be subsumed into Der Vaderen Erfdeel. 
Nachenius was actually one of the official founders of Der Vaderen Erfdeel, even if Farwerck 
had been the principle force behind its creation.  In spring 1940, Nachenius would be promoted 
                                                 
174 Herman Laagland, Beknopte Geschiedenis van Het Noordras (Amsterdam: Der Vaderen Erfdeel - 
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175 The Wolf’s Barb. 
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to editor of the official journal of Der Vaderen Erfdeel - also called Der Vaderen Erfdeel.  When 
the foundation Der Vaderen Erfdeel was reorganized in late 1940 into the Volksche 
Werkgemeenschap, under the leadership of Feldmeijer, the journal Der Vaderen Erfdeel was 
changed to the Volksche Wacht177 and published by Hamer.178  Like Volk en Bodem, Hamer was a 
successor publishing house to Der Vaderen Erfdeel, although Hamer had an even closer 
relationship to the SS as its official publishing organ tasked with propagating the Greater 
Germanic ideal within the Netherlands.  Nachenius would later be appointed to the 
Nederlandsche Kultuurraad and join the Nederlandsche SS, becoming the educational leader of 
the latter organization.179  He would end the war working in Berlin for the SS.180   
As his pedigree shows, he was not considered suspect by the German occupiers like 
Farwerck.  In fact, Nachenius gained even more influence as the occupation persisted.  The 
author of multiple books and articles in national socialist publications, his Beknopte geschiedenis 
van het noordras, which had originally been published under a pseudonym in 1938, was actually 
published a second time, with minor changes and under his own name by Hamer in 1944.181  The 
work itself, intended for secondary school instruction, was much longer than Het is anders dan 
men ons leerde, reaching one hundred thirty-seven pages, along with a sixteen-page appendix.  It 
is divided into five main chapters, each with several sub-units, covering the development of the 
Nordic Race, Neolithic culture, the spread of Nordics throughout the world, and the rise of the 
Germanics.   
                                                 
177 Völkisch Guard. 
178 Schöffer, Het nationaal-socialistische beeld, 278; See also In ‘t Veld, De SS en Nederland, 514–16. 
179 Vormingsleider. 
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In what can only be described as a testament to why historians and artists should 
probably steer well clear of evolutionary biology, Nachenius begins his work with an 
introduction that compares the development of the Nordic race with the breeding of sheep and 
hunting dogs, even if he couches his comparison with the note that humans are more complicated 
than animals.182  Extremely important to this racial development is the climate in its broadest 
sense, according to Nachenius.  In what is essentially an argument based on a racialized 
understanding of natural selection, Nachenius argues that certain races became adapted to the 
northern European climate during the last ice age, while others faltered and were extinguished.  
What was left was the Nordic race, a race whose characteristics are both external, that is its 
phenotype, as well as a part of its inner posture: “race is disposition, including [the] spiritual.”  
Naturally, the inner disposition of the Nordic race is that of ruler, specifically a “ruler with self-
control.”183  After discussing the physical characteristics of the Nordic race, including a climate-
based argument that the Nordics must have originated in Northern and Northwestern Europe, not 
in Asia, the Middle East, or Africa, Nachenius moves on to various Neolithic cultures.184   
His description of Neolithic Europe is cursory in its coverage, subsuming the various 
cultures into three major groups: the Funnelbeaker culture, the Linear Pottery Culture, and the 
Middle Danubian culture.  He argues that the first two were definitely of the Nordic race, while 
the third was mostly of a foreign race, using both anthropological and archaeological evidence to 
argue that, at best the ruling faction of the Middle Danubians were of the Nordic race.  This 
Nordic influence eventually overran the foreign racial influence in the Middle Danubians, such 
that when later cultures emerged, such as the Ancient Greeks, they had significant Nordic 
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qualities, naturally through the influence of Nordic blood.185  After a second section on the 
landscape of Europe during the late stone age and a short description of the etymology of the 
Dutch term Noordras (“Nordic race”), Nachenius turns to the spread of the Nordic race 
throughout the world. 
Because the Nordic race, according to Nachenius, stems from Northern and Northwestern 
Europe, it is necessary to explain how, in contrast to the contemporary (and still current 
scientific) understanding of the origins of Indo-European peoples, the Nordic race spread from 
Northern Europe to the other areas that are populated by Indo-European speaking peoples, 
instead of the dominant thesis of an Indo-European homeland in Southern Russia along the 
Caspian Sea.186  Unsurprisingly, Nachenius argues that the upper classes of the “Aryan” peoples 
of the Middle East and South Asia were Nordic, although coming to South Asia via Southern 
Russia, using evidence as varied as archeology and literature.187  Somewhat curiously, in his 
section on the ancient peoples of the subcontinent, he compares the Aryan conquests with 
Tacitus’s description of later Germanic conquerors to argue that these people must have 
originated in Europe.188  While in and of itself not surprising, it is curious because Farwerck uses 
the very same similarities to argue that Tacitus’s descriptions adhere only to a conventional 
Greco-Roman trope regarding anything foreign, and therefore cannot be trusted.189    
                                                 
185 Ibid., 25–32. 
186 The Kurgan Hypothesis, which is the dominant hypothesis today of the origins of proto-Indo-European peoples, 
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Regardless of the contradictory evaluation of Roman sources, the conclusion Nachenius 
comes to regarding the Indians is the same as other national socialist writers.  Through 
intermixing with non-Aryan peoples, they lost their purity and can no longer be considered part 
of the Nordic race.190  Similar arguments are made regarding the other larger group of Aryan 
invaders in Asia, the Iranians, although in this case, the influence of intermixing with local, and 
later subjugated, populations, including Greeks and Jews, meant that the original Aryan 
conquerors diluted their Nordic blood to a much greater extent than the ruling classes of India.191  
At this point, Nachenius also takes several paragraphs to discuss how Jewish culture and religion 
were influenced by Persian culture, and that through this interaction, as well as Persian influence 
upon Greece and later Islamic encounters, Persian culture had greatly influenced European 
culture.192  He closes the chapter with a shorter recounting of Nordic influence in East Asia, 
which was much lower than in South Asia, but still perceptible, not least because “it is quite 
possible that the great Confucius is a descendant of the Scythians,” who Nachenius argues were 
similar in racial make-up to the Aryans who would go on to conquer south Asia.193 
In Europe the situation was mostly similar to Asia.  Southeast Europe and the Eastern 
Mediterranean had originally been populated by a mixture of peoples, but by the time of the 
Greek heroic age, a conquering race, descended partially from the Middle Danubians, and also 
probably from the Linear Pottery Culture, and thus with a strong Nordic influence, conquered the 
area and set themselves up as the rulers.  It was these people that Homer discussed, according to 
Nachenius, in his epic poems of the heroic age of Ancient Greece.  Naturally, Ancient Greece 
then was a mixture of racial and cultural influences—and for Nachenius, culture is merely a 
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symptom of race, much in the same way that one’s internal spirit was a symptom of one’s race—
but in the Greek case, it was the Nordic influence that predominated and determined its 
essence.194  Thus all of the great cultural artifacts of Ancient Greece can be said to have been the 
result of Nordic influence.195 
The situation in the western Mediterranean was somewhat different, for this area was 
originally populated by the “western race,” which was the most closely affiliated race to the 
Nordic, having the same ancestors in the middle and late stone ages, but who had simply 
migrated south.  Nonetheless, there were also some other racial influences, personified by the 
Etruscans, who after their migrations into Italy from the areas around the Danube, assimilated the 
culture of the original Indo-Germanic, “western race” inhabitants.  Thus, the original Romans, 
while not necessarily Nordic themselves, was descended from the Nordic race.  Eventually these 
original inhabitants became the patriciate, while later additions to the Roman polity became the 
plebeians.  But again, intermixing with these lesser peoples, according to Nachenius, led to the 
decline of the Romans by the time of the imperial period.  Equally important to this decline was 
the role of other Nordic peoples, especially the Macedonians and Alexander.  Himself a Nordic, 
as all Macedonian nobles were, Alexander was a purveyor of the false idea of equality among 
peoples, and through his efforts at integrating the peoples of his empire, allowed for the 
influence of various outside, non-Nordic ideas which helped lead to a cultural degeneration of 
Rome, as it adopted Hellenistic cultural norms.196   
The other major part of the “western race” were the Celts.  Originally a part of the Nordic 
Race, the original Celts came from what is today southern Germany.  Eventually, through 
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migration, they settled in various locations, but principally in present-day France, Spain, and 
Northern Italy, and there acted as a sort of buffer zone between the Romans and the Germanics.  
As a result of this influence, not necessarily intermixing with other races, the Celts developed 
into a different race, one that spoke Romance languages and was strongly influenced by the 
peoples to their south.197  It is here that Nachenius’s argument that the landscape and 
environment, as much as the blood, comes to its fullest form.  It was not that blood mixing with 
foreign races changed the Celts from Nordic to “western,” rather that the cultural influences of 
Rome and other Mediterranean peoples, whether language, art, or spirit, caused the 
transformation, although, especially in France, this would be combined with later race mixing 
with eastern and colonial peoples, such that by Nachenius’s time the French had been 
“bastardized.”198 
In his final section, Nachenius devotes the entire chapter to the Germanics, which he 
notes could have just as easily been included in the previous chapter on European groups.  
Rather, he chooses to put the Germanics in their own chapter for two reasons.  First, because 
they are still living in the same area as the original Nordics and are therefore also the direct 
descendants of those peoples.  Second, and perhaps more importantly for the author’s didactic 
purposes, “there is no doubt that they are still the culture-creating power in the North and North-
West, and—it is a serious word—the last reserves of the Nordic race.”199  The rest of the chapter 
takes up the history of the Germanics from the late Stone Age through the Early Middle Ages, 
focusing first on anthropology and archeology, and then moving into historical inquiry proper.200  
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But the emphasis in all of this is on the maintenance of the race, of which the Germanics of old 
were acutely aware.  Further, Nachenius exhorted his readers to respect this tradition: 
It is necessary to write about it [i.e., the racial consciousness of the Germanics] extensively in order to 
gradually get back to something like that, to awaken this consciousness, in the hope that, at the eleventh 
hour, the downfall of the Nordic race can be reversed.  For “the last reserves” of this race will also 
irrevocably go the way that all the waves of this race have gone, they will fade for the last time, wasteful of 
blood by negligence, by disobeying the “holy order,” through neglecting the conservation and improvement 
of the race by means of superior families.201  When we preach this, the dazed, short-sighted ones call out: 
idolization of the race, but we know that we obey our conscience, that we do not “exalt” ourselves, in 
overestimating the powers that are in us, but that we are reflecting on the most sacred thing that awakens in 
our minds, and that we feel as in harmony with the creation, as an outgrowth of God [is] in us, as our 
farthest ancestors must have felt in the religious representations of their time, which in essence (not in 
form) are also ours, therefore we are not deterred, but work with dogged earnestness to this awakening, 
before it is too late.  It may sometimes seem hopeless—we do not ask but do our duty.  How this insight 
can be converted into practice, cannot be treated here, but the practice must be preceded by the awakening 
of responsibility and we can do that by learning from the history of the Nordic race.202 
 
In their overall tenor, the two works suggested by Roskam are similar to those directly 
created or suggested by the occupation regime.  All of the works serve to promote the Germanic 
element in the Netherlands specifically, and Northern Europe more broadly, with the specific 
goal of educating young minds about their place within their race and their race’s place within 
the larger world.  That the works written by Dutch authors prior to the occupation were never 
introduced in schools does not take away from their content or the didactic purpose that is clear 
in the writings.  While it is not entirely clear, beyond van Dam’s hollow excuses, why these 
works were not suitable for introduction into the schools, especially in the ideologically reliable 
Nachenius’s case, van Dam’s reaction to the works as worthy of a broader audience testifies to 
their acceptable content, even if the author of one of the works, Farwerck, was seen as suspicious 
by the regime itself.  In fact, all of these works, both those written before the invasion and those 
written after, fit into a larger schema of Nazi historicization of the Netherlands that was favored 
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by the occupation regime, and which, especially after the occupation began, became increasingly 
popular among historical writers writ large. 
A Nazi View of Dutch History 
Much like the political landscape of National Socialism in the Netherlands prior to the 
German occupation, there was no singular, national socialist view of Dutch history.  Beyond an 
overt glorification of the high-points of the Dutch past, such as the acts of the water-geuzen and 
sea-faring exploits of the early modern Dutch state, probably the most common theme was the 
importance of the language barrier as being the defining element of what made up the 
Netherlands—that is to say that most, but not all, Dutch Nazi historical thinkers viewed the 
boundaries of the Dutch nation as being coterminous with the boundaries of the Dutch language, 
rather than being the political boundaries of the modern Dutch state.203  This is in lock step with 
the more popular political ideology of Dutch national socialist parties that followed the Diets 
ideology, to say nothing of their nineteenth century German counterparts, as discussed in 
chapters two and three.  But moving beyond that general framework, which itself was not 
universal among such thinkers, there is little to unify the historical views of the majority of Nazi-
inclined historians in the pre-occupation Netherlands.   
As discussed in chapter two, there was a growing movement for the study of the Low 
Countries in Germany in the early twentieth century, although for various reason, this was, more 
often than not, subsumed under the field of German Studies.204  Centered at the Universities of 
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Bonn and Cologne, especially the latter, a diverse group of thinkers came to see the peoples of 
the Low Countries as ethnically related to the German nation.  Although this work, subsumed 
under the title Westforschung was not overtly tied to völkisch, racialist thinking, there was a 
strong overlap between the two, with many scholars engaged in the Westforschung espousing 
völkisch beliefs.  With the onset of the Nazi dictatorship, this overlap became much stronger.205   
In 1935, Dr. Walter Frick, an official at the Reich Education Ministry in Berlin set forth a 
fifteen-point program for historical scholarship and instruction designed to bring historical 
education into line with the “decreed science” that was representative of national socialist 
scholarship.206  Historical instruction and scholarship in a national socialist mold should, 
according to Frick, include: 
1) Role of prehistory in which is emphasized the high civilization attained by the ancestors of the Germanic 
race. 
2) Role of the primitive race in which are prefigured all the great peoples and personalities of Germanic 
origin. 
3) Role of the racist and national idea as opposed to the internationalist ideal so perilous to the German 
people, too much inclined to dreams and utopias. 
4) Role of the great Germanic community scattered throughout the world and inseparably linked to the 
destiny of the Reich. 
5) Role of political history which surveys the ensemble of large historic periods and takes account of their 
laws. 
6) Role of the idea of heroism, in its Germanic form, which is inseparable from the idea of chief and leader. 
7) Role of the heroic ideal, peculiar to the German race, always compelled to assert itself against an 
encirclement of enemies. 
8) Role of the great migrations of peoples since the glacial epoch, which have determined the history of the 
Germanic race and assured the preponderance of Indo-Germanic languages. 
9) Role of the great Germanic migrations into Asia and Africa which explain the pre-excellence of the 
Egyptian and Sumerian civilizations. 
10) Role of the mixtures of races, with disastrous consequences—to be extensively developed and 
explained. 
11) Role of the ancient Greeks, closest brothers of the Germanic race, with explanation of how they 
succumbed when the population declined and they were outnumbered by inferior and democratic races. 
12) Role of the great Germanic migrations into Italy, France, Spain, and England, which explain the 
preponderance of these countries over Russia and the Balkans, which have not been fertilized by new 
blood. 
13) Role of the conquest of territory east of the Elbe. 
14) Role of modern history which shows how Germany was too easily receptive to alien influences, and 
then lost consciousness of her own qualities, through lack of knowledge of the laws of blood. 
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15) Role, in particular, of the last twenty years in the course of which Germany, having struggled against 
the coalition of her enemies, was betrayed by forces hostile to the nation and led to the verge of ruin by 
liberal and Marxian ideologues, carried down to the day when, in a heroic resurgence, she gave herself to 
National Socialism.207 
 
The points outlined by Frick are clearly visible in the works that were intended for school 
instruction in the Netherlands during the occupation.  In fact, if one substitutes “the Netherlands” 
for “Germany” in the last two points, they fit nearly perfectly.  There are some slight variations, 
such as Nachenius’s use of the term “Nordic race” in favor of “Germanic race,” but that is a 
minor difference, with Nachenius seeing the Nordic Race as being the original race, and the 
Germanics being their direct descendants who had never been corrupted by “race-mixing.”  But 
by and large, it is easy to see how some works produced by national socialist authors prior to the 
German invasion as well as those produced directly on behalf of the German occupation were 
influenced by the points Frick proposed in the 1930s, even if direct evidence that this exact 
program was prescribed for the individual authors is lacking.208   
As in Germany, the ascendancy of Nazism via occupation also allowed for a greater 
consensus among Nazi-oriented historians in the Netherlands.  Very quickly after May 1940, the 
focus in Dutch Nazi historical writing shifted from an emphasis on language as being the 
defining characteristic of the Dutch nation to blood and race being the defining characteristics, 
although there was some pushback and variation within that larger shift.209  Beyond a shift in 
focus toward the racial, a more unified, but still not completely homogeneous, interpretation of 
the historical development of the Netherlands came into being.  This movement was led by both 
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Dutch and German Nazi scholars, intellectuals, and popular thinkers, including, but by no means 
limited to, Robert van Genechten, Tobie Goedewaagen, Alfred A. Haighton, P.E. Keuchenius, 
Hendrik Krekel, J.C. Nachenius, Franz Petri, Werner Reese, Robert van Roosbroeck, Christoph 
Steding, Rudolf Steinmetz, Johan Theunisz, and the father and son combination of Jan and Hans 
de Vries.210 
Through a close examination of these and dozens of other scholars and publicists who 
produced thousands of books, pamphlets, and brochures regarding the history of the Netherlands 
from a national socialist perspective, Ivo Schöffer has managed to sketch out a very general 
outline of Dutch history as seen through the lens of national socialist ideology.211  Without a 
doubt, the history of the Netherlands, according to this national socialist view, was a history of 
lost opportunities.212  By and large, the schema outlined by Schöffer fits with the histories 
presented in those works designed for primary and secondary education, even though Schöffer’s 
analysis focuses on the larger field of national socialist historical writing instead of those work 
intended for school instruction specifically. 
According to the national socialist conception of Dutch history, it had all started out 
along the right path.  In Antiquity, the Netherlands was populated by the same Germanic tribes 
as the rest of non-Roman Western and Northern Europe.  But unlike the previously held wisdom 
of humanistic, and especially Roman-Catholic tradition, these were not savages at all.  In reality, 
these people were “tall, upright, beautifully dressed with that strong, hard face and those steel-
blue eyes, entirely the National Socialist heroic ideal.”213  Their technology was by no means 
inferior, and in some cases, perhaps superior to that of the Romans, and of course, their warlike 
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nature was feared by their contemporaries, with heroes such as Julius Civilis and Arminius.  In 
any case, and perhaps most importantly for the racially-obsessed, völkisch faction of Dutch 
Nazis, their racial and genetic characteristics had carried through, unmolested, to the present 
day.214    
The history of the Franks was especially troublesome for national socialist scholars, for 
although the Franks definitely started as a Germanic tribe, their later Romanization resulted in 
the modern state of France, which itself was definitely not Germanic, even if Germanic elements 
could be found within its borders.  The general schema that resulted was to argue that the 
Frankish conquest had been mostly the result of its original Germanic element.  Under the 
Merovingians, these original conquerors had become Romanized as they pushed south and west 
toward Paris, the Seine, and the Loire (i.e., Neustria).  Alternatively, it was the Carolingians 
whose strongly Germanic, un-Romanized nature, centered as it was on the Maas, Moselle, and 
Rhine regions (i.e., Austrasia), that managed to establish dominance later in the Early Middle 
Ages and halt the spread of Roman culture and language north and eastward.  Thus, using this 
scheme, the national socialist scholars could argue that not only was Charlemagne really 
Germanic, but they could also explain the language border that arose between the Low German 
languages of the Lower Rhine Valley and northern Low Countries and the Romance languages 
further south.215 
Charlemagne himself had been, prior to the Second World War, somewhat problematic in 
the national socialist mind.  The Saxon Wars; Charlemagne’s turn toward Rome and the Church, 
which led to further Romanization of the Germanic world; his embracing of Christianity and his 
Christianizing mission; and his effort toward universal, rather than Germanic, empire were all 
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parts of his legacy with which true-believing Nazis took issue.  But during the war, a sort of 
rehabilitation of his image took place.216  His wars against Saxons were perhaps unfortunate, but 
he could not be blamed entirely.  They were, after all, not different than later intra-German wars, 
such as those between Frederick Barbarossa and Henry the Lion or between Frederick the Great 
and Maria Theresa.  Moreover, he could not be faulted for a lack of a specifically Germanic 
identity, as no such identity had existed at that time, and even so, his focus on waging war to the 
east meant a turn toward the Germanic, instead of focusing to the South.  His turn toward Rome 
was mitigated with the argument that he had not actually wanted to be crowned by the Pope and 
he perhaps really wanted to subjugate the Papacy under his own rule.  That it worked out as it 
did, with the Pope crowning him was unfortunate, but hardly enough to throw away his legacy.  
And of course, the Nazis’ own efforts in Europe during the 1940s, which included domination of 
many non-Germanic peoples in Eastern Europe put Charlemagne’s universal ambitions in a new 
light.  And so, during the Second World War, many Nazi thinkers reevaluated their opinion of 
Karel de Grote and came away with a much more positive view.  He was, definitely, Germanic, 
a true leader of whom national socialists could be proud.217   
A similar veneer can be found for the rest of medieval history.  The various groups and 
events were all seen through the lens of those elements most dear to National Socialism: a 
strong, warlike nature; mythic elements; vitality; and above-all race.  In that vein, the Vikings 
were hardly blood-thirsty pillagers, but rather the bringers of Germanic vengeance who spread 
their blood from north to south and from west to east.218  The entire High and Late Middle Ages 
were particular high-points in both Dutch and German history.  This was the time of the 
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colonization of the east by Germanic peoples, which saw Dutch and Germans moving further 
east, establishing themselves over the native populations there.219  It was also the time of the 
Hanseatic League, the beginnings of which, at least, were viewed by many national socialists as 
a sort of pan-Germanic community.  While it was definitely an economic grouping, that element 
was downplayed in favor of emphasizing the “more ethical view of the excellent Germanic 
person” and his integration with his community, by focusing on the cities themselves, rather than 
the trading between them.220   
Even events that might otherwise be seen as disastrous were repainted in a positive light 
as much as possible.  So, the disintegration of the Carolingian Empire was actually a good thing, 
as it allowed for the permanent separation of Germanic and Romance cultures and languages.  
Far from a dissolution, the breakup of the Carolingian Empire was a reassertion of Germanic 
interests against proto-French domination, in what appeared to be remarkably similar argument 
to that used by Nazi historians for the explanation of Carolingian ascendancy, only with the 
Carolingians now representing French influence rather than being the bastion of Germanic blood 
and culture.221  Similarly, the domination of the Low Countries by the French Dukes of Burgundy 
was seen as a step in the wrong direction, with their connections to the French throne seen as 
pulling the Low Countries away from its Germanic roots.222 
But these minor setbacks were nothing in comparison to the tidal wave of problems that 
began with the onset of the modern period in the sixteenth century.  The breakaway of the 
Netherlands from the Holy Roman Empire, which started with the Dutch Revolt in 1568 was just 
the beginning of the downward spiral.  But even here, the focus of the historiography was 
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slightly altered.  Where previous historians like Treitschke had argued that the independence of 
the Low Countries had been a shortcoming of the Holy Roman Empire, national socialist 
historians, especially Hendrik Krekel, focused instead on the innocence of the Reich and played 
up the dissolution of the Netherlands as a single state through the breakaway of the Seven United 
Provinces from the larger Seventeen Provinces.223  This tactic of bemoaning the setbacks of the 
early modern and modern periods, but highlighting certain aspects as exceptions to this general 
rule was a reversal of sorts of the very same tactic which saw the medieval period as largely a 
sort of Germanic golden age with only certain low points. 
In this way, the geuzen, hardened by a strict adherence to Calvinism and led by the great 
leader William the Silent, were seen as a singular highlight of the otherwise disastrous Dutch 
Revolt.  The culprits, on the other hand, were the burghers and regents of the cities, focused as 
they were on economic gain instead of the well-being of the volk.224  In the same way, despite the 
growing commercialism and liberalism of the nineteenth century, national socialists could be 
proud of Dutch imperial exploits in South Africa and the Far East as well as growing German-
Dutch and German-Flemish contacts.225  Even at points that one might expect national socialist 
thinkers to see positive developments, such as the period of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, instead the focus is on the cause of the creation of that state through defeat by 
France, the dominance of the English in Northwest Europe, and the state’s eventual dissolution 
into the Netherlands and Belgium in 1830.226 
But, in the grand scheme of things, none of this really mattered in the Nazi view of 
history, for in 1940, the German savior had come to help their Germanic brothers find their 
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rightful place among the peoples of Europe.  It would awaken within the Dutch nation the 
völkisch, Germanic thinking whose absence had been at the root of so many of the problems of 
the previous centuries.  The problems of the past would be corrected through the dynamism of 
the coming future.   
Voorbije tijden: vaderlandsche geschiedenis voor de lagere school 
The Nazi view of history was substantially different from that which had been taught in 
Dutch schools prior to the German invasion.  Although, to a certain extent, there was some 
penetration of Germanic ideas regarding historical instruction among the far-right of Dutch 
society, this view of history had in no way penetrated the educational establishment.  While 
some teachers certainly were NSBers, even members of the völkisch wing of the party, their 
teaching material was strictly traditional.  This was, after all, one of the primary reasons that 
occupiers decided to both censor school books and attempt to introduce new, more Nazi-oriented 
works.   
One such work that was deemed unworthy of use in education during the German 
occupation was the primary school history book Voorbije tijden: vaderlandsche geschiedenis 
voor de lagere school by J. Dijkstra.227  Dijkstra, who was a school head in The Hague, was a 
prolific author of history textbooks during the 1920s and 1930s.  His various works were 
designed for all levels of education in the Netherlands, from primary education to the teacher 
training colleges.  His textbook Voorbije tijden had multiple editions designed for both primary 
and lower secondary schools, beginning no later than 1926, with later editions being published in 
1928, 1929, 1932, and 1933.  Given the prolific nature of his work, it was likely relatively widely 
                                                 
227 J. Dijkstra, Voorbije Tijden C: vaderlandsche Geschiedenis voor de Lagere School, 3e Leerkring (tot 1648) (’s-




used in schools, although given the decentralized nature of Dutch education in the pre-
occupation period, it is impossible to determine exactly how widespread its use actually was.  On 
the other hand, it does not appear on any of the lists of banned books, which may indicate that its 
use was not terribly widespread.228  However, given that it most certainly was used at schools in 
The Hague, the failure of the school book control commission to notice it was more likely an 
oversight on the commission’s part and a testament to how enormous the task of censoring the 
entirety of Dutch school literature truly was.   
The book did come to van Dam’s attention, via Goedewaagen, when, in November 1943, 
F. J. Meijer informed the Goedewaagen about the less-than-satisfactory content of the book.  
Describing the chapters over the Germanics of antiquity as “rubbish” and “nonsense,” Meijer 
noted that such material “in the present time” would cause the “spirit of our children to be 
poisoned.”229  In fact, when one compares the material in Dijkstra’s work with those that more 
closely conform to the national socialist view of Dutch history, it is clear that Meijer had 
definitely found a work that was, at least from a Nazi perspective, worthy of disdain.   
Using Roman authors, especially Tacitus and Caesar, as his sources, Dijkstra notes that 
the Germanics were “true nomads” who subsisted off of hunting and fishing, and when they had 
free time engaged in gambling and drinking.  They did little in the way of farming, but when 
they did, it was exclusively the work of women and slaves.  They clothed themselves with 
animal pelts, although he does note that they wore linen cloth as well.  They lived in what could 
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best be described as “little more than clay huts.”230  Their religion, which was based on nature, 
was actually a “terrible superstition” which saw every elderly woman as a witch to be abused.231 
If the description of the Germanics was not bad enough, Dijkstra’s argument regarding 
the Romans was much worse, from a national socialist point of view.  The “most highly 
civilized” Romans were “much, much more developed” than the Germanics, with their roads, 
cities, and palaces, and as such practiced a “civilizing influence” upon them.  This included 
increases in commerce, through Roman roads and trading materials such as coinage, better 
agricultural practices, and the knowledge of digging wells and finding non-riverine water 
sources, allowing the Germanics to settle land further away from rivers and streams, which had 
not been possible prior to Roman contact.232  Naturally, this higher form of civilization led to 
Roman military dominance, against which the Germans eventually unsuccessfully rebelled. 
Dijkstra makes no mention of Arminius at all, while noting that the rest of the rebellions against 
Roman dominance were all eventually defeated.  It was only the later Germanic migrations of the 
5th century that ended (western) Roman imperium.233   
Post-Roman life, according to Dijkstra, was not entirely dissimilar to Germanic life 
during Roman times.  Many of their customs remained, including a division of people into free 
and unfree, the latter including both serfs and slaves.  They continued to hold proto-assemblies in 
the open air in which free men could discuss the future of the community, offer sacrifices to their 
gods, and try criminals for their offenses.  These “trials,” ordeals really, included such actions as 
an accused holding their hand in fire with innocence being proved by a lack of harm.  
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Alternatively, the accused might be thrown into water where floating was a sign of guilt.234  And 
then came Christianity.  After spending several pages discussing the Christianization of the 
Netherlands, in which individuals such as Radboud of Frisia, who it will be recalled, according 
to Werner vom Hofe, Peter Seifert, and Werner Steinbacher in their De Germaansche 
Nederlanden, had “remained loyal to his race and his fatherland.” For Dijkstra, however, 
Radboud was nothing more than a “Christian-hater” who stood in opposition to the Irish 
missionary Willibrord’s efforts to bring the faith to the Netherlands.235  Of course, in both 
accounts, Christianity eventually prevailed against Germanic paganism, but according to 
Dijkstra, this was very much a positive development, for one Christianity was adopted “one 
could see the blissful effects: bondage was softened, wives were raised from slave-status, the 
desire for revenge was curbed, [and] alcoholism was contested.”236  There could hardly be a more 
of a contrast between the Germanic period as presented by Dijkstra and the very same presented 
by later, national socialist authors.   
Another period of Dutch history on which national socialist historians focused was the 
Dutch revolt.  As the author of Over volk en vaderland noted at the end of the chapter on the 
Dutch Revolt, the very same treaties that had given the Netherlands its de jure independence also 
marked the end of the devastating Thirty Years’ War and the beginning of the end of the Holy 
Roman Empire.237  Dijkstra’s recounting, however, does not even mention Germany in the five 
chapters he spends on the Dutch revolt, save to briefly mention William the Silent’s brief self-
imposed exile there and his raising of mercenary troops.  The Thirty Years’ War and the decline 
of the Holy Roman Empire go unmentioned entirely.  Where later Nazi historians would bemoan 
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the breakaway of the Netherlands from the Holy Roman Empire and the lack of unity among the 
entirety of the Low Countries, Dijkstra does no such thing, moving triumphantly from the Peace 
of Münster to the Golden  Age and the establishment of the Netherlands as a colonial and world 
power.238  In fact, the entire last forty per cent of the book that includes the chapters covering the 
ascension of Charles V and Phillip II through to the end of the work, offer a predominantly 
triumphant narrative of Dutch resolve in the face of overwhelming odds, the eventual successes 
that resolve achieved, and the subsequent reward, in the form of Dutch independence, the 
subsequent Dutch Golden Age, and the formation of a colonial empire.  This is explicitly and 
unapologetically a Dutch story.  There is no bemoaning of the lack of unity among “Germanics” 
here or even among the people of the Low Countries; this is purely a patriotic Dutch history 
celebrating the very events that make the Dutch unique among those larger groups.  It is no 
wonder that the German occupiers and their sympathizers would find the book problematic.   
Conclusion 
Of all the German occupiers’ many attempts to instill a more Germanic identity among 
Dutch youth through educational initiatives, the most concerted effort was put toward the 
creation of new school books, especially history books, aimed at this end.239  This effort was not 
entirely limited to the Netherlands either. In February 1944, a group of German, Austrian, and 
Dutch scholars met in Salzburg to discuss an all-encompassing Germanic history book.240 Unlike 
the other books that Nazis had tried to introduce into Dutch schools, this work was meant to be 
applicable everywhere, from Norway to Austria to the Netherlands and everywhere else in 
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between, although all of those in the planning meeting were either German, Austrian, or Dutch. 
Nothing came from the planning session beyond a commitment to continue working on this idea, 
but the continued efforts of the Nazis to recast history along Germanic lines in such a way as to 
bring together the Germanic peoples of Europe is indicative of the importance leading 
ideologues placed on Germanic identity and historical education as a way to inculcate that in, not 
just the Netherlands, but the wider European populace under Nazi control.241 
The Nazis attempted to use historical education to re-create and reshape the way that 
Dutch youth thought about their society, its past, and its place within the larger European world 
in order to instill a völkisch spirit, often called a vaderlandsche or volksche geest.242  Pre-
occupation historical works like Voorbije Tijden focused on an overtly national identity, with the 
history of the Netherlands and the Dutch people viewed through the singular lens of the Dutch 
nation and its interactions with the wider world.  Everything else was secondary, filler material 
aimed at giving context to the uniquely Dutch story taking place.  The heroes of these works 
were Dutch patriots, like William the Silent and Prince Maurice, father of the Zuiderzee Works 
Cornelis Lely and liberal constitutional reformer Johan Thorbecke.  Christianity, and especially 
Calvinism, were defining elements of what made the people of the Netherlands Dutch, and the 
adoption of Christianity was viewed as a positive development in the history of the Low 
Countries, helping to rid the country of dangerous superstitions.  Moreover, commercial, 
scientific, and artistic development; liberal parliamentarianism; the expansion of the franchise; 
and the establishment of a proto-welfare state were seen as victories for the Dutch people.  It 
was, by and large, a Whig-style history of progress, a movement of society from the dark into the 
light.   
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In contrast to this triumphant, national history, Nazi ideologues and historical thinkers 
promoted a pan-Germanic mindset.  The high point of his Germanic civilization had been in 
antiquity and the Middle Ages when Germanic peoples had understood the importance of their 
race.  They were united, more or less, through the apparatus of the Holy Roman Empire, but this 
changed with the transition to modernity when Dutch history became a history of setbacks and 
lost opportunities.  First was the independence of the Dutch from their Germanic brothers in the 
Holy Roman Empire, and then disunity among the peoples of the Low Countries themselves.  
Chances to make the most of that disunity, through the establishment of a strong, unitary state 
with a singular leader were defeated by urban merchant elites.  From there things only went 
downhill, as foreign powers took control of the country, liberalism was cemented as the 
governing ideology, and the people were divided along confessional and political lines.  The 
Netherlands ended up as a weak state, unable to protect itself.  But worst of all, it was 
disassociated from the Germanic world, taking instead its cues from France and England.  The 
Dutch had, according to Nazi thinkers, lost their place in the world, unaware of the most 
important and defining aspects of historical and cultural development: their Germanic identity.  
Luckily, the Germans, with their racially conscious National Socialism would help the Dutch 
find their true calling and return the Netherlands to the greatness it deserved as members of a 
ruling Germanic ruling class.   
The change in emphasis exhibited by Nazi historical theorists displays their 
understanding of what it truly meant to be Dutch.  The true meaning of Dutchness was as a 
constituent member of the larger Germanic community.  The place of the Netherlands lay at 
Germany’s side, and together they would, along with other Germanic nations, lead the future 
Europe into a new era defined by their own perceived racial superiority.  When the Netherlands 
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had strayed from this path, as it had in the modern era, it was met with setbacks and defeat.  
Even in those areas where the Dutch had shown characteristics of what the Nazis viewed as 
greatness, such as the establishment of a Dutch colonial empire across the seas, the emphasis was 
always on what could have been if the Netherlands had had the powerful German nation standing 
alongside it.243   
The changes to the historical curriculum were meant to foster this cultural identity among 
Dutch youth, and these efforts were part of a larger educational project with the same end goals, 
which itself was part of a larger cultural project aimed at transforming Dutch identity writ large.  
As the highest levels of the Nazi leadership understood, education was a tool that could be used 
to shape the youth in much the same way that propaganda could be used to shape the larger 
populace.244  But much as resistance to Nazi designs began to pervade Dutch society, in the 
classroom Nazi educational “reformers” experienced significant resistance to the changes they 
hoped to implement.245  The following chapter turns to the local level, with a focus on the two 
extraordinary school inspectors tasked by the regime with maintaining peace and order in the 
schools. Through a close examination of their work, as well as the many complaints regarding 
anti-regime activity on the part of students, teachers, and administrators that made their way up 
the hierarchy to the Education Department in The Hague, it will be shown that the majority of 
Dutch students, teachers, and administrators had little use for their new German overlords and 
the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Netherlands. 
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Chapter 7 - Chaos and Disorder in the Schools1 
 
Again and again there are noticeable signs of a destructive and negative attitude, which presents itself in the 
spreading of rumors and jokes, the slandering of the Germans and [our] fellow countrymen, the passing on and 
writing down of childlike, indeed repulsive, nonsense. …In particular, every terror against teachers and pupils with 
national socialist convictions must also be strictly suppressed. - Jan van Dam, January 29, 19412 
 
Thus far the focus of this study has been placed upon the efforts of the German 
administration and their Dutch collaborators in the education realm during the Nazi occupation 
of the Netherlands in the Second World War.  That is, the focus has remained upon the upper 
echelons of the administrative and educational apparatus in the Netherlands, the actions of men 
like Heinrich Schwarz and Jan van Dam.  This chapter will deviate slightly from that focus to 
look more closely at what was happening in the schools themselves.  It will approach this topic 
from two perspectives.  First, it will look at the efforts of the men appointed by the government 
to enforce “peace and order” within the schools.  These men, Piet van Rossem and Dr. D. G. 
Noordijk, stood outside of the already extant School Inspectorate and were tasked with, mostly, 
combating anti-German and anti-NSB actions on the part of teachers, administrators, and 
students, although Noordijk’s commission expanded significantly as the occupation entered its 
third calendar year.3   
It should be noted from the outset, however, that there was a bit of a divergence between 
the ways in which “peace and order” were described by the government and what was actually 
going on in the schools themselves.  For the most part and for the overwhelming majority of 
students, teachers, and administrators, school life went on more or less the same as it had before 
the occupation began.4  With the exception of higher education, which saw significant 
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disruptions during the occupation as a result of both university closures and the forced-labor 
service, the larger educational establishment continued to operate as usual.  Schools remained in 
session and most students kept attending classes, except for those students forced out of the 
classroom because of their Jewish heritage.  While there were occasional student revolts, with 
the exception of some unrest that followed the dismissal of Jewish civil servants, there were no 
large scale, nationwide protests or strikes in primary or secondary education, as occurred at the 
universities.  Those strikes and protests that did occur were limited to a single school and lasted 
no more than a day.  For the most part, peace and order as a modern reader would understand it 
actually reigned throughout the occupation period, despite the changes the occupation regime 
hoped to implement.   
Despite that, however, the government was overwhelmingly concerned with maintaining 
“peace and order” in the schools and was decidedly suspicious of the regular school inspectorate 
tasked with enforcing it.5  But it is on this point that the occupation regime’s definition of “peace 
and order” is betrayed, as what the government meant by “peace and order” was really the 
removal and/or suppression of anti-NSB or anti-German elements from the schools.6  If a teacher 
was thought to have been imparting anti-regime politics to the students, that threatened “peace 
and order.” Similarly, if students, teachers, or administrators demonstrated against the regime or 
engaged in acts of harassment against NSB colleagues or students, that was seen as disrupting 
“peace and order.”  To the extent that these types of actions occurred, the occupation authorities 
viewed the educational establishment as needing a reestablishment of “peace and order.”  It was 
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these types of acts, after all, that were at the center of the overwhelming majority of 
investigations conducted by van Rossem and Noordijk.7   
The second focus of this chapter is on those actions actually taken by administrators, 
teachers, and students that contributed to the regime’s belief that chaos and disorder ruled in the 
schools.  These actions ran the gamut from passive protests through the wearing of political 
insignias such as Nederlandsche Unie badges to active harassment of NSB connected 
individuals, up to and including physical violence.8  Most of the passive and active resistance 
performed by teachers, administrators, and students did not necessarily affect the functioning of 
the classroom itself.  Passive resistance was, by its very nature, mostly non-disruptive, even if 
the occupation authorities took a dim view of it, while more active resistance, actions like the 
bullying and harassment of NSB students and teachers, tended to affect the victims specifically 
more than the entire classroom more generally.  Both types of resistance to the occupation 
regime were widespread if the records of the two extraordinary inspectors and the complaints 
that made it to the Education Department are any indication. All of these actions, when taken 
together, suggest a widespread disdain on the part of students and teachers for the occupation 
regime and its supporters in the education realm, but do not necessarily evidence a widespread 
state of chaos within the schools, even if the government often described it so. 
These types of anti-regime demonstrations, whether by students or teachers, were among 
the few ways that students and teachers could demonstrate their anti-regime feelings without 
exposing themselves to the risk of retaliation.  Occasionally students and teachers were actually 
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suspended, fired, and even arrested for the actions they took inside the schools, but such 
instances were comparatively rarer.  Rather, the most common punishment such individuals 
received as a stern warning from the educational inspectors or van Dam.  For this reason, 
resistance through the creation of “chaos and disorder” in the schools offered students and 
teachers a relatively safe way to protest the occupation regime, and given the option, many 
Dutch students and teachers took it.   
Finally, it is difficult to argue with any certainty that the actions of teachers and students 
toward their NSB or German-oriented colleagues was tantamount to a specific rejection of the 
Nazi occupiers’ Germanic project in the Netherlands, as opposed to a rejection of foreign 
occupation more generally.  In most cases, those accused of anti-regime activity denied the 
allegations against them rather than offering a motive for their purported actions.  Nonetheless, 
passive and active resistance against the regime and their local representatives, whether those 
representatives were government officials or simply members of NSB organizations, 
demonstrated a rejection of the occupation regime in its entirety on the part of those who 
committed such acts.  Therefore, it is not necessary in my view to be able to prove exactly what 
motivated anti-regime agitators in the schools.  Given the antipathy that many Dutch students 
and teachers displayed toward the German occupation regime, it is extremely unlikely that they 
were disdainful of the messengers while at the same time indifferent to or even supportive of the 
message itself.  This is all the more true because the German occupiers tried to put a positive 
spin on their occupation during the initial “hearts and minds” phase, and yet, active and passive 
resistance in the schools was prominent right from the very start of the 1940-1941 school year.  
Most Dutchmen and women simply viewed the occupation with scorn, and that scorn extended 
to any policies the Germans tried to implement.  Had the Nazis’ Germanic project been 
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implemented by a democratically elected, native Dutch movement, it is certainly possible, 
although in my view still highly unlikely, that it would have been more readily accepted by the 
populace.9  But it was not instituted in such a way; rather, it was instituted by a conquering 
regime that was detested by the majority of the populace, and as such, was a nonstarter entirely.    
The Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar for Supervision of Peace and Order 
in the Schools 
 
The efforts of the government, whether by the German supervisory administration or 
their Dutch collaborators, to change the curriculum in schools could only be carried out if there 
were enforcers on the ground who made sure that local administrators, school heads, and 
teachers actually implemented the mandated “reforms.”  As briefly mentioned in chapters three 
and five, one of the first actions that the Germans took in this regard was to appoint the NSB 
teacher Piet van Rossem as the “Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar for 
Supervision of Peace and Order in the Schools.”10  Van Rossem, a Belgian by birth, fought in the 
Belgian Army during the First World War where he became involved with Flemish nationalist 
circles known as Activists who were willing to collaborate with the German army.  After the war, 
he fled to the Netherlands where he continued his studies and eventually became a teacher in 
Zwolle.11  Already a member of the NSB when the Germans invaded, van Rossem quickly made 
himself widely known as sympathetic to the occupiers.  When a local German official 
complained to the director of the lyceum where van Rossem taught about anti-German 
sentiments being spread by the student body, the director held an assembly wherein he, the 
                                                 
9 The failure of the liberal side in the school struggle should not be forgotten here as several of the initiatives of the 
occupation regime, such as gaining state control over education, had been the goal of the failed liberal bloc in the 
previous century. 
10 Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust, and Genocide Studies (NIOD) 114a/5; Nationaal Archief (NA) 
2.14.37/414. 
11 De Pater, Het schoolverzet, 48–49. 
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director, praised the German people.  In protest, several teachers walked out, and in response, 
two of them were arrested by the German security police.  It was widely believed that van 
Rossem had denounced the arrested teachers to the German authorities.12  Shortly thereafter, on 
November 15, 1940, van Rossem received his commission from Seyss-Inquart to inspect the 
schools.   
Van Rossem was directly empowered by Seyss-Inquart to investigate incidents in all 
schools, both public and private, save institutions of higher education, regarding the behavior of 
teachers in the classroom as it related to “peace and order.”  To further this effort, he was 
empowered to sit in on lessons; gather information, including making copies of documents; and 
conduct interrogations of faculty, staff, students, and other relevant parties.  He was then to 
submit the results of his investigation to Wimmer and suggest appropriate measures.13  To 
complete his work, van Rossem would need a certain amount of support, but unfortunately for 
him, Jan van Dam had been appointed to the position of Secretary-General of the Education 
Department shortly after van Rossem’s own appointment, and van Dam had little use for the 
Authorized Representative of the Reichskommissar.  Van Dam consistently worked to undermine 
the Authorized Representative in every way. For example, van Rossem requested a salary 
increase to the level of Chief Inspector of Secondary Schools, but van Dam countered with an 
increase to the level of Chief Inspector of Primary Schools, which was only equivalent with that 
salary of a regular Inspector of Secondary Schools.  Further, van Rossem requested that he be 
allowed two deputies, J. J. Valkenburg and P. R. Dijkema, and while van Dam initially declined 
                                                 
12 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, IV/678. 
13 NA 2.14.37/414. 
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this request, he eventually relented and allowed for the temporary installation of Valkenburg and 
Dijkema as van Rossem’s lieutenants for the period of three months.14 
To make matters worse for van Rossem, van Dam issued a series of instructions in early 
January 1941 regarding how van Rossem was to carry out his duties as Authorized 
Representative.15  First and foremost, van Dam noted, in contradiction to the actual order of the 
Reichskommissar, that van Rossem’s “work consists of conducting research into the behavior of 
teachers, who could be dangerous for the maintenance of peace and order in the schools … and 
issuing advice to the Secretary-General.”16  Further, any conclusions should likewise be brought 
directly to van Dam’s attention.  This restriction issued by van Dam was due to a certain amount 
of vagueness in the original order given by Seyss-Inquart.  That order stated that van Rossem 
was empowered to “investigate which teachers, according to their general behavior, do not offer 
or offer only an incomplete guarantee that peace and order reigns in school life, or those teachers 
who in their current assignment do not appear to be suitable for the development of the school 
system in the interest of the Dutch people.”17 Van Rossem understood this authorization to mean 
that his authority extended to more general personnel matters, but van Dam made clear that this 
was not the case—van Rossem was to be restricted only to actions that affected “peace and 
order.” 
When performing his work, van Rossem was to work in concert with the heads of the 
sub-departments (i.e., primary education, secondary education, etc.) within the larger Education 
Department and the existing school inspectors, and only in “very urgent cases” was he to venture 
out on his own without first informing the School Inspectorate, and even then, he was to inform 
                                                 
14 NA 2.14.37/414. 
15 NA 2.14.37/414. 
16 Van Dam, of course, claimed his instruction was in accordance with the authorization given by Seyss-Inquart. 
17 Emphasis added. 
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the School Inspectorate and the corresponding sub-departmental chief immediately afterward.  
Further, van Rossem was to steer clear of anything dealing with the appointment of teachers, as 
van Dam reserved that prerogative for himself, as he was soon to make public.18  Should van 
Rossem encounter any resistance in his activities, he was to inform van Dam, who would take 
care of the issue, for van Rossem was in no circumstances to attempt to counter any such 
resistance on his own.  Finally, he was to allow all teachers who came under suspicion to explain 
their actions in person.  There would be no decisions made based upon rumor and conjecture 
alone.19  In total, it was clear that van Dam was trying to curtail van Rossem’s personal authority 
and subsume it under his own. 
Naturally, van Rossem objected to many of the restrictions that van Dam attempted to 
place on his personal authority, especially the curtailment of his authority over general personnel 
matters.  In his reply to van Rossem’s objections, van Dam relented regarding the temporary 
installation of Dijkema and Valkenburg but noted that the curtailment of van Rossem’s 
jurisdiction over general personnel matters had been approved by Schwarz.  Moreover, he 
informed van Rossem, that, after consultation with the German authorities, it had been 
determined that not only were the appointments of Dijkema and Valkenburg temporary, so was 
van Rossem’s appointment itself.20  The power struggle between the two men that had begun 
almost immediately after van Dam’s appointment in November 1940, was ended, thanks to the 
support of Schwarz, in a decisive victory for van Dam by the end of January.  This sort of back 
and forth, in which both men attempted to assert their own authority would continue for the 
remainder of van Rossem’s time in office.   
                                                 
18 The Appointment Decree would be released to the public a few months later, on April 9. See NIOD 216e/14; 
Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete, Verordnungsblatt, 73/1941. 
19 NA 2.14.37/414. 
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Despite the restrictions that van Dam put in his way, van Rossem, along with his two 
colleagues, J. J. Valkenburg and P. R. Dijkema, proceeded to create more unrest in the education 
field than peace and order.  By and large, the actions of van Rossem’s office were sporadic, 
given the still large mandate they had to ensure peace and order.  In most cases the Authorized 
Representative or his deputies would receive tips from regime-oriented teachers or parents, or 
sometimes directly from Robert van Genechten, who had been appointed Solicitor-General in 
The Hague after he had failed to attain the top spot in the Education Department.  They would 
then investigate the circumstances of the incidents and recommend actions to be taken directly 
by Wimmer or van Dam.21  The tips van Rossem’s office received and the cases they investigated 
ran the gamut from ordinary issues of discipline that could be expected at any school in any age 
to specifically anti-German and anti-NSB activities that could border on the cruel and unusual. 
Despite the broad power granted to van Rossem and his deputies by Seyss-Inquart, 
however, their investigations took on a broad pattern for their entire tenure in office.  First, the 
incidents reported, such as the anti-German and anti-NSB actions of the students, whether 
directed at other students, teachers, or passers-by on the street, were encountered by van Rossem, 
Dijkema, and Valkenburg much more often than the more regular incidents of student 
misconduct.  This is, however, unsurprising given the nature of van Rossem’s mandate.  Those 
more typical incidents of poor student behavior generally did not fall under the purview of his 
office and so only reached his desk rarely, staying instead under the purview of the local 
administration or, if necessary, the regular School Inspectorate.  Second, upon receiving a report 
from van Rossem’s office, van Dam tended to turn the issue over to the local school inspectors to 
get a second opinion, most of whom were careerists in the Education Department and only a 
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couple of whom, at least at this early stage in the occupation, were NSB or German 
sympathizers.22  Finally, because van Dam trusted the reports provided by the local school 
inspectors more than those presented by van Rossem’s office and because he set himself up as 
van Rossem’s opponent, the punishments that the latter or his deputies suggested were often 
significantly curtailed, if an agreement on the facts was even possible in the first place, which 
was not always the case.   
Typical of the types of investigations handled by van Rossem’s office was one incident in 
Doetinchem, a small town to the east of Arnhem, near the German border.  In March 1941, 
Dijkema received a tip from a local NSB official regarding a whole range of illegal activity at the 
public lyceum there.  Among the activities being carried on by the students there was the illegal 
sale of stamps with the Queen’s portrait on them, purportedly with the approval of the school 
director.  After an investigation was conducted, it turned out that the student body at this school, 
with the tacit support of the administration, was practically in open revolt against the new 
regime, at least as much as could be expected from school students.  Accusations abounded, 
including the widespread distribution and display of stamps in support of both the Queen and the 
Nederlandsche Unie, death threats against the children of local NSB functionaries, harassment of 
a local NSB functionary and a German official on the street in front of the school, and a student-
led strike after the larger dismissal of Jewish civil servants.  To rectify the situation, Dijkema 
suggested the that the school director be dismissed from his position and transferred to another 
school as a teacher, that another involved teacher be suspended for a month without pay, and that 
one offending student be suspended for a month while a second student should be expelled for a 
year.  Van Dam availed himself of the local school inspector, who conducted his own 
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investigation, which established that many of the points Dijkema had made were, at least in the 
inspector’s eyes, and thus also van Dam’s, less than completely forthcoming.23 
The local school inspector noted that the incidents regarding the sale of Unie stamps had 
occurred not during the school day, were quite limited in nature, and the students were not even 
aware that it was against the rules.  Further, the director had, originally, no knowledge of the 
nascent black market that had developed, and when he did discover it, he put an end to it 
immediately.  The incident with the German official had been handled by the Germans 
themselves, with the offending student having been hauled down to the local police station and 
given a stern talking to, while an incident between another student and an NSB functionary had 
been handled by that NSB man himself, who got in touch with the student’s parents.  As for the 
school director, he was judged to be both competent and hard-working, taking every effort to 
clamp down on disorder, as evidenced by the lack of such since the new year had begun.  The 
teacher, on the other hand, was the victim of a series of misunderstandings.  The only issue that 
van Dam found concerning was the strike, but even then it was downplayed significantly, with 
the local school inspector noting that the strike had been spontaneous, lasted barely forty-five 
minutes, and ended when the teachers called the students back into class and discussed the 
inappropriateness of their actions.24  It was, for all intents and purposes, a total rebuke of 
Dijkema’s investigation and complete undercutting of the authority of the office of the 
Authorized Representative. 
As a result of van Dam’s constant use of local inspectors to undercut the authority of the 
Authorized Representative, van Rossem and his lieutenants were largely ineffective in their 
work.  Occasionally, because of the resistance that they faced from van Dam, van Rossem or his 
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subordinates would attempt to go over the head of the Secretary-General straight to Schwarz, but 
this did not usually have the desired effect.  On March 4, 1941, van Rossem wrote to Schwarz 
complaining about van Dam’s practice of having the regular school inspectors conduct secondary 
investigations of complaints regarding peace and order in the schools, thus undercutting van 
Rossem’s authority.25  Schwarz does not appear to have taken any action in response, as the 
practice continued unabated.  On April 22, Dijkema complained to Schwarz about van Dam 
undercutting his authority at the public secondary school in Winschoten, where the director was 
making his anti-NSB attitude known among the student body.  In this instance, instead of 
punishing or removing the director, van Dam sent a letter telling the director to knock it off.  
Again, Schwarz did not take any action to counter van Dam, as van Rossem was still 
complaining about the situation a month later, this time about a synagogue visit planned for 
students by that very same school director.26 
In fact, van Rossem made a similar appeal to Schwarz regarding the situation in 
Doetinchem and van Dam’s less than helpful reaction on May 29, more than two months after 
Dijkema’s initial investigation began.  But by this point, although van Rossem did not yet know 
it, he had been fired from his position as Authorized Representative.  After a discussion with van 
Dam on the subject of van Rossem in mid-May, Schwarz convinced Wimmer and Seyss-Inquart 
to remove the Authorized Representative’s mandate.  Wimmer had originally scheduled the 
removal to take place on May 25, but the actual order from Seyss-Inquart was only signed on 
May 26 and forwarded to van Rossem on May 29, apparently after he had sent his complaint 
about van Dam to Schwarz.  The official reason for van Rossem’s dismissal was that his office 
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had achieved its function to restore peace and order in the schools.  But that was purely a cover.  
In reality, anti-NSB and anti-German activity in the schools continued to be a problem for the 
authorities.  The real reason for van Rossem’s dismissal is that he had stood outside of van 
Dam’s authority, and van Dam had been acting to contain under his own control all elements of 
education in the Netherlands.  All van Dam really needed to do was to convince Schwarz of this 
necessity, which van Dam was able to accomplish in mid-May.27  The falsehood behind van 
Rossem’s dismissal was made clear when, a few weeks later, van Dam appointed a new 
functionary to fulfill the exact same role, but this time directly under his own authority.28   
During his time as Authorized Representative, which spanned about six months from 
mid-November 1940 to late-May 1941, van Rossem and his deputies fielded hundreds of 
complaints from cities and towns across the country.  The overwhelming majority of these 
complaints dealt with actions that were perceived to be anti-German and/or anti-NSB and the 
perpetrators of these acts came from all areas of the educational system, whether students, 
teachers, or administrators.  By and large, however, van Rossem and his lieutenants were 
ineffective in combating chaos and disorder within the schools.  At the ground level, the odds 
were simply stacked against them, as the overwhelming majority of both faculty and students 
were in some way opposed to the German occupation regime and their Dutch collaborators.  
Their efforts were made more difficult by the lack of support they received from van Dam, who, 
it should be noted, was looking out more for his own political authority within the educational 
system than he was acting on behalf of anti-German or anti-NSB students.  Not only did van 
Rossem represent a threat to van Dam’s own authority via his position outside the chain of 
command of the Education Department, van Rossem, as a member of the NSB, represented that 
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28 De Jong, Het Koninkrijk, V/347; Knippenberg and Ham, Een bron van aanhoudende zorg, 209. 
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sector of Dutch society that van Dam otherwise detested.  Van Rossem’s position, therefore, 
represented not just a threat to van Dam personally, but also the ascendancy of the NSB within 
education more generally.  By getting rid of van Rossem, van Dam was able to not only make his 
own position more secure, but also to remove the threat of the NSB in the education realm at the 
same time.29 
The Inspector of Education in General Service 
Only a few weeks after van Rossem was sacked by Seyss-Inquart, van Dam appointed a 
new functionary as extraordinary school inspector: Dr. D. G. Noordijk.  The official rules for the 
new “Inspector of Education in General Service” were approved August 29, and then published 
in the Nederlandsche Staatscourant, the official government bulletin on September 2.30  In large 
part, the new rules for Noordijk’s position as they regarded school inspections were essentially 
similar to those that van Dam supplied for van Rossem’s position the previous January, except 
for one major difference.  The new Inspector of Education in General Service also carried the 
authority to make suggestions and consultations regarding all hiring and firing of teachers and 
education officials, and in the case of primary education, the additional authority to mandate that 
any proposed personnel changes be brought directly to the attention of the Secretary-General.  
Thus, Noordijk held a weak veto power over appointments and dismissals in primary education, 
limited only by the direct authority of van Dam himself.  In exercising his right to give input on 
appointments, Noordijk was to pay special attention to “the suitability of the candidate to be 
employed in education in a manner and in a spirit, as would be expected in connection with the 
state of occupation of the Netherlands.”31    
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The weak veto that Noordijk held was more powerful than it might at first appear, 
however, because Noordijk was an old acquaintance of van Dam’s and had been one of the 
individuals van Dam consulted before the latter took up the position of Secretary-General of the 
Education Department.32  He was, according to van Dam, “my closest adviser from the very 
beginning and a colleague on all points where education had to be adapted to the current political 
situation.” At the same time, Noordijk was the one who was to carry out “the dirty work.”33  
Noordijk was trained as a Germanist and, at the time of his appointment, was a lecturer of 
German in The Hague.  He was also a member of the NSB, although more closely aligned with 
the SS faction thereof, and the Opvoedersgilde.  He was generally a bit more radical than van 
Dam in his ideological outlook, but because he was a member of the SS faction, as opposed to 
the Mussert faction, he suited van Dam’s purposes as Educational Inspector.34  Administratively, 
he was positioned directly under the Secretary-General, although he largely worked with the 
existing School Inspectorate.  This meant, from van Dam’s perspective, that there was a bit of a 
check on how much trouble the new Inspector of Education in General Service could stir up, lest 
he turn out to be as disruptive as van Rossem and his subordinates had been.   
In reality, Noordijk’s tenure as Educational Inspector was a continuation of the work van 
Rossem had begun.35  The cases that reached Noordijk’s desk were essentially similar to those 
that van Rossem had investigated, indeed he even took over cases that had originally been sent to 
van Rossem.36  For all intents and purposes, Noordijk’s office functioned as a sort of “universal 
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complaint bureau.”37  For example, at the Amsterdam Lyceum in summer 1942, one of the 
teachers was accused by an informant of having passed the collection plate in order to help a 
dismissed Jewish colleague.  Although this was a banned offense, the teacher, according to the 
complaint that reached Dr. Albrecht, who worked in Schwarz’s Main Department Education and 
Churches, replied, “I don’t care.  I do what I want.” As a result, Noordijk was sent to investigate.  
Upon reaching the lyceum, both the individual teacher and the school director were interviewed, 
steadfastly denying having passed the hat for their departed colleague.  Although Albrecht had 
wanted to dismiss both the teacher and the school director, Noordijk recommended that too little 
evidence existed for their dismissal and both remained in place for the foreseeable future.38  The 
same school also had problems with NSB-oriented students being bullied by their classmates as 
well as one teacher who was pro-German being disrespected by her students.  It got so bad for 
the NSB students that several students actually ended up switching schools to other institutions, 
while the teacher side-stepped the administration and took her complaints directly to Noordijk.  
The disruptions continued, however, until late 1941 when the school director finally started 
punishing the perpetrators with detention and ultimately suspensions.39 
In another instance at the Ambachtsschool in Amsterdam, one disruptive student was 
assaulted by his teacher—the teacher hit the student with a ruler—and then removed to the 
hallway.  When the student kept being disruptive from the hallway, the teacher sent him to the 
director’s office.  The student’s father, who was an NSB member, complained to Noordijk, 
suggesting that the cause of the problem was political and that the teacher was taking out 
frustrations with the regime on his son.  Although both the teacher and the school administration 
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insisted that the student himself was the cause of the problem, with his constant disruptions, 
Noordijk appears to have sided with the NSBer, recommending that the teacher be suspended for 
a week, which was carried out in early 1942.  The teacher’s assault on the student does not 
appear to have factored heavily into the punishment, rather the belief that his motives were 
political was the cause.40 
Sometimes, however, Noordijk’s investigations revealed what he considered to be good 
work on the part of school officials.  When one student at a private school in Cuyk was being 
harassed by other boys in his class, naturally because of politics, the school director sent 
circulars home with all students warning parents that future transgressions, that is bullying, 
would incur stiff penalties.  When the harassment of the one child continued, the perpetrators 
were suspended.  All of this had already occurred by the time Noordijk got around to 
investigating, and so he cut his investigation short, noting that the school director was doing 
good work to maintain peace and order.41 
These examples are typical of the types of inquiries that Noordijk’s office handled for 
most of the time he was on the job as Inspector of Education in General Service.  He would 
receive a tip or complaint, sometimes directly from the complainant him or herself, but also 
through other channels such as the police, van Genechten’s office, or through local NSB circles.  
He would then contact the school to inquire, which usually led to a personal investigation when 
possible or his reliance on the existing school inspectorate when he was not personally able to 
intervene.  He would then pass along his recommendations up the chain for further action by van 
Dam or one of their German supervisors.  In both style and function, he was the successor of van 
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Rossem.  But this all changed in 1942, as his own personal power to affect changes in personnel 
matters was expanded greatly.   
In January 1942, van Dam delegated to Noordijk the direct authority to fire teachers and 
other school inspectors.  This had not been one of the original powers granted to Noordijk by van 
Dam when the former was appointed and empowered in summer 1941.  Rather, this new 
authority was the result of an order by Seyss-Inquart from January 9, 1942, promulgated along 
with the Second Appointment Decree, which gave the Secretary-General the authority to fire 
teachers, when previously such personnel changes had required either the intervention of one of 
the German administrators, such as Schwarz, Albrecht, or Wimmer, or the compliance of the 
local authorities, whether schools boards, school directors, or mayors.42  Van Dam’s new power 
was further expanded in June of that year to include the ability to suspend teachers, 
administrators, and school inspectors.43  Van Dam quickly delegated his new authority to 
Noordijk, and in concert with the latter van Dam outlined the use of that authority in set of 
guidelines that was published on September 2.44   
The “Guidelines to Follow for the Implementation of Order Number 5/1942” outlined the 
duty of the educator to both uphold and pass along to the student a sense of solidarity with 
Germany, its government, and its people.  Key to this duty is an understanding of the 
volksgemeenschap.  Where the previous era of individualism, which was based on the ideas of 
the French Revolution, saw the volk as individuals merely living near each other, the present 
saw individuals living with each other, or as van Dam writes, it is the difference between an 
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orchard and a forest, where the former is simply “mechanical” and the latter is “organic.”  
Arguing that the Dutch owe loyalty to the German government and its people, not just because it 
was expected by the occupation authority, but also because of “common descent and 
neighborliness,” this loyalty and approval by the Dutch of the new ideas of volksgemeenschap 
“must now be attested to in education, especially in history education.”  And because the idea of 
a volksgemeenschap is “not only just an acclamation, but also a reality,” benefits for 
volksopvoeding can also be attained in the Netherlands through collaboration with Germany.45  
This required a defense of the youth from Bolshevism, which threatened their western ideals and 
Christian character, and support of the struggle, led by Germany, for the future of European 
civilization.46 
The guidelines were set up in two parts, one for school inspectors and one for teachers.  
With the exception of a single guideline directed specifically at school inspectors, which stated 
that they should never deny those teachers who support the new ideals of the volksgemeenschap 
appointments and promotions in favor of those teachers who do not support the new Europe, the 
entire list is the same.  Included among the combined set of guidelines were instructions that 
implored teachers and school inspectors to “face the music of the meaning of this time and that 
the exercise of their activities should bear witness [to that] in the formation of the youth.” 
Further, that they “at least should show understanding for National Socialism and appreciation 
for the work of its carriers in the Netherlands”47 as well as showing “appreciation for the struggle 
to orient the people toward the idea of community [gemeenschapsidee], for the position and 
work of the Greater German Reich which leads the way in the new Europe, and for the place of 
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the Dutch people therein, including its Germanic character.”48 Finally, the guidelines warn 
teachers and inspectors that they should work toward a better understanding between the Dutch 
and German peoples and should avoid any type of resistance and, indeed, work against any 
resistance activity.49 
Noordijk exercised his new powers broadly.  For example, in April 1942, he dismissed a 
teacher from his position in The Hague for making anti-German remarks.  The teacher was 
accused of telling a student, whose father had recently been released from a concentration camp, 
that the father would, in due course, attain a position of honor for the ordeal he had been forced 
to go through.  The teacher was subsequently arrested by the German police.  When questioned 
about his statements, the teacher suggested that he was merely reflecting the popular attitude of 
the public in The Hague but owing to this being his second infraction—the same teacher had 
made anti-German statements the previous December—he was fired from his position.50   
Similar situations were encountered across the country.  In Rotterdam at the 
Zeevaartschool, a teacher was fired for making anti-German statements, according to several 
students and the school director.51  While at the secondary school in Winterswijk, it was the 
gymnastics teacher who was causing problems by fostering an anti-NSB environment in his 
class.  Noordijk suspended the teacher pending an investigation, while the teacher was 
subsequently arrested and interred at the concentration camp at Amersfoort.  Shortly after his 
arrest, he was fired permanently.52  In Tilburg, at the St. Odulphus school, the school director 
was taken to account, not for having engaged in anti-German activity, but merely for not having 
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reprimanded students who hooted and hollered during a public film viewing.  During a school 
festival, a film was shown to some five hundred attendees, many students among them.  When a 
character named Adolf died in the film, the students erupted in laughter, but the school director 
did not respond to this provocation.  He was suspended pending an investigation, after which 
both the local school inspector and Noordijk both concluded that suspension was sufficient, 
given that the director was an otherwise upstanding citizen.  Their German superiors, however, 
felt that suspension did not go far enough, and ordered his removal, both from his position as 
school director and from his position as lecturer at the local university.  It was only through the 
direct intervention of Wimmer, who personally reviewed the case, that the dismissal was 
reversed, with the Commissioner-General noting that his actions were “exceptional” to the 
standard procedure.53   
Sometimes, the anti-German activity was not limited to a single teacher or administrator 
but was more widespread.  Such instances presented a problem for Noordijk as he could not very 
well close the entire school for anti-German activity.54  This was the case at a primary school in 
Neerbosch, near Nijmegen.  According to a local leader of the Opvoedersgilde, the entire school 
establishment, from the director and teachers, down to the students, exhibited strongly anti-
German sentiments.  Among the various accusations included the school director passing out 
Nederlandsche Unie pamphlets, passing along Radio Orange reports to students, singing anti-
German and anti-NSB songs, and hanging anti-NSB placards in the school hallways, as well as a 
general anti-German and anti-NSB teaching curriculum.  The school director steadfastly denied 
these accusations, but when he learned of an impending investigation by the local school 
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inspector instigated by Noordijk, the illegal placards were apparently taken down, again 
according to the Opvoedersgilde leader.  When the local inspector completed his report, it was 
determined that all of the accusations were basically correct.  The school director was eventually 
fired in June 1943, while the rest of the administration and faculty was given a stern talking to.55 
Although Noordijk was primarily concerned with anti-German sentiments, sometimes it 
was a teacher’s pro-German sentiments that brought on Noordijk’s investigation.  At the St. 
Antonius School in Voorhout, a teacher incensed the local clergy by proclaiming that “Christ 
was not a Jew.  He was the first and best National Socialist.” Complaints about the incident made 
Noordijk’s desk, who actually agreed that the teacher’s statements were uncouth.  After promises 
by the teacher to refrain from such pronouncements in the future, Noordijk recommended only a 
warning in April 1942.  The school board, however, felt this was insufficient, and so fired the 
teacher anyway.  The situation was brought to the attention of Dr. Zunft, a German official in 
Wimmer’s office, who ordered Noordijk to have the teacher reinstated, while others were to take 
the teacher’s place on the unemployment rolls for anti-German statements that had been 
uncovered during the course of the original investigation.56  Clearly, one needed to tread 
carefully when involving the authorities. 
In another case of being reckless when the authorities were near, a teacher in Groningen 
was at first cleared of wrongdoing through Noordijk’s investigation.  The teacher, who taught at 
one of the local secondary schools, was accused of having said in front of his class, upon the 
death of an NSB-oriented student, “It is good that the swine is dead, it was getting too hot for 
him.” Naturally, the teacher denied it completely, but when the local school inspector conducted 
an investigation at Noordijk’s request, it turned out that only a single student, also an NSB 
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sympathizer, was making the accusation, while the rest of the students in the class said it had 
never happened.  The teacher was cleared of wrongdoing, but then, unwisely, noted to another 
teacher that they need to be careful around the NSB sympathizer, because she was a tattle tale.  
That statement, which was obviously made to the wrong colleague, got him suspended and 
fined.57 
It was not just the actions of teachers inside of the classroom that garnered Noordijk’s 
attention.  A teacher’s actions outside of school could also become a cause for dismissal.  One 
teacher in Amsterdam at the Reseda School was picked up on the street for wearing a Jewish star 
in solidarity with the persecuted Jewish population in spring 1942.  She was subsequently 
sentenced to six months’ incarceration.  Upon receiving word of the incident from Albrecht, 
Noordijk immediately suspended the teacher for the duration of her imprisonment, but later fired 
her outright and took away her pension, owing to the severity of her “crimes,” despite protest 
from the local civil administration of Amsterdam and the teacher’s status as a breadwinner for 
her younger sister and elderly parents.58  Similarly, a teacher was arrested in De Bilt for having 
passed along information about a potential hiding location to a local Jewish woman.  When the 
teacher’s “sabotage” was discovered, she was arrested on June 22, 1943, with her suspension and 
ultimately her dismissal following later in the summer.59 
In a similar situation in Alphen on the Rhine in September 1943, a teacher was caught 
listening to English radio broadcasts.  This came out because he mentioned to his students, 
without naming the source or discussing it in a political way, that Allied armies had landed in 
Italy the previous day.  As it would turn out, one of his students had also heard the same report, 
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knew the source of information was English radio, and spread this information clandestinely 
around the school.  When word reached Noordijk, he began an investigation, and the teacher 
admitted to having listened to English broadcasts on an illegal radio.  But Noordijk and the 
teacher were old acquaintances, having been university students together at the University of 
Amsterdam.  Noordijk knew from his previous experience that this particular teacher, who taught 
German language and mathematics, was generally pro-German in his sensibilities.  The teacher 
claimed only that he was listening to English broadcasts to better his English language abilities, 
which Noordijk believed.  Van Dam, who also knew the man, also tried to intervene on the 
teacher’s behalf.  Regardless, Noordijk determine that, at the least, he must suspend the teacher, 
which he did.  Because the teacher was listening to an illegal radio, however, the 
Sicherheitsdienst began a parallel investigation, arrested the teacher, and sentenced him to one 
years’ imprisonment at the concentration camp Vught.  Despite appeals from Noordijk, Van 
Dam, and the local Protestant preacher, the latter of whom especially bemoaned the case because 
the teacher was one of the few non-NSBers in the local area who was well known for his pro-
German sensibilities, the sentence was upheld in December 1943.  As a result, a little more than 
halfway through his imprisonment at Vught, he was dismissed on Wimmer’s orders.60 
In Apeldoorn, in November 1943, five teachers were suspended not because of what they 
did, but because of what they did not do outside the classroom.  In this case, the mayor of 
Apeldoorn called for a teachers’ conference where lectures from local and regional figures would 
be held, including the head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde and an official from the Department of 
Arts and Public Enlightenment.  When another scheduled speaker, the municipal “Councilor for 
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Education” in Apeldoorn, noted the five teachers’ absence to Noordijk, they were suspended for 
one month and their pay was docked.61   
Not uncommonly, a teacher, seeing the writing on the wall, attempted to head off 
discipline.  In one case in Bellingwolde, a teacher at the local school refused to interact with the 
school director, who was an NSBer.  She learned of the director’s complaints against her, which 
reached Noordijk via the Opvoedersgilde, and pro-actively announced that she would retire at the 
end of the school year.  Given that it was already July, and only six weeks of classes remained 
before the summer break, she apparently hoped this would buy her a reprieve.  She was wrong.  
Noordijk simply suspended her for the remainder of the term, with her outright dismissal set to 
come into effect at the beginning of the new school year on October 1.62   
Toward the end of the occupation, this type of strategy took a different turn.  Instead of 
announcing one’s retirement, teachers just absconded entirely, as was the case of one school 
head who objected to the Red Cross handing out oranges to school students.  Noordijk was 
unable to determine why, exactly, such a thing would be objectionable, but the local NSB 
chapter leader was insistent that the school director be punished for his obstinance in the matter.63  
The only thing Noordijk could do was dismiss the director, as he was unavailable to participate 
in any investigation because he went underground shortly after the incident.  His extended 
absence—several months by the time of his dismissal—was cited by Noordijk as the cause.64   
In other cases, teachers absconded for reasons that were not entirely clear, and that was 
the cause of an investigation.  In Doetinchem, one teacher went underground on June 6, 1944, 
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feigning illness, which was one of the more common excuses teachers gave before going 
underground, likely because it would allow them to continue to receive their pay and benefits for 
the immediate future.  When the teacher never returned to school, an investigation was launched 
by Noordijk, and it was determined that the teacher had never been ill in the first place, 
according to his own wife, who may, or may not, have been in on the secret.  According to the 
wife, the teacher had simply disappeared on June 6 and had not been seen or heard from since.  
Because he was a reserve officer in the Dutch army, Noordijk determined that the likely cause of 
the teacher’s disappearance was his desire to join the invading Allied armies in Northern France.  
Noordijk turned the case over to the SD in late June, and formally dismissed him on July 25.65 
Over the course of his tenure, Noordijk would intervene in thousands of cases and 
suspend or dismiss dozens of teachers and administrators for their anti-German actions.  But this 
was, in the grand scheme of things, less substantial than his other primary intervention into the 
school establishment—the dismissal of school inspectors.  Beginning with his newly designated 
authority, Noordijk began to implement a “cleansing” of the School Inspectorate, replacing anti-
German inspectors with NSBers.  The impetus for these changes came directly from Seyss-
Inquart himself in November 1941, who ordered a survey of the School Inspectorate to be 
conducted by the Reichsbeauftragten of the Reichskommissar in the various provinces.  The 
survey results were less than stellar, with more than half of the inspectors judged as poor, and a 
third as merely “provisionally acceptable.”66  Although the surveys included inspectors of all 
levels, both the Germans and their Dutch collaborators were overwhelmingly more concerned 
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with primary education.67  It was there that the minds of the future would be won, but also there 
that resistance was least likely. 
Noordijk got to work quickly.  He began with the Primary School Inspector in Deventer, 
who had previously ordered that van Rossem’s staff be barred entry to schools under his 
supervision unless he personally accompanied the agents of the Authorized Representative.  
Noordijk suspended him indefinitely in January 1942 because of his anti-NSB activities, very 
shortly after he gained that authority.68  His suspension was turned into a dismissal the following 
summer.  Noordijk’s attempts to “cleanse” the School Inspectorate picked up steam in summer 
1942.  It was at that time that W. Terpstra, who also happened to be Mussert’s brother-in-law, 
was promoted by van Dam to head the Sub-Department Primary Education.  Terpstra, who had 
previously been a school inspector himself, was, unlike Noordijk, an ardent Mussert supporter.  
To be certain, Terpstra was not the first NSBer with a prominent position in the department - that 
honor belongs to G. Vlekke, who in November 1940 was appointed to Chief Inspector of the 
First Inspectorate, which encompassed the provinces of Limburg, Gelderland, and North Brabant 
in the southeastern part of the country—but it was Terpstra’s appointment that marked a rather 
rapid increase in the number of NSB functionaries, especially within the School Inspectorate.69  
Before the war started, there were only three NSB members working for the Department of 
Education, Sciences, and Arts out of a total of one hundred, seventy-eight.  But by 1943, that 
number had increased to thirty-four, out of a total of two hundred, sixty-seven officials in the 
Department of Education, Science, and Cultural Administration.  The NSB’s strength within the 
department was growing much faster than the department itself.70   
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Within the School Inspectorate, Terpstra and Noordijk formed a partnership of sorts 
aimed at ridding the Inspectorate of suspect individuals.  After the first dismissal of the school 
inspector in Deventer, it was the turn of the inspector in Utrecht, who was dismissed on June 8, 
1942, for refusing to sit on a committee for a home crafts exhibition.  On June 6, 1942, an annual 
meeting for primary school inspectors was held in Utrecht, during which Terpstra interviewed 
the inspector from Breukelen, whose unsatisfactory answers provided an excuse to dismiss him.  
Seven other school inspectors were summoned to The Hague for interviews and were 
subsequently dismissed as a result of unsatisfactory answers they provided Terpstra regarding all 
nature of questions.  These included the inspectors in Nijmegen, Tilburg, Breda, Amersfoort, 
Zwolle, Zaandam, and Dordrecht, all of whom were dismissed over the next two months.71  An 
eleventh inspector was fired by Noordijk later that year.72  Given that there were only forty-nine 
primary school inspectorates across the country, grouped under three Chief Inspectorates, the 
eleven who were fired by Terpstra and Noordijk in the summer and fall 1942 would amount to a 
significant change in the personnel of the primary school inspection regime.73   
All of these fired inspectors were replaced by NSBers, but they too were problematic.  
Van Dam, who like Schwarz was never a fan of the National Socialist Movement in the 
Netherlands, found most of these new school inspectors to be sub-par, and so prevented, as best 
he could, the appointment of further NSB members to the School Inspectorate.  For the 
remainder of the occupation, only five additional NSBers were appointed as school inspectors.74  
When Mussert attempted to have a further five NSB candidates appointed to positions as school 
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inspectors in 1944, van Dam rejected all five.  Mussert appealed to Schwarz, but to no avail.75  
Although the NSB managed to get a total of sixteen members appointed as school inspectors 
over the course of the occupation, mostly as a result of the actions of Noordijk and Terpstra in 
the latter half of 1942, NSB members never formed a majority of primary school inspectors.  
They did, however, make up almost a third of the total inspectors, which accounts for a much 
more significant impact by Noordijk (and Terpstra) upon the inspection corps than upon school 
faculty.  So, while van Rossem had little impact on the educational realm, beyond creating chaos 
in the ranks, Noordijk was comparatively much more effective.   
Over his time as Inspector of Education in General Service, Noordijk handled thousands 
of inquiries, with an average of roughly eighty replies going out per day and even more inquiries 
coming in in the first half of 1942 alone.  He personally dismissed or suspended a total of fifty 
one teachers, although his own willingness to accept the recommendations and proffered 
punishments of local administrators and school inspectors, most of whom had no interest in 
helping Noordijk in his work, was in complete contrast to van Rossem and likely helped keep 
this number relatively low.76  Even when one considers his additional tasks of handling students 
transfers, the composition of exam committees, and work on the German language text book for 
primary schools, this is still an incredible amount of work that Noordijk and his office managed 
to complete.   
Resistance at the Local Level 
Ostensibly, both van Rossem and Noordijk were to be occupied with keeping peace and 
order in the schools.  In reality, their job was more akin to enforcing the will of the occupation 
regime upon students, teachers, and administrators at the local level.  Although Noordijk was 
                                                 
75 Knippenberg and Ham, Een bron van aanhoudende zorg, 244. 
76 Ibid., 212. 
377 
 
more effective than van Rossem in making personnel changes both within the schools and in the 
inspectorate, neither was very successful in rooting out passive or active resistance on the part of 
teachers, administrators, and students.  There was simply too much work to be done and too few 
willing collaborators, whether in their individual offices or within the School Inspectorate more 
generally, to effectively police a teaching population that reached into the tens of thousands.  At 
best, their efforts could be described as a game of whack-a-mole, in which the inspectors would 
reply to complaints, “solve” an issue, and return to find four more complaints in queue.  To the 
extent that one can describe anti-German and anti-NSB resistance by administrators, teachers, 
and students as “chaos and disorder,” it reigned supreme for the duration of the occupation at all 
levels of schooling in the Netherlands.   
Resistance by students, administrators, and teachers took various forms.  It included the 
wearing of political insignias such as orange ribbons and badges; the singing of anti-German, 
anti-NSB, or patriotic songs by students, often with the either tacit or explicit support of their 
teachers; anti-German and anti-NSB pronouncements and lessons by teachers, including the use 
of banned books; the hanging of anti-regime placards; and harassment of pro-German and pro-
NSB students and teachers by their colleagues.  The records of both of the extraordinary school 
inspectors and the complaints that reached the central office of the Education Department in The 
Hague (and later Apeldoorn) are riddled with such actions.77 
For the most part, it is difficult to determine the deeper political motives of many of these 
actors.  The overwhelming majority of teachers, students, and administrators who were 
investigated either denied outright the accusations leveled against them or recast them as 
complete misunderstandings.  Little good could come to a teacher in admitting anti-German or 
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anti-NSB activity.  If they were lucky, and most were, they would be given a warning, but if they 
were unlucky, they would be suspended, expelled, fined, fired, arrested, and/or imprisoned in a 
concentration camp.  The complainants, on the other hand, usually assumed that the motivations 
of those against whom they informed to the authorities were entirely political.  But it is 
impossible to determine whether the political manifestations of particular incidents were causes 
or symptoms of a deeper misunderstanding.78  Regardless, the mere fact that politics was used by 
some individuals to lash out at their colleagues and charges, even if their motives were not 
political in origin, suggests that using the political dimension as an avenue of attack was seen as 
especially effective.  In other words, if a student or teacher used a colleague’s association with 
the NSB as a weapon with which to attack that colleague, regardless of whether the assailant him 
or herself even cared about the victim’s politics, it suggests a wider understanding within the 
schools that NSB or German-related activity or affiliations were worthy of scorn, and so itself 
serves as evidence of this larger phenomenon of anti-NSB and anti-German sentiment.   
The Singing of Patriotic and Anti-German Songs 
Perhaps most benign of all forms of passive resistance was the singing of patriotic songs.  
The most obvious such song is Het Wilhelmus, the Dutch national anthem.  Van Dam recognized 
this early in his tenure as Secretary-General, writing to Dr. Albrecht in Wimmer’s office asking 
for advice.  He suggested that the song be viewed in two lights.  In its cultural and historical 
context, van Dam did not believe that it could be banned completely, and so suggested that, so 
long as it was sung as part of a lesson in a music class or read as a poem in a literature class, its 
use in the schools should remain.  Alternatively, if it is sung as political demonstration, and that 
included any performance of the song outside of the classroom, it should be banned as all anti-
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German political demonstrations were.  The German leadership agreed with his suggestion.79  
This understanding, however, would cause problems because it was often impossible to 
determine whether its singing inside of the school was meant to be an anti-German 
demonstration.    
Many teachers and administrators took full advantage of this ambiguity.80  For example, 
at the Primary School B on the Weesperstraat in The Hague, students often sang Het Wilhelmus 
as they returned from school field-trips.  Owing to the letter of the regulations, this should have 
been seen as a violation outright, as it was not in the classroom.  The teachers present did little to 
stop the students, and both students and teachers claimed that the singing was on the initiative of 
the students themselves.  As so often was the case, the local school inspector’s investigation 
simply sided with the teachers, noting that “according to all witnesses, one cannot call it 
provocative.”81  That is all witnesses save the NSB-oriented students with whom the complaint 
originated.   
Similarly, at the public primary school in Oud-Zuilen, the children had taken to singing 
Het Wilhelmus three times each day.  Van Genechten, whose office sent the tip to van Dam noted 
that, as far as he knew, the children were not being forced to sing the song, “but whenever it 
happens three times in a day, it takes on the character of [an anti-German] demonstration.” When 
the local inspector went to investigate, it turned out that the song was sung one per week, and 
then during music lessons.  Both the inspector and van Dam declined to take any measures 
against the school, although it should be noted that this particular inspector, based in Breukelen, 
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was one of the several who would be dismissed by Noordijk in the coming months as 
unsatisfactorily pro-German.82     
In one instance, the problematic nature of the singing was clear.  At the Marnix 
Gymnasium in Rotterdam in early 1941, one teacher allowed students to pick their own songs for 
musical instruction and the class overwhelmingly voted for Het Wilhelmus.  When the students 
changed the text to indicate William being of Dutch blood, instead of German blood, that was 
indeed not allowed.83  When their spontaneous changes to the text went unpunished, the students 
pushed it further, choosing poems and songs that highlighted freedom of thought and which 
called on patriots to either defend their freedoms or die trying.  Again, it was a change in the text 
that pushed the students’ action into the realm of subversion.  In one poem, in which the original 
text noted that “there is freedom of thought in Holland,” the students changed to “there was 
freedom of thought in Holland.” Although there were several teachers who were suspect, 
according to Valkenburg, who investigated the case, there was little that the inspectors could do 
about it.  The main teacher involved steadfastly denied the accusations, or placed the blame upon 
the students, who had, after all, voted themselves on which songs and poems to recite.  The 
single student who admitted to substituting in the subversive lyrics even covered for his teacher, 
telling the local school inspector that the teacher reprimanded him immediately.  Because the 
local school inspector disagreed with Valkenburg’s conclusions, the matter was mostly dropped.  
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Valkenburg was able only to urge that the teacher be denied any advancement—the teacher was 
in line to become the next school director—but van Rossem’s office was unable to take any 
further steps.84 
In another, similar instance, at the Queen Wilhelmina School in Haarlem, students and 
teachers sang the song in combination with a prayer for Queen Wilhelmina and the oppressed of 
the country, while a drawing of a German eagle and swastika was torn apart by a teacher in a 
“demonstrative way,” according to the Weerafdeling member who filed the tip with van 
Rossem’s office.  Valkenburg, who replied to the tip, noted that the singing of the Wilhelmus 
was, in and of itself, not forbidden, while the rest of the tip was simply too vague to act upon.85  
In another instance, when the son of an NSB student refused to sing along to the Wilhelmus with 
the rest of his class and was sent to the school director’s office as punishment, Valkenburg 
replied to the inquiry, which had gone up the chain from the child’s father through the local NSB 
apparatus, that singing of the Wilhelmus was not banned unless it was meant as an anti-German 
demonstration, which did not appear to be the case in the father’s complaint.86  But exhibiting the 
confused nature of the situation, one tip that made it directly to van Dam regarding two primary 
schools in The Hague stated that during a combined field trip to a museum, students began 
singing anti-German songs.  When the tipster went to the school director to complain, the school 
director noted that the Wilhelmus, the song in question, had not yet been banned so not only 
would the director not punish the students, he would have them sing it the following day.  Van 
Dam only promised to look into the matter.87 
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Other times, the songs in question were much more clearly anti-German, and these were 
generally banned outright.  But this did not stop students from singing them, with or without 
their teachers’ permission.  For example, at the Protestant primary school in Heemstede, in 
addition to Het Wilhelmus, students were fond of the following song: 
 
Holderdebolder 
Hitler hangt op zolder 
Een touw op zijn nek 
Een prop in zijn bek 
Daar hangt die halve gek. 
 
Zie ginds komt de stoomboot 
Uit Engeland weer aan 
Zij brengt ons Wilhelmintje 
Ik zie haar al staan 
Hoe waaien de wimpels 
Van ’t rood, wit, en blauw 
Laat Hitler maar strikken 
Wij bleven getrouw.88 
Swinging back and forth 
Hitler hangs in the attic 
A rope on his neck 
A gag in his mouth 
There hangs the weirdo. 
 
See yonder comes the steamboat 
From England again 
It brings us sweet Wilhelmina 
I already see her standing there 
How the pennants blow 
Of red, white, and blue 
Let Hitler [remain] tied up 
We remain faithful. 
 
When the local inspector came to investigate the matter, the teacher in charge of supervising the 
children on the playground denied being able to determine what was being sung, and as soon as 
she did figure it out, she banned the students from singing it, or so she claimed; the inspector 
suspected that she was fully aware of the students’ actions from the beginning.  The inspector 
held an assembly for the teachers of the school and told them to take better charge of their pupils, 
but that was the end of the whole ordeal.  As for the singing of Het Wilhelmus, all of the teachers 
denied it, including the music teacher, for whom assigning the song would not have been against 
the rules.89 
For the most part, anti-German songs appear to have been relatively common in schools 
across the country as many of the same songs show up in different locations, sometimes with 
their verses altered slightly.  For example, the second verse of the above-mentioned song that 
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was sung in Heemstede, which lies just south of Haarlem in the far west of the country, also 
appears with slight alterations in complaints regarding the Protestant primary school in Dreumel, 
clear across the country near Nijmegen: 
 
Zie ginds komt de stoomboot uit Engeland weer aan 
Ik zie Wilhelmina aan ‘t stuurboord al staan 
Hoe waaien de wimpels van rood, wit, en blauw 
Laat Hitler maar komen, Ik blijf Wilhelmina getrouw90 
See yonder comes the steamboat from England again 
I see Wilhelmina standing on the Starboard [side] 
How the pennants of red, white, and blue blow 
Let Hitler come, I remain faithful to Wilhelmina 
 
Similarly, an anti-NSB song from the primary schools in The Hague shows up again in slightly 
altered fashion at the Juliana School in Amsterdam.  In The Hague, the verses, as recorded by a 
complainant, are rendered as: 
  
Op de hoek van de straat staat een pharizeeër 
‘T is geen man, ‘t is geen vrouw, maar een NSBer 
Met een krant in zijn hand staat - is daar te vinden 
Hij verkoopt zijn Vaderland voor 6 losse eenden91 
On the corner of the street stands a Pharisee 
It is no man, it is no woman, but an NSBer 
With a paper in his hand - is there to find 
He sells out his Fatherland for 6 loose ducks 
 
While in Amsterdam, the same song is rendered: 
Op de hoek van de straat staat een pharizeeër 
‘T is geen man, ‘t is geen vrouw, maar een NSBer 
Op de hoek van de straat, staat hij daar te venten 
En verraad zijn Vaderland voor ‘n paar roode eenden92 
On the corner of the street stands a Pharisee 
It is no man, it is no woman, but an NSBer 
On the corner of the street, he stands to peddle 
And betray his Fatherland for a pair of red ducks.   
 
Another song initially reported in The Hague found its way across the country to Emmen, in the 
province of Drenthe, on the German border, again in slightly altered form.  According to van 
Genechten’s sources, in The Hague, the song had two very similar versions: 
 
1) 
Holland is gevallen door verraad 
Engeland kwam natuurlijk te laat 
Vliegtuigen rondom 
parachutisten op de grond 
Holland viel door verraad 
Holland has fallen through treason 
England, naturally, came too late 
Airplanes all around, 
paratroopers on the ground 
Holland fell by treason 
2) 
                                                 
90 NA 2.14.37/408, 410. 
91 NA 214.37/448. 
92 NA 2.14.37/459. 
384 
 
Holland is gevallen door verraad 
Engeland kwam precisie een dag te laat 
Het is gevallen voor een boef 
Die op alle landen loert 
Holland viel door verraad93 
Holland has fallen through treason 
England came exactly one day too late 
It has fallen to a scoundrel 
Who lurks in every land.   
Holland fell by treason 
 
In Emmen, however, the song went, according to Dijkema: 
Holland is gevallen door verraad 
Engeland kwam natuurlijk weer te laat 
Hitler is een groote ploert 
Die op kleine landjes loert 
Enz.94 
Holland has fallen through treason 
England again came naturally too late 
Hitler is a huge bastard 
Who ambushes small countries 
Etc. 
 
The variations in these anti-German and anti-NSB songs, as well as their wide 
distribution, from north to south, and east to west, suggests that they were being passed by word 
of mouth, and although the records do not indicate the singing of these particular songs at other 
schools between the various locales, it stands highly likely that they were, in fact, sung at many 
more locations than just Dreumel, The Hague, Amsterdam, Emmen, and Heemstede.  This is not 
to say, however, that other songs were not sung at schools across the country.  In reports to 
Schwarz by van Genechten, several other songs or rhymes were relayed to the German 
administrators in The Hague, including: 
1) 
Heb je het gehoord 
Peter Ton is vermoord 
Have you heard 
Peter Ton was murdered95 
2) 
Wie is Jansen, Wie is toch deze Jansen 
Jansen is de leider van de Swingclub NSB96 
Who is Jansen, who is this Jansen 
Jansen is the leader of the swing club NSB 
 
By and large, most of these songs were harmless little tunes sung by school children.  The 
records do not indicate any instances in which teachers sang along with the children, save for Het 
Wilhelmus, although teachers’ tacit approval was likely common enough, regardless of their 
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denials.  The songs might be directed at a particular classmate, hoping to taunt those particular 
children, as was recorded occurring at the Primary Schools on the Weesperstraat in The Hague, 
but beyond a few hurt feelings, the school yard singing of children was unlikely to actually stir 
up trouble directly.97  In much the same way, school children took up another form of largely, but 
certainly not entirely, passive political protest: the staging of anti-regime demonstrations.   
Political Demonstrations 
Anti-regime political demonstrations took many forms.  They ranged from relatively 
minor “silent demonstrations,” in which students might wear particular clothes or political 
insignias to the distribution of anti-regime propaganda and, in some cases, all-out student strikes 
aimed at protesting the regime.  The government took a range of steps to combat these efforts on 
the part of students, most of which were entirely reactive.  Over the first few years of the 
occupation, the Education Department, and sometimes the German administrators in the 
Reichskommissariat themselves, sent out repeated decrees banning certain types of political 
insignias, everything from badges and pins to pictures of the Queen.  When these actions did not 
prove effective enough, the government resorted to threatening local administrators to take 
further precautions to prevent anti-regime agitation on the part of students.  This was, by and 
large, more effective, but the unequal application of punishments, whether of students or of 
teachers, kept these further regulations from being completely effective.   
Political insignias were first banned generally in September 1940 by the Secretary-
General of Internal Affairs for all state officials, save those that were specifically prescribed by 
the government.  This was followed by a circular from the interim Secretary-General of 
Education Reinink in October 1940 noting that educational establishments were included in this 
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ban.98  But these did not have the effect of banning the wearing of such insignias by students, 
which had become problematic for the occupation regime in the meantime.  For example, at the 
advanced primary school in Bilthoven, students had taken to wearing orange ribbons, whereas at 
the municipal secondary school in Zutphen, the students took to waving orange flags as symbols 
of their patriotism.  In both instances, according to police reports, the teachers and administrators 
appeared to at least tacitly support the students.99  At the same time, in a primary school in The 
Hague, students hung orange flags in a classroom as a sign of their own political feelings, 
although these were promptly removed by the teacher.100 
The situation regarding political insignias was so poor in Maastricht that the mayor and 
city council wrote to Reinink on November 11 asking him to amend the rules to this effect.  Van 
Dam, who was appointed on November 25, complied with their request on December 11, 
outlawing the wearing of “insignias or other differentiating symbols” by students in or near 
school buildings, and ordering teachers, administrators, and local officials to help police the 
matter.  This second circular, which was followed by a third on December 23, caused much 
confusion within the ranks.  Questions came in regarding German Nazi symbols, such as the 
swastika, the Wolfsangel, and the Sonnenrad.101  While others questioned whether it was 
permissible to wear completely non-political insignias, such as those often worn at parochial 
schools as part of the uniform.  The mayor of the town of Vries noted that several local 
townships in his area often distributed pins to advancing students meant to spread notions of 
traffic safety among the locals.  Surely that could not be problematic, he believed.102 
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Van Dam appears to have immediately recognized the problem and sent the question 
upstairs to Wimmer’s office.  Albrecht responded and informed van Dam that all insignias and 
differentiating symbols, save German symbols, were banned, although he did not directly 
address the three specific symbols Nazi symbols in van Dam’s inquiry.  Van Dam then sent out a 
fourth circular in April 1941 noting that all such symbols and insignia, even as parts of a 
uniform, were banned, save those specifically authorized by the state, followed by a fifth circular 
in late May that expanded the ban to any Dutch placards or posters of a political nature, save 
those issued by the Dutch government at the occupiers’ behest (such as those supporting 
Winterhulp Nederland).103  Neither Albrecht’s reply nor van Dam’s circular cleared up the matter 
regarding what, exactly, constituted a German symbol, as questions still came in asking for 
clarification.  For example, in the second half of 1941, repeated questions came into the 
Education Department regarding students who wore an orange V symbol (presumably indicating 
vrijheid) on their clothing.104  Oddly, van Dam, in consultation with Schwarz, decided that the 
orange V was actually a German symbol and thus should be allowed, although V symbols of a 
different color or form were not to be allowed.105  The curious case of orange Vs was only one of 
many.   
The goal of the German regulation, of course, was to prevent the display of patriotic or 
anti-German insignia by students and teachers in the schools, as this was a common tactic 
students and teachers used to show their loyalties.  Such was the case at Woerden in May 1941, 
when a local NSB member, who lived across the street from the local primary school, hung an 
NSB placard in his window.  In response the students of the school hung Nederlandsche Unie 
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placards in the windows and doors of the school.  Although the political element of the 
provocation was obvious, the school director did not act until directly confronted by the NSBer, 
at which point he ordered the Unie placards removed and strictly enforced the ban on political 
demonstrations.  The NSBer then withdrew his complaint.  Noting that the complaint was 
withdrawn in his reply to van Genechten’s office, van Dam saw no reason to take any further 
action against either the students or the administrator.106 
Similarly, at the Princess School in Amsterdam, some twenty students, both boys and 
girls, arrived at school with Nederlandsche Unie leaflets and wearing red-white-blue caps.  In 
what was clearly an anti-German demonstration, the director appears to have done little to 
combat the student agitation.  Upon investigation, he admitted that some students had brought 
oranges (that is, the fruit) into school—which he himself had forbidden previously—but claimed 
not to remember anything else.  Noordijk took this as a sort of nolo contendere plea and 
recommended he be put on probation for six months.  This, it would turn out was a light 
sentence, as van Genechten, through whose office the complaint first emerged, suggested a more 
proper punishment might be sending him to a concentration camp for his trouble.107 
Although such anti-regime displays continued to occur throughout the occupation, their 
banned status was not really in question.  Alternatively, the status of non-political and non-
German, pro-regime insignia and uniforms was completely in flux.  Non-political uniforms and 
insignia had to be handled on a case by case basis.  Students at shipping and vocational schools 
who wore “uniforms as such,” were permitted to continue as they always had.108  But when the 
head of a private, Catholic school in Arnhem inquired about symbols worn by a priest, who also 
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occasionally taught religion classes, van Dam informed the school director that such symbols 
were definitely not allowed.  He further informed the director that if the priest did not want to 
comply, then the school director should inform van Dam directly.109   
Even more problematic than non-political insignia were non-German, pro-regime 
insignia.  Most obviously here, the NSB was not a German organization nor had the wearing of 
NSB insignia been explicitly allowed by the state and so questions came flooding in regarding 
NSB and its associated organizations, such as Winterhulp Nederland, the Nazi charity 
organization.110  The answers proffered by van Dam defied a specific logic.  Winterhulp 
Nederland insignia were to be allowed.111  The Wolfsangel, as van Dam understood it, was not 
specifically German, but rather used by the NSB, and so should be banned.  At the same time, 
iron rings, which NSB youth commonly wore on their fingers, were not banned by van Dam, 
even though van Genechten, head of the NSB’s Opvoedersgilde and Solicitor-General in The 
Hague, saw them as “differentiating symbols” that should be banned.112  The issue of NSB 
related symbols and uniforms was only finally cleared up on February 2, 1942, when a circular 
released by van Dam made allowances for the NSB and its related organizations, such as the 
Nationale Jeugdstorm (NJS).  Although van Dam released the circular, the order came from 
Wimmer.113  This was later followed up with an allowance for officials to wear NSB insignias 
and uniforms as well.114   
Finally, the logic of the occupiers came full circle, when on February 20, 1942, van Dam 
decreed that Nazi organizations such as the Waffen SS and the NJS were allowed to hang 
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propaganda posters in the schools and that requests to hang such posters “are to be granted.” 
When questions came asking whether this final circular was a direct order to allow such posters, 
van Dam clarified his position on May 4, noting that while the ultimate decision was left to the 
individual administrators at each school, it was certainly wise to acquiesce given that Waffen SS 
posters were meant to further “the fight against Bolshevism and the preservation of our own 
Christian civilization, which is important to and must be valued by everyone, young and old, 
who have not consciously chosen the side of communism.” He followed this up with a warning 
that should such requests by the Waffen SS be denied, it would reflect upon the individual 
administrator’s personal feelings regarding this larger struggle.  A similar argument was made 
regarding NJS posters, although when it came to the distribution of pamphlets, van Dam 
suggested it would be better to simply provide the NJS with the home addresses of students so 
that direct propaganda initiatives would remain outside of the schools.115 
The problem, however, with allowing Nazi paraphernalia in the schools, aside from the 
larger political dimensions, was that it gave anti-German students and administrators yet another 
reason, or more likely an excuse, to harass their pro-German or pro-NSB classmates.  In summer 
1941, Albrecht wrote to van Dam noting that he had gotten many complaints of students wearing 
Hitler Youth uniforms in schools being sent home.  Van Dam again released a new circular on 
August 16, reminding local officials that German symbols and uniforms were completely 
allowed, this time specifically mentioning the Hitler Youth.  In the same circular, van Dam 
warned of the “undesirable consequences” that would follow should such anti-German 
disturbances continue.  It must not have been universally accepted, however, as yet more 
circulars were released later that year, this time aimed specifically at confessional schools.116 
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In a similar case in ‘s-Hertogenbosch in April 1941, a primary school director began 
harassing a German student at that school for wearing symbols associated with the Hitler Youth.  
The director attempted to claim to both the local school inspector and Valkenburg, both of whom 
investigated the case, that his actions were more of a blanket ban against any and all insignias, 
which he attempted to institute because he had difficulty telling various allowed and banned 
insignias apart from one another.  Neither the local inspector nor Valkenburg bought this 
explanation, and both were of the opinion that the director’s excuses were just that, excuses 
meant to cover up his anti-German attitude.  Although Valkenburg recommended a stiff penalty, 
van Dam let the director off with a stern warning.117 
A blanket ban on political insignias was a rather common tactic used by school directors 
during the early days of the occupation, although if one can believe the complaints of NSB 
parents, it was often selectively enforced.  At the Van Speyk primary school in The Hague, the 
director there banned all political insignia personally when the school year began in September 
1940.  One particular child, who had been accosted by his classmates as a “traitor” and “scummy 
NSBer” previously, apparently wore an NJS insignia in some form of personal protest, 
complaining that other students were wearing Nederlandsche Unie badges at the same time, 
knowledge of which the director denied entirely.  The school director personally confiscated the 
NJS badge and warned the student to not try and argue with him.  When the child’s father wrote 
to the school director, the director, believing that the father had written at the instigation of the 
child, took this to be a direct affront to his own authority and his previous warning not to argue 
and suspended the student.  A personal intervention by the father at the director’s home resulted 
only in the return of the particular NJS badge, but not the reinstatement of the student because 
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the teacher became even more convinced that the student had instigated his father’s intervention.  
When the police investigated the case, it also turned out that a history and geography teacher at 
the school had made some inopportune comments about the governance of Eupen-Malmedy (the 
teacher said it was easiest to assume it was a part of Belgium), and so the authorities focused 
almost exclusively on that aspect.  When van Dam finally wrote to the school director, he did not 
even mention the insignia case, and so it was left to stand in favor of the school director.118 
In a more troubling instance, at a Catholic boys’ school in Haarlem, the insignia ban does 
not appear to have been initially enforced at all, whether for patriotic insignia or for NSB-related 
insignia.  In February 1941, the student body was heavily anti-German, with the anti-German 
faction wearing coins, which contained portraits of Queen Wilhelmina, as symbols of their 
patriotic allegiance.  One Nationale Jeugdstorm member was intercepted on the way to school by 
a group of boys from the anti-German faction who began accosting the lad.  The group attempted 
to forcefully remove his NJS badge from his rucksack, and when the boy defended himself, the 
group of assailants attempted to throw him off a bridge into the canal below.  Only the 
intervention of a second group of students, who warned against such an attack as being Pyrrhic 
in nature, brought the assailants back from the brink.  All the while a teacher from the school was 
standing there, refusing to intervene, ostensibly because the incident occurred off school 
grounds.  In another instance, the same NJS student was threatened by at least two other students 
with knives.  In both cases the police were involved, but the only penalties handed out were for 
the leader of the group of student assailants, who was expelled, and to the teacher, who was 
given a stern warning.119 
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The case of the Catholic boys’ school in Haarlem is representative of a particular type of 
problem for the German occupier—what to do about the royal family.  As is the case in many 
monarchies, the presence of the royal family was rather ubiquitous in the Netherlands.  In the 
education sphere, this specifically took the form of portraits and school names, while in the 
larger public arena, street names, currency, and other public symbols of the royal family were 
widespread.  The occupation authority took quick action, when in late 1940, internal discussions 
took place regarding the naming of new school buildings, including those already under 
construction, after living members of the royal family.120  The ban came out on February 7, 
1941.121  This was furthered when, in October 1941, the use of names of living members of the 
royal family was extended to all public associations and organizations.  The ban on the use of 
such names for new buildings and institutions was one thing, but the expansion of the rule to 
encompass all already existing institutions created quite a dilemma, as van Dam himself 
immediately recognized.122 
Despite this, the Germans were determined to go through with the changes.  Streets, 
parks, large hotels, bridges, and other public buildings were to be renamed.  To make matters go 
smoothly, at least in theory, the responsible organizations were to submit a name change list to 
the Representative of the Reichskommissar for their province, after whose approval was given, 
the name changes could go through.  Excepted from this rule were only private residences and 
smaller, less important hotels, although Wimmer’s office noted that the continued choice of a 
name of a living member of the royal family for such buildings would be seen as provocative.123  
The results in the education sector were somewhat mixed.  Many schools simply changed their 
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name outright, such as the Queen Wilhelmina Primary School in Voorburg, which changed its 
name to the Christian Primary School in Voorburg.  Similarly, the Queen Wilhelmina School in 
Sneek changed its name to the rather pedestrian “School on the Frederick Hendrik street.” 
Alternatively, the same school association rejected a change to the Queen Wilhelmina School’s 
sister school, known as the Princess Juliana School.  The board informed van Dam that the 
Juliana in question was not the daughter of Queen Wilhelmina, but actually Juliana van Stolberg, 
the mother of William the Silent, and thus it did not fall under the ban against naming institutions 
after living members of the royal house.  Similarly, the Queen Wilhelmina School in The Hague 
made an end run around the decree, changing its name to the Queen Emma School, Emma being 
a popular nickname for Wilhelmina.124 
The question of political insignias based on the royal family had further implications as 
well.  The students in Haarlem had used coins to display their patriotic affinities, but this was by 
no means the only form of royal portraiture that could be found across the country.  Initially, 
such portraits were not banned from public display, if for no other reason than that they could be 
found everywhere and their removal would be a gargantuan task.  The sole exception to this rule 
were portraits of Prince Bernhard—consort to Princess Juliana—whose trademark white 
carnation became a symbol of Dutch resistance to Nazi domination when, on the prince’s 
birthday June 29, 1940, the Dutch public adopted the wearing of carnations as a sign of passive 
resistance in what became known as Carnation Day.  As a result, the Germans banned any 
portraits of Bernhard in public, arrested Dutch commander-in-chief Henri Winkelman, and fired 
the mayor of The Hague, where the largest demonstrations had taken place outside of the 
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Noordeinde Palace.125  But for the time being, only Bernhard’s portrait was banned in public 
spaces and buildings.126 
For the immediate future, the question of portraits of other members of the royal family 
came up repeatedly.  When van Rossem advised the head of the primary school in Avereerst in 
April 1941 that it would be wise to remove the portrait of the Queen that was then hanging in the 
school, van Dam intervened, telling van Rossem that only portraits of Prince Bernhard were 
banned.127  In another instance, in Alphen on the Rhine, the director of the secondary school there 
actually inquired about portraits of the Queen and royal family in April 1941.  Valkenburg 
replied that, as far as he could determine, the ring one girl had been wearing that included a 
picture of the queen fell under the ban on the wearing of political insignias, but that the actual 
portraits hanging in the schools were allowed, provided that they did not include Prince 
Bernhard.  Van Dam seconded this opinion, noting that the ring should be considered as a 
political demonstration and therefore, the girl who wore the ring should be punished for breaking 
the rules.128   
In what was seen as a much more serious issue, the previous month, March 1941, a 
twenty-year old teacher at the Christian National Primary School in Groningen was arrested for 
the production and distribution of over three thousand photos of members of the royal family.  
The school director informed the local school inspector that he was unaware of any such 
distribution in the school itself and dismissed the possibility as “out of the question.” 
Furthermore, the school inspector came to the conclusion that the young man was not entirely 
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aware of the severity of his crime, owing to his young age and his only very recent employment 
at the school.  The case was treated with some leniency—by Dutch law, he was still a minor—
but he was nonetheless dismissed from his position after his release from custody.129 
The situation was finally resolved from an administrative standpoint through the 
complete ban on public portraits of living members of the royal family that was enacted by Karel 
Fredericks, Secretary-General of Internal Affairs, under orders from his German superiors, likely 
Wimmer, on May 2, 1941, although buildings in use by the government itself were exempted.130  
That was extended by Wimmer personally on June 28 to all public places, this time including 
schools and other institutions used by the government.  Van Dam passed this order along to 
educational institutions on July 1, at which time he also removed the portrait of Queen 
Wilhelmina that had been hanging in his own office.131  The ban on using portraits of the Queen 
was so all encompassing that it included a ban on the use of Dutch coinage in math lessons, 
because those coins contained portraits of the Queen, although it was not extended to permitted 
history texts, probably because that would have been indefensible from a regulatory and fiscal 
standpoint.132 
By mid-1942, the government had finally figured out the larger outlines of the insignia 
ban generally and the place of the royal family specifically as it related to educational 
institutions. Political insignias of any and all non-Nazi organizations or groups were banned, as 
were any portraits of living members of the royal family.  Alternatively, Nazi organizations were 
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allowed to both use the schools as bases of propaganda and their members, whether students or 
teachers, were allowed to wear their uniforms and insignias as they saw fit.  But this did not 
solve the question entirely.  Questions regarding specific organizations continued to roll in 
regularly and had to be handled on a case by case basis.  Nor did the problem of students and 
teachers wearing banned insignias end.133  Reminder circulars went out repeatedly from the 
central government in The Hague to the towns and provinces warning local officials to carry out 
the decrees of the occupation authority under penalty of severe punishment.134   
The wearing of anti-regime political insignias was most often seen by the regime as a 
form of political demonstration, but that was not the only way in which students protested the 
occupation.  In early May, 1941, the director of the public secondary school in Tiel reached out 
to van Dam in order to get ahead of what he feared was a planned series of student 
demonstrations against the regime.  The school director noted that on April 30, 1941, many 
students had come to class wearing their “Sunday best,” which the director could only assume, 
given the unusual nature of such a concerted effort by the students, was meant to be an anti-
German “silent demonstration.” He feared that the upcoming May 7 birthday of a recently 
dismissed Jewish teacher would turn into cause of a second demonstration and had heard rumors 
of a third impending “silent demonstration”—via the wearing of black scarves—planned for May 
10, the anniversary of the German invasion of the Netherlands.  He requested from van Dam the 
authority to close the school entirely to prevent such demonstrations, apparently fearing that, as 
the head of the school, he would be found partly responsible for any such actions on the part of 
the students.  Although van Dam did not grant that specific request, he did take the extraordinary 
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step of empowering the local school inspector to shutter the school and ordered the school 
director to keep in close telephone contact with the local inspector.135  Unfortunately, the records 
in the file do not indicate whether the feared second and third demonstrations actually went 
forward. 
Although in Tiel, van Dam was supportive of the director’s efforts to combat student 
demonstration, in other instances, van Dam came to the aid of students themselves.  One such 
student at a secondary school in Zwolle collected English propaganda pamphlets that had likely 
been dropped out of a British airplane near his house and distributed them to his classmates.  
Initially, the school expelled him for this action, but the boy’s father appealed, noting that the 
thirteen-year-old child could barely read the German language fliers, and so had no idea of what 
he was doing, and did so despite warnings by his father against bringing them to school.  The 
local school inspector, upon hearing the father’s appeal suggested to van Dam that the boy be 
allowed to return to school with a stern warning.  Van Dam, convinced of the father’s case as 
well, was able to persuade Schwarz to allow the child to return, should the school accept him.  
Regardless of this fortunate intervention by van Dam on the boy’s behalf, he still was out of 
school for more than two months in spring 1941 while the case was adjudicated.136 
Although van Dam’s close relationship with Schwarz allowed him a certain amount of 
influence in such cases, the Germans were not always as lenient, especially if older students were 
involved.  At St. Trinitatis Lyceum in Haarlem, two older students were caught producing anti-
German propaganda.  As a result, the two students were arrested, expelled from the school, and 
forbidden to continue their education at any other institution in the Netherlands.137  In other cases, 
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the provenance of anti-regime propaganda was unknown, but it was nonetheless spread through 
the school.  Such was the case at the Royal Secondary School in Maastricht, in which some two 
dozen students were found to have been in possession of communist propaganda pamphlets 
aimed at Dutch youth.  Although all of the students claimed that they had found the propaganda 
pamphlets by the bicycle racks, the original finders of the pamphlets did distribute them to the 
rest of their classmates, at least until they ran out of the roughly thirty pamphlets that were 
found.  Neither the police report nor the included correspondence between van Dam and 
Noordijk reveal what actions the occupation authorities took against the students, most of whom 
freely admitted to spreading the propaganda.  However, given the age of those involved—most 
students were thirteen or fourteen years old—and the quickness with which the school director 
took action to combat the spread of the propaganda, it is unlikely they suffered severe 
consequences, although that cannot be determined with any certainty.138 
In perhaps the most draconian reaction to anti-regime demonstrations, the mayor of the 
public lyceum in Eindhoven suspended or expelled more than half the school, in response to one 
of the largest anti-NSB demonstrations at any non-university educational establishment during 
the entire occupation.  The immediate cause of the disruption was a visit by NSB Leider Mussert 
on May 29, 1942.  As part of the visit, local officials hung the orange-white-blue Prince’s Flag 
on the school building, which was the preferred flag of the NSB.139  When the flag remained up 
at the school even after Mussert had left, the students decided to strike.  The following day, of 
the two-hundred, ninety-three total students at the school, two-hundred, sixty remained home.  
Although most returned to school the following Monday, the message the students had hoped to 
send was clear.  Equally clear was the message the mayor sent in response.  One-hundred, eight 
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students were given some form of detention, the overwhelming majority being required to stay 
late at school Wednesday and Saturday afternoons.  The other one-hundred, twelve students were 
suspended for a period of between eight days and an entire year, with more than half receiving a 
suspension of one month, and a full twenty receiving a suspension of one-half year.  The curators 
of the lyceum and the parents involved were, naturally, furious.  The stiff penalties handed out 
by the mayor threatened not only the smooth functioning of the school but the future education 
of dozens of students, and so both groups took their complaints to van Dam.  The Secretary-
General agreed that some punishment was necessary, but also found the rather harsh nature of 
the mayor’s actions troubling, especially for the twenty-four students who were punished with a 
one-half year or full-year suspension.  Luckily, the timing of the event played to van Dam’s 
favor, as the upcoming summer break offered the opportunity for van Dam to suggest to the 
mayor that he could, on the last day of class, offer a general amnesty to the most severely 
punished students, support for which he appears to have received from both Noordijk and 
Schwarz.  Equally luckily for those students involved, the mayor availed himself of this 
opportunity and announced the amnesty for the twenty students who had received a half-year 
suspension, although he waited until later in the summer to extend that offer to the four students 
who had received a full-year suspension.140   
The Harassment of NSB Members and Children 
Although anti-regime demonstrations occurred throughout the Netherlands, that was not 
the most common form of agitation that students engaged in, nor was it the type of anti-German 
activity that most perturbed the authorities.  By far the most pervasive form of anti-German 
activity found in the records of complaints that reached Education Department was the 
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harassment of NSB and German-friendly children by both teachers and students.  This type of 
activity ran the gamut from the relatively innocuous anti-German or anti-NSB statement to 
physical violence directed at such youths.  In the case of the former, it could rightly be 
questioned whether, in some cases, minor statements or asides were even actually directed at 
specific children intentionally, although in those cases that went up the administrative chain, the 
complainants usually believed as much.  Regardless of whether anti-German or anti-NSB 
statements were directed at specific children, however, the presence of NSB and/or German 
children in the classroom must have been known to those who made such statements, and so 
would constitute harassment regardless of whether or not the perpetrator intended it as such.  At 
the very least, anti-German or anti-NSB statements would have contributed to a hostile learning 
environment for children with personal or familial connections to Dutch or German Nazism.  
And that is the least corrosive form of harassment those children faced.  On the other end of the 
spectrum, literal, physical violence, including death threats made with brandished weapons, were 
not unheard of.    
Naturally, the German authorities and their Dutch collaborators took these cases very 
seriously.  On the one hand, mere anti-German statements, much like larger political 
demonstrations, threatened to poison the well of the next generation, undoing all of the work the 
occupiers hoped to accomplish.  On the other, physical violence against NSB or German-
oriented youths in or outside the school was, in the eyes of the regime, just about the most severe 
form of resistance a school-aged student could engage in on their own initiative.  The prevalence 
of such complaints in the records testifies to both the seriousness with which the government 
viewed these types of activity and the frequency with which they occurred.   
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Given that most of the accused steadfastly denied the charges against them, it is difficult 
to determine with any certainty whether or not the accusations leveled against them were 
accurate.  Generally speaking, van Rossem, Dijkema, and Valkenburg tended to assume the 
worst of the accused, while Noordijk and the local school inspectors tended to be a bit more 
trusting of the teachers’ (although not necessarily of students’) explanations, but this is only a 
general trend.  Moreover, school directors tended to side with their teachers (again, not 
necessarily with students) against the inquiries of the government.  In the case of the Authorized 
Representative and his deputies, they had a vested self-interest in portraying the schools as 
centers of chaos and disorder, for if the schools were bastions of peace and discipline, there 
would be no need for their services, which would have put them in a precarious position given 
van Dam’s clear desire to remove them.  Alternatively, Noordijk’s and the local inspectors’ 
positions were relatively more secure, and so they would have little need to take otherwise mild 
infractions out of context as a means of creating job security.141 
At the same time however, the local inspectors, especially before Noordijk managed to 
make substantive changes in their numbers, were, by and large, in lock step with the larger anti-
NSB consensus in the country, even though they mostly carried out the orders of the central 
government faithfully.142  Assuming that these career officials overlooked harassment of NSB or 
German-friendly students in deference to their own political motivations is unsupported by the 
evidence and needlessly casts doubt on the work ethic of these largely career public servants.  
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Finally, it is extremely unlikely that all of the incidents that were reported up the chain, whether 
through local NSB circles, via the police, the local inspectors, or through the office of the 
Authorized Representative were entirely fictitious.  Even in those cases in which it was later 
determined that the events had originally been substantially misrepresented to the authorities, 
some kernel of dissatisfaction on the part of the complainant(s) must have been present, 
otherwise they would not have complained in the first place, and most of the time, the 
complainants represented that dissatisfaction as political in nature.   
Such was the case at a Protestant school in Amsterdam, when a father complained of 
violent interactions between his three children and other students that included the throwing of 
rocks which caused injuries, owing to his wife’s membership in the NSB.  As it would turn out, 
the family only had two children at that school, and both denied having had any adverse 
interactions with their classmates as a result of their mother’s NSB membership, although one of 
the children did, after prodding, recall an incident that occurred when he was passing by a 
completely different school in which he was accosted because of his mother’s NSB 
membership.143  So although the original complaint was unfounded, there was a kernel of truth to 
it in that the one child had, in fact, been mistreated as a result of his connection to Dutch Nazis.   
In other instances, the connection to politics was simply unclear or imagined entirely.  
Such was the case at the expanded primary school in Steenwijk, where a student who had a long 
history of truancy was finally expelled from the school after he passed the age of required 
attendance.  His parents both complained through NSB circles that this was the result of the 
boy’s role in the NJS, but when the inspector investigated, it turned out that the boy was 
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welcome to return, so long as he actually attended regularly.  This particular offer was left out of 
the original complaint by the boy’s parents.144 
Nor was it uncommon that the authorities would view certain acts through the lens of 
politics when no such intention was present.  In one such example, in a teachers’ lounge at the 
First Public Trade School in Amsterdam, teachers hung a thank-you note from the widow of a 
recently deceased colleague.  Because this colleague was Jewish and had been dismissed along 
with other Jewish civil servants, the German authorities, upon learning of the thank-you note, 
assumed the matter was entirely political.  In fact, it had often been the custom in that particular 
school to hang announcements and other items of interest in the teachers’ lounge so that all of 
the faculty might see them, as was the case here.  The fact that the recently deceased teacher was 
Jewish was, according to Noordijk and all of the witnesses he interviewed, completely 
coincidental.145 
At the protestant primary school in Driebergen, local NSB officials complained to van 
Genechten that the “strong anti-national socialist” mood of the school, especially by the director 
and one of the teachers, had led to several NSB and German families to remove their children 
from the school and send them elsewhere.  As part of his investigation, the local school inspector 
inquired about every single student who had left the school since May 10, 1940.  In the previous 
year, forty-four students had left the school, and of those, forty-three had either moved or 
fulfilled their schooling requirements.  Only a single student, who switched to the German 
School in Utrecht, had complained of anti-NSB or anti-German harassment as the cause of the 
move.  The only actual “infraction” that the inspector could find was that the accused teachers 
had, in fact, allowed students to sing Het Wilhelmus in a music lesson, and only then, it was 
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problematic because the teacher had previously been investigated by the NSB’s security 
service.146 
Despite evidence that some complaints about disorder in school were mostly, or entirely, 
misrepresentations of the true events, anti-German or anti-NSB statements were common 
throughout the occupation.  By and large, it was teachers who were most accused of making 
these types of more general anti-regime statements.  At the Pontinstituut in Rotterdam, on 
October 15, 1940, a teacher told three girls, none of whom were affiliated with the NSB, that 
“The NSBers always disrupt radio broadcasts” and “NSBers are genuine traitors.”147  The 
inspector, in his report, noted that no one in the class actually heard the teacher say the second 
item about NSBers being traitors, even the girl whose father initially reported the incident to the 
authorities.  The teacher did admit to the radio comment, however, received a stern talking to, 
and promised to keep politics out of the classroom.148 
At the municipal secondary school in Zutphen, one teacher constantly made anti-German 
and anti-NSB statements to his class, noting things such as, “there are the NSBers, who all think 
that they are world reformers,” and, whenever a plane would fly over, “There go our 
defenders.”149  Upon inspection, the teacher denied having ever made such statements, and 
indicated that, at worst, he had made more innocuous statements that students had taken out of 
context and assumed referred to the NSB.  He even wrote directly to van Dam defending his 
maintenance of order within the classroom.  The inspector warned him about how things could 
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be taken out of context, but owing to a lack of any further evidence, was forced to let the issue 
slide.150 
Even though these types of anti-regime statements were not necessarily directed at a 
specific student, their meaning was still clear to anyone paying attention.  For example, at the 
extended primary school in the small village of Klazienaveen, near the German border, a history 
teacher going over the Napoleonic Era asked his students about St. Helena, “Who should actually 
be sent there?” In unison, the class answered, “Hitler.”151  One school director at the Christian 
advanced primary school in Noordwijk elicited a “hoorah” from students by noting that they 
seemed boisterous in class, perhaps because of the recently reported death of Rudolf Hess, which 
earned the school director a warning from Noordijk to keep politics out of the classroom.  
Although the director denied it specifically, the testimony of several students in the class, 
including one who participated in the “hoorah” and subsequent laughter, worked against him.152 
At a public primary school in The Hague one religion instructor, according to four 
witnesses, referred to the German bombing of Rotterdam as the work of the devil, thereby 
comparing the Germans themselves to the devil.  According to the witnesses, he bragged about 
actually saying this, in Dutch, to two German soldiers while visiting his parents in Rotterdam 
shortly after the Dutch capitulation, but the German soldiers did not understand the meaning of 
the man’s words.  At another point, the same teacher, in front of his students, compared the 
bombing of Rotterdam to Genesis Flood Narrative, noting that what the Dutch had to go through 
in Rotterdam was child’s play compared to the trials of the ancients.  As the father of one of the 
students was a member of the NSB, these utterances made their way to the police, who informed 
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van Dam.  As was not uncommon, instead of taking more drastic actions, van Dam told the 
school director to make sure the teacher stopped teaching in such a way.153 
In other cases, teachers and administrators were more direct in their criticism of 
individuals because of their connection to the regime.  At a primary school in Leiden, a specific 
NSB child was constantly bullied by other students because of his father’s connection to the 
NSB.  When the father went to the school to complain to the director, the director told the father 
that he wanted nothing to do with the NSB (i.e., the father) and he refused to instruct the children 
to stop their torment of the individual student.154   
At the private primary school in Dreumel, the pastor, who occasionally came to teach at 
the school, harassed one 12-year old NSB student in particular with statements such as, “You all 
think that you are the bosses, but that won’t last much longer” and “Look in front of you, you 
need not look at me any longer.”155 It would turn out, after the local school inspector conducted 
an investigation, that the child in question was unable to remember exactly what the teacher had 
supposedly said.  Even her parents suggested the child had difficulty remembering such things, 
although they stood by their original complaint.  For his part, the teacher steadfastly denied any 
wrongdoing, suggesting the complainant had misrepresented his actual statements.156   
Other times, the teacher did not deny wrongdoing.  When the director of a secondary 
school in The Hague passed away from a heart attack one evening, the following morning one of 
the teachers accused students at the school of having been the impetus for the heart attack 
through their spreading of NJS propaganda, which, according to the teacher, the poor director 
simply could not tolerate.  The director was so taken aback, the teacher claimed, that he suffered 
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the heart attack as a result.  At the same time, another teacher at the school reacted to the death of 
the director by noting that all NSBers should be removed from the school including those only 
suspected of NSB membership.  As it would happen, only the first teacher was actually removed 
from his position, primarily because he actually admitted to having made the offending 
comments, albeit the teacher’s version of the events, he stated only that “the events of yesterday 
probably did not do him [the deceased director] any good.  He got very annoyed by it all.”157 
Students were not the only recipients of teachers’ ire, however.  Sometimes it was 
representatives of the regime directly.  In these cases, there was little the offending teachers 
could do in their own defense, as the accusers were trusted bureaucrats, not school children or 
their parents.  In one instance at a public primary school in The Hague in May 1943, a teacher 
was visited by the local school inspector for a regular inspection.  The inspector was 
accompanied by a local city councilor who was also an NSB member.  When the councilor 
offered the teacher his hand for a hand shake, the teacher refused.  This was bad enough, but to 
make matters worse, the teacher refused in front of his class of third graders.  Noordijk 
suspended the teacher for one month without pay.  Such an affront was not taken lightly, as Dr. 
Schmidt, in Wimmer’s office became aware of the case and requested an even stiffer penalty, 
although Noordijk held his ground on that point.158 
The previous month, in April 1943, in Heerlen, a similar incident bordered on the 
childish when a local school inspector came to visit the class of a teacher at the Christian primary 
school there after receiving several complaints.  This particular inspector was one of the NSBers 
who Noordijk had appointed in 1942 after the latter made significant changes to the School 
Inspectorate.  When the inspector offered his hand to the teacher as a greeting, the teacher 
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refused it, in front of both the school director and the entire class.  The inspector tried to remain 
civil and brought the teacher into the hallway.  He informed the teacher that there was no need 
for such childishness, as he was there as a part of the government and that their individual 
political beliefs need not interfere with their official business.  The teacher replied that if he were 
truly acting childish, he would invite the inspector out into the school yard to handle things in a 
more physical manner.  Moreover, the teacher insisted that, as a reserve officer in the military, he 
had sworn allegiance to the Queen and the government in London.  The inspector demanded the 
teacher’s immediate dismissal, which the director refused to do.  The very next day, Noordijk 
signed the order to dismiss the teacher from his position.  The school board tried to intervene, 
suggesting that Noordijk did not have such authority, even though Noordijk very clearly did.  
Noordijk kicked the complaint upstairs to Schwarz’s office, who took Noordijk’s side in the 
dispute.  It all became moot, however, as the teacher and his family absconded and went 
underground within a week.159 
Local government officials were not the only ones to earn the wrath of teaching faculty.  
In some cases, Dijkema and Valkenburg, the two deputies of the Authorized Representative were 
themselves the recipients of anti-NSB or anti-German opposition, for example, when they 
encountered trouble just entering the schools in the first place, as happened at a primary school 
in Deventer in spring 1941.  There, Dijkema saw a child playing with a political pin—in this case 
one supporting the Nederlandsche Unie—and confronted the student.  When Dijkema then 
attempted to take the child inside to meet with the school master, a teacher barred his way.  As it 
would turn out, the teacher was acting on orders from the local school inspector.  Although 
Dijkema protested to van Dam, the school inspector explained in reply that it was all a 
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misunderstanding and that he had told the school administrators to not allow entrance to anyone 
who did not have proper authority, a prohibition which obviously did not apply to van Rossem or 
his deputies.  The entire incident turned into a contest between van Dam and van Rossem 
regarding their respective spheres of authority.  Van Dam refused to punish school inspector and 
claimed that the director’s refusal was based only on a misunderstanding that developed because 
Dijkema, in the director’s eyes, appeared to be too young to have held such authority and 
therefore must have been an impostor with falsified credentials.160  The protection this particular 
inspector received turned out to be short-lived.  He was the very first such inspector dismissed by 
Noordijk when the latter was appointed to the role of Inspector of Education in General 
Service.161 
In a similar instance in April 1941, the director of a secondary school in Alphen on the 
Rhine attempted to put barriers in the way of Valkenburg, who wanted to sit in on a class of a 
teacher suspected of instructing students in an anti-German manner.  This had been the second 
time recently that Valkenburg had been denied entry into a classroom, the first time at a 
Christian primary school in Haarlem.  In both instances, the Valkenburg and van Rossem 
complained to van Dam, who only noted to the school directors that it was not their place to bar 
van Rossem or his deputies from sitting in on classes.162   
In both of these cases, those who barred entry to the deputies of the Authorized 
Representative claimed a misunderstanding was the result.  No such claim could be made for a 
teacher at the Catholic lyceum in ‘s-Hertogenbosch, who refused on principle to shake 
Valkenburg’s hand upon meeting him in May 1941.  The teacher did not mean it to be insulting, 
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he promised, but rather it was a matter of principle.  “As a Dutchman I cannot be a national 
socialist, not even shake a national socialist’s hand,” he reportedly explained to Valkenburg.  
This case apparently hit a nerve with van Dam, as he ordered the teacher suspended immediately 
and then summoned him to The Hague for an in-person dressing down.163   
Although teachers and administrators often expressed their opposition to the occupation 
regime through a general anti-NSB or anti-German attitude and sometimes directed their ire 
directly at adult representatives of the occupiers, harassment of NSB students by teachers was 
comparatively rarer.  No such thing could be said for students themselves, however.  The files of 
the Education Department are littered with complaints of harassment of NSB-oriented children 
by their fellow classmates, sometimes with the at least tacit approval of their teachers.  In May 
1941, a complaint came into van Rossem’s office about the Catholic boys’ school in Noordwijk.  
Students there were continually accosting NSB children as “traitors.” Valkenburg requested that 
the school director conduct an investigation, and although the teacher in the class, per the 
investigation conducted by the director, was in a position to have possibly heard the insults, he 
claimed ignorance.  The director still punished the offending students, but not the teacher.164   
In early 1941, at the Hogere Burger School (secondary school) in Terneuzen, one girl, 
who was a member of the Nationale Jeugdstorm was constantly harassed by fellow students.  
Her life was being “made impossible” and she was accused of being a “traitor” by other students.  
Although the girl’s parents took the issue directly to the director, the school head was either 
unwilling or unable to put an end to the harassment.  The complainants suggested in their letter 
to van Rossem’s office that there were only a few NSB-oriented students at the school, all of 
whom were subjected to abuse by the “Unie-clique”—the group affiliated with the 
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Nederlandsche Unie—to which a majority of students belonged; several of the teachers 
apparently condoned this behavior.  Unfortunately for the girl in question, van Rossem was 
unable to conduct an inquiry to investigate the matter.165 
In most cases, the central government left discipline of students up to school officials, 
although they freely handed out warnings to teachers and school directors that they had better 
take more care to prevent disorder in the schools.  At the Girls’ Primary School in Utrecht, one 
ten-year old student complained to her teacher that she was being harassed by her fellow students 
with constant taunts of being an “NSBer.” Her teacher replied to the girl with the less than 
supportive notion that “if you always have arguments with other girls, you could go to another 
school.”  The teacher freely admitted this to the local inspector when interviewed, although 
denied the more serious charge that was brought up in the initial complaint that she had called 
the student a “traitor” and further taunted the girl by telling her, “if you are bothered by that, just 
get out of school.”  The teacher and the school’s director faced only a warning that they should 
better keep order in the school.166 
At the primary school in the village of Oud-Sabbinge, the children of two NSBers were 
occasionally harassed by fellow students with statements such as “Orange on top” and “long live 
the Queen.”167  The boys, all of whom were between eight and ten, recognized that these taunts 
were directed at them because when they refused to take part in the chants, they were further 
accosted by their classmates.  But in this case, it appears to have been a temporary matter, as by 
the time the local inspector got around to investigating, the matter had cleared itself up, with the 
parents of one set of brothers saying there was no longer any other problem and the father of the 
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other victim indicating he had only complained because he thought it was his duty as the local 
NSB leader to pass complaints up the ladder.  The school inspector agreed that any disruptions 
had since ceased, and so no further actions were necessary by the inspector.168 
It was also not unheard of that students harassed their NSB colleagues with the support of 
their teachers.  In one instance in at a confessional school on the Koepelstraat in Rotterdam, an 
NSB affiliated student was constantly harassed by his classmates, including through name 
calling— “NSBer” and “traitor”—as well as hitting him with sticks.  When he tried to complain 
to the teacher, she labeled him a “tattle-tale” and a “wimp,” and she refused to punish the 
offenders.  His further complaints to the school director, as well as those of his mother to both 
the teacher and the school director were rejected, for the teacher denied her actions and the 
school director stood behind his faculty member.  The director further attempted to deflect blame 
from the accused students by noting that the NSB child had also used a stick against his 
assailants, although that was claimed by the boy’s mother to be pure self-defense.  Only when 
Noordijk interrogated the teacher directly did the truth of the matter come out through her own 
direct admission of having ignored the proper protocols and tacitly approved the harassment.  
Again, Noordijk only suggested that the teacher be sternly warned against future indiscretions.169 
Harassment of NSB students was not limited to the classroom either.  In the small village 
of Roosendaal, the anti-NSB attitude extended to the church, when two NSJ students were barred 
entry to Saturday morning services at the St. Josephskerk, not once but twice.  When their father 
kept the children home from school the following Monday in protest — the students attended a 
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private school attached to the church — the children in the class celebrated their absence, 
according to fellow students who were in attendance.170 
   In some cases, the form of harassment that NSB students endured was more 
problematic.  Name-calling was one thing, but when harassment threatened to, or actually did, 
turn violent, it was an altogether different beast.  In one such instance in The Hague, a student at 
a private primary school there was constantly accosted as a “mof” by his classmates, which 
caused the student, who was half-German, to respond that his assailants were “kaaskops.”171  In 
reply, several of the other students prepared a “death warrant” for the half-German child.  The 
child obtained a copy of this “death warrant” and brought it home to his mother, who promptly 
complained through NSB circles.  It took the usual path of going through van Genechten’s office 
to van Dam and then to the local school inspector, the latter of whom determined that the 
creating and signing of the “death warrant” had occurred off school grounds and thus could not 
be punished by the teachers.  Given the ages of the children, all of whom were between twelve 
and thirteen, it is unlikely that the “death warrant” was meant in earnest.  The authorities 
certainly did not perceive it that way otherwise van Genechten would likely have involved the 
police in the matter rather than sending it over to van Dam’s office.172 
Death threats, however, were only the tip of the iceberg when it came to anti-NSB 
violence by students.  In Bussum, a thirteen-year-old girl was harassed by fellow students, with 
one tarnishing her blouse, which was strikingly similar to that of the NJS uniform, with 
garbage.173  Sometimes harassment took on an even more criminal nature.  At the municipal 
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secondary school in Hilversum, the daughter of an NSB member was repeatedly harassed by her 
fellow classmates, both verbally and through theft of her belongings, including her wallet, which 
was taken from her rucksack.  Although the school director could not punish the culprits of the 
thievery, because they were unknown, he did punish the leader of the students harassing her 
verbally with a five-day suspension.  To make matters worse, several children at the school took 
to following the girl home on their bicycles, riding in such a way as to cause the girl to 
repeatedly fall off her bike to avoid getting into a bicycle accident.  Much to the chagrin of the 
director, however, the girl was unable to name her assailants, and so they too went unpunished.174 
Direct assault was also not uncommon.  At the Catholic Bonaventura School in 
Rotterdam, one set of brothers was repeatedly harassed by their classmates because of their 
membership in the NJS.  Each of the brothers, who ranged in age from eleven to thirteen, had 
been victims of assault by other students, either by being punched or hit with belts, albeit always 
outside of school.  If that were not bad enough for the poor children, one of their teachers 
appeared to be fond of punishing them by expelling them from class for no other reason than 
their membership in the NJS.  Even the government did not take very stern measures, as the 
teacher in question was judged by Noordijk to have suffered enough during his two-month wait 
between the time when the reports first came out and his journey to The Hague to be interviewed 
by Noordijk.  The teacher was, according to Noordijk, quite concerned about his fate and had 
kept the stress bottled-up inside, not even informing his own wife of the potential trouble he 
might be in.  The student assailants, save for one child who actually hit one of the brothers inside 
the classroom went unpunished entirely.  The only administrative punishment meted out by the 
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Education Department was a stern warning that the school administration would be held 
responsible for any future transgressions.175 
Violence was not limited to male students either.  At the Mariengaarde Girls’ School in 
Aarle-Rixtel, one girl was constantly harassed by her classmates.  Inside of the school, she was 
taunted by her classmates as a “dirty NSBer,” had paper balls with curses thrown at her, and was 
otherwise shunned.  But it was on the way home from school that the harassment became violent, 
as she was sometimes followed home from school, whereby her classmates would push her 
around and sometimes even throw rocks at her.  One time, a boy of unknown origin got involved 
in the harassment and even threatened her with a knife.  Unfortunately, Noordijk’s report is 
missing from the file, but a later note of his indicates that the harassment eventually petered out 
after his intervention, suggesting that at least some of the accusations by the girl and her mother 
were true.176 
The ride home from school also presented some youth the opportunity to harass their 
NSB-oriented classmates.  In one such instance at the Reformed Lyceum in Amsterdam, a girl 
had come to school wearing an NJS uniform in April 1941, before it was officially permitted.  
The school director, hoping to avoid problems, allowed her to wear her jacket over the uniform 
instead of sending her home to change, which, in retrospect, probably would have been the better 
option.  When school let out, the girl was followed by a large crowd of students that eventually 
forced her into the house of a sympathetic neighborhood doctor, who immediately called the 
school director to come and intervene, which the latter did.  After breaking up the gathering, the 
girl was able to make her way peacefully home.  Van Dam, in consultation with Valkenburg, 
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ordered that the students who led the anti-NJS crowd be punished with suspensions, while the 
girl was to be reminded that uniforms of the NJS were not allowed to be worn in school.177 
Conclusion 
For the most part, the reports that made their way to the Education Department in The 
Hague come from the first three years of the occupation.  Starting in about mid-1943 they drop 
substantially in frequency, becoming more and more infrequent as the occupation goes on.  
There are many possible reasons for this.  The most obvious possible cause for the drop in the 
number of complaints is that the incidence of anti-regime agitation inside the schools began to 
subside, that is, because the new regulations and punishments meted out by Noordijk, van Dam, 
and their German superiors started becoming effective.  This seems especially unlikely given the 
overall tenor of the occupation, with resistance activity picking up precisely around this period 
owing to the changing tide of the war and the general increase in German repression.  Anti-
regime students, teachers, and administrators would have been emboldened by the uptick in 
resistance activity and increase in German oppression; it is unlikely that they would have chosen 
this time to stop causing problems for the regime and their local representatives on the ground, 
especially since such activity had not yet been, up to that point, especially risky for most 
individuals.   
Another, related possibility is that fewer complaints reached the central Education 
Department offices in Apeldoorn—the Education Department moved from The Hague to 
Apeldoorn in March 1943—because inspectors on the ground were both initiating and handling 
the investigations entirely themselves.  This is certainly possible and cannot be discounted 
entirely.  But this theory does not account for the ways in which most complaints made it to the 
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local inspectors in the first place, that is, via NSB circles, through van Genechten’s office, along 
to van Dam, and down to Noordijk and the local inspectors.  It seems unlikely that van Dam’s 
office would have been excluded in this way.  Moreover, the majority of the School Inspectorate 
was never in the hands of NSB officials, and those career officials would have no reason to 
exclude van Dam’s office from their investigations, especially since van Dam tended to support 
their conclusions.178 
A more reasonable explanation comes in the demotion of Robert van Genechten from his 
position as Solicitor-General in The Hague in February 1943.  While this is certainly possible, it 
assumes that van Genechten was the main force behind these complaints reaching van Dam’s 
office.  Although it cannot be discounted entirely, it seems unlikely that victims of harassment 
would give up their attempts to gain relief simply because one key advocate was no longer 
employed in a specific key position.  After all, many individuals made complaints through 
several channels, including via the NSB, the local police, and the educational establishment more 
generally, all of which continued to supply cases for investigation after van Genechten was 
demoted.179   
In my view, the most likely reason that complaints stop showing up in mid-1943 is 
because the government was simply dealing with other matters of greater import.  Noordijk’s 
office and purview expanded significantly over the course of the occupation, and so he was 
dealing with many other issues beyond inspecting the schools.180  The German administrators 
were, by mid-1943, more worried about extracting the greatest amount of resources possible 
from the Dutch populace in the name of winning the war.  And of course, it is around this time 
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that van Dam stopped performing anything but house maintenance at the Education 
Department’s central offices.181  Schwarz’s last report to the office of the Party Chancellery in 
Berlin is, although undated, also written around this time.182  It seems most likely that the 
significant drop off in reports of anti-regime agitation in the schools is connected to this larger 
drop off in general activity at the Education Department after its move to Apeldoorn. 
Regardless of the cause in the decline in reported anti-regime agitation, however, the first 
three years of German rule offer more than enough evidence that students and teachers were 
unsupportive of the German occupation.  Even if anti-regime activity actually declined, rather 
than the reporting of such activity declining, that would certainly not mean that students and 
teachers had been somehow convinced of the larger German mission or were for some reason 
less antagonistic to the occupation itself.  From early 1943 onward, the Nazi regime was less and 
less tolerated by the Dutch public owing to the increasingly repressive nature of the occupation.  
Assuming that students and teachers for some reason bucked this trend defies logic entirely.   
In fact, during the occupation, anti-regime activity in schools was a widespread problem 
for the German occupiers and their Dutch helpers.  Although it is impossible to say for certain 
what motivated most individuals to act out against the regime, the very fact that they did strongly 
suggests a general antipathy towards not just the occupation itself, but also the goals the 
occupiers hoped to implement.  Students and teachers displayed their antipathy through a myriad 
of ways, all of which combined to make the classroom an especially uncomfortable place for 
supporters of the regime.  By rejecting the representatives of the occupation in their local 
context, students and teachers also rejected the goals of the occupation more broadly. 
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In the following chapter, the focus turns back to the institutional changes the German 
occupiers tried to institute in Dutch society. Unlike those “reforms” discussed in chapters four, 
five, and six, however, the new initiatives were mostly reactive rather than proactive. As 1942 
pressed on, the German occupiers turned to ever more repressive measures that had the dual 
purpose of punishing those who engaged in resistance and providing economic support for the 
German war effort, but which nonetheless had a significant effect on the education sphere. Gone 
were the days in which Seyss-Inquart tried to win the “hearts and minds” of the Dutch populace. 
Rather, as the war went on, the Dutch would be compelled, by force if necessary, to do the 
Germans’ bidding. The nature of these newer “reforms” would cause even greater resistance on 
the part of the Dutch populace, and eventually, would convince even van Dam, one of the most 
strident supporters of the Nazis’ Germanic project in the Dutch educational realm, to question 
whether success was possible, or even desirable.
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Chapter 8 - The End of Educational Reform 
 
Thus, the policy of the [Reichskommissar] is either fruitless in its effect, since it leads to nothing, or even fatal for us 
since it must lead to a complete suppression of our people. - Jan van Dam, June 1, 19431 
 
By mid-1943, the tenor of the German occupation of the Netherlands had significantly 
changed. On the one hand, reversals in the field, especially in Eastern Europe at the hands of the 
Red Army, but also in North Africa, where the Western Allies had pushed the Germans out of 
Africa, followed by the invasions of Sicily and mainland Italy in Summer 1943, made it 
increasingly likely, even from the layman’s point of view, that the Germans would lose the war. 
These reversals were a partial cause of a significant uptick in resistance activity on the part of the 
Dutch populace. On the other hand, the German war effort against the Soviet Union required 
ever larger extractions of materiel and labor from occupied Europe. In the Netherlands as it 
related to the education sphere, this was most prominent through the increase in forced labor 
drafts, which hit young Netherlanders especially hard, many students among them.  Moreover, 
the recall of Dutch soldiers in April 1943, which was a precursor to their interment in prisoner-
of-war camps in Germany, ignited the second large strike action during the German occupation. 
This concluding chapter focuses on those events, mostly in late 1942 and early 1943 that 
led to the end of educational reform in the Netherlands. It was during this time of unrest and 
worsening repression that resulted from the disruptions to higher education because of the forced 
labor drives, the general increase in resistance activity because of the changing tide in the war, 
and the April/May Strike of 1943 that work at the central Education Department declined 
significantly. From then on out, the majority of work done at the Department of Education 
consisted of either cursory administrative work or active resistance to German goals, such as 
working against the forced labor drafts of students and department officials. It is also during this 
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time that van Dam even begins to actively help at least one acquaintance involved in direct 
resistance activities. By this time, Van Dam appears to have lost his prior zeal for educational 
“reform,” questioning whether it was possible, and if it was, whether it was desirable.2 
On the German side, the activities of Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and Schwarz in the 
education realm also begin to lessen.  With the exception of historical education, for which some 
work does continue, the efforts of the Education Department largely stop.3  For the remainder of 
the occupation, local municipalities and schools were able to continue without much interference 
from the central government. And so the situation would remain until the late summer and fall 
1944, when the southern portions of the country were liberated by Allied armies. Naturally, the 
nature of the southern portions of the country being an active war zone caused significant 
disruptions in education, and the same would happen over the rest of the country during Spring 
1945 as Allied armies pushed the remaining German forces out of the Netherlands.4  Once the 
Western Allies liberated the country, democratic rule returned and schools got back to the 
normal process of educating the next generation. 
Forced Labor 
On May 23, 1941, Seyss-Inquart decreed that all young Netherlanders of both sexes were 
required to register for the Nederlandsche Arbeidsdienst (NAD) where they would serve the 
Dutch volk.5 The goal of the Labor Service was “educate Dutch youth in the spirit of a true 
Volksgemeinschaft toward a moral sense of work and, in particular, for a respect for manual 
labor.”6 Under the terms of the new decree, all Dutch youth were to register for labor service by 
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the end of their eighteenth year and were liable for service until they reached twenty-five years 
of age. The idea of work as an educational tool had been a justification that Seyss-Inquart had 
used before. In July 1940, he stressed that much in a speech he gave in The Hague when he 
argued that labor service would help educate young Netherlanders in the ideals of National 
Socialism.7 
The NAD was a successor to the Opbouwdienst, which Seyss-Inquart had also seen as an 
educational institution.8  The Opbouwdienst dated to the very beginning of the occupation when 
the new occupation authority was trying to find a way to put the recently demobilized Dutch 
military back to work. Beginning in July 1940, thousands of mostly voluntary former soldiers 
began working for the Opbouwdienst in various jobs such as road construction, wetland 
drainage, and land reclamation. The Opbouwdienst was meant to be a temporary endeavor for 
individual workers who would, in time, find regular work. And although it was not required, 
pressure was put on workers to perform militarily essential tasks, such as working at German 
airports—this was during the height of the Blitz when those German airports in the Netherlands 
were prime military targets for British retaliation—or on coastal fortifications in Belgium and 
France. Workers who were not willing to work on German military projects, and who could not 
otherwise find work in the Netherlands or Germany, could not receive state benefits, which made 
even the dangerous jobs in the Netherlands attractive to some.9 
The Opbouwdienst, however, was a short-lived project. The following summer, Seyss-
Inquart established the Nederlandsche Arbeidsdienst, which started with about 20,000 workers 
who were simply transferred from the now-defunct Opbouwdienst. This “educational” 
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institution, which was designed to instill a Greater Germanic mindset among the youth, was 
originally also voluntary, but in April 1942, Seyss-Inquart, by way of the Secretary-General of 
General Affairs, decreed that service in the NAD was mandatory for all persons wishing to be 
appointed to public service, including teaching personnel in both public and confessional 
schools, as well as any student who wanted to matriculate into higher education and currents 
students who wanted to take their university exams.  Those who were already employed in public 
sector or in confessional education were required to perform their labor service by July 1, 1944.10  
Later that year, in October 1942, service with the NAD was made mandatory for all unemployed 
persons, in addition to those already required to serve. More importantly, however, instead of 
simply requiring young adults who worked in schools to perform their labor service before July 
1, 1944, this new order called up specific age cohorts for service at designated times, with the 
first group—those born between April 1, 1922 and March 31, 1923, who would have been 
nineteen and twenty at the time—to perform their service in the first six months of 1943.11 
The regulations that were decreed had only minimal initial effect on the educational 
sector. At first, those who worked in schools and were required to register for labor service could 
delay their service period. Once the government started calling up specific age cohorts, however, 
many people simply did not show up at the designated time. School heads and school boards 
failed to check whether their new applicants had performed their labor service, to say nothing of 
the universities, which did even less to help the NAD, so that the NAD eventually started 
checking the records of schools and educational institutions themselves. Furthermore, even 
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though there was little organized resistance to the NAD, the Department of Education, which 
was the most affected department because of the nature of the regulations, did nothing in support 
of the measures either, meaning that there was not much pressure on prospective applicants to 
teaching positions to actually fulfill their service.12 Van Dam claimed, after the war, to have 
never once done anything to help the NAD in its activities.13   
Although the NAD did not have a great impact upon education, it did summon tens of 
thousands of young, unemployed Netherlanders for work. Service performed for the NAD was 
similar in nature to that of the Opbouwdienst. Tasks included mostly manual labor, including 
agricultural work, that were meant to show young people the value of hard work in honor of their 
fatherland and, in theory, win them for National Socialism and the Germanic project.  And the 
work was, more or less, directly in service to the Dutch nation and not the German occupier.14  
So in that sense, labor service with the NAD really was in the interests of the Dutch volk, but this 
changed in spring 1942, when compulsory labor service in Germany, known as the arbeidsinzet, 
began. 
The arbeidsinzet, or Forced Labor Service in Germany, had been the result of two 
intermingling factors. First, like many of the major powers during the Great Depression of the 
1930s, Nazi Germany engaged in an active attempt to reduce unemployment, and in that effort, 
the Nazis experienced great success. By 1936, Germany experienced a shortage of skilled 
workers which only grew as the 1930s went on, such that by mid-1938, the German government 
instituted compulsory labor service. When Hitler’s armies began their conquest of Europe in 
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1939, the large numbers of formerly working men who had been drafted into military service 
created even larger labor shortages in the German economy, which were only exacerbated by the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, and their subsequent defeats during the winter of 
1942-43. Those defeats led to increased military drafts and the ever-greater need for military 
production, further increasing the labor shortages that were already quite prevalent in Germany’s 
economy.15   
The second factor was the nearly opposite situation in the Netherlands. Where the large 
economies of Germany and the United States combated the depression through large scale state 
intervention into the economy, the Dutch governments of the 1930s preferred to take a hands-off 
approach. Thus, in 1936, when Germany was experiencing a labor shortage, unemployment in 
the Netherlands was extremely high at roughly half a million workers out of a working 
population of just over three million individuals. Although the Dutch government at that time did 
look to Germany as a source of inspiration for combating their economic woes, little actual 
policy resulted, such that, on the eve of the invasion, there were at least two hundred thousand 
officially unemployed workers in the Netherlands, with perhaps a half million total unemployed. 
The demobilization of another seventy thousand soldiers after the Dutch capitulation only made 
matters worse.16 
Already in the late 1930s, the Dutch government had toyed with the idea of sending 
Dutch workers to Germany to fill out the labor shortages there and briefly even made accepting 
work in Germany a condition for the continued reception of state benefits, although that policy 
was reversed, in secret, in 1939.  After the German occupation began, this policy of trading state 
subsidies for work in Germany was re-instituted by the Dutch government of its own accord by 
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simply not telling the German authorities that the policy had been abandoned in the first place. It 
was the re-institution of this policy that led to the first wartime labor drafts of Dutch civilians to 
work in Nazi Germany, even though such a position was, strictly speaking, illegal under Dutch 
laws that were aimed at preventing the coerced use of Dutch labor on behalf of the German war 
effort. Despite this coercion, the Germans’ propaganda efforts focused on the “voluntary” nature 
of the work assignments in Germany.17 To the extent that unemployed Dutch workers were not 
forced at the point of a gun, the “voluntary” nature of the work assignments is accurate, but the 
financial coercion employed by the Dutch government and their German overseers should not be 
ignored. 
This changed in two ways during the spring of 1942. One the one hand, labor service 
became compulsory, with shirkers threatened with arrest and imprisonment. On the other hand, 
the labor drafts were no longer limited to the ranks of the unemployed, as employed workers had, 
up to that point, not been shipped to Germany to work in factories, on farms, and in other 
industries deemed vital to war production. These changes were a direct result of Germany’s war 
effort. The German economy lost roughly six million workers between 1939 and mid-1941, the 
vast majority to the German military. From mid-1941 when the Germans launched the invasion 
of the Soviet Union through mid-1942, almost two million more Germans were called into 
military service.18 The situation got even worse after the German defeat at Stalingrad and the 
subsequent declaration of total war in early 1943, with German demands for Dutch conscript 
laborers reaching into the tens of thousands of individuals per month, although they were rarely 
able to meet these quotas.19   
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Administratively, the Forced Labor Drafts were handled on the Dutch side through the 
Generalkommissariat zur besonderen Verwendung led by Fritz Schmidt and, to a lesser extent, 
by the Generalkommissariat für Finanz und Wirtschaft headed by Hans Fischböck.20 On the 
German side of the equation, administration was handled by various agencies, including the 
Office of the Four Year Plan, headed by Hermann Goering as well as the 
Reichsarbeitsministerium,21 but in March 1942, the planning and administration of forced labor 
was centralized under the auspices of Fritz Sauckel, former official in Göring’s office, Gauleiter 
of Thuringia, and newly appointed Generalbevollmächtigter für den Arbeitseinsatz.22  Sauckel 
would be the person who coordinated most of the efforts on the German side for the use of Dutch 
forced laborers, and it would be his office that set the quotas for forced labor participation. 
The forced labor draft affected the educational sphere in two ways. First among these was 
the recruitment, and later forced removal, of Education Department personnel to work in 
Germany. Beyond the voluntary teacher re-training seminars held in Oldenburg for teachers 
looking for placement in German schools, the forced labor of workers in the education 
department was not a problem until the changes implemented in spring 1942 that allowed for the 
deportation of employed workers to Germany. Even here, the most heavily affected sector of the 
department that was sent to Germany did not include instructors, but rather those who performed 
auxiliary services, such as maintenance. For his part, van Dam was a significant defender of the 
personnel in his department, complaining constantly to Schwarz, Wimmer, and even Seyss-
Inquart about the problems that would follow if departmental personnel were sent to Germany in 
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large numbers. All of the “reforms” that had been instituted in the prior three years, he argued, 
would be for naught. Moreover, given his position as Secretary-General, with its consequent 
ability to mark personnel as indispensable, he was able to hold off the worst of the forced labor 
drafts from affecting teachers.23  Luckily, Wimmer agreed with him, such that by the end of 
1943, only twelve officials in the department had been sent to Germany in the labor service.24 
In 1944, the problem of teachers being sent to Germany for forced labor became more 
serious, but again, van Dam worked against the Germans in this regard. By this time, most 
people who were being called up for forced labor were not reporting but rather going 
underground, and this included teachers.25 But teachers going underground because they had 
been called up for labor service was actually one half of the reason. Just as many, if not more, 
teachers had gone underground because of the recall of former POWs in April 1943.26 Obviously, 
the German authorities saw this situation of teachers going underground as untenable, but van 
Dam continued to drag his feet on the matter. In February 1944, Schwarz sent a sternly worded 
letter—complete with specific words underlined and the word Sofort! (immediately) written in 
red and underlined twice for emphasis—to van Dam demanding to know how it was possible 
that the wife of a teacher who had gone into hiding was still receiving his paycheck. Schwarz 
demanded an answer within one week. Van Dam replied simply that it is an issue of inefficient 
bureaucracy.27 
The problem for the Dutch authorities was political in nature. On the one hand, the 
inspectorate, headed by Dr. Noordijk, wanted nothing to do with the situation. He did not think it 
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possible to fire such teachers, as they were using sick leave as their excuse for not working, but 
because he kept getting questions on how to proceed, he simply passed the problem up the chain. 
The provincial and central administrations decided that the best course of action was to turn the 
matters over to the police, as this was not an appropriate task for the school inspectors.28 
Therefore, van Dam turned to Schwarz and Wimmer for instructions on how to proceed. As far 
as van Dam was concerned, it was not possible to characterize the situation of a teacher who had 
used sick leave to go underground as having been released. Only a new governmental decree 
could change that situation, and when Schwarz had ordered him in mid-June to draft such a 
decree, he came up with the idea that any teacher who had been absent for more than a month 
would be considered released. Schwarz was not happy with the month-long waiting period and 
ordered that the period of absence be reduced to only two days, which mirrored the time frame 
for other government officials who had not reported to work without any notice at all.29 The 
circular was finally released on August 8, 1944; van Dam had managed to drag his feet for 
almost six months. By this point, however, central control was beginning to break down. Only a 
month later, the first Allied troops would enter the country. 
The other way in which the Forced Labor Service affected the Education Department was 
through the impressment of students, especially those in the final years of secondary education 
and in higher education. The genesis of the plan to send students to Germany came from G. A. 
Apitz, head of the Hauptabteilung Soziale Verwaltung30 of the Generalkommissariat für Finanz 
und Wirtschaft. Sauckel’s quotas for the period of April through November 1942 had not been 
met, falling short by about twenty-four thousand people, despite the fact that the number of those 
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sent to Germany, roughly one hundred, five thousand, had been higher than the number sent to 
Germany in all of 1941.  When Sauckel’s demand for twenty-five thousand forced laborers be 
sent in December, Apitz decided that he could pad the numbers with some five thousand 
students.31   
Apitz then informed Schwarz that six thousand students were to report for labor service 
(he had increased his requirements), who suggested that the number was impossible to fulfill, 
and even if it were possible, it would engender much resistance among the students, who had 
formed a strong contingent of the resistance movement over the course of the year. Apitz, who 
was supported by Schmidt, refused to budge, and sent his requirements directly to van Dam, this 
time with a further increase in number to between six and eight thousand. Although van Dam 
protested to Schwarz, arguing that only graduated students should be sent to Germany, his 
objections were set aside, even though he was able to obtain some minor concessions.32  Instead 
of reporting for labor service on the nineteenth of December, the students destined for the 
arbeidsinzet could stay in the Netherlands until after the Christmas holidays, their labor service 
was promised to be no longer than one year, and they were to be installed in locations that made 
the further pursuit of their studies during their year in Germany feasible. Regardless of the 
concessions, however, the forced labor draft would mean that the total number of Dutch students 
studying in higher education in the Netherlands would be cut roughly in half.33 
With the concessions in hand, van Dam assembled the heads of the various universities 
and informed them of the situation, against which all of the university leaders, save one, 
strenuously objected. But their objections did little good, as the Germans were intent on 
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following through with the policy. They left their December 9 meeting with van Dam without 
having gotten any real answers about their concerns and were instructed to keep quiet about the 
coming labor drafts. How exactly, the news got out is uncertain, given the large number of 
individuals privy to the otherwise secret information, but it did get out quickly.34 The Council of 
Nine, an umbrella organization that coordinated student resistance at the nine Dutch institutions 
of higher education, called for student strikes, many of which occurred, but none of which had a 
centralized leadership and so all fizzled out. On Saturday December 12, van Dam sent telegrams 
to the various universities asking for the names and addresses of students, so that he could 
forward them to the appropriate authorities. That evening, however, the student registry at 
Utrecht went up in flames.  The following Monday, Schmidt gave in. He had not expected the 
level of resistance to the labor draft that had occurred, and informed Apitz and van Dam that the 
labor draft would not be possible.35 
In early February 1943, a pair of attacks against NSB collaborators spurred the Germans 
back into action. The first was a deadly attack against Hendrik Seyffardt, a General in the Dutch 
Army and member of Mussert’s newly established shadow cabinet. Two resistance fighters, the 
communist neurologist Dr. Gerrit Kastein and a university student named Jan Verleun, looked up 
Seyffardt’s address in the local telephone book, went to his house on the evening of Friday, 
February 5 and simply rang the bell. Seyffardt, who was home alone, answered the door and was 
greeted with two bullets to the stomach. He died the following day, but not before reporting that 
the perpetrators of the attack against him had been students.  On February 7, Kastein carried out 
another attack against H. Reydon, the successor to the recently dismissed Dr. Tobie 
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Goedewaagen as Secretary-General of the Department of People’s Enlightenment and Arts. 
Kastein had located Reydon in Voorschoten, a small town between Leiden and The Hague, and 
upon approaching him, shot both Reydon and his wife. Reydon survived the assassination 
attempt, but his wife did not. Kastein fled to an unknown location where the police could not 
find him, but after a member of his resistance cell was compromised, he was picked up by the 
Sicherheitsdienst on February 19 in Rotterdam. He was taken back to The Hauge to be 
interrogated, but instead of submitting himself to the brutal interrogation methods of the SS, he 
jumped through a closed window, fracturing his skull on the pavement below. He died within 
hours.36 
As a result of the attack on Seyffardt, the Germans conducted razzia raids in Amsterdam, 
Delft, Utrecht, and Wageningen on February 6 that netted about six hundred students and sent 
them to the concentration camp at Vught.37 Then, on February 9 an even larger razzia raid in 
Amsterdam netted about twelve hundred young people, most of whom were university students, 
but some who were also secondary school students.38  They too were sent to Vught.  Although 
the Germans had netted just under two thousand students, the plan had been much greater. In 
meetings with Seyss-Inquart, Rauter, and Schmidt, the discussion had been to arrest as many as 
five thousand young people, and possibly to execute fifty on the spot, even if those fifty could 
not be directly connected to resistance activity. Luckily, Seyss-Inquart, with the help of more 
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level-headed German officials, came to his senses and recognized that such drastic measures 
would be counterproductive.39 
As a result of the raids, many students simply stopped going to school, given the danger 
of collecting so many students in a single place.40 If it was not the danger of being collected for 
forced labor, it was the danger of being arrested in German reprisals. Which factor most students 
thought more dangerous is difficult to determine, but regardless, such a situation was impossible 
to endure, even for the German leadership.  As a result, on February 17, 1943, Seyss-Inquart 
released a circular stating that those young men under eighteen years of age and those older 
students who were engaged in serious study would not be called up for the arbeidsinzet. When 
some students continued to receive calls to report, Seyss-Inquart issued a second circular on the 
matter in March, exempting all secondary school students from forced labor, but also ordered 
that students who were nineteen years old needed to take their school exit exams, regardless of 
whether they were otherwise prepared. Even more students responded by going underground.41 
The Loyalty Declaration 
Although the Germans had been somewhat successful in collecting and deporting 
workers, many of whom were students, for labor in Germany, the goals they had set were almost 
never met. Their most effective actions had been razzia raids collecting students off the street. 
While some students did, indeed, report when called, they were a small minority. Many more 
responded to the summons by going underground. Thus, already by early 1943, Seyss-Inquart 
was at an impasse. His superiors in the Reich were demanding quotas of young Netherlanders to 
work, but try as he might, those young Netherlanders would not answer the calls. He could not 
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allow that situation to continue. Moreover, university life had been nearly shut down by the 
February razzias, and this threatened to cause political problems for Seyss-Inquart if Rauter and 
Harster were able to assert themselves vis-à-vis Seyss-Inquart by arguing that students were a 
significant portion of the resistance. This might, Seyss-Inquart rightly feared, allow the two SS 
men to refer the entire question of universities and student labor over to the German security 
forces.42   
In order to help solve the problem, van Dam returned to his request from the previous 
December—to force students who had completed their studies to join the Forced Labor Service 
while keeping still enrolled students free of such obligations. According to van Dam, this had 
several benefits. First and foremost, it would reduce the ongoing student insurrection. But it 
would also, hopefully, provide a steady stream of graduating students for labor in Germany, and 
even better, workers who might actually be qualified to perform the work to which they were 
assigned, instead of students who were, at best, still in training. He granted that the roughly two 
thousand students who would complete their studies each year was a far cry from the five 
thousand which Sauckel had been demanding, but it was, nonetheless, better than no students at 
all, and the German war economy needed all of the labor it could get.43  At the same time, van 
Dam suggested two further regulations aimed at preventing too many students from using further 
university study from delaying their labor service in Germany: the loyalty declaration and a 
general numerus clausus limiting the total number of students who were allowed to attend 
university in any given year.44 
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By this point, A. A. Mussert, leader of the NSB, had been declared by Hitler as the Leider 
of the Dutch nation.  Although it was a mostly meaningless gesture, it did give him the ability to 
insert himself into the internal deliberations at the Reichskommissariat. He wasted no time in 
doing so and used this opportunity to try and strike a blow against his nemesis van Dam (van 
Dam was one of many Mussert nemeses). Because he had not been consulted, or even informed, 
about the razzias against the students that took place on February 6 and 9, Seyss-Inquart was 
forced to allow Mussert a seat at the table regarding the loyalty declaration. Where van Dam had 
wanted to limit the loyalty declaration to students alone, Mussert hoped to not only force 
students to sign the loyalty declaration, but also hoped to require professors sign along with 
them. Furthermore, he wanted to insert language that forbade any actions by students that went 
against the NSB and its student organization. Finally, he wanted to expand the powers of the 
university curators and rectors. The former would be able to suspend instructors and the latter to 
suspend students for up to a year, where they had previously been limited to suspensions lasting 
a single week. Van Dam opposed all of these insertions, save the increased power of the 
university rectors and curators. Van Dam asked Wimmer to intercede on his behalf, which 
Wimmer did. In the end, van Dam’s position held; the Leider was totally defeated.45 
The second week of March, the government made public two decrees that followed the 
intent and purpose of van Dam’s recommendations. The first regarded the arbeidsinzet and was 
issued directly by Seyss-Inquart. “In order to guarantee, on the one hand, total commitment, 
including academic youth, to the European fight against Bolshevism and, on the other hand, 
sufficient academic talent,” the Secretary-General in the Department of Education is empowered 
to implement a numerus clauses in all areas of university education.46  University students who 
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had completed their exit examinations were required to work in the arbeidsinzet for a specified 
period of time, provided they did not receive a reprieve from either the Secretary-General of the 
Education Department or from the same in the Department of Social Affairs. The second decree, 
which was issued by van Dam himself, detailed the new authorities of university rectors and 
curators, including their increased ability to suspend students, as well as made mandatory the 
signing of the loyalty declaration. The loyalty declaration declared only that the undersigned 
would follow the appropriate laws, decrees, and governmental regulations; would not engage or 
support resistance acts against the German Reich, Wehrmacht, or Dutch government such that 
would endanger the peace and order in the universities.47  Three days later, on March 16, the 
majority of the students who had been interned at Vught were set free. 
The declaration itself had been rather reserved in nature. It had called only for the signers 
to refrain from engaging in anti-German activities to the extent that they would disrupt the 
universities. Moreover, he required only that students sign it “every year.” This latter point had 
the effect of pushing the requirement to sign the declaration into the winter semester of 1943/44. 
But without his knowledge, the Germans inserted a clause into the decree that stated, “every 
year, for the first time one month after this regulation goes into effect…”  This meant that the 
first students were required to sign the loyalty declaration within a month of the order going into 
effect in order to keep studying.48  Van Dam had been too clever by half. 
In a radio speech to the Dutch nation, van Dam declared that signing the declaration did 
not mean that students would automatically, voluntarily register for the arbeidsinzet after they 
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completed their studies. The order requiring participation in the Forced Labor Service had been 
released by Seyss-Inquart and was completely separate from the loyalty declaration decree issued 
by van Dam himself. Even the dates on which the two decrees had been released were different 
(by a single day).49 Van Dam further argued that the loyalty declaration had only two purposes: 
the maintenance of peace and order in the universities and the guarantee that students would be 
able to complete their studies. In contrast to the fears of many students, the loyalty decree would, 
if signed before the deadline of April 10, prevent signers from being shipped to Germany, not 
cause it, or so he argued. As was by this point nearly formulaic, van Dam ended his address by 
appealing to the listeners’ sense of patriotism: “It is up to you to show whether you will answer 
these attempts with understanding for our intentions and an attitude, which better than anything 
negative, witnesses to a truly sophisticated patriotism that is elevated above the influences of the 
day!”50 
Regardless of van Dam’s efforts to make the loyalty declaration palatable to students and 
convince them that it was in their best interest to sign it, the Council of Nine advised students to 
refuse to sign the declaration, and their advice was taken to heart. Only about thirteen per cent of 
students signed the declaration at all by the deadline, with rates varying from university to 
university, with some student bodies effectively refusing to sign en masse.51  Rates increased 
only slightly after the deadline.52  On the other hand, the loyalty declaration was quickly 
overshadowed by the strike events of late April and early May, during which Rauter decreed that 
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anyone who had not signed the loyalty declaration by May 5 were required to sign up for the 
arbeidsinzet—about three thousand of the students did just that.53   
As a result of the low rates of signing the loyalty declaration, the universities in Tilburg, 
Utrecht, Groningen and Nijmegen, as well as the Free University of Amsterdam were all closed. 
The German security forces rounded up thousands of students who had not signed the loyalty 
declaration and sent them to Germany as part of the arbeidsinzet. Thousands more went 
underground. Although most of the closed universities were reopened shortly, they proved 
almost empty of students.54  In March 1944, van Dam sent a letter to Wimmer describing the 
general state of affairs in higher education. He noted that although there had been disturbances 
among the students in the 1943/44 school year, they had not been as bad as the previous year. 
More problematic was the loss of both students and teachers to the arbeidsinzet. On the other 
hand, too many teachers were going underground, using sick leave as the pretense. Nor were 
there enough vacancies to fill those positions left unoccupied. As van Dam put it, “the machine 
cannot be put back into gear.”55  Although higher education would struggle through the final year 
of the war, it was a shadow of its former self. This was made worse by the fact that the 
Netherlands in fall 1944 and spring 1945 was turned, quite literally, into a war zone, as Allied 
and German forces fought for control of the crucial Rhine river crossings. Across all of the 
universities in the Netherlands, these various factors would combine to keep total enrollments to 
less than two thousand students, when the university student population had traditionally hovered 
around sixteen thousand annually.56 The machine was indeed completely broken.   
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By this point in the occupation, van Dam seems to have grown weary of the Germans. He 
had not been a fan of the NIVO but did not actively work against it. The same could be said for 
the Reichsschulen. He had opposed most of the anti-Jewish measures, along with the rest of the 
Dutch bureaucracy, but again did not entirely stand in the way of the Germans’ efforts in that 
realm, although he was instrumental in saving a small group of about 700 Jewish Netherlanders, 
by working along with his colleague Karel Frederiks, the Secretary-General of the Department of 
Internal Affairs. The two of them had interceded with Seyss-Inquart to save a number of notable 
individuals who were, for various reasons, deemed significant to Dutch culture. Compared to the 
many points on which van Dam had agreed with the Germans’ policies, or indeed been an 
originator of such policies, these few instances of resistance are outliers. The loyalty decree, 
which was van Dam’s last real attempt at implementing major policy, had been an effort to 
forestall the worst of the Germans’ actions against students, but it was largely ineffective in this 
purpose, since so few students were willing to sign it. With the imposition of forced labor, the 
razzia raids against students, their internment in concentration camps, and other elements of 
increased repression against the Dutch populace, van Dam began working, more or less, against 
the ultimate goals of the Reichskommissariat. 
The April/May Strike 
The loyalty declaration, which had been devised as a way to both maintain order in the 
universities as well as increase enrollments in the arbeidsinzet, had been an abject failure.  But 
while the situation in higher education had led to massive resistance efforts on the part of the 
students, it did not disrupt the entire country in the same way that the recall of POWs would. The 
very fact that POWs could be recalled was due to an order that Hitler had given the German High 
Command in the Netherlands shortly after the armistice in May 1940 to release the members of 
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the Dutch military back into civilian life. Hitler, of course, wanted to show the Dutch that he was 
looking out for their best interests, but at the same time, forced the soldiers to sign a loyalty 
declaration stating that they would not engage in anti-German activities.57  Contrary to what 
Hitler might have hoped, however, the former soldiers would, in many cases, not adhere to either 
the letter or spirit of their pledges. 
The process of recalling former soldiers included two stages. The first came in May 1942, 
when, under orders directly from Hitler, the Germans began considering the recall of the officer 
cohort of the Dutch military. The reason for this recall was simple. Many Germans officials 
believed, not incorrectly, that the Dutch Army contained within its ranks important members of 
the resistance movement that had been picking up steam over the previous months.58 Career 
officers, with their training and organizational abilities, would be essential to the resistance 
movement, and so in order to crush resistance, it would be necessary to remove the military 
leadership from the scene. So, on May 9, at the behest of Luftwaffe General Friedrich 
Christiansen, the commander of German military forces in the Netherlands, former career 
military officers, cadet officers, and officers of the Dutch Army in the Dutch East Indies who 
were under the age of fifty-five, were ordered to report to various barracks throughout the 
country precisely at 2pm on May 15. No reason was given for the order.59  However, two days 
later, the Commissariat for the Interests of the former Dutch Army, a section of the Dutch 
Department of Defense that had been re-established under German orders to look after the well-
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being of former soldiers, posted announcements that those officers required to report to barracks 
would be eligible for reimbursement of their traveling costs, both to and from their destinations.60 
But there was no return home for these soldiers as they were all promptly arrested and 
sent to prisoner-of-war camps in Germany. Two days later, Christiansen made clear their 
reasoning: “Members of the former Dutch Army have participated to a significant extent in all 
kinds of hostile acts against Germany. Among them were a considerable number of officers and 
aspiring officers … [who] had broken their word.” Moreover, in case the stakes were not clear 
enough, the notice went on to threaten non-commissioned officers and reserve officers with 
future arrest should former soldiers continue further anti-German sabotage actions and general 
resistance.61  Although some career officers had seen the writing on the wall and did not report to 
the barracks on May 15, they were a small minority. The vast majority of those who reported, 
over two thousand career military officers from both the army and the navy, were arrested, 
although some exceptions were made, such as for members of the NSB, the weerafdeling, and 
those who had actively collaborated with the Reichskommissariat in some form or fashion.62  
Although there were some protests at the train stations as the officers were led away, given the 
secretive nature of the events, those protests were only attended by people who had happened to 
be there at that time, making them small in nature and easily controllable. 
The underground newspaper Het Parool reacted to the arrest of the career officers with 
its characteristically sharp tongue. Noting that the officers had been arrested for failing to honor 
the pledges they had been forced to sign in May 1940, the paper wrote: “The way in which this 
was done, of course in the lowest, worst way, shows again that the occupying power does not 
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know what is meant by ‘soldier’s honor.’” The paper went on to note that the entire reason these 
career officers had been released in the first place was not, as the Germans had declared, out of a 
friendly belief in the racial kinship between the two peoples, but rather because they had hoped 
that they would be able to “shackle the Dutch volk, in its entirety, into a Germanic front, with the 
chance then that our Dutch officers could be taken up into the German Wehrmacht.”63 
The second stage of the POW recall occurred almost a year later, in late April 1943, when 
the German high command called for the re-internment of the 300,000 members of the Dutch 
military. But given the underhanded way in which the arrest of the officer corps had proceeded, 
even the German High Command in the Netherlands could not have expected to be able to repeat 
the process so easily. When Christiansen released his decree, he did not mince his words. The 
soldiers of the Dutch Army would be sent away to POW camps and had “only to thank the 
instigators who have made this action necessary by their criminal behavior.”64  Despite his 
statements that the reason for the POW recall was a punishment, that was only half the reason. 
Himmler had imagined the recall of Dutch soldiers as a new reserve labor force for German 
industry.65  Regardless of the motives, however, just as Christiansen had been less reserved in his 
decree, the population was considerably less reserved in its reaction. 
Christiansen’s decree was transmitted to the newspapers the morning of Thursday, April 
29. In the town of Hengelo, near the German border, the director of a printing company with ties 
to the local newspaper decided not to wait for the decree to hit the papers and instead to print 
large copies of the proclamation that very morning and hang them as placards in the street-facing 
windows of his printing shop. The shop itself happened to be located on a street located near 
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several large factories, which resulted in large numbers of workers seeing the placards during the 
morning shift changes.66 Word of the recall of POWs spread quickly from there to neighboring 
towns in the region as workers returned home from the overnight shift and informed their 
friends, colleagues, and neighbors. The reaction was nearly unanimous among the local 
population, which turned to the greatest weapon they had to protest the Germans’ actions—a 
general strike. By midday, of the forty-one major factories in the Twente region, twenty-eight 
were already closed as more than twenty thousand workers took to the streets. And all of this was 
before the newspapers had even published Christiansen’s decree.67   
The German reaction to the events in Twente was immediate but hampered by Seyss-
Inquart’s absence from the country—he was visiting with Hitler in Berchtesgaden at that very 
moment. Hanns Albin Rauter, the Higher SS and Police Leader and Generalkommissar for 
Security Matters in the Netherlands took the lead.68 The plan had been, since after the February 
1941 strike, to declare martial law, but only the Reichskommissar could give that order. This had 
been officially implemented by order of the Reichskommissar in early 1943, which allowed him 
to suspend the regular courts and establish police courts, which would preside over little more 
than show trials.69  Because he was unreachable in Berchtesgaden—Rauter tried to call Seyss-
Inquart, but could not reach him—Rauter instead ordered SS police regiments into service and 
sent them to Twente with orders to await the declaration of martial law and then, when it came, 
to start shooting into any crowds they came across. There would be no arrests and certainly no 
trials.70  At some point during the night of Thursday into Friday, Seyss-Inquart got word of the 
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unrest in Twente and immediately took a train back toward the Netherlands. In the meantime, he 
granted the order for martial law in those areas in which strikes had broken out.71 
By the morning of Friday, April 30, the news of the POW recall had spread to the rest of 
the country, along with rumors of all sorts, including the imminent invasion of the Allies. Strikes 
broke out almost everywhere that morning, and those places that remained calm in the morning 
joined in the strikes that afternoon. Rauter called into service all of the SS battalions and German 
police battalions that were stationed in the country.  He then ordered placards be hung in various 
locales throughout the nation declaring martial law and warning citizens that any groups of five 
or more individuals congregating on the street or in market squares would be shot on sight. In 
many places the German police did just that, killing about ninety-five people over the next few 
days.  At the same time, they also arrested hundreds, put them in front of police courts, and 
“tried” the defendants. In most cases, the defendants were convicted in these summary courts and 
sentenced to death. The sentences were usually carried out immediately, although, since this was 
mostly meant as a scare tactic, clemency was offered in some cases, especially if other strikers 
agreed to go back to work.72 Also on Friday, the Dutch government in exile in London had gotten 
news of the POW recall, and through the BBC’s Radio Oranje broadcasts, argued that the 
recalled soldiers simply not show up at the appointed time. If necessary, they should go 
underground. But because their sources of information were limited—they learned of the POW 
recall through a Swiss newspaper—the Queen and her ministers were not aware of the strikes 
breaking out across the country. 
Over the weekend, the pace of the protests slowed down considerably, hampered by that 
fact that the 30,000 members of the Dutch railway service stayed on the job and did not join the 
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strike at all.73 The railways had not had a long history of striking and their refusal to join the 
strike actions of the rest of the population allowed both for the effective deployment of German 
police units throughout the country as well as for those individuals who did not want to join in 
the strike to continue to go to work. By Monday, many of the strikers who had joined in the 
protests on Friday and over the weekend went back to work, leaving only a hardened core of 
strikers on the streets, who made easy prey for the German security forces. In some areas, the 
strike actions continued throughout the rest of the week, but these were mostly isolated stretches 
of the countryside; the major, nation-wide strike ended on Monday.74 Over the course of the five 
days, hundreds of people were arrested, with over a hundred sentenced to death for participating 
in the strikes, although some of those sentences were commuted. At least ninety-five had been 
shot on the streets without even being arrested.75 
The April/May Strike of 1943, in many ways, marked the very end of any attempts by the 
Germans to be accommodating to the desires of the Dutch population, and, for that reason, is 
usually cited as a major turning point in the occupation.76 It was clear, even to the occupation 
authorities, that the Dutch would not be won over to Nazism, but would resist in any way 
possible. Moreover, the entire impetus for the strike, the recall of the POWs, had been an abject 
failure. The overwhelming majority of former soldiers simply went underground and did not 
report for arrest. Between former soldiers and students, as well as the tens of thousands of Jewish 
individuals who were in hiding, the Netherlands was a nation in open rebellion against the 
demands and desires of their German occupiers. In response to this fact, but also as a result of the 
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ever-worsening war situation, which saw the Soviets both gaining strength and repelling German 
attacks in the east, the Germans turned to outright repression in the occupied Netherlands, intent 
on extracting as many resources as possible, whether capital or human, in order to save their 
teetering empire.77 
Forced Labor, continued 
By mid-1943, the Forced Labor Draft as a whole stopped being an entirely effective tool 
for the Germans. German attempts at registering the Dutch population for labor in Germany had 
mostly been a failure, whether through resistance of the Dutch bureaucracy and Dutch industry 
or through the efforts of the Dutch Resistance to destroy successfully compiled records. To make 
matters worse for the Germans, most Netherlanders went into hiding when called up for labor 
service, so even if the Germans could successfully compile and maintain accurate records, it did 
them little good. Although the Germans continued to attempt to register Dutch workers and force 
them to go to Germany, their efforts were faltering greatly. In the first seven months of 1943, 
roughly 118,000 Netherlanders had been successfully sent to Germany for forced labor, for an 
average of just over 16,000 workers per month. In August, that number dropped to just over 
9,300, while in September it fell further to about 4,400, and fell again in October to just over 
3,000. Between November 1943 and July 1944, on average, just over 2,000 workers were 
deported monthly to Germany for forced labor.78 
In the summer 1944, there was a short hiatus in the forced labor draft, but by the autumn 
and winter of that year, the labor drafts picked up again, and in even greater numbers than ever.79 
Because fewer and fewer Netherlanders were actually reporting for labor service when called, 
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whether by going underground or feigning illness, the Germans resorted to razzia raids to collect 
men on the streets and from their homes.80 Between September and December 1944, at least 
120,000 Dutch laborers were deported for work in Germany, including an astounding 50,000 
who were rounded up in the city of Rotterdam over two days in early November.81 By this point 
in the occupation, however, the dynamics of the war had changed significantly. The Germans 
were in open retreat on all fronts and forced laborers from the Netherlands were no longer being 
put to work in factories or on farms, but rather doing the grunt work of military fortification in 
advance of the impending Allied onslaught.82 Indeed, the first Allied troops reached the city of 
Maastricht, in the far south of the country in mid-September, liberating it on September 15, 
1944. 
Two days after the liberation of that city, as the Germans and Allies were engaged in a 
heated battle over Rhine river bridge crossings at the city of Arnhem as part of Operation Market 
Garden, the Dutch government-in-exile in London ordered Dutch railway workers to strike in an 
effort to keep reinforcements and supplies from reaching the German forces there.83 Although the 
Dutch railway workers dutifully carried out the orders and successfully shut down the Dutch 
railway system, the German defenders managed to hold off the Allied advance. The German 
reprisals for the railway strike were unimaginably harsh. Seyss-Inquart, who was never a 
supporter of the forced labor drafts because of the instability they caused among the Dutch 
populace, threw caution to the wind and ordered a complete cessation of food imports to the still-
occupied and heavily-populated western provinces.84 The forced famine that resulted, known as 
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the Hunger Winter, resulted in the death of about twenty thousand Netherlanders over the next 
several months. 
It is difficult to say how many Netherlanders in total were deported to Germany for 
forced labor for several reasons. First, not all labor contracts were indefinite, and many Dutch 
workers ended up being sent to Germany multiple times and being counted more than once as a 
result. Further, many workers escaped the forced labor service illegally, especially those who 
were sent to work just across the German border and for whom escape back into the Netherlands 
would have been relatively simple. Finally, an untold number of workers died in Germany, 
further throwing off the statistics. A rough estimate, taking these factors into consideration 
would be that somewhat more than 550,000 Netherlanders—out of a total Dutch population of 
about nine million—were sent to Germany to work at some point during the war.85   
By all accounts, the increase in the use of forced labor was problematic for van Dam 
specifically, especially as the forced labor drives began to disrupt the educational sphere he 
oversaw.86  The Loyalty Declaration would turn out to be van Dam’s last major effort to initiate 
occupation policy, and it was a failure. The month of March 1943, when the Loyalty Declaration 
was issued, marked another important milestone for the department—the move to Apeldoorn in 
the interior of the country. Although the move itself likely had little to do with van Dam’s 
declining interest in the aims of the German occupiers, it does correspond mostly with that 
apparent change in van Dam’s views, and therefore, in many ways, marks the end of educational 
reform efforts during the occupation.   
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Van Dam and the End of Educational Reform 
On August 19, 1942, British, Canadian, and American forces launched a small-scale raid 
on the French port town of Dieppe. The purpose of the raid was to gather intelligence about 
coastal fortifications in “Fortress Europe.” The raid was never meant to establish a lasting 
beachhead in Europe, but rather to test the defenses the Germans had devised. Ultimately, the 
raid itself was an immense failure, with several thousand Allied casualties and a retreat back to 
England on the very same day. Although from a military-strategic perspective the raid had failed, 
it did have consequences throughout German-occupied Western Europe. One of those 
consequences was the removal of most Dutch government offices from The Hague, which lies 
along the Atlantic coast in the southwestern Netherlands, to the interior of the country.87  
Although the planning and execution of the move took some time to accomplish, the Education 
Department finally moved offices to the central city of Apeldoorn in late March 1943.88 
The move to Apeldoorn, in many ways, signified the end of any concerted effort at 
educational “reform” on the part of the German occupiers and their Dutch helpers. Rather, for 
the rest of the war, the Germans focused on further implementing those changes in Dutch 
education that had already been introduced, or in the case of historical instruction, conceived of. 
But the German leadership did this without much success.89  It was also around this time that van 
Dam appears to have lost all motivation to carry out further attempts to work in support of those 
objectives. In the realm of higher education, the arbeidsinzet and the loyalty decree had wreaked 
havoc across the nation. Those universities that were still open were open almost in name only, 
given the lack of both instructors and students. Moreover, the rectors and curators of the 
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universities had lost all confidence in van Dam’s ability to act in the best interest of the nation. 
His influence in higher education was completely shot. 
In primary and secondary education, his status was not much better. The introduction of 
the eighth school year of primary education had to be pushed back a second time in summer 
1943, and, as a result, would not be implemented at all. His attempts to increase the influence of 
the state, especially in the confessional schools, were met with significant and effective 
resistance. The Catholic and Protestant school associations were, for all intents and purposes, 
still de facto independent of the central government and the attempts by van Dam, the Germans, 
or their other collaborators to control them met with failure, despite the de jure control they had 
attained. The arbeidsinzet continued to cause problems for teachers in the lower schools as well, 
and van Dam had to spend much of his time attempting to get exemptions for teachers and 
secondary school students from the forced labor drives, all in an effort to simply keep the schools 
running. In many ways, van Dam’s efforts in Apeldoorn were just holding actions to keep the 
department running and to prevent the education system in the country from collapsing entirely. 
It was also in mid-1943 that van Dam appears to have undergone a personal change of 
opinion regarding National Socialism and the German occupation more generally. In a draft 
letter, intended probably for Wimmer, with whom he was acquainted on a friendly basis, he 
criticized the inefficiency and corruption of National Socialism, including the Germans. Seyss-
Inquart’s policies were pointless as they did not do not lead anywhere, and if they did lead 
somewhere, that usually ended up being the repression of the Dutch people. The Dutch were 
simply too individualistic to accept a political ideology such as Nazism, which was too 
complicated, often contradictory, and sometimes outright random in its efforts and effects.90  It is 
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unclear whether the letter was ever sent, but its contents nonetheless reveal van Dam’s state of 
mind at the time. 
Moreover, van Dam also started to tangentially participate in the resistance. An old 
acquaintance of his from his days as a military reservist lived in Apeldoorn and van Dam, who 
was granted a car and chauffeur for his personal and professional use, routinely picked up the 
man’s wife on his way to and from the office. While he likely did not know, at first, that this 
woman was a courier for the resistance movement in Apeldoorn, he did eventually learn the truth 
yet far from doing anything to sabotage the woman’s efforts, he instead put his car and chauffeur 
at her disposal.91 Furthermore, it was during his time in Apeldoorn that van Dam’s greatest and 
most far reaching efforts to save the roughly 700 Jewish Netherlanders deemed to be culturally 
significant took place, although those efforts had started in the latter part of 1942. 
At the same time, however, van Dam did not discard his affinity for German culture, nor 
did he renounce his membership in the SS. While in Apeldoorn, he continued to expend 
significant effort on his publication De Waagschaal, which continued to appear until August 
1944. But this focus on extra-departmental activities was somewhat of a common occurrence in 
Apeldoorn. Other departmental officials spent their time writing plays and doing other non-job-
related activities.92 But otherwise, for the most part, work at the department in Apeldoorn came 
to a standstill.93 
Unsurprisingly, this situation led some of van Dam’s adversaries to use his waning efforts 
on behalf of the German occupation against him. Jap Schrieke, who attempted to blame his own 
failures regarding the prosecution of confessional school boards who had defied the appointment 
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decree is one such example. The NSB declared him “Public Enemy Nr. 1” due to the “the 
untenable state of the department of education due to the impossible attitude of van Dam” and 
attempted to have him sacked from his office.94  Hanns Albin Rauter, the Generalkommissar für 
das Sicherheitswesen and Higher SS and Police Leader in the Netherlands, complained to Seyss-
Inquart about several alleged offenses van Dam had committed, including helping to save Jews, 
and defending a man who had murdered a  Dutch police man (van Dam was acquainted with the 
murderer’s father, and appears to have intervened on the father’s behalf).95  Dr. Harster, the head 
of the security police and SD in the Hague attempted to work against him as well. The SS 
magazine Storm declared that the Department was “the strongest crutch of confessionalism” and 
that “its leaders covered for those whose lack of belief is well known.”96  But despite these 
efforts, van Dam retained the confidence of those most important to his position within the 
Education Department and his personal well-being: Seyss-Inquart, Wimmer, and Schwarz. 
In his final report to the Party Chancellery on November 23, 1943, Schwarz listed a 
number of “radical measures” for which he thought van Dam’s support had been necessary.97 
The right of confessional schools to appoint their own teachers had been revoked and could only 
proceed with the approval of the Secretary-General, and therefore also of his direct superior, 
Schwarz. The state gained the authority to determine the curriculum and to punish financially 
those schools that did not comply. In this way, Mein Kampf was introduced in secondary schools, 
physical education in primary schools, and German propaganda school films in both. The state 
was also able to dismiss teachers and school heads as necessary, which it was able to accomplish 
through the appointment of a school inspector in general service, whose office was filled with 
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Greater-Germanic thinkers. By using these authorities, the position of the confessions could be 
broken, especially through the closing of confessional teacher training colleges, the removal of 
clerical school heads, and the reduction of clerical teaching salaries. The school inspectorate had 
been filled with Dutch Nazis of a Greater Germanic mindset, while Jewish children had been 
removed from the schools. Parity between the German Schools in the Netherlands and Dutch 
schools was achieved, as was the introduction of German language instruction in primary 
education and an increased emphasis placed upon German language in secondary education. 
Becoming a German instructor was made more appealing by freeing them from the 
Arbeitseinsatz as well as exempting them from arrest as POWs. These new German language 
teachers were trained in SS schools and were opened to the Germanic ideal. Twelve thousand 
school books were “cleansed” and those that were anti-German or written by Jews were removed 
from circulation. And a school history book on the Germanics as well as a new book for German 
language instruction in the primary schools were both introduced. As Schwarz put it regarding 
van Dam, “despite some relapses into a false sense of humanism, on the whole, he has proved 
himself.”98 
Van Dam would stay in the position of Secretary-General until the end of the war. In 
March 1945, he moved back to Amsterdam, shortly before Apeldoorn was liberated by Allied 
armies. On May 7, he was suspended by the Minister of Education and five days later, he was 
arrested by Dutch Resistance fighters. He would spend the next four years, to the day, in various 
prisons. Over the course of the winter and spring of 1946, a parliamentary commission was 
established to look into his activities during the occupation. The commission established that he 
had mostly acted as a mouth-piece for the German occupiers, helped them carry out their plans, 
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but also had, for the most part, done his best to serve the interests of the Dutch nation. The 
commission, however, did not have all of the facts in front of them, especially the Gedanken und 
Vorschläge and Reform pieces, which spelled out his part in initiating many of the “reforms” he 
later attempted to blame on the Germans. But also working in van Dam’s favor were his various 
actions toward the end of the war, such as his role in saving Jewish Netherlanders, his work 
against forced labor, and his model status as a prisoner after the war. Despite the commission’s 
report, however, he was not freed. In 1948, after several years’ wait, he was put on trial for his 
actions in support of the German occupiers, for which he was found guilty and sentenced to 
seven years’ imprisonment on November 8, 1948. Through several interventions, including 
Cardinal De Jong, as well as a Royal commutation (which was given to many prisoners, not just 
van Dam), he was eventually freed on May 12, 1949.  Although he attempted to reenter 
professional service, those doors were closed to the former professor. He lived out the rest of his 
life in relative obscurity working odd jobs in the educational field and as an editor to make ends 
meet. He died on October 30, 1979, aged 83 years.99   
His work during the German occupation is somewhat of a mixed bag, although certainly 
not nearly as clean as was judged by either the parliamentary commission or at his trial. Without 
question, many of the “reforms” that the Germans instituted during the occupation were actually 
his ideas. In fact, it was in light of these ideas that he was chosen in the first place over van 
Genechten.100  Van Dam proposed the introduction of German language and physical education 
long before he was in a position to carry out those “reforms.” Van Dam proposed the curtailing 
of clerical authority; indeed, his initial proposal went further than the “reform” eventually 
adopted in 1941. Van Dam argued long before he was appointed that the influence of the state 
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needed to be increased and that education must be given in a national sense.101  In those areas of 
school “reform” with which he did not agree, he was nonetheless a willing tool of the German 
occupier, although the same could be said of both van Poelje and Reinink.102   
His motivations for his actions remain equally suspect and ambiguous. He stated both 
during the war and after that he was only looking out for the best interests of the Dutch people.103 
There is no reason to believe that van Dam himself did not believe that was the case. But it does 
beg the question, what, exactly, he thought those best interests were. Long before the war started, 
he had been fascinated by Germany and German culture. Already in the 1930s, he had moved in 
völkisch circles in the Netherlands and had been a leader within that movement, which was 
capped off with his joining the SS in September 1941. Once the war broke out, he argued over 
and over and over again that the future of the Dutch people lay with the German Reich. That 
future was one in which Germany would be the leading force in Europe and it was, therefore, in 
the best interests of the Dutch people to ally itself with Germany, to be a partner in the future 
Germanic Reich that the Germans were attempting to build.  Although it does appear that van 
Dam did not believe the Dutch would have a choice in the matter—he was convinced, as so 
many others were especially in the early days of the conflict, that the Germans would win the 
war and become the undisputed masters of Europe—his belief in the inevitability of German 
victory does not negate his predilection for the type of society that the Germans were hoping to 
build. If anything, they were mutually reinforcing. The inevitability of German victory 
confirmed his own beliefs in, and affinity for, German culture and the German people. 
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The efforts of the German occupiers and their Dutch collaborators to create a new type of 
education in the Netherlands were largely a failure. The German occupiers had entered the 
country with the express goal of winning over the Dutch populace for National Socialism in 
order to eventually incorporate the Netherlands into a Greater Germanic Reich. In the 
educational sector, as Schwarz outlined, this process flowed along two paths: a direct path 
through German educational institutions like the German International Schools and the 
Reichsschulen and an indirect path through Dutch schools. Both paths proved unsuccessful 
avenues for the creation of a new Dutch national and cultural identity for several reasons. 
The direct path was inhibited, on the one hand, by resistance from within. This included 
infighting within the SS over the ultimate authority over the two Reichsschulen, opposition on 
the part of the NSB against the German International Schools, the NIVO, and the Reichsschulen, 
and a lack of acceptable teaching staff. But even if this avenue had been effective, it was aimed 
only at the future elite of the new order, and therefore did not have an appreciable influence on 
the larger population. Moreover, the use of these schools as models for the reform of Dutch 
education was largely ineffective. Had the Germans been able to cement their control and 
continue down this direct path, it is certainly possible they might have encountered more success, 
especially if the populace ever resigned itself to permanent German hegemony, but as that never 
happened, it is impossible to say if such a success was possible, let alone likely. 
The indirect path, while broader, was resisted by the majority of those whom it affected. 
Dutch school administrators and teachers were, by and large, unwilling to acquiesce to the 
demands of the central government in The Hague (and later Apeldoorn). Whether it was the 
appointment decrees, the introduction of new subjects like German language instruction, changes 
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to already existing subjects like historical instruction, the extension of primary education to an 
eighth school year, the use of banned books, etc., there was simply too much opposition on the 
part of teachers and local administrators. Additionally, significant structural obstacles existed 
that made the attempted “reforms” nearly impossible. Primary school teachers were not prepared 
to teach German language, nor were there acceptable numbers of qualified professionals for the 
introduction of physical education, to say nothing of the lack of space and appropriate material. 
Even when it came to the introduction of propaganda films into the classroom, the shortage of 
film stock became problematic. Just as with the direct path, had the Nazis been able to secure 
their place atop the Dutch state indefinitely, it is certainly possible that these efforts would have 
been more successful, but whether or not that is the case is impossible to say. 
In his reports back to the Office of the Deputy Führer/Party Chancellery, Schwarz was 
acutely aware that more time was necessary for the “reforms” about which he raved to be fully 
implemented. He was under no delusions that the work he was attempting to implement would 
be quick or easy. The steps that the occupiers and their Dutch helpers had taken were 
introductory and would need to be followed up with further efforts if they were to bear fruit.104 
The changing tide of the war, the increased resistance of the Dutch populace to Nazi rule, and the 
increasingly repressive nature of the German occupation essentially put an end to any hope of 
success in the immediate future. German defeat would make success impossible. 
In this inquiry, however, I have been just as much, if not more concerned with the 
Germans’ goals in the educational sphere as with the actual “reforms” implemented. In this 
instance, it is clear that the goals of the German occupiers in the educational realm were largely 
in lock step with the larger German goal of incorporating the Netherlands into the Greater 
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Germanic Reich. In order to fully incorporate the Dutch nation into this new European empire, it 
was necessary to win the Dutch over to National Socialism, to a racialist, völkisch, Germanic 
mindset which would then prepare them for future incorporation into the Reich. This was the 
impetus behind the “reforms” introduced in the educational section. And the entire leadership of 
the Reichskommissariat agreed in this larger goal. 
While the question of the motives of the German leadership in the Netherlands, as well as 
Nazi leaders in Berlin, is, in my view, clear, it is more difficult to determine the exact motives of 
their chief collaborator in the Netherlands, Jan van Dam. Van Dam clearly was sympathetic to 
Nazi rule. He was sympathetic to the völkisch tendencies of the SS, even joining the organization 
in September 1941. His two pieces on education reform written before he was appointed to lead 
the Education Department show that many of the various “reforms” he proposed were essentially 
similar to the same ideas promoted by the Germans, indeed this had been one of the reasons for 
his appointment in the first place. At the same time, he does not appear to have been a “diehard” 
member of the SS clique in the Netherlands. All evidence suggests, for example, that he did not 
share the virulent antisemitism of the SS. Moreover, his growing antipathy toward the German 
occupation, especially in the last two years of the war, suggests he had lost confidence in the 
correctness of his earlier views. 
It is equally difficult to say where van Dam stood on the question of the Greater 
Germanic Reich. He does not appear to have taken a public stance on it during the war, indeed, 
he may not have even been aware of this goal of the occupation, since concrete plans for the 
incorporation of the Netherlands into the Reich were never made, remaining instead in the realm 
of conjecture and possibility, being put off until the future European settlement was more clearly 
visible. Van Dam certainly believed that the relationship between the Netherlands and Nazi 
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Germany would be much closer after the Nazis won the war, but whether van Dam saw that 
relationship looking like the federated empire preferred by Mussert or the more centralized 
empire preferred by the Germans is unknown. By way of speculation, given his overall 
tendencies in favor of the SS, it stands to reason that, at least in the early part of the occupation, 
van Dam would have preferred the more intimate relationship between the two countries, but 
whether or not that is the case is impossible to know.  During his trial, he denied any motives 
other than doing what was in the best interests of his country and fellow Netherlanders.  But 
then, that was also the motive he most often gave during the early years of the occupation when 
he was clearly working in support of goals he himself shared. And quite frankly, under the 
circumstances, what else would he have said? Given that the most damning evidence of his direct 
collaboration—his two pre-appointment writings on educational reform—were unknown, he had 
a significant amount of plausible deniability regarding his actions on behalf of his German 
superiors. He, like most other senior Dutch bureaucrats, could argue that they were simply 
carrying out the orders that were given them. Had he quit in protest, his work would have been 
carried on by someone else. So, his protests that he was only trying to work in the interest of the 
Dutch people could not be rejected outright. Nor should they. 
In my estimation, van Dam appears to have taken the mostly pragmatic view that Nazi 
rule over the Netherlands was unlikely to end any time soon. In the near term, the Nazi 
occupiers’ goals and his own goals lined up almost perfectly, and so van Dam believed that his 
collaboration with the regime was in the best interests of the Dutch nation. Whether or not van 
Dam viewed these “reforms” through the long-term lens of the creation of a German-dominated 
Germanic empire in Europe is more difficult to say. Either way, the changing tide of the war and 
the increased repression of the German occupiers against the Dutch people removed the 
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pragmatism behind van Dam’s initial choice of collaboration, for even he did not believe the 
Germans’ efforts at this later stage were really in the best interest of the Netherlands. It was 
around this time, early to mid-1943, that van Dam began working against his German superiors. 
So even if van Dam was a true believer early in the war, he was not so strongly attached to his 
own views about educational reform to ignore the damage being done to the Netherlands 
generally and Dutch education specifically through German repression. 
Ultimately, however, van Dam’s motives are secondary to the overall history of 
educational “reform” attempts in the Netherlands during the German occupation. His initial 
support and later antipathy for many of the Germans’ efforts had little, if any, effect on the 
Germans’ overall designs, of which education was but a single piece in a much larger puzzle. In 
the education sphere specifically, van Dam was able to work against some measures, such as the 
introduction of German language in the third year of primary education, but then it was a matter 
of degree more than substance.105 He was also able to effectively counter the draft of many 
students and educators into forced labor, or at least significantly reduce their total numbers, but 
this too was really in defense of the education sector writ large, for further disruptions, especially 
of teachers, might have actually caused a breakdown in primary and secondary education as had 
already happened in higher education. But for the most important changes, van Dam either 
largely went along with the Germans or was sidelined entirely. 
Although van Dam was a central figure in the education sector during the occupation, his 
work must be seen through the lens of the German occupiers’ goals, and in that lens, as Schwarz 
noted, van Dam had, despite some humanistic misgivings, proved himself useful. But despite the 
utility that van Dam offered, the task the Germans were attempting to complete in the 
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Netherlands was simply too gargantuan to be effectively forced through in the short period 
during which they had total control of the education sector. Even if there had been no resistance 
to their overtures, and there certainly was significant resistance from the Dutch populace, their 
task would have taken many, many years to complete. It was, after all, an attempt to influence 
the next generation of Dutch adults, and so the fruits of that effort would have only been 
vindicated had the Germans maintained their control for decades into the future.   
But the future the Nazis hoped for, the future at which their attempts to change education 
in the Netherlands were aimed, never arrived. Instead of a thousand-year Reich, Hitler’s empire 
crumbled under the combined military might of the wartime Allies after only thirteen years in 
power. The Nazis’ grandiose plans at a Greater Germanic Reich, their efforts at educational 
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